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Social Exclusion, Resort Decline and the English Seaside 
 
Steven Jakes 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Traditionally seaside resorts have been one of the least understood of Britain’s ‘problem areas’. 
This thesis breaks new ground by reporting on an exploratory data analysis to probe the 
influence of resort decline on social exclusion in England’s seaside resorts. Drawing on a wide 
range of socio-economic datasets and quantitative methods of data analysis and GIS software, 
the study investigates the scale, nature and extent of multiple deprivation in English seaside 
resorts, differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts and 
the factors that may explain these differences, and the nature and incidence of localised problem 
complexes. A combination of univariate, bivariate and multivariate empirical analyses, 
undertaken at several geographic scales, illuminates the differential incidence of deprivation. 
The study findings reveal that the majority of seaside districts, small areas and resorts are 
experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation. Various facets of population 
composition (worklessness, education and skills, health, family stability, connectivity, and 
poverty) and place factors (employment base, economic prosperity, housing, and community 
safety) are significant for deprivation in seaside resorts. Four types of highly deprived resort 
areas emerged from the cluster analysis. Not only are the research findings of paramount 
importance in understanding both the pattern of socio-spatial disadvantage and the prospects 
for socio-economic regeneration, but they also contribute to an understanding of the outcomes 
of post-mature resort development, particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort 
change. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Social Exclusion and the English Seaside: An Introduction 
 
 English seaside resorts have experienced relatively significant decline in recent decades 
and many of these formerly busy destinations appear to be suffering from a range of economic 
and social problems, which are more readily associated with inner-city areas (British Resorts 
Association, 2000; Agarwal and Brunt, 2005, 2006; Shared Intelligence, c2008; Coastal 
Communities Alliance, 2010). Although the problems of many seaside resorts, when taken 
together, relate broadly to social exclusion, little is known of the exact nature and extent of their 
problems and of the implications for resort planning and management. The report of the House 
of Commons Communities and Local Government (CLG) Select Committee on Coastal Towns 
brought this issue into sharp focus. The report outlined that ‘seaside towns are the least 
understood of Britain’s “problem” areas’ (CLG, 2007a: 42), indicating that the problems and 
challenges of seaside resorts have been insufficiently acknowledged and targeted. Indeed, 
seaside resorts have not generally been regarded as a discrete category of place in policy terms 
by Governments. As Local Futures (2007: 1) have noted, ‘there has been a significant urban 
focus within the government’s regeneration and renewal agenda, a policy framework that may 
exacerbate the challenges for some coastal areas because higher levels of investment are going 
to central urban areas’. 
 
 That said, in recent years, seaside resorts have moved up the regeneration agenda. The 
CLG Select Committee report, together with the evolving seaside regeneration framework, has 
spawned increasing demand for evidence of change at the national and local level. There has 
been an increasing interest in the processes driving area decline and renewal and the extent to 
which resorts and their neighbourhoods are susceptible to policy intervention (CLG, 2007a, 
2007b). Thus, within the context of current academic and policy debates on social exclusion 
from which tourism has been conspicuously absent, the research reported here investigates 
characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts, factors that influence 
social exclusion, and the implications for policy of such factors. Such geographic research into 
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disadvantage can contribute to understanding of the socio-economic ‘downside’ to the 
restructuring of seaside resorts. This improved understanding, at a local level, can be used to 
inform local policy and delivery to better target resources and support and thereby reduce 
inequalities and genuinely improve the day-to-day lives of people living in seaside resorts. But 
it can also inform a national level agenda from which local initiatives usually derive. This 
chapter introduces the concept of social exclusion outlining its fundamental features, explains 
the background to the research, details its aims and objectives, sets out potential uses of the 
research and summarises the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Understanding social exclusion 
1.1.1 Historical origins of social exclusion 
 
 The concept of social exclusion emerged from sociological and social policy debates on 
poverty, inequality and the role of the welfare state. The concept’s birth is invariably located in 
France of the early 1970s, when it was coined by René Lenoir, a socialist government minister, 
to refer to the many groups of people without access to the employment-based social security 
system and thus unable to participate in different spheres of social and economic activity 
(Silver, 1994). Within France, the term later extended to incorporate new problems and social 
groups. It was used in the 1980s to refer to various types of social disadvantage related to social 
problems arising from economic upheavals and crises of the welfare state (Silver, 1994). The 
term was broadened to include spatial concentrations of disadvantage in the late 1980s, after a 
number of civil disturbances and violent incidents on French social housing estates (Silver, 
1994). Exclusion came to denote a breakdown in social cohesion, a ‘rupture of the social bond’ 
considered central to the social contract between the republican state and its citizens (Silver, 
1994: 535). In response to these concerns, strategies to promote social inclusion were key 
elements of French social policy through the 1980s and, under the presidency of Jacques 
Delores, began to influence European Commission policy. 
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 The European Commission was a significant player in the dissemination of the concept. 
Since the 1990s, the Commission has promoted the concept of social exclusion rather than 
poverty within its political debates and social research programmes (Room, 1999). The shift of 
the Commission to exclusion issues met little obstacle at the national level. One of the reasons 
for this Europe-wide hospitality toward the concept was that:  
  
‘Member states adhered to different definitions of poverty and consequently some denied 
that poverty was a problem within their borders. This hostility towards the idea of poverty 
was coupled to the enthusiasm of some member states for the notion of social exclusion. 
… The notion of social exclusion thus offered a way of avoiding a possible impasse by 
allowing member states to commit themselves to an imprecise, but nonetheless worthy-
sounding mission’ (Marsh and Mullins, 1998: 751). 
 
While its relative vagueness was a key quality leading European Union member states to adopt 
the concept, the UK New Labour government elected in May 1997 embraced the concept of 
social exclusion with considerable enthusiasm and gave it a twist. Originally the Labour Party 
saw the concept ‘as rather unhelpful, combining as it did the traditional alleged imprecision of 
the French social philosophical debates with the echoes of earlier, discredited right-wing 
accounts of the ‘‘underclass’’’ (Room, 1999: 166). But this situation changed. The concept was 
linked to the consensual ‘Third Way’ thinking underpinning New Labour’s political economy 
and: 
 
‘[Tony Blair] established in Downing Street itself a Policy Unit concerned with social 
exclusion; the Economic and Social Research Council established at the LSE [London 
School of Economics] a high profile Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion; and 
‘‘social exclusion’’ recurs as a central point of reference throughout a wide range of 
government policy documents’ (Room, 1999: 166). 
 
By the time that the New Labour government entered its third term in office, Levitas (2005: 
ix) observed: 
 
‘The language of social exclusion is no longer the preserve of a temporary specialist unit. 
It has become commonplace in public discourse, and pervades government policy’. 
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Thus, social exclusion made its first appearance on the UK stage in the late nineties. However, 
it is now widely used by government and appears widely in the lexicon of academics, policy-
makers and development practitioners. One reason for the rapid uptake of the term may be that 
it ‘describes a phenomenon that already existed, but lacked a suitable name’ (Page, 2000: 4). 
So what is it and how is it different from the more familiar concepts of "poverty" and 
"deprivation"? 
 
1.1.2 Differences between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion 
 
 It is crucial to draw a firm distinction between social exclusion and poverty when 
seeking to understand the concept of social exclusion and its many causes and consequences. 
Poverty should be seen as just one dimension of exclusion. The concept of poverty has evolved 
over the last century. When Seebohm Rowntree attempted to define poverty in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, he did it in absolute terms and as minimum subsistence. A family would 
be considered to be living in poverty if their ‘total earnings are insufficient to obtain the 
minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency’ (Rowntree, 1901: 
186). The key weakness of this definition of poverty is that it fails to recognise the differing 
circumstances – temporal and spatial – and therefore income needs of different members of the 
global population, assuming that ‘there is always a fixed level of basic needs and an income 
which is insufficient to provide these needs defines the poverty line’ (Foley, 1999: 3).  
 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, the relevance of the absolutist or subsistence 
definition of poverty in industrialised countries became questioned by academics and social 
reformers. The general level of living had improved and most people in welfare states had a 
guaranteed minimum income. For these reasons, poverty was redefined in relative terms, 
placing emphasis on the distribution of income and wealth in a society. In measuring relative 
poverty, some analysts have priced a ‘basket of goods’ to set a poverty level, while others have 
used market research techniques to find out what society at large generally thinks is a reasonable 
minimum standard of living (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010). The most commonly used 
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definition of poverty in Britain is that used by the European Union: low-income or 
impoverished households are defined as those with incomes of less than 60% of the national 
median income level (minus housing costs) (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013). 
  
 What all these measures have in common is that they are to do with income and how it 
is distributed. During the 1970s, there was a crucial change in the understanding of poverty in 
the academic as well as the public debate. There was a change in the focus from income to 
multidimensional poverty. The work of Peter Townsend is crucial here. Townsend (1979) 
defined multidimensional poverty as relative deprivation and argued that people could be 
considered as living in poverty:  
 
 ‘when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and 
have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely 
encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so 
seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in 
effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities’ (Townsend, 1979: 31). 
 
This definition raises awareness of the adequacy of resources needed to avoid poverty not only 
in terms of the ability to obtain material items (e.g., diet and amenities) but also so that people 
can avoid being excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities. This latter feature 
suggests that exclusion is a sub-component of the broader notion of deprivation, although this 
is a misleading assessment, as explained later. 
 
 The key feature of the definition of deprivation that links it to the notion of poverty is 
its emphasis on a lack of resources as being the underlying cause of deprivation. It follows that 
if deprivation can be defined, it can help to identify who is in poverty and also how much 
income is needed to avoid it. Although income is a primary determinant of the standard of living 
of most people, an exclusive reliance on income poverty as a measure of deprivation is 
problematic for the following reasons. First, it assumes that the (only) unit of analysis is the 
individual/household. Second, it assumes that deprivation should be measured solely in terms 
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of outcomes as opposed to risks or conditions. Third, it does not consider broader aspects of 
quality of life, such as, for example, neighbourhood, health, environment, access to transport 
and services, location and general life opportunities. Lastly, it narrows the focus of policy. 
 
 These wider issues have, since the social policy debates of the 1980s, increasingly been 
brought together under the term ‘social exclusion’. Although there is a wide range of views 
about what the term social exclusion means (Silver, 1994), it tends to be defined in very similar 
ways to Townsend’s view of relative deprivation. However, where poverty and deprivation 
research has emphasised lack of financial and material resources at the disposal of an individual 
or household (Walker, 1995), social exclusion emphasises a wider range of factors – social, 
political as well as economic – which may lead to individuals, population groups or 
geographical communities living a life which differs significantly from the mainstream of 
society. There is a stronger emphasis in the exclusion literature on relational issues, that is, 
‘inadequate social participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration, and lack of 
power’ (Room, 1995b: 105). Social exclusion is therefore a broader concept than poverty and 
deprivation ‘encompassing not only low material means but also the inability to participate 
effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life, and in some characterisations, 
alienation and distance from mainstream society’ (Duffy, 1998: 241). According to Room 
(1995a: 243), it is a dynamic process ‘of becoming detached from the organisation and 
communities of which society is composed and from the rights and obligations that they 
embody’, and it may vary between the individual, household and the local community in its 
spatial dimension. Table 1.1 summarises the differences between the concepts of poverty, 
deprivation and social exclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Table 1.1: Comparison of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion               
 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
Poverty Deprivation Social exclusion 
One-dimensional Multi-dimensional Multi-dimensional 
Physical needs Physical needs 
Material needs 
Physical needs 
Material needs 
Societal participation 
Distributional Distributional Distributional 
Relational 
Static Static Dynamic 
Individual 
Household 
Individual 
Household 
Individual 
Household 
Community 
Source: Collated from Barnes (2005), Berghman (1995), Room (1995a) 
 
 The conceptual distinction is now clear. Poverty is an outcome, denoting an inability to 
achieve an acceptable standard of living because of a lack of financial resources. Deprivation 
is different from poverty. Deprivation is multi-dimensional, whereas lack of financial resources 
(i.e., poverty) is one-dimensional. Deprivation is concerned with circumstance, particularly 
material, and how this impacts upon the condition of people’s lives (Berghman, 1995). Thus, 
the concepts of poverty and deprivation deal with static outcomes. Social exclusion, in contrast, 
is a concept that refers to ‘the multiple and changing factors resulting in people being excluded 
from the normal exchanges, practices and rights of modern society’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1993: 1). The factors linked to social exclusion are summarised by 
Percy-Smith (2000) and range from globalisation and associated structural changes, 
universalistic forms of inequality, including segregation within a system of social processes, 
for instance, through class, race and gender discrimination or denial of basic citizenship rights, 
to inequality described in more particular terms. The latter includes inadequate rights in 
housing, education, health and access to labour markets. Other aspects are as diverse as the 
local context and, in particular, the effects of population, place and location. The crucial point 
here is that, poverty and/or deprivation are important and possible, but not necessary, 
ingredients of social exclusion. A visual annotation of the relationship between poverty, 
deprivation and social exclusion is illustrated in Figure 1.1. As can be seen, while there is a 
core of disadvantaged people who experience all three conditions, there are others who face 
only a single problem, or a combination of two of them. In summary then, poverty, deprivation 
and social exclusion are distinct, but overlapping concepts. 
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
1.1.3 Social exclusion as a contested concept 
 
 Despite this distinction from poverty and deprivation, ‘social exclusion is a contested 
concept’ (Silver, 1994: 540). There is no exact or generally agreed definition. This point is 
exemplified by reference to the varying definitions that have been put forward for its meaning, 
as shown in Table 1.2. The term ‘social exclusion’ has been used to describe: groups at risk of 
exclusion; what people are excluded from; the states or problems associated with exclusion; the 
processes involved and levels at which they operate; and, the agents involved. This contested 
nature is also evident in the way that social exclusion has been defined across Europe. There 
are significant differences, reflecting diverse historical and political traditions (Silver, 1994). 
Not only are there a variety of national discourses about social exclusion, but also competing 
versions within individual countries. In the UK context, it is possible to detect three competing 
discourses (Levitas, 2005). These discourses range from: a redistributionist discourse (RED) 
within which social exclusion is associated with poverty; a social integrationist discourse (SID) 
which considers exclusion primarily in terms of labour market detachment; and, a moral 
underclass discourse (MUD) which relates to the idea of the underclass. Levitas argues RED, 
SID and MUD are: 
Social exclusion
DeprivationPoverty
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‘… ways of thinking about exclusion that imply different strategies for its abolition. In 
RED, the assumption is that the resources available in cash or kind to the poor need to be 
increased both relatively and absolutely, implying both improved levels of income 
maintenance and better access to public and private services. In SID, the solution is 
increased labour market participation, for paid work is claimed to deliver inclusion both 
directly and indirectly through the income it provides. In MUD, the emphasis is on 
changing behaviour through a mix of sticks and carrots – manipulation of welfare 
benefits, sanctions for non-compliance and intensive social work with individuals’ 
(Levitas, 2005: x). 
 
Further evidence for a lack of any consensus comes from the work of Veit-Wilson (1998) who 
distinguished between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ conceptions of social exclusion in Europe, whereby: 
 
‘In the ‘weak’ version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded 
people’s handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into dominant 
society. ‘Stronger’ forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing 
the excluding and therefore aims for solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion’ 
(Veit-Wilson, 1998: 45). 
 
Put differently, the weak version seeks to change socially excluded individuals, groups and 
communities. Addressing the capacities of the socially excluded is not only what the stronger 
version focuses on, looking additionally at structural processes, social mechanisms and the 
different institutions which lead to, and affect patterns of, exclusion. Thus, the strong version 
is more about change at societal level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Table 1.2: Facets of ‘social exclusion’     
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. groups at risk of being excluded 
 
For example, Lenoir (1974) quoted in Silver (1994: 532) wrote: 
 
‘the excluded made up one tenth of the French population: the mentally and the physically handicapped, 
suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, drug addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem 
households, marginal, asocial persons, and other social misfits’ 
 
What people are excluded from 
 
For example, Silver (1994: 541) notes that:  
 
‘the literature says people may be excluded from: a livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; 
property, credit or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption level; education, skills and cultural 
capital; the benefits provided by the welfare state; citizenship and equality before the law; participation in the 
democratic process; public goods; the nation or the dominant race; the family and sociability; humane 
treatment, respect, personal fulfilment, understanding’ 
 
The states or problems associated with social exclusion 
 
For example, New Labour’s Social Exclusion Unit (1997: 1) defined social exclusion as: 
 
‘a shorthand for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as 
unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family 
breakdown’ 
 
The processes driving exclusion and the levels at which they operate 
 
 For example, Estivill (2003:19) argues that:  
 
‘Social exclusion must… be understood as an accumulation of confluent processes with successive ruptures 
arising from the heart of the economy, politics and society, which gradually distances and places persons, 
groups, communities and territories in a position of inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and 
prevailing values’ 
 
The agents involved 
 
For example, Percy-Smith (2001: 6) makes the point that: 
 
‘While the causes of social exclusion may be structural, its effects can be ameliorated or exacerbated by the 
attitudes, activities and policies of governmental bodies’ 
 
Source: Collated from Mathieson et al. (2008), Millar (2007), Peace (2001) 
 
 
1.1.4 Previous research into social exclusion in the UK 
  
 Debate over the definition of social exclusion has not prevented researchers from 
identifying and analysing it, and the definition itself has evolved as new forms of exclusion 
have emerged, with the current position neatly summarised by New Labour’s David Miliband 
in 2006. He argued that in the UK ‘social exclusion exists in wide, deep and concentrated forms, 
and it is important not to confuse them’ (Miliband, 2006: 3). Wide exclusion refers to the large 
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number of people disadvantaged on a single or small number of domain-specific indicator(s). 
Deep exclusion refers to those who are disadvantaged on multiple and overlapping dimensions, 
while concentrated exclusion refers to the geographic concentration of problems and to ‘area 
exclusion’. Deep exclusion and ‘area exclusion’ occur where different factors combine to trap 
individuals and areas in a spiral of disadvantage, resulting in severe negative consequences for 
quality of life, well-being and future life chances. ‘Here we get closer to a more recognisable 
definition of social exclusion reflecting the most disadvantaged in society’ (Miliband, 2006: 7).  
 
 But social exclusion is not particularly well understood in the UK, primarily because 
academic study until recently was couched in terms of poverty and deprivation and focused on 
attempts to discover the distribution, causes and consequences of social problems relating to 
the lack of financial and/or material resources (Walker, 1997). However, it is now widely 
recognised by academics that analyses of single problems associated with social exclusion, as 
for example through studies of employment or studies of income poverty, must be 
supplemented by analyses based on more general definitions of the problem (Millar, 2007). 
‘Social exclusion’ itself is universally regarded in the academic and policy literature as 
involving severe, multi-dimensional disadvantage. A common approach to the analysis of social 
exclusion is then, as in the previous paragraph, to focus on disadvantaged groups or 
disadvantaged areas amongst whom, or within which, the incidence of disadvantage is 
disproportionately high.  
 
 To date, academic research and policy interest has largely focused on specific groups of 
people thought to be ‘at risk’ of or presently socially excluded, such as ex-offenders (SEU, 
2002a), teenage runaways (SEU, 2002b), children in care (SEU, 2003) and older people (Scharf 
et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2003; SEU, 2005, 2006). There has also been a specific focus on 
particular social issues, such as truancy and school exclusion (SEU, 1998a), rough sleeping 
(SEU, 1998b) teenage pregnancy (SEU, 1999a), young people not in education, employment 
or training (SEU, 1999b), crime (Grieve and Howard, 2004; Hale, 2005), housing (Pleace, 
1998; Ratcliffe, 1998; Anderson and Sims, 2000) and long-term unemployment (Atkinson, 
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1998). Moreover, with the exception of a few studies that attempt to monitor social exclusion 
nationally (e.g., Aldridge et al., 2011; Burchardt et al., 1999; Gordon et al., 2000), the vast 
majority of research has been undertaken within depressed inland inner-city neighbourhoods 
and some declining rural environments (Brennan et al., 1998, 2000; Chapman et al., 1998; 
Commins, 2004; Countryside Agency, 2000; Glennerster et al., 1999; Lupton, 2001; Power and 
Wilson, 2000: Shucksmith and Chapman, 1998). Incidentally, such areas have been subject to 
considerable social policy intervention (i.e., New Labour regeneration and neighbourhood 
renewal initiatives), linked to attempts to reduce the geographic divide between Britain’s most 
deprived areas and the ‘mainstream of society’ (SEUb, 2001).  
 
 It is somewhat ironic that much of the empirical literature on social exclusion (cited 
above) has focused on patterns rather than processes of generalised disadvantage. The empirical 
literature has concentrated on the characteristics and conditions of vulnerable groups and, to a 
lesser extent, specific disadvantaged areas. Relatively little attention has been paid to the 
processes that put individuals, population groups or geographical communities at risk of being 
socially excluded, or which protect them from it, and even less to identifying those social 
mechanisms, structures, and the different institutions which endorse and are thus responsible 
for accommodating various acts of exclusion. Perhaps the relative neglect of ‘exclusionary 
processes’ is because such processes are not readily amenable to measurement when compared 
to ‘states of exclusion’.  
 
 The latter strand of research has, for the most part, approached social exclusion from 
the vulnerable group perspective, rather than from the domain perspective. Arguably, 
vulnerability is highly dependent on context. For instance, while older people are often 
described as vulnerable, it is not their age that causes the vulnerability but rather they may have 
pre-existing health problems, or live in isolation or on a low income. The crucial point here is 
that while vulnerable groups may contain some of the most severely socially excluded people, 
they also have a range of social and economic problems which are shared by larger groups. 
However, previous research has rarely examined social exclusion across a spectrum of social 
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groups, or across a number of exclusion domains, in entire communities or the population at 
large. There has been an almost exclusive focus on vulnerable groups and/or specific 
disadvantaged localities (i.e., policy-designated urban neighbourhoods or rural settlements). 
 
 Studies that are concerned with the condition (or the state) of social exclusion variously 
examine the levels of social exclusion, the risk of social exclusion according to socio-economic 
and demographic factors, the nature of the links which exist between different elements which 
may constitute the phenomenon, whether and how income and material exclusion is related to 
other forms of exclusion and, where longitudinal data are available, the persistence of social 
exclusion over time (e.g., Aldridge et al., 2011; Burchardt et al., 1999; Gordon et al., 2000: 
Millar, 2007). This approach to studying social exclusion is through the construction of 
statistical indicators, often with the purpose of informing and guiding resource allocation or of 
supporting a case for resource targeting. That there should be a plethora of such studies is 
perhaps not surprising giving that, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, New Labour’s strategy 
placed a strong emphasis on ‘states of multiple deprivation’, thereby giving prominence to 
marginalised groups and, to a lesser extent, marginalised areas as the defining feature of social 
exclusion.  
 
 The focus of poverty and deprivation policy is also important as it has influenced social 
exclusion policy. For the most part, the wide social exclusion experienced by a larger 
population, including those living in deprived neighbourhoods and those in poverty, has been 
addressed through individually targeted measures. There has been a strong emphasis on 
counting and targeting the poor (as individuals) through the tax and benefit systems. Doubtless, 
financial transfers through the tax and benefit systems are useful for addressing the 
poverty/deprivation suffered by the large number of people excluded on a single or small 
number of economic indicators. However, ‘social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon 
that cannot be captured by measures of income only, or even material resources more broadly, 
but must include a wider range of other factors’ (Millar, 2007: 4). The crucial point here is that, 
while the use of means testing considers some household factors (e.g., income, size and type of 
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family, living in a jobless household), this approach does not take into account the fact that an 
individual’s experience (i.e., socio-economic characteristics) is also generally shaped by i) 
household factors such as race and social class and ii) local-area factors (e.g., particularities of 
population, place and location).  
 
 Indeed, within the small but growing contemporary international ‘area effects’ 
literature, it has been argued that processes within localities and the relationship to the wider 
area (i.e., the town/city, city region, district or region) are both important because of their likely 
determining influence on an individual’s life opportunities and living standards (e.g., Ellen and 
Turner, 1997; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Lupton, 2003). However, 
this idea that where people live (because of the concentration of socially deprived/excluded 
individuals and households within the local population or because of the nature of the area 
itself) affects their ability to participate in key domains of modern life has not been universally 
accepted. Many writers and particularly politicians have tended to dismiss or downplay the role 
of area effects, suggesting that family and the individual are more important (e.g., Gordon, 
1996; Kleinman, 1999; Buck and Gordon, 2004). The role of geography or space per se has 
therefore added a further dimension to the social exclusion debate. At the present time, there is 
no clear consensus of evidence emerging. Area studies in Britain have yet to demonstrate how 
social exclusion develops, to what extent it is an individual or locational problem, and how 
important local-area factors are in this process. 
  
 Treatment of social exclusion in Britain may be criticised further as academic research 
and policy attention of social exclusion has been geographically constrained to inland inner-
city neighbourhoods and some rural environments, and has neglected coastal areas. 
Consequently, little is known about social exclusion in English seaside resorts. This lacuna is 
surprising given that previous research noted that many English seaside resorts are in decline 
(Cooper, 1997; Agarwal, 1999, 2002; Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 1999; 
Department of Trade and Industry, 1999; English Tourism Council, 2001) and are experiencing 
severe economic, social and environmental difficulties (British Resorts Association, 2000; 
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Beatty and Fothergill, 2003; Agarwal and Brunt, 2005, 2006; CLG, 2007; Shaw and Coles, 
2007; Shared Intelligence, c2008; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010; Centre for Social 
Justice, 2013), which, when taken together, relate broadly to social exclusion. Perhaps the lack 
of research is because seaside resorts are traditionally associated with the ‘pleasure-periphery’ 
(Turner and Ash, 1975) rather than as production spaces subject to economic and social change. 
  
1.2 Social exclusion and English seaside resorts: the relevance 
 
 While there is widespread recognition that many English seaside resorts are exhibiting 
characteristics associated with social exclusion, its presence is unclear as many are not 
displaying any of the obvious signs of decline, such as loss of their tourism economic base, 
which has invariably been blamed for their predicament. This point is illustrated by the only 
national study of the economies of seaside resorts. Beatty and Fothergill (2003) assessed the 
economies of forty-three resorts over the period 1971-2001 and found that, far from declining, 
seaside resorts are experiencing increases in employment and population, the latter fuelled by 
steady flows of in-migration. Thus, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) present evidence that 
employment in seaside resorts is growing and that they remain attractive places to live and 
work.  
 
 However, the picture is actually more complex. Paradoxically, although seaside resorts 
may be growing in terms of population and employment, claimant unemployment is ‘well above 
the level in surrounding areas and in a few towns it is high by national standards’ (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2003: 6). Moreover, there are ‘high levels of recorded permanent sickness among 
the working age population of seaside towns’ (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003: 41), which hides 
widespread unemployment. In emphasising coastal employment growth, moreover, Beatty and 
Fothergill (2003) may be glossing over the extent to which many of the jobs are taken by in-
migrants than local residents. In addition, the quality of the jobs created is questionable, with 
many in the low-wage service sector, part-time and seasonal. This criticism aside, the growth 
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in employment may explain the reluctance of government to acknowledge the social and 
community issues facing seaside resorts.  
  
 It was not until 2006 that Government, led by the CLG, sent out a call for evidence. The 
CLG Commons Select Committee Inquiry received written submissions on coastal issues from 
local authorities and coastal organisations, visited several resorts, and invited experts to a 
number of oral evidence sessions at Westminster. In March 2007, the CLG Select Committee 
published a report in which they used the terms ‘coastal towns’ and ‘seaside resorts’ 
interchangeably, which is misleading, and identified several common challenges facing such 
areas (see Table 1.3). It was noted that coastal areas tend to have relatively low wage, low-skill 
economies with a seasonality of employment, suggesting a tendency for economic under-
performance. The Committee said it was ‘particularly struck by the demography of many 
coastal towns, where there is a combination of trends occurring, including the outward 
movement of young people and the inward movement migration of older people’ which leads 
to a burden on the local public sector (CLG, 2007a: 3). The committee’s report highlighted a 
range of housing issues in seaside resorts, including lack of affordability (owing to high levels 
of second home ownership), empty homes but conversely homelessness and disproportionate 
levels of unsuitable accommodation. It also noted relatively high numbers of houses in multiple 
occupations and vulnerable children and adults. Vulnerable people, in need of care or support, 
are more likely to move to seaside resorts because of the availability of low cost 
accommodation. Again, this in-migration is burdensome to the local public sector. The 
committee’s report also drew attention to the Government’s own statistics which showed a 
disproportionately high rise in the number of people claiming sickness and disability benefits 
in seaside resorts, a trend which has never been identified by Government and is also ‘likely’ 
to be linked to inward migration (CLG, 2007a: 24). 
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Table 1.3: Key issues facing seaside resorts                             
 
Changes in tourism trends  
- evolving tourist market (e.g., day trippers, short breaks, second holidays, conferences) 
Low wage rates, part-time and seasonal employment 
High levels of deprivation indicators 
- poor levels of education, skills and training 
High levels of in-migration of  
- young, low-skilled migrants 
- people aged 35 and over 
- people aged 65 and over 
High levels of out-migration of youth for education and opportunities 
A range of housing issues, including  
- a lack of affordable housing due to high levels of second-home ownership  
- disproportionate levels of unsuitable accommodation  
- high levels of Houses of Multiple Occupation associated with tourist accommodation stock and 
transient population 
Transient populations 
Many ‘vulnerable’ residents 
- on sickness-related benefits, in care homes and hostels (young and old people) 
Peripheral locations and weak transport links 
Source: Compiled from CLG (2007a) 
 
 
 The Committee felt that the New Labour government had neglected the particular needs 
of coastal areas for far too long. The government was also rebuked for its poor understanding 
of how national policies and systems, such as the regulation of private rented housing and the 
benefits system, impact on seaside resorts specifically. Perhaps most damning of all is the 
criticism of a lack of cross-departmental liaison on seaside resorts because ‘the Government 
does not sufficiently appreciate the needs of coastal towns’ (CLG, 2007a: 42). The Committee 
felt that there were a number of areas that were in need of specific government action. Most 
significantly, it called for a national approach to be adopted by the government in addressing 
the social challenges of the seaside, together with the proactive management of seaside resorts 
(CLG, 2007a). 
 
 However, the government dismissed the report and its recommendations. The 
assessment was that, because the experience of different coastal areas is very varied, a national 
approach to the issues is not justified (HM Government, 2007). Angry exchanges followed. The 
chair of the Select Committee told CLG secretary Hazel Blears of her committee’s: 
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‘deep dissatisfaction with the Government’s response to our report on Coastal Towns. 
The response appeared to fail to grasp the central premise of our report, that many coastal 
towns face significant challenges based on their combination of characteristics, and that 
as such coastal towns warrant specific attention and action by Government to address 
their challenges’ (CLG, 2007b: 6). 
 
The Select Committee’s dissatisfaction was shared by the Director of the British Resorts and 
Destinations Association, who told Blears it was ‘difficult, in polite terms, to accurately 
describe to you the depth of displeasure that the government response has created among many 
Elected Members from all parties, public sector officers and our colleagues and partners in the 
private sector’ (quoted in CLG, 2007b: 5). Prompted by these criticisms, the CLG took the 
unusual step of issuing a second response, which has created a cross-departmental working 
group and a nationwide regeneration network to examine the problems affecting England’s 
seaside resorts (CLG, 2007b). The New Labour government called for more coastal research, 
noting that ‘there is not enough research into coastal towns to form a true picture of the issues 
involved’ (CLG, 2007b: 8). 
 
 Despite such calls, the only major national study of the multifaceted problem of social 
exclusion in English seaside resorts, by Agarwal and Brunt (2006), revealed variability in its 
manifestation. Based on the profiling and analysis of selected Census (2001) variables relating 
to key socio-economic characteristics, they found that, although there was remarkable similarity 
in nature and extent of multiple deprivation being experienced and that all 87 seaside resorts 
had several socio-economic characteristics in common, there was evidence that some of the 
most affected were characterised by particular socio-economic variables (Table 1.4). Such a 
finding enabled the identification of a typology which distinguished ‘all resorts’ from others 
labelled ‘young’, ‘old’ and ‘wealthy’ on the basis of specific socio-economic characteristics 
exhibited. The typology developed not only suggests that ‘social exclusion is affecting 
differentially different sections of the community’, but also implies that ‘there may be several 
different causes of multiple deprivation’ (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 667). They concluded that 
social exclusion appears to be ‘a more serious and complex problem’ in English seaside resorts 
‘than has formerly been recognised’ (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 669). 
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Table 1.4: Typology of the socio-economic characteristics of English seaside resorts 
 
Type  Characteristics 
‘All resorts’ High proportions in terms of average age, retired, white, with long-term illness or permanently 
sick or disabled, providing unpaid care, unemployed, no qualifications, one person households, 
lone parents with dependent children, without central heating, without car 
‘Young’ As above but higher proportions of lone parents and unemployed 
‘Old’ As above but particularly elderly population, lower unemployment but higher health related 
problems 
‘Wealthy’ As above but pockets of deprivation masked by wealthier wards, often with high average 
house prices 
Source: Agarwal and Brunt (2006: 666) 
  
 Explanations for the existing conditions within English seaside resorts may be drawn 
from theoretical similarities between the causes and consequences of social exclusion and resort 
decline. These changes relate to the shift from Fordism, a regime based on relatively stable 
relations between production and consumption, to post-Fordism, a regime based on more 
flexible modes of accumulation (Dicken, 1998). This shift has contributed to heightened levels 
of competition and to the widespread economic restructuring of national, regional and local 
economies (Britton, 1991). With respect to social exclusion, the consequences of these 
structural changes have been precarious forms of employment, insecurity of employment and 
unemployment, especially, but not exclusively, within areas based on primary and 
manufacturing industries (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004; Munck, 2004). In terms of resort decline, 
post-Fordist related processes have undermined the appeal of the mass packaged and 
standardised seaside resort holiday (Agarwal, 2002). These processes include: flexible modes 
of production which have contributed to the growth of non-seaside destinations and products; 
the search for expanded capital accumulation as exemplified by the continuing 
internationalisation of the tourism industry; and, consumption changes toward preferences for 
more individual and niche forms of holidays demanded by the new or post-modern tourist 
(Agarwal, 2002). Many English seaside resorts are now dependent on a diminishing share of 
the holiday-market and on low-status, down-market visitors (Cooper, 1997).  
 
 Given the occurrence of these major transformations in the world economy, it therefore 
appears that English seaside resorts are perhaps more susceptible to decline, which in turn, has 
resulted in the occurrence of socio-economic problems that may be associated with social 
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exclusion. However, despite this contention and the fact that there are theoretical relationships 
between the causes and consequences of social exclusion and resort decline, there is a dearth of 
research which examines social exclusion in this context. Again, area-based studies of social 
exclusion in the UK have been geographically constrained to inland inner-city neighbourhoods 
and declining rural areas. In fact, academic study of social exclusion in post-mature coastal 
tourism resorts, whether northern European or Mediterranean, is conspicuously absent and, as 
a result, it is not clear whether, in what manner and to what extent social exclusion exists and 
whether there are similarities in its nature and form within these particular environments. In 
addition, little is known about its cause or causes, or whether and to what extent social exclusion 
inhibits resort restructuring.  
  
 The regeneration response to the effects of decline over the past two decades has been 
characterised by an approach that focuses on the tourism problems of seaside resorts. The 
central issue is assumed to be decline in tourist volume and expenditure, tourism-related 
employment and income, and resorts’ market share. Addressing these concerns has been 
through market repositioning, which ‘involves the realignment and strengthening of the resort’s 
image in relation to potential target markets and existing holiday and business markets’ 
(Agarwal, 2002: 31), and diversification, which involves expanding and varying the existing 
range of products that are available within the resort (Agarwal, 2002). Even though the 
implementation of such restructuring strategies may maintain and create new sources of 
demand, the occurrence, nature, and extent of social exclusion is likely to influence the 
restructuring process because it affects the resort’s very ambience, essence and atmosphere. 
Such qualities are, of course, vital to a tourist destination. It follows that identifying, 
understanding and tackling social exclusion is critically important to the promotion of a positive 
restructuring process. Thus, having established the study context and discussed the project’s 
theoretical underpinnings, the remainder of this chapter details the study’s aims and objectives, 
contributions and thesis structure. 
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1.3 Aims, objectives and contributions of the research 
 
 
 The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion 
in English seaside resorts. This aim will be achieved through the following objectives: 
 
1. To develop a national seaside resort database, which given the dearth of available 
specific seaside resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable resource; 
 
2. To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, drawing, 
in the first instance, on the Indices of Deprivation; 
 
3. To assess the socio-economic structure and ‘health’ of resorts and, in doing so, 
investigate whether there are differences in socio-economic performance between 
deprived and non-deprived resorts and whether place- and population-based variables 
operate as resort advantages or disadvantages; and, 
 
4. To investigate if there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities, and if so, 
whether a typology of excluded localities can be established. In other words, to identify, 
classify and map deprived seaside resort areas. 
 
 
 Thus this study aims to develop understanding of social exclusion in a post-mature mass 
tourism coastal resort context by investigating characteristics associated with social exclusion 
in English seaside resorts. The study consists of three elements of research. The first stage 
focuses on establishing the nature, intensity and extent of social exclusion in all English seaside 
resorts and involves the construction of a national seaside resort database, drawing, in the first 
instance, on the Indices of Deprivation. The Indices of Deprivation dataset is ideally suited for 
the purposes of this analysis, as it covers a range of different and related aspects of deprivation 
which together are indicative of social exclusion. Since data does not correspond directly to 
resorts, district and available lower level super output area data will be collated for, and matched 
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to, identifiable seaside resorts, and will be subject to statistical analysis. A combination of 
univariate and bivariate statistical analyses, undertaken at several geographic scales, is 
employed to illuminate the differential incidence of social exclusion. The first element of the 
work therefore provides an account of how social deprivation differs between seaside and non-
seaside areas, and how social deprivation varies within and between seaside resorts in England. 
Thus, this study makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge and understanding of the 
manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. 
 
  As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the different circumstances of 
resorts, a comparative analysis of the national averages of a set of variables selected as measures 
of area factors and population composition for seaside resorts is undertaken, providing both 
insight into the socio-economic performance of resorts and the differences in performance 
between deprived and less deprived resorts. The analysis – based on the manipulation of major 
datasets at LSOA and ward level – seeks to establish whether the variables operate as negative 
or positive influences and whether they have a large or significant effect. The second element 
of the work therefore aids understanding of some of the causes and consequences of exclusion, 
but it also enhances comprehension of the way in which place- and population-based factors 
might influence social exclusion in English seaside resorts.  
 
 Thus, by focusing explicitly on the consequences of decline through an investigation of 
the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics associated with social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts, this study makes a theoretical contribution by enhancing understanding of post-
mature resort development, particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort change. 
From theoretical and practical perspectives, further insight may be gained, and the formulation 
of remedial policies advanced, by investigating the manifestation of social exclusion within 
local areas. In order to facilitate this, the scale of resolution changes in the third stage of the 
research and focuses on the intra-resort level where cluster analysis of a set measures of area 
factors and population composition for excluded resort localities is undertaken to reveal the 
nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Cluster analysis is a method for 
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identifying groups whose members are similar to each other, but different to those in other 
groups. The resulting typologies are not explanations of processes per se, but are ‘an attempt to 
systemise classification in aid of explanation’ (Marcuse, 1997: 248). They provide a ‘richer 
understanding of complex phenomena’ (Mikelbank, 2004: 961) and as such provide useful 
insights into the structural bases of local areas. The third element of the research therefore 
affords a clear indication of some of the causes and consequences of local area exclusion, and 
of the variations in need between different groups of excluded resort localities, by using 
multivariate analytical techniques.   
 
  As well as enhancing understanding of the internal dynamics of post-mature resorts, by 
investigating social exclusion within a post-mature resort context, a number of practical 
implications for resort restructuring and regeneration policy are revealed. This study also 
generated three main practical research outputs, these being: 
 
1. The completion of the first comprehensive and detailed comparative study of social 
exclusion in English seaside resorts through the manipulation and application of an existing 
dataset, namely the Indices of Deprivation. The results of this study will be of interest to a 
range of user groups, including voluntary organisation and agencies, local government 
officers, policy makers and academics. It will be of use in understanding the character and 
levels of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts and identifying the most and least deprived 
of the areas analysed. 
 
2. The production of a bespoke place typology of excluded seaside localities, which might 
lead variously to understand: underlying trends, including how types of resort localities are 
changing in different ways; and, policy problems, including which kinds of localities need 
priority intervention, which can survive with reduced intervention in a time of severe public 
spending restraint and whether different policy responses are needed in different kinds of 
localities – and how many varieties are needed. Thus, the typology will have implications 
for policy development (i.e., allocation, types and levels of policy interventions). However, 
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it will also be of interest to academics, not least because it offers the necessary comparative 
basis for detailed empirical research on any one local area or collection of local areas. 
 
3. The production of a national seaside resort database, which given the dearth of available 
specific resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable resource. The database itself has 
a variety of commercial applications beyond the identification of the factors which are 
influencing seaside resort performance. It can provide in-depth market intelligence on the 
demographic, social, and economic composition of English seaside resorts which may 
inform a variety of planning and development decision-making concerning the populations 
of such environments themselves, and how best to meet and/or service their needs.     
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
 The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the origins 
and development of social exclusion as a concept. Arguably, this term originated in France of 
the 1970s, but developed in the 1980s and largely in the policy of the European Union. This 
focus then leads to an analysis of how the concept has been mobilised and manipulated by the 
British to explain disadvantage in the UK. Particular interest is paid to the development of the 
concept in the hands of New Labour. The chapter argues that much of the debate on social 
exclusion has been characterised by an approach that focuses on individuals and population 
groups, ignoring those places marginal to the process of capitalist development. As a result, 
although New Labour implemented a raft of policies to tackle disadvantage, there was a strong 
emphasis on person-based policies and, in particular, on counting and targeting the poor (as 
individuals) through the tax and benefit systems. Not surprisingly, given the overwhelming 
focus on people rather than place, English seaside resorts remained on the margins of central 
government regeneration policy. Indeed, these formerly busy tourism destinations were not 
included in mainstream area-based social exclusion programmes such as the National Strategy 
for Neighbourhood Renewal and the Housing Market Renewal Programme. Thus, with respect 
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to the social exclusion agenda, the problems and challenges facing seaside residents are notable 
by their absence.  
  
 In chapter 3, the social and community issues facing English seaside resorts are 
examined. Partly by way of a backdrop to the main body of the review, the chapter opens with 
a short resume of the development of coastal resorts in Britain and reviews three key approaches 
to studying resort development. It argues that little attention has been paid to the non-touristic 
dimensions of resorts and goes on to examine conceptual issues important to an understanding 
of resort socio-economic change. The issues identified include the concept and definition of 
resort itself, different perspectives on resort change, measuring resort change and causes and 
effects of resort change. With these issues in mind, the final section of the chapter summarises 
the existing evidence and considers the role of socio-economic resort change in local area 
exclusion. The principal factors identified through a review of the literature as being potentially 
important for social exclusion in seaside resorts may be categorised according to whether they 
relate directly to the environment in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the 
characteristics of the seaside residents (i.e., people-oriented factors). Thus the chapter presents 
a framework for understanding resort change and social exclusion. This framework provides a 
basis for subsequent analysis, undertaken in the methodology, to determine how relevant 
variables are represented by the available data. 
 
 Chapter 4 clarifies the research objectives and sets out how the research was developed, 
both in relation to the process and the materials developed to provide the results. Chapter 5 
then provides a descriptive analysis of the nature, intensity and extent of social exclusion in 
seaside resorts. Attention turns in Chapter 6 to the role that place- and population-based factors 
play in contributing to the presence of characteristics associated with social exclusion. 
Presentation of the results obtained from a comparative analysis of mean values for variables 
selected as indicators of area factors and population composition in the seaside resorts of 
England split between the deprived and non-deprived resorts is followed by a statistical analysis 
of the composition and characteristics of each cluster of excluded resort locality. Finally, 
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chapter 7 discusses how the findings established in Chapters 5 and 6 contribute to knowledge 
and understanding of social exclusion, and of its relationship with resort change. In addition, 
several policy-related implications are discussed and consideration is given to areas for further 
research. 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
 This chapter has introduced the concepts of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, 
considered the definition, scope and nature of each and explored the links between them. Social 
exclusion is a much broader concept than poverty and deprivation, and social exclusion may 
not be poverty- and/or deprivation-based. Its growth and regular appearance in both academic 
and policy debates since the late 1980s has occurred in response to the realisation of the need 
to re-evaluate what constitutes and causes disadvantage in advanced capitalist societies. 
However, despite over twenty years of use within the European Union, there is no universally 
accepted definition either theoretically or operationally. Thus, debate has centred on how it 
should be defined, the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may 
constitute the phenomenon, how it might be measured, its causes and the role that different 
factors play in creating, reducing and sustaining geographical concentrations of social 
exclusion, and how policy might best tackle the problems which emerge.  
 
 Treatment of social exclusion in the UK may be criticised as academic research and 
policy attention of social exclusion has focussed on discrete social issues, specific sectors of 
society and particular areas, such as depressed inland urban neighbourhoods and some declining 
rural environments, and has neglected coastal communities and seaside resorts. This neglect 
has occurred despite the fact that i) the dominant perspective on the recent history of English 
seaside resorts has been to treat them as places in decline and ii) there is increasing evidence of 
the presence of characteristics associated with social exclusion within some English seaside 
resorts. In light of these shortcomings, this research will investigate the influence of resort 
decline on social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In order to achieve such an aim, a number 
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of specific objectives will guide the work and these were detailed in the objectives section of 
this chapter. The project draws upon existing area studies of social exclusion and post-mature 
resort development and seeks to make a theoretical contribution to both these fields, with 
practical value. Academically, this study makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge and 
understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its 
relationship with resort change. Practically, by investigating manifestations of social exclusion 
within a post-mature resort context, significant policy implications are likely to emerge from 
the study’s findings which will inform the design of more appropriate approaches to tackling 
social exclusion in English seaside resorts and elsewhere.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Social Exclusion: Origins, Development and Policy 
 
Chapter One was concerned with the context of the study which argues that many 
English seaside resorts are facing a combination of economic and social pressures which 
represent the culmination of many years of decline. The visibility of problems in English 
seaside resorts has undoubtedly been obscured by successive governments focus on urban and 
rural categories. Yet seaside resorts are likely to be more vulnerable to economic change and 
its social and spatial consequences than inland inner-city and rural areas, as seaside resorts have 
a significantly different geography, urban morphology and economic ecology. However, 
despite this contention and evidence of characteristics associated with social exclusion in some 
English seaside resorts, these coastal environments are an under-researched entity in 
geographical studies of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. The lack of research of social 
exclusion in English seaside resorts may also be because ‘the recognition and acceptance of 
social exclusion as a problem and a concept is a fairly recent phenomenon’ (Agarwal and Brunt, 
2006: 657).  
 
This chapter therefore investigates the conditions in which the concept of social 
exclusion arose and how the concept has been mobilised and manipulated by the European 
Union and the British. Particular attention is paid to the development of the concept under New 
Labour, which heralded social exclusion as a substantial ‘policy departure’ from previous 
policy focus on ‘poverty’ (Miliband, 2005). Before drawing conclusions on the potential impact 
of New Labour’s social exclusion agenda, however, there is a review of the earlier influences 
upon, and development of, New Labour’s economic and social ideology. The Labour Party 
underwent deliberate political reinvention in the 1990s and embraced third way politics, which 
prioritised equality of opportunity over equality of outcome. It will be argued that individually-
centred policies mark out New Labour’s approach as a weak form of social exclusion, rather 
than strong form, which provides a possible explanation why there was a stalling of social 
exclusion outcomes. By reviewing the policy responses to social exclusion, the chapter clearly 
demonstrates that English seaside resorts remained on the margins of central government 
regeneration policy.  
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2.1 Tracing the beginnings of the concept 
 
 It is generally accepted that the term social exclusion originated in France in the mid-
1970s. Initially, French socialist politicians used social exclusion to refer to the ten per cent of 
French citizens who were unable to access government services because of particular forms of 
vulnerability and discrimination, not all of which were because of income poverty. The people 
identified as living on the "margins of society" were the ‘mentally and physically handicapped, 
suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance abusers, delinquents, single parents, 
multi-problem households, asocial persons and other social "misfits"’ (Silver, 1994: 532). In 
the 1980s, however, the term was used to refer to various types of social disadvantage related 
to social problems arising from economic crises and crises of the welfare state. Social exclusion 
in this context referred not only to the rise in long-term and recurrent unemployment, but also 
to ‘the growing instability of social bonds: family instability, single member households, social 
isolation, and the decline of class solidarity based on unions, the labour market, and the working 
class neighbourhood and social networks’ (Silver, 1994: 533). It later extended to incorporate 
those suffering multiple deprivation in worst affected areas (i.e., spatial concentrations of 
disadvantage) (Silver 1994). Exclusion was seen as the progressive rupture of social bonds – 
economic, institutional and meaningful – between individuals and society (Silver, 1994). 
Furthermore, social exclusion was viewed as a ‘failure of the Republican state in protecting the 
cohesion of society’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 414). Social policy was directed towards 
‘insertion’ or ‘integration’ of the excluded to ensure social cohesion or social solidarity (Silver, 
1994: 535).  
 
 The eighties proved crucial to the conceptualisation of the term. Beginning in the 
seventies industrialised countries underwent ‘a deep structuring of their socio-economic 
systems’ with their embrace of neo-liberalism/neo-conservatism (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3). 
The neoliberal consensus arose as a reaction to the economic crises of the 1970s and prescribed 
industrial restructuring, the opening up of labour markets, moves to reduce workers protection 
and the retreat of state provided welfare to pump up economic growth (Quark, 2008). The new 
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economic policy generated the ‘globalisation of capital and the restructuring of the labour 
market’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3) causing disruptions to the equilibrium of society. There 
was ‘a drastic ideological shift towards the supremacy of self-adjusting free-market 
mechanisms aimed at dissolving or circumventing most of the institutional forms inherited from 
the compromises of the Fordist growth regime’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3). It has been 
argued that these deep socio-economic transformations have caused a shift from a Fordist era 
to a post-Fordist era. Fordism was not only about a mode of industrial organisation. It denoted 
a specific configuration of society. There was ‘a certain degree of social integration’ (Munck, 
2004: 31). ‘Fordist employment and compensation norms included internal labour markets and 
a family-supporting wage in exchange for a commitment of lifetime loyalty to a firm’ (Vidal, 
2012: 551). A secure job for a worker meant better participation in society in terms of social 
networks (Munck, 2004). In essence, Fordism implied stability and predictability (employment, 
family, community, welfare, lifestyle, leisure, consumption etc.) in society. Although there 
were economic problems (see Vidal, 2012: 556-558), the Fordist era of state-mediated 
capitalism was, for the most part, characterised by ‘rising real living standards and a 
considerable degree of upward social mobility through expanding educational and occupational 
opportunities’ (Quark, 2008: 7).  
 
 All that would change in the 1980s and, in an accelerated manner, in the 1990s as 
neoliberal globalisation impacted on society. Where once there was stability of employment 
now the buzzword is flexibility. ‘Under current restructuring, labour flexibility is privileged in 
the competitive, globalised market’ (Quark, 2008: 6). Labour flexibility meant ‘precarious 
forms of employment and insecurity of employment… the loss of a stable link to the world of 
work was loss of access to social, political and cultural resources and the ability to sustain stable 
family life’ (Munck, 2004: 32). That is why in the eighties social exclusion was not referring 
to various categories of people unprotected by social insurance. Rather, French socialist 
politicians talked of the ‘social exclusion of industrial workers who lost not only their jobs, but 
also their way of life, as well as experiencing a breakdown of traditional workplace ‘solidarity’ 
when the economy made its post-industrial switch from manufacturing to service industries’ 
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(Page, 2000: 5). Mass vulnerability was not confined to France. Many areas throughout the 
developed world have been adversely affected by the processes of global economic 
restructuring. Parkinson (1998: 1) describes these processes in the following terms: 
 
‘Rapid changes in the economic environment caused by internationalisation and industrial 
and corporate restructuring have transformed the character of local economies. They have 
brought a more fragmented labour market, a decline in manufacturing and a rise in the 
service sector, high levels of structural unemployment, an increase in part time, insecure 
and low paid employment, a shift in the balance of male and female employment and a 
growing gap between the highest and lowest household incomes. These changes are not 
only found in areas where the economy is in decline or during periods of recession. They 
are also a feature of booming economies’. 
 
 
The implementation of the neo-liberal strategy of development has resulted in drastic 
socioeconomic implications for large sectors of national populations:  
  
‘People in many countries have experienced rates of unemployment above historical 
rates; a lack of job security, salary reductions and a loss of benefits as a result of the 
process of restructuration and rationalisation of private and public corporations; and a 
more restricted access to basic services such as health and education as a result of new 
fiscal policies. They have also experienced the negative consequences of high rates of 
inflation; a more unequal distribution of income; and, in some cases, the deterioration of 
institutional forms of resistance, such as labour organisations’ (Diaz et al., 2001: 2). 
 
 
The post-Fordist era is depicted as ‘creating increasing income inequality and a closure of 
mobility chances, generated as a result of three broad neoliberal tendencies, specifically: a shift 
in the share of incomes from labour to capital; a cut in cash welfare transfers to households; 
and increasing disparities in earned incomes’ (Quark, 2008: 7). The above mentioned changes 
are felt acutely at the level of individuals and households as they result in unequal access to 
resources and life chances. Noting the growing social divide of this era and intensifying 
inequality on a number of axes, Madanipour (1998: 78) insists ‘there are ever larger numbers 
in transition from inclusion to exclusion’.   
  
 It is crucial to make explicit a number of key points from the above discussion. Unlike 
definitions of poverty or deprivation, social exclusion is seen in a wider context. In particular it 
33 
 
is seen in the context of globalisation and the structural changes brought about by neoliberal 
globalisation. It is a consequence of the alleged Fordist–post-Fordist shift and is related to ‘the 
deep economic restructuring necessitated by growing competition in the emerging global 
economy’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 415). Hence, the notion of ‘social exclusion relates to 
socio-economic structural changes rather than to individual’s behaviour or characteristics’ 
(Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 4). However, although social exclusion can be seen as ‘a 
consequence of global phenomena, it is nevertheless affected by the national context, notably 
the particularities of national economic policies, welfare regimes and rights of citizenship’ 
(Percy-Smith, 2000: 5). For example, the French Government made policies that disqualified 
certain groups from receiving social insurance on the basis of specific criteria. ‘If you wanted 
to be included amongst those who had access to social insurance you found a job, or you got 
married to someone who had a job’ (Peace, 2001: 20). These national and global forces have 
different implications for different areas and different social groups. Thus, the concept of social 
exclusion draws attention to the underlying processes of change at work on, and in, society. 
 
2.2  Social exclusion in the European Union 
 
 Since the late 1980s, the European Commission has promoted the notion of social 
exclusion rather than poverty within its political debates and social research programmes. The 
shift of the Commission to ‘exclusion issues’ is mainly attributed to the Jacques Delors 
presidency (from 1985 to the early 1990s) and was ‘born in the context of the French policy 
discourse’ (Ferrara et al., 2002: 228). Initial references to social exclusion may be traced back 
to 1989. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (the Social 
Charter, as it is known) was the first major EU policy document to refer to social exclusion – 
the Social Charter incorporated the term in its preamble. However, within a few months the 
concept had made a substantial entry into EU thinking. The Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers for Social Affairs on Combating Social Exclusion was its birth certificate. In this 
document, social exclusion was coined as an outcome and process that involves multiple 
dimensions but is grounded in structural changes, with (reduced) access to the labour market as 
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particularly decisive (Council, 1989). The Council Resolution emphasised that ‘combating 
social exclusion may be regarded as an important part of the social dimension of the internal 
market’ and urged ‘the need for economic development policies to be accompanied by 
integration policies of a specific, systematic and coherent nature’ (Council, 1989: 1). 
Combating social exclusion has from then on become one of the important concerns for 
European social policy that however was still in its infancy and needed to be developed. 
 
 Room (1995c) has traced the development of the concept from EU anti-poverty 
programmes. From the first two (1975-80 and 1986-89) to the third (1990-94), the naming of 
the social problem of interest shifted from ‘poverty’ to ‘exclusion’: 
 
‘"Poverty" was at the heart of the Council decisions that launched the first and second 
programmes… The third programme, in contrast, was concerned with the "integration" 
of the "least privileged"… By the time the programme was actually launched, social 
exclusion became the fashionable terminology. It was debatable how far these shifts 
reflect any more than the hostility of some governments to the language of poverty, and 
the enthusiasm of others to use the language of social exclusion’ (Room, 1995c: 3. 
Emphasis added). 
 
 
Part of the rise in popularity of the social exclusion concept has been attributed to its political 
appeal. It has been argued that it is perceived as less charitable (Silver, 1994), less blatant 
(Peace, 2001) and less accusing/threatening than poverty and deprivation (Berghman, 1995). In 
addition, its semantic flexibility allows it to be acceptable to a range of political positions. 
Right-wing governments, including UK Conservatives and Christian Democrats in Germany, 
did not recognise the existence of poverty in their own countries pointing out that as welfare 
states they guarantee a minimum income, while commentators on the left were becoming 
increasingly concerned with the growing social divide associated with the increasing income 
inequality (Silver and Miller, 2003). "Social exclusion" was sufficiently broad to accommodate 
both these political perspectives, and – crucially – allowed debates about social policy to 
continue at EU level. Indeed, many writers refer to the difficulties (from 1989 to the mid-1990s) 
the EU had in getting agreement for taking action on poverty to be included in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The difficulties relate to the before-mentioned connotations of poverty, the fact 
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that ‘member states adhered to different definitions of poverty and consequently some denied 
that poverty was a problem within their borders’ (Marsh and Mullins, 1998: 751), ‘the principle 
of "subsidiarity" that assigned social protection responsibilities to the member states, as well as 
to British refusal to ratify that section of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’ (Silver and Miller, 2003: 
5). As a term, ‘social exclusion appeared to offer a less emotive, perhaps less understood and 
therefore less politically contentious alternative concept to poverty’ (Atkinson and Davoudi, 
2000: 436). Put differently, social exclusion provided a way for ‘member states to commit 
themselves to an imprecise, but nonetheless worthy-sounding mission’ (Marsh and Mullins, 
1998: 751). 
  
 The third (and final) anti-poverty programme (Poverty 3, as it is known) financed and 
established the European Observatory on National Policies for Combating Social Exclusion 
(1991-94). The Observatory has linked the notion of social exclusion to ‘the social rights of 
citizenship... to a basic standard of living and to participation in the major social and 
occupational opportunities of the society’ (in Room, 1993: 14). The principal focus of the 
Observatory’s work has been on the effectiveness of different national policies. It had to 
conceptualise social exclusion, discuss its measurement and suggest indicators for monitoring 
the effectiveness of policies for combating social exclusion (Room, 1995a). The Observatory’s 
researchers suggest that social exclusion should be conceptualised in terms of the breakdown 
of one or more of four societal institutions which support the basic rights of citizenship of 
European residents: 
 
‘the democratic and legal system, which promotes civic integration; the labour market 
which promotes economic integration; the welfare system promoting what may be called 
social integration; and, the family and community system which promotes interpersonal 
integration’ (Berghman, 1995: 19). 
 
 
 According to the lead researcher (Room, 1995a), social exclusion could be analysed in 
terms of the denial or non-realisation of social rights and in circumstances where citizens are 
unable to secure their social rights, they will tend to suffer processes of generalised and 
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persistent disadvantage and their social and occupational participation will be undermined. 
Room (1995a) argued that such rights were implied in European policy statements rather than 
enshrined in legislation. The Observatory produced four annual reports which were 
accompanied by a number of thematic reports (all of these based on national reports). The 
Observatory, which reported back to the Council of Ministers, identified several key areas of 
policy on social exclusion – including access to social services (with welfare, housing, health, 
education and justice, expressly mentioned), measures to prevent exclusion (with access to 
technology, the prevention of life crises and the promotion of family solidarity specifically 
mentioned) and measures to help vulnerable groups (especially those with disabilities, those at 
risk of poverty and children with special needs). However, the Council of Ministers considered 
employment to be the most important. Social exclusion was roundly understood to be closely 
associated with the labour market process, particularly the long term, high levels of 
unemployment of the 1980s and early 1990s (European Commission, 1994; Room, 1995a). 
Indeed, the White Paper on European social policy - the way forward for the Union (European 
Commission, 1994) contained only one chapter on social policy. It focused on labour-market 
measures and identified reducing unemployment and promoting reinsertion into work as the 
single most important factor in combating social exclusion. Thus, after 1994, issues such as 
employability (skills, flexibility, adaptability, marketability) and job creation dominated the 
social agenda. The situation is neatly summarised by Daly (2006: 6): 
 
‘For at least five years [1989-94], a concern with a more solidarisitc social policy – which 
was a genuine thrust of the period and a hallmark of the Delors presidency – came to be 
replaced by the exigency of modernising social policy, as internal political problems 
(including opposition to Delors’ Commission) and external problems associated with the 
relatively poor performance of the EU in the face of an increasingly globalised economy 
turned the collective mind away from a social policy for the sake of the social and towards 
the economic’. 
 
 The fight against "social exclusion" has primarily been undertaken with the European 
Social Fund (part of the European Structural Funds), which has spent in excess of €60 billion 
on labour market initiatives in the period 1995-99 (European Commission, 1999). However, 
such initiatives fail to address the social exclusion of people who are not in the labour market 
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(e.g., the young, the old, the disabled, care providers etc.). Another criticism is that the 
employment programmes are linked to the EU objective of achieving economic cohesion, 
meaning the potential beneficiaries are people in those regions within the EU that are worst off. 
Consequently, people who live in hardship in better off regions are not eligible for assistance 
from employment programmes. It is also questionable whether European governments should 
pool their budgets and concentrate their efforts on employment. Not only are they subsidising 
industry by shifting responsibility for job training from the private to public purse, governments 
also are diverting monies that might otherwise be spent on welfare, social programmes and 
public services.  
 
 Thus, the EU’s actions have focused primarily on combating unemployment. Wider 
aspects of social exclusion have received comparatively little attention. It is necessary to 
emphasise that the principle of subsidiarity restricts the EU in the field of social policy, 
especially where member states are unable to agree a single definition and what the appropriate 
responses should be (Daly, 2006). Indeed, there are significant differences in the way social 
exclusion has been interpreted across Europe. The three-fold typology of paradigms for social 
exclusion developed by Silver (1994) has made a valuable contribution to understanding the 
ideological and political roots of these differences and highlighting the implications for 
policy/action to address social exclusion. Referring to the three paradigms of solidarity, 
specialisation and monopoly, Silver (1994: 539) notes: 
 
‘Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in a different 
political philosophy: republicanism, liberalism and social democracy. Each provides an 
explanation of multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political and 
cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as 
well as poverty and long-term unemployment’. 
 
The key characteristics of each paradigm are summarised in Table 2.1 and below: 
 
1. The ‘solidarity’ paradigm is rooted in French Republican political ideology and 
attributes exclusion to the breakdown of social solidarity, that is, the social bond 
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between the individual and society. The solidarity paradigm, which is heavily informed 
by Durkheim’s sociology, views society ‘as something external, moral and normative 
rather than grounded in individual, group or class interests’ (Silver, 1994: 541). 
Solidarity or social order arises out of shared values and rights. From this perspective, 
social exclusion is regarded as a break in the social fabric, of the bond between the 
individual and society, along with an erosion of widely accepted values and rules about 
the appropriate ways to behave within society. ‘Like deviance or anomie, exclusion both 
threatens and reinforces social cohesion’ (Silver: 1994: 542). In this model, the state 
and public institutions have an important role to play in promoting social integration for 
those that are excluded, specifically, by inserting groups (e.g., the poor, the unemployed, 
disaffected youth, ethnic minorities) back into the mainstream society and dominant 
culture. Even though individuals have political rights, they also have duties and 
obligations to maintain national solidarity. This model underpins the Republican State. 
 
2. The ‘specialisation paradigm’ is embedded in Anglo-American liberalism. Here the 
basis of the social contract is considered to be in social differentiation. Individuals 
engage in voluntary economic and social exchanges based on their interests and 
motivations. Social exclusion occurs when barriers such as discrimination, market 
failures and unenforced rights prevent individuals from freely engaging in these 
exchanges (Silver, 1994). The specialisation paradigm stresses the pathological and 
micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion; however, social liberals are also 
cognisant of the effects of structural change. According to Silver (1994: 560), ‘the split 
between supply-side and demand-side theories parallels the division between classical 
and social liberalism… In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty or 
unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that the new poverty 
and long-term unemployment have demand-side or structural causes’. Unlike the 
solidarity model, minimal public intervention is seen as the way to prevent exclusion. 
Government support in terms of welfare payments, for instance, is depicted as creating 
dependency rather than promoting a work ethic, leading to the development of a cultural 
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underclass (Silver 1994). Although this paradigm is dominant in the United States of 
America, it can be broadly equated with the ideology of the New Right in Europe 
including Britain during the 1980s and 1990s (and more recently too). ‘The traditional 
solution to poverty and unemployment is to create jobs and raise productivity by 
lowering wages and eliminating rigid employment regulations’ (Silver, 1994: 555).  
 
3. The ‘monopoly’ paradigm, influential on the European Left, views exclusion as the 
result of the formation of group monopolies. Non-members of the dominant groups are 
restricted access to resources, goods and services. ‘Drawing heavily on Weber, and, to 
a lesser extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set of 
hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory, exclusion 
arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the political 
interests of the included… Exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension 
of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders’ (Silver 1994: 
543). This model underpins the existing Western European structure of society and is 
influential in many North European countries and, to a certain extent, Britain. The social 
democratic State holds the balance of power and attempts to compensate through social 
protection. 
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Table 2.1: Three paradigms of exclusion                                
 
 Solidarity Specialisation Monopoly 
Ideology Republicanism Liberalism Social Democracy 
Discourse Exclusion Discrimination, 
Underclass 
New poverty,  
Inequality 
Cause of 
Exclusion 
Erosion of collective values, 
 
Break in bond between 
individual and society 
Barriers to voluntary 
exchanges 
Different hierarchical class 
access to resources 
Solutions Individual rights and 
obligations to solidarity 
(cultural and moral), 
 
Public institutions important 
Rights and obligations in 
contractual sense, 
 
 
Limited public intervention 
Extend equal citizenship 
rights, 
 
 
Social protection 
Source: Modified from Silver (1994: 540) 
 
It is crucial to make explicit a number of key points from the above discussion on the 
emergence and development of social exclusion in the EU. First, the concept of social exclusion 
was adopted for both conceptual and political reasons. Second, the term "social exclusion" has 
been linked to the EU objective of achieving economic and social cohesion. Third, although the 
language used by the European Commission/European Observatory in its discussions of social 
exclusion resonate with the Republican language of the solidarity paradigm (i.e., internal 
solidarity, shared values and rights, social integration) and the social democratic language of 
the monopoly paradigm (i.e., the concept of citizenship, social rights orientation), the policies 
proposed suggest that the Anglo-American neoliberal tones of the specialisation paradigm have 
been a greater source of influence. As discussed in the previous section, ‘while the causes of 
social exclusion may be structural, its effects can be ameliorated or exacerbated by the attitudes, 
activities and policies of governmental bodies’ (Percy-Smith, 2000: 6). For example, EU 
policies on labour market flexibility and reduced social protection are incompatible with 
promoting secure employment and, together with public spending cuts required to meet 
conditions for monetary union (i.e., economic cohesion), may actually increase the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion (Percy-Smith, 2000; Room, 1995a). The final point is that the 
European approach to social exclusion has, in practice, reflected a more limited concern with 
labour market exclusion. Indeed, even though the EU now (owing to the Amsterdam Treaty 
which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999) has a clear legal basis for work on 
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social exclusion that goes beyond the labour market, ‘the EU’s social policy portfolio mainly 
consists of components of employment/active labour market policy, industrial safety, 
promoting workers’ rights, social dialogue, enabling labour mobility and gender equality’ 
(Daly, 2006: 5).   
 
2.3 Social Exclusion in the United Kingdom 
 
 Social exclusion made its first appearance on the UK stage in the late nineties. During 
Conservative rule (i.e., 1979-97) the notion did not enter policy debates. ‘The concept of 
solidarity and social integration which underlies the notion of "social exclusion" in the French 
tradition is difficult to grasp for people working within a liberal individualistic tradition’ (Gore, 
1995: 2). Indeed, when the exclusion approach was given first consideration in the 1980s by a 
Conservative administration dismissive of the suggestion that income poverty was a significant 
problem, the emphasis shifted from social cohesion to individualism (Hills et al., 2002). The 
New Right linked concerns about increased levels of unemployment, crime and family 
breakdown to the idea of an "underclass". This idea, which was imported from America and 
characterised by the work of Murray (1984, 1990), locates the causes of societal disadvantage 
within individuals themselves and draws together three explanations – dependency theory, the 
culture of poverty thesis and the cycle of deprivation. Indeed, Murray directly related poverty 
to the behaviour (i.e., parenting-, criminal- and labour market-behaviour) and decisions (e.g., 
on family relationships, marriage and child-bearing) of individual poor people and, 
furthermore, argued that poverty was transmitted culturally through an intergenerational cycle 
of deprivation. In short, poverty was viewed as the result of personal choices and therefore a 
matter of individual responsibility. According to Murray, it was the underclass culture itself 
that was holding people back, not structural inequality. Consequently, Murray’s policy 
prescription was to limit the extent of government intervention so that poor people’s behaviour 
and decisions were more constrained by economic reality – the idea being that the resultant 
circumstances/hardship would change individual attitudes and behaviours and thus reduce the 
size of the underclass. These were the arguments behind the Conservative government’s 
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coercive policies including greater welfare restrictions (i.e., through greater emphasis on 
means-testing and through tighter definitions of need and of entitlement and stricter conditions) 
and increased deterrence through law enforcement and imprisonment (Lister, 1997; McAnulla, 
2006). Thus, the Conservatives used the stick rather than the carrot and drastically reduced 
levels of social protection.  
 
 While the idea of a socially and morally inferior underclass is preferred by conservative 
thinkers and politicians (possibly because it blames the poor and diverts attention away from 
blaming the mechanisms through which resources and wealth are distributed), as other reviews 
on the issue indicate, the ‘dependency culture’ is not supported by research evidence (Walker, 
1990). There is, however, clear evidence of social polarisation in the 1980s. Indeed, in-equality 
of wealth between the rich and the poor has been growing. During the 1980s, incomes 
substantially diverged and, in the 1990s, the income gap widened; for example, in 1983, 14% 
of households in the UK lacked three or more basic necessities because they could not afford 
them, a proportion which increased to 21% in 1990 and to over 24% by 1999 (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2000). Figure 2.1 shows income inequality in the UK as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, which measures inequality across the whole of society. Simply put, if all the income 
went to only one person (maximum inequality) and everybody else in society received nothing, 
the Gini coefficient would be equal to 1. If income was distributed equally, and everyone had 
exactly the same amount, the Gini would equal 0.  
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Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Gini coefficient                                  
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies (2012: 36) 
 
 
 
 As can be seen, inequality increased rapidly during Conservative rule, with the Gini 
coefficient rising from 0.25 in 1979 to 0.34 in 1991. ‘This was the largest increase in income 
inequality seen in British history and was larger than the rise that took place in other countries 
at the same time’ (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2012: 2). Thus, inequality widened enormously 
during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the results of the growing divide between the rich and poor 
has been the growing marginalisation of particular social groups (e.g., the long-term 
unemployed, homeless, lone parents, ex-offenders, disabled and long-term sick, ethnic 
minorities) and the concentration of the poor in marginalised areas, ‘particularly the large cities 
in northern Britain and inner London, but also former coalfield areas and some seaside towns’ 
(North and Syrett, 2006: 72). British interest in social exclusion reflects the growing of socio-
spatial inequalities over the 1980s and 1990s. Reversing this decline became one of the central 
challenges for the Labour party, which saw its best opportunity to win power in almost two 
decades. 
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2.3.1 New Labour – new exclusion? 
 
 The decision by the Labour Party to adopt a focus upon tackling social exclusion was 
not only due to the high levels of inequality in the UK in the mid-1990s. The problem of social 
exclusion formed part of the development of a new political language to ensure electoral success 
(Levitas, 1998). Indeed, the term social exclusion was adopted by the Labour Party from the 
EU as it underwent a process of deliberate reinvention from "Old" to "New" Labour. So what 
factors led to social exclusion forming a key focus for such a transition? The Labour Party 
sought to define itself in opposition to the excesses of Thatcherism and was influenced by the 
report of the Commission on Social Justice (1994) and the Third Way thinking of Giddens 
(1994).  
 
 With respect to Thatcherism, as indicated earlier, during Conservative rule the welfare 
state underwent significant change. The Conservatives were adamant on ‘rolling back the state, 
promoting choice and consumerism, encouraging the mixed economy of welfare and reducing 
welfare dependency’ (Powell, 1999: 4). Committed to New Right ideology, the Thatcher 
government believed that the state was too big and too involved and that ‘it should do less by 
shifting responsibility for welfare back onto private individuals and families’ (Driver and 
Martell, 1998: 84). Thatcher argued that ‘spiralling welfare expenditure is both unsustainable 
and limits the competitiveness of the domestic economy in global markets’ (O‘Brien, 2002: 
404). Consequently, ‘the Conservatives cut benefits and put pressure on claimants to take up 
job opportunities that came along’ (McAnulla, 2006: 128). In response to the Conservative 
approach, ‘the defence of the welfare state and the promise of extra funding for social benefits 
and services were the centre pieces of the 1983 and 1987 Labour election manifestos’ (Driver 
and Martell, 1998: 85). Likewise in 1992, the Labour party manifesto pledged ‘to restore the 
value of child benefit, raise the basic pension and reintroduce the link between pensions and 
earning that the Conservatives had abandoned in 1981’ (Purdy, 2000: 183). The Conservatives 
turned that into ‘Labour’s tax bombshell’ and reminded the electorate of past failures, including 
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‘the winter of discontent, the IMF crisis, ‘lame duck’ nationalised industries and punitive direct 
taxation’ (Larkin, 2001: 51). Labour found itself losing the election. 
 
 The Labour Party’s response was to set up the Commission on Social Justice (CSJ). It 
was to carry out an independent inquiry into social and economic reform and produce 
recommendations for a strategy and programme of policy changes. The introduction to the 
report of the CSJ set out the values of social justice as ‘the equal worth of all citizens, their 
equal right to be able to meet their basic needs, the need to spread opportunities and life chances 
as widely as possible, and finally, the requirement that we reduce and where possible eliminate 
unjustified inequalities’ (CSJ, 1994: 1). The report cited extensive evidence of increasing 
inequality and acknowledged the forces of globalisation, deindustrialisation and technological 
change, as well as demographic changes, particularly the changed role of women in society. 
The CSJ argued that ‘inequality is very inefficient’ (1994: 23) and that ‘squalor and crime carry 
enormous economic as well as social costs’ (1994: 20).  
  
 The report referred to the ‘unwelcome’ process of social exclusion (1994: 81-82). The 
report discussed exclusion from work, transport, politics, education, housing, and leisure 
facilities as increasingly obvious features of British society. Accumulated disadvantages of 
unemployment, bad housing, poor schooling and high crime were understood to combine to 
produce areas where there was simply ‘no economy’. The CSJ remained unconvinced by 
descriptions of the underclass, but recognised that the dismantling of the welfare state brought 
with it consequences, including ‘increasing alienation and disaffection among many people’ 
(1994: 82). Social viability would depend upon building a society based on ‘inclusion’ in terms 
of an end to structural unemployment, a sustained attack on the accumulated disadvantages of 
deprived parts of the UK and effective support for families of all kinds (CSJ, 1994). 
 
 The economic analysis of the CSJ argued that inequality held back economic growth 
through costs to government and deterring investors from whole areas which were seen as 
disadvantaged. In contrast, social justice and investment in people could contribute to economic 
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growth. The report recognised that markets were not created by natural forces, but were the 
product of the values, institutions and political decisions that governed them, calling for 
‘intelligent regulation’ to make markets work better for society (1994: 98). The CSJ viewed 
paid employment as crucial to a secure and stable life. Among the specific recommendations 
(i.e., intelligent regulation necessary to create a more inclusionary labour market) made by the 
CSJ were: policies to prevent discrimination of part-time workers; effective equal pay; anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment legislation; a statutory minimum wage; and, family-friendly 
employment policies. The latter include: improvements in maternity leave; the introduction of 
parental leave and leave for family reasons; carers leave; and flexible working hours that meet 
employees’ needs and not just employers’ needs (1994: 155-157). The CSJ stressed that certain 
groups such as the young unemployed, long-term unemployed and lone parent families would 
require practical support (i.e., education, skills and training, child-care), as well as income 
support to secure insertion in society. This welfare-to-work initiative would sit comfortably 
with many of the EU ideas on social integration through labour market policies.  
 
 The CSJ argued for a future which combined the dynamics of a market economy with 
strong social institutions, families and communities. Labour modernisers had their sights fixed 
on ‘third way politics’. The Third Way has been presented by the sociologist Giddens as a new 
approach to politics and policies which transcends the old categories of Left (i.e., top-down 
socialism) and Right (i.e., traditional neo-liberalism). Table 2.2 presents a summarised account 
of the Third Way. The idea was to reshape the way in which the state addressed inequality. 
Giddens (2000: 85-86) argued ‘there is no future for egalitarianism at all costs’ and that instead 
‘emphasis should be placed upon equality of opportunity’. The distinction between equality of 
outcome and equality of opportunity is crucial here. While equality of outcome demands 
reducing the privileges of the rich in favour of the poor through the tax and benefit systems 
(favoured by "Old" Labour), equality of opportunity does not. Equality of opportunity (although 
traditionally a more liberal stance) is more in keeping with the drive towards social cohesion 
and inclusion (providing opportunities for people to enter the labour market, making everyone 
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equally employable, addressing socio-spatial disadvantage) sought by the CSJ (and 
subsequently New Labour).  
  
 In the run up to the 1997 election, the New Labour manifesto promised to create equality 
of opportunity, not simply by redistribution through the tax and benefits system, but by 
reforming government, improving public services and targeting support for the most 
disadvantaged (Labour Party, 1997). Priority areas would be education and health, with specific 
pledges on reducing class sizes and hospital waiting lists. The welfare-to-work initiative (the 
New Deal, as it is known), comprising both the duty to seek work and proactive government 
programmes to support entry/re-entry into a flexible market, would also receive a high priority. 
By reducing claimant numbers, New Labour intended to release funds for investment in 
education and health. The New Deal, funded through a windfall tax on privatised utilities, 
would be linked to a comprehensive reform of welfare provision. In implementing a welfare 
programme, there would be no increase in the basic or top rates of income tax and a New Labour 
government would seek to manage the economy so as to maintain stable economic growth and 
low inflation. Welfare spending would be funded through the benefits of steady economic 
growth (Labour Party, 1997). This manifesto, together with the language and broad policy goals 
and means associated with the Third Way agenda (see Table 2.2), was meant to appeal both to 
Labour’s traditional working-class base and to the middle income, middle Britain voters New 
Labour was courting. 
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Table 2.2: Dimensions of the Third Way in social policy 
 
Source: Barrientos and Powell (2004: 15) 
 
 
2.3.2 Social exclusion and New Labour policy  
 
 Following a landslide election victory, New Labour came to power in May 1997 on a 
promise not to repeat the mistakes of earlier government social policy programmes. Social 
exclusion was a central part of this agenda, that is, the Third Way politics of equality of 
opportunity. The term social exclusion rose to prominence in the UK during the first term of 
the Blair premiership, owing in particular to the setting up of the interdepartmental Social 
Exclusion Unit (SEU) in December 1997. According to David Miliband (2005: 2), the then 
Minister of Communities and Local Government, the creation of the SEU represented ‘not just 
a change of terminology, or governmental plumbing, but a policy departure that occurred to 
address the moral vacuum at the heart of Conservative policy, but also the policy limitations in 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
Old Left - social democracy 
Third Way 
New Right - neo-liberal 
Discourse  
Rights 
Equity 
Market failure 
 
Rights and responsibilities 
Equity and efficiency 
Market and state failure 
Responsibilities 
Efficiency 
State failure 
Values  
Equality of outcome 
Security 
 
 
Inclusion 
Positive welfare 
 
 
Equality of opportunity 
Insecurity 
Policy goals  
Equality of outcome 
Full employment 
 
 
Minimum opportunities 
Employability 
 
Equality of opportunity 
Low inflation 
Policy means  
Rights 
State  
State finance and delivery 
 
Security 
Hierarchy 
High tax and spend 
High services and benefits 
 
High economic redistribution 
Universalism 
 
High wages 
 
 
Conditionality 
Civil society/market 
State/private finance and 
delivery 
Flexicurity 
Network 
Pragmatic tax to invest 
High services and low 
benefits 
High asset redistribution 
Mix of universalism and 
selectivity 
National minimum wage 
 
 
Responsibilities 
Market/civil society 
Private/state finance 
 
Insecurity 
Market 
Low tax and spend 
Low services and benefits 
 
Low economic redistribution 
Selectivity 
 
Low wages 
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inherited assumptions on the Left’ (Emphasis added). Social exclusion was defined by New 
Labour as: 
 
‘A shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a 
combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor 
housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’ (SEU, 1997: 1). 
 
 
Notably this definition does not refer to citizenship rights, but rather multidimensional 
disadvantage. Thus, New Labour’s definition is focussed on outcomes and ‘makes no reference 
to the processes that create the problems identified in the definition’ (Percy-Smith, 2000: 4). 
Inevitably, policies were designed around the symptoms of social exclusion rather than 
preventative actions to tackle the underlying causes. 
 
 Indeed, New Labour implemented a raft of person- and place-based policies to tackle 
disadvantage. Place policies can be defined as interventions aimed at designated 
neighbourhoods/settlements, or groups of neighbourhoods which, when taken together, can be 
regarded a discrete category of places (Griggs et al., 2008). Examples of place-based policies 
range from comprehensive regeneration schemes, including the New Deal for Communities 
Programme, to domain-specific neighbourhood renewal initiatives, such as Sure Start (i.e., 
neighbourhood nurseries, family centres), Employment Zones and Health Action Areas. Person 
policies include macro-level policies which generate support for individuals and households 
through the tax and benefit systems (Griggs et al., 2008). Examples include government 
initiatives to address the problem of low pensioner incomes through the implementation of a 
Minimum Income Guarantee, strategies to tackle non take-up of benefits by older people, and 
Winter Fuel Payments. Person policies also include programmes which are applicable to 
individual needs rather than area specific, such as the New Deal programmes (for specific target 
groups, such as young adults aged 18-24, the disabled, lone parents, the long-term unemployed 
aged 25-49, partners of the unemployed, and those aged 50 years or more) and the Connexions 
strategy, which provides employment, education and training programmes for young people 
aged 13-18 years. 
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 There are four phases into which the social exclusion agenda can be broadly divided: 
the establishment of the SEU in 1997 to 2001, when it formed part of the Cabinet Office; 2002 
to 2005, when the unit moved to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; 2006–2007, when 
the SEU was merged with the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and re-named as the Social 
Exclusion Taskforce (SETF); and 2007–2010, with the SETF under the Brown government. 
This discussion is best organised in terms of two periods of engagement with social exclusion. 
The reason to identify two periods is substantive rather than temporal. Before and after 2006, 
social exclusion has varied in terms of priority, focus and intensity of activity. The change in 
the social exclusion agenda is broadly evident in a series of key policy reports (see Table 2.3). 
Over the fourteen year period in which these documents were written, some concerns remained 
the same. However, each subtle shift in focus alters the construction of the socially excluded 
and influences the policy response. 
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Table 2.3: Description and indicators relating to social exclusion 1997-2011 
 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
Tony Blair (1997) ‘The poorest people… 
the forgotten people’ 
• Single mothers 
• Five million people of working age living in 
homes where nobody works 
• People who have never worked since leaving 
school 
• 150,000 homeless 
• 100,000 children not attending school 
Peter Mandelson 
(1997) 
‘Today’s underclass’ 
‘Our fellow citizens who lack the 
means, material and otherwise, to 
participate in economic, social, 
cultural and political life in Britain 
today’. 
• 5 million families in which no one of working 
age works 
• 150,000 homeless;  
• Single parents of children who are not attending 
school 
• 3 million people living in the worst 1300 estates 
Social Exclusion 
Unit (2001) 
‘People affected by the most  
extreme forms of multiple  
deprivation’ 
 
‘A fraction of one per cent of the 
population’ 
• Teenagers pregnant under 16 
• Young people excluded from school 
• Those sleeping rough 
 
 
 
 
 ‘People suffering significant  
problems’ 
• 16-18s not in learning or work 
• Alcohol dependents 
Social Exclusion 
Unit (2004) 
‘Those with multiple 
disadvantages’ 
Five or more of the following: 
 
• Being a lone parent or a single person 
• Having low qualifications or skills 
• Having a physical impairment 
• Being over 50 
• Being from an ethnic minority group 
• Living in a region of high unemployment 
David Miliband 
(2006) 
‘Wide exclusion’ 
 
 
Those deprived according to a single indicator 
 
• 10.1 million working-age adults without an 
NVQ (National Vocational Qualification) Level 2 
qualification 
• 3.8 million working-age people in workless 
households 
• 3.2 million children who live in non-decent 
housing 
• 2.2 million older people living in relative low-
income households 
• 464,000 19-year-olds with no NVQ Level 2 
qualifications; 
• 194,000 16- to 18-year-olds not in education, 
employment or training 
• 2.2 million children in absolute poverty 
• 3.5 million children in relative poverty 
• 5.2 million people struggling with basic literacy 
and numeracy 
• Homeless people 
• Housebound elderly  
 ‘Deep exclusion’ 
 
 
 
 
Those who are excluded on multiple counts 
 
• Those struggling with basic skills and long-term 
unemployed 
• A child in poverty, in poor housing, with a 
parent suffering mental illness  
• Homeless, on drugs, without skills, and without 
family. 
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  Deprived areas where there is a geographic 
concentration of problems 
Tony Blair (2006) ‘The “hardest to reach” families’ Individuals including: 
 
• Looked after children 
• Families with complex problems 
• People with mental health issues 
• Pregnant teenagers 
Social Exclusion 
Taskforce  
(2006) 
‘Individuals and families who have 
failed to benefit from the 
improvements and opportunities 
available’ 
 
‘The 2-3 per cent’ 
• Those who suffer from moderate to severe 
mental health problems 
• Young problem drug users 
• Young offenders 
• 16–18 year olds who are not in employment, 
education or training 
• Children in care 
• People who lack functional numeracy or 
literacy  
Social Exclusion 
Taskforce  
(2007a) 
‘Families at risk’ 2% of families – or 140,000 families across 
Britain experiencing complex and multiple 
problems. 
Social Exclusion 
Taskforce  
(2007b) 
‘Adults facing Chronic 
Exclusion’ 
Adults experiencing some or all of: 
 
• Poor health prospects – mental and/or physical 
health issues  
• A history of exclusion, institutionalisation or 
abuse  
• Behaviour and control difficulties  
• Skills deficit – unemployment and poor 
educational achievement  
• Addictions 
Gordon Brown 
(2009) 
‘50,000 most chaotic families’ 50,000 households who have complex needs and 
have received multi-agency intervention for a 
considerable period of time 
HM Government  
(2010a) 
‘Individuals experiencing  
multiple disadvantage’ 
 
11% of UK adults or 5.3 million individuals 
 ‘Individuals persistently  
experiencing multiple  
disadvantage’ 
 
7.7% of population 3.7 million individuals 
 ‘Individuals experiencing  
multiple disadvantage according  
to a tighter definition’ 
 
2.5% of all adults or 1.2 million people 
 ‘Individuals persistently  
experiencing multiple  
disadvantage according 
to a tighter definition’ 
1.7% of all adults or 800,000 people 
David Cameron 
(2011) 
‘Troubled families’ 120,000 families living troubled and chaotic lives 
 
1. Are involved in crime and anti-social 
behaviour; 
2. Have children not in school; 
3. Have an adult on out-of-work benefits; 
4. Cause high costs to the public purse 
 
Source: Modified from McNeil (2012: 48-49) 
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 Before examining the two periods of engagement and drawing conclusions on the 
potential impact of New Labour’s ‘policy departure’ (Miliband, 2005), at the outset it is 
important to remember that the concepts of "opportunity for all" and "rights and 
responsibilities" were key elements of New Labour’s political programme and underpinned the 
social exclusion agenda. Being in employment, education or training was the main goal of 
"opportunity for all", ‘with "responsibility" promoted through greater conditionality in the 
welfare system and "rights" through more programmes aimed at improving services and 
outcomes in the most disadvantaged areas’ (McNeil, 2012: 20). It is also important to note the 
terms under which the assessment will be made. The work of Levitas (1998, 2005) is crucial 
here (see section 1.1.3). 
 
 According to Levitas (2005) who was writing prior to the closure of the SEU in 2006, 
New Labour’s approach demonstrated ‘an inconsistent combination of SID and MUD’ (p. 28), 
with considerable ‘pulling’ towards the SID ‘in which paid employment is the central means of 
social integration and social control, and unemployment the overriding element in social 
exclusion’ (p. 48). Indeed, the labour market was always seen as the most promising route out 
of poverty and exclusion for all people of working age. Consequently, the labour market served 
as the main redistributive mechanism for New Labour. The introduction of the national 
minimum wage in 1999 meant a more regulated labour market. The minimum wage was 
supposed to address the problem of poverty pay, which exists when the earnings from paid 
work do not result in a living wage and fail to lift people out of poverty. The higher wage was 
also to act as an incentive for people to supply their labour (i.e., work more hours, join the 
labour market). In order to assist entry/re-entry into the labour market, in 1998 New Labour 
instituted the New Deal programmes for six client groups (see Table 2.4). The young 
unemployed (i.e., people aged between 18 and 24 who have claimed Job Seekers Allowance 
for six months) and the long-term unemployed (i.e., those claiming Job Seekers Allowance for 
over two years) had to participate. Both programmes involved extra help with job search and 
training, a wage subsidy, and penalties for non-compliance. Under these schemes, those reliant 
on welfare would ‘lose the whole of their benefit for two weeks’ (Purdy, 2000: 187) and ‘lose 
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40% of their benefit indefinitely if they refused to accept one of the welfare-workfare options 
presented to them’ (Hay, 1999: 121). 
 
 
Table 2.4: The New Deal programme  
 
Client group Conditions and eligibility Provision 
18-24 year olds Compulsory after unemployed 
for six months 
Personal adviser. Gateway period for four months 
(advice, guidance, preparation), then one of: training or 
education, job with wage subsidy, voluntary work, 
public sector employment through the environmental 
task force. Help with travel and childcare costs. 
Sanctions for non-compliance. 
25-49 year olds Compulsory after unemployed 
for 18 months 
Personal adviser. Gateway period for four months 
(advice, guidance, preparation), then one of: training or 
education, job with wage subsidy, work placements. 
Help with travel and childcare costs. Sanctions for non-
compliance. 
Aged 50 and over Voluntary after unemployed 
for six months 
Personal adviser. Help with job search. One year’s 
employment credit if move into low-paid work. 
Lone parents Voluntary for lone parents 
who are not working 
Personal adviser. Help with job search, training, 
childcare arrangements and in-work support. Financial 
help for training and childcare. May join other New 
Deals. 
Partners of 
unemployed 
people 
Voluntary if partner claiming 
out-of-work benefit for six 
months 
Personal adviser. Help with job search, training, 
childcare arrangements and in-work support. Financial 
help for training and childcare. 
Disabled people Voluntary if receiving 
disability-related benefits 
Personal adviser and access to job broker. 
Source: Compiled from Appendix 3 & 4 of Griggs et al. (2008)  
 
 
 
 During the first period (i.e., 1997-2006) New Labour not only implemented its policies 
on welfare to work, it also established the SEU. The purpose of the SEU was to raise the profile 
of social exclusion and coordinate policy between central government departments, and 
between central government, local authorities, the voluntary sector and private organisations 
(SEU, 1997). Initially, the SEU focused on four main issues – truancy and school exclusion 
(SEU, 1998a), rough sleeping (SEU, 1998b) teenage pregnancy (SEU, 1999a) and young 
people not in education, employment or training (SEU, 1999b). In all of the reports before 
mentioned, the SEU sought to frame the issue in terms of social exclusion and apply a broad 
methodology of costing the problem, analysing the systemic barriers, establishing 
accountability and focusing departments, authorities and agencies on key measures of success. 
Its recommendations resulted in a variety of government-funded programmes, but the 
geographic reach of these programmes was limited. A particular emphasis was given to those 
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living in deprived areas (Miliband, 2006). Thus, the SEU’s achievements were limited by the 
relatively few areas in which many of the programmes operated. There was also a specific 
policy focus on groups of people thought to be ‘at risk’ or presently socially excluded, such as 
ex-offenders (SEU, 2002a), teenage runaways (SEU, 2002b), children in care (SEU, 2003) and 
older people (SEU, 2005, 2006). These reports encouraged agencies, along with central and 
local government, to be aware of their responsibilities in relation to such groups and respond to 
their needs effectively. 
 
 The emphasis on people and place in the early years of the social exclusion agenda was 
in January 2006 described by David Miliband as ‘wide’ and ‘concentrated’.  According to 
Miliband (2006), the scope reflected political priorities as well as analysis of need. Over time, 
there was a shift away from discrete issues, vulnerable groups and area-based concentrations of 
disadvantage to individuals and families facing multiple combined social problems, which 
Miliband (2006) labelled ‘deep social exclusion’. The population facing deep social exclusion 
was identified as existing at the intersection of poverty and wider social exclusion: ‘within the 
large minority of people who are below one or more of the basic minimum standards, there will 
be some who face exclusion on multiple counts. Here we get closer to a more recognisable 
definition of social exclusion reflecting the most disadvantaged in society’ (Miliband, 2006: 7).  
 
 A visual annotation of the distinction between wide and deep exclusion is displayed in 
Figure 2.2. To be clear, many people suffer one or more forms of disadvantage. For example, 
they may live below the poverty line, have a long-term illness or struggle with basic literacy 
(see Table 2.3 for Miliband’s examples of ‘wide social exclusion’). However, just because a 
sector of the population (however large or small) may be deprived on a single or small number 
of indicators does not necessarily mean that they are socially excluded, although they are at-
risk of social exclusion (hence the amber colour). Miliband’s (2006) analysis suggests that there 
is a small group of people who face multiple intractable problems that when combined result in 
deep social exclusion.  
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Figure 2.2: Deep and persistent social exclusion 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
 Miliband’s (2006) examples of ‘deep social exclusion’ are given in Table 2.3. It is 
apparent from Table 2.3 that the policy focus on unemployment and economic inactivity 
remained over time, but there was a gradual shift from indicators of deprivation to include 
indicators of social dysfunction (e.g., learning difficulties, mental illness, family breakdown, 
criminality, addiction, institutional care). Doubtless, the inclusion of some of these indicators 
had to do with the election of 2005, during which anti-social behaviour emerged as a key voter 
concern (Levitas, 2005). Ultimately, the shift to address more acute disadvantage reflects the 
success – as much as the failure – of policy up to 2006. On the one hand, it was deemed that 
policies to tackle poverty and wider social exclusion such as the minimum wage, the New Deals 
and tax credits had helped the majority move from welfare into work (Opportunity for All / 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2005). That said, according to the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (an organisation which monitors progress in tackling poverty and inequality), 
although progress was made in several high profile areas, such as employment and education, 
many measures of "low income" and "work" show a worse picture in 2005 than in 2000 
(Aldridge et al., 2011). On the other hand, there was a realisation that the SEU’s group-led 
Wide exclusion refers to the large 
number of people disadvantaged on a 
single or small number of indicator (s).  
Deep exclusion refers to people who are 
disadvantaged on multiple and 
overlapping dimensions, resulting in 
severe negative consequences for quality 
of life and future life chances. 
General population 
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approach to social exclusion had failed to reach the most severely excluded and some of the 
poorest, most isolated and vulnerable families (see Table 2.3).  
 
 That there should be a stalling of social exclusion outcomes is perhaps not surprising 
giving that New Labour’s claim of a ‘policy departure’ is questionable on a number of points. 
First, underpinning New Labour’s approach in particular was a focus on targets, as underlined 
in a number of government publications, notably the Opportunity for All reports. Beginning in 
1999, the reports in the series have charted the success or otherwise of explicit targets towards 
the reduction of specific social exclusion features, in relation to three population groups – 
children and young people, people of working age and older people. For children and young 
people, dimensions of social exclusion focused on education (largely academic test scores, but 
also school exclusions), health outcomes (such as low-birth weights), family poverty and youth 
unemployment. For people of working age, dimensions of social exclusion were focussed 
primarily on unemployment, but also included low income jobs, as well as drug use and 
homelessness. The dimensions for older people centred on poverty (largely from reliance on 
state pension, but also from fuel poverty), health and life expectancy, fear of crime, poor 
housing and lack of independence (Department of Social Security, 1999: 5-7). Doubtless, such 
a wide range of indicators can be useful in providing a general picture of the extent of social 
exclusion and also to focus on its specific features. However, there are problems with this 
battery of single indicators. The problems identified include that they ‘do not distinguish 
between risk factors and outcomes. They cannot prioritise one indicator, or potential field of 
intervention, over another. They say nothing about the interaction of different factors’ (Levitas, 
2007: 14). The failure to specify the nature of the links which exist between different elements 
which may constitute the phenomenon is crucial here. For example, reducing unemployment 
may lead to a reduction in social exclusion, but there is no explanation of to what extent or how, 
meaning that for New Labour, ‘government is about solving discrete problems’ (Lister, 2001: 
433), which to a large extent undermines its ‘multidimensional’ approach. 
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 Second, the major initial focus of New Labour’s approach was a specific emphasis on 
integration through paid employment (Levitas, 2005). It reflected the twin belief that ‘work 
strengthens personal independence, fosters greater social inclusion and is the best route out of 
poverty’ and that ‘there were groups of people locked into long-term dependency on benefits 
who [had] been denied the opportunities that work can bring’ (Opportunity for All / Department 
of Work and Pensions, 2006: 5-6). The main policy initiative, as mentioned earlier, was the 
New Deal. The success of the New Deal is contested and ‘very little information is available 
about the value of the schemes, in other words how people’s lives have been changed by them’ 
(Taylor, 2005: 197). ‘The government claimed that the New Deal had assisted around 1.2 
million people into paid work between 1998 and 2004, including 535,000 young people and 
200,000 unemployed adults’ (Taylor, 2005: 197). However, Taylor (2005: 197) points out that 
‘up to the end of 2004 it has been estimated that only 130,000 people actually moved directly 
from participation in the government’s programme into unsubsidised employment at the end of 
the process’. Regardless of whether the figures are or are not misleading, the government paid 
subsidies to participating employers to take on the young and long-term unemployed (Sunley 
et al., 2006). There was no incentive for employers to provide work experience to other groups 
(i.e., the disabled, lone parents, partners of the unemployed, and those aged 50 years or more). 
Thus, a key question is whether the intervention in favour of the young and long-term 
unemployed was detrimental to other target groups. Another question, closely linked to the 
previous one, relates to whether the job offered to a New Dealer is genuinely new or permanent. 
A job that is not new may actually increase social exclusion. The ability of the New Deal to 
accomplish social inclusion was questioned by Brennan et al as early as 1998 who noted that 
the policy would involve ‘recycling lower skilled jobs to the socially excluded away from others 
who were slightly less deprived and disadvantaged’ (Brennan et al., 1998: 4). Put differently, 
the New Deals were liable to be inefficient as they displace problems to other sections of 
society. 
 
 Third, the assumption that employment is a route out of poverty and social exclusion is 
questionable. People can be in work and socially excluded, not least because they can be on 
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low pay/flat wages (which may not cover the rising costs of living - such as food prices, housing 
costs, utilities, child-care costs, and transport/fuel costs - but also Council Tax), caring for 
relatives or doing more than one job (which compromises family and/or recreational life). 
Moreover, the emphasis on work has overshadowed the needs of those for whom work is not 
an option. For pensioners and severely disabled people an employment-based strategy for 
alleviating poverty and exclusion is clearly not relevant. Although there was some financial 
redistribution to pensioners and to some disabled claimants, ‘security for those who cannot 
work received very little attention’ during Blair’s first term in office (Stewart and Hills, 2005: 
21).  For example, the work capability test for Incapacity Benefit was strengthened, ‘with a 
view to reducing the number of recipients’ (Brewer et al., 2002: 505). Again, the response 
consisted of welfare-to-work (i.e., the New Deal programmes), changes to incentives to make 
work pay (i.e., minimum wage, Working Families Tax Credit), and action on inequalities by 
improving public services.  
 
 Thus, Levitas argued New Labour understood social inclusion primarily in terms of 
participation in paid work; it is an understanding based heavily in SID (Levitas, 2005). She also 
suggested that certain welfare policies, such as benefit sanctions for New Deal participants, 
have undertones of MUD. However, as pointed out earlier, the SEU has given prominence to 
specific ‘problem groups’ as the defining feature of social exclusion, which is also a good 
example of MUD. In this respect, New Labour has ‘discursively placed the unwanted 
characteristics of the socially excluded as outside those of mainstream society, the effect of 
which has been to distract attention from the essentially class divided character of society and 
to make conformity to mainstream society the focus of policy’ (Sealey, 2009: 24). Again, 
according to Levitas (2005: 28), New Labour’s approach demonstrated ‘an inconsistent 
combination of SID and MUD’ with considerable ‘pulling’ towards the SID. But the 
simplification that the Levitas position represents is unfair to New Labour, particularly when 
considering New Labour’s second term in office (i.e., 2001-2005). There was extensive policy 
action in this period, such as the raft of person- and place-based polices mentioned earlier, 
which demonstrates that New Labour’s approach has some foundations in RED.  
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 In New Labour’s second term in government, increases in in-work benefits, such as the 
Working Families Tax Credits aimed at some working families with children, were 
accompanied by increases in out-of-work benefits, like Income Support, at least for some client 
groups (Brewer et al., 2002). Income support rates for single parent families, low-paid families 
with children and support for pensioners all increased, which is bizarre when considering that, 
all else being equal, they discourage paid work. The reason why the rates were increased was 
due to other government objectives. In particular, during the latter stage of his first term Tony 
Blair announced an aspiration to reduce relative income poverty for children and pensioners 
(Opportunity for All / Department of Social Security, 1999). Financial redistribution was not 
possible before 1999 largely because of ‘the Government’s commitment to stick to the previous 
Conservative Government’s very tight spending plans for its first two years in office’ (Brewer 
et al., 2002: 8). What limited financial redistribution occurred during and after the second term 
was done by ‘stealth’. Labour went into the 1997 and 2001 general elections pledging not to 
increase the standard or top rates of income tax (Labour Party, 1997, 2001). That is to say the 
emphasis shifted from direct to indirect taxation such as VAT, fuel duty, vehicle exercise duty, 
fossil fuel levies, stamp duty on house purchases, air passenger duties, tobacco and alcohol 
duties, insurance premium tax, TV licenses, custom duties etc. (Emmerson et al., 2005).  
 
 Moreover, what limited financial redistribution occurred was constrained to ‘improving 
the situation of those at the bottom relative to the middle with the position of those at the top 
considered unimportant’ (Stewart and Hills, 2005: 15). Put differently, New Labour was 
concerned more about the distance between the bottom of the income distribution and the 
middle, and less about the distance between the middle and the top. Furthermore, the concern 
was with children and pensioners. There was little sympathy for working-age singles and 
couples without children or with non-dependent children (Stewart and Hills, 2005). Again, 
work was viewed as the best form of welfare for working-age adults. This criticism specifically 
questions the narrow focus of New Labour’s Third Way within which, as mentioned earlier, 
‘problem selection’ is prioritised over ‘problem definition’. For New Labour, the concern was 
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not income poverty per se or overall income inequality, but a reduction in inequality in the 
bottom half of the income distribution, at least for children and pensioners.  
 
 Consequently, means-tested benefits were prioritised over universal benefits. To be 
clear, means-tested benefits are based mainly on a test of income, though some also include 
tests of assets or capital. The key means-tested benefits are Pension Credit, Jobseekers 
Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support and (since 2013) Child 
Benefit. Means-tests are extensively criticised in the literature – see, for example, Lister (1997) 
and Spicker (2014). Briefly, the advantages of means tests are they concentrate financial 
resources on those most in need and they are progressive, meaning they redistribute resources 
vertically from rich to poor. The disadvantages are: ‘they are complex and difficult to 
administer; they often fail to reach those in need [the reasons commonly given for low take-up 
are ignorance, complexity, the effect of changing circumstances, fear, stigma, and the history 
of means-testing]; people’s income changes rapidly [thus effective means-testing calls for 
constant reporting and frequent adjustment in the level of benefit]’ (Spicker, 2014: 2); and, 
‘because it is based on the joint incomes of couples, it threatens to undermine women’s financial 
independence and means that one partner’s economic activity affects the other’s benefit 
entitlement’ (Lister, 1997: 8).  
 
 The main concern is that a means-tested approach is ‘likely to marginalise the poor and 
their interests even further as the rest of society no longer has any stake in the welfare system’ 
(Lister, 1997: 8). This position was adopted by the Institute of Fiscal Studies who warned New 
Labour, ‘the extension of means-tested benefits might lead to a drop in support for the welfare 
state as the benefits are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution, and so offer little 
to the supposedly crucial voters of so-called middle Britain’ (Brewer et al., 2002: 12). Means 
tests thus, many would argue, represent a force for social exclusion rather than inclusion. 
Perhaps these concerns were partly why New Labour introduced universal benefits for the 
elderly, such as free eye tests, free prescriptions, the Winter Fuel Allowance, free TV licences 
and free bus passes.  
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 It could be argued those perks for the rich were necessary for persuading them to help 
out their less fortunate fellow citizens. But there are strong principled reasons why means-tested 
benefits are important. For a start, a welfare state should not collect taxes from everyone – 
including from the least well-off – and then arbitrarily give some of that cash back to people 
who do not really need it. Consider also Child Benefit which, until relatively recently, was a 
universal benefit with take-up as high as 99 per cent in some years (Spicker, 2014). Doubtless, 
child benefit involved redistribution from poor single persons and poor couples without 
children to better-off families. Another reason for defending redistribution and ensuring the 
wealthiest contribute back to society with no expectation of receiving a bribe to do so is partly 
captured by the report of the CSJ which stated that, ‘taxes are the contribution that we all make 
towards building a better society. Taxation in a democratic society is based upon consent; it is 
a desirable good, not a necessary evil… fair taxes, wisely and efficiently used, are a 
responsibility we should share and accept’ (CSJ, 1994: 376. Emphasis added). The point here 
is taxes pay for public services (health, education, transport etc.) which benefit all private 
citizens (even if the rich do not use those services themselves) which in turn creates the 
conditions for a prosperous society. Thus, redistribution through means-tests, together with 
direct taxation ensuring that those who earn most pay most, need not be a force for social 
exclusion. Arguably, it is necessary in the drive towards social inclusion and cohesion.  
 
 The discussion so far has related to 1997-2006. The second period of the social 
exclusion agenda began in June 2006. It was marked by the announcement of the closure of the 
nine-year-old SEU, with its work transferred to a smaller Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF) 
in the Cabinet Office. Although a ‘cross-departmental’ approach remained at the heart of the 
SETF (SETF, 2006), its reduced size and profile suggests that social exclusion was no longer 
at the heart of government policy itself. The SETF adopted as its core focus the ‘2.5 per cent of 
every generation caught in a lifetime of disadvantage and harm’, as set out in Reaching Out: 
An Action Plan on Social Exclusion (SETF, 2006: 5). This report builds on the distinction 
between wide and deep exclusion, and translates Miliband’s (2006) analysis into a critique of 
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‘why even some of our most ambitious programmes aimed at breaking the cycle of deprivation 
have had only a modest impact to date on the most excluded’ (SETF, 2006: 20). The assessment 
was that, while there had been success in reducing poverty and wider social exclusion in the 
general population, ‘a small minority’ had effectively been left behind, and this minority was 
suffering from ‘deep and persistent social exclusion’ (SETF, 2006: 8). Signiﬁcantly, Reaching 
Out: An Action Plan on Social Exclusion (hereafter referred to as "the Action Plan") recognises 
that for this minority, the barriers are not only economic but also social and cultural (see SETF, 
2006: 17-20). More significantly, there was an acknowledgement of the perverse consequences 
of the group-led approach that characterised earlier efforts: 
 
‘Individual agencies do generally focus on improving outcomes for the neediest within 
their services (for example the most mentally ill or the most prolific offenders) but often 
miss those who have multiple needs but need less help from any one service. Thus, people 
may not meet the threshold of any given agency to trigger a fuller intervention – despite 
the scale of their problems or the harms caused to the communities in which they live’ 
(SETF, 2006: 74). 
 
There was a realisation that methods had to change, and this realisation led to an increased focus 
on the principles of early intervention, systematically identifying what works, better co-
ordination of the many separate agencies, personalisation, and intolerance of poor performance 
(see Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.5: Reaching Out - guiding principles                          
 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
Response 
Not knowing who is likely to be 
excluded until they already are 
Better identification and early intervention:  
We will identify early who is at risk of persistent exclusion and use this 
information to intervene and more effectively support those most in 
need before disadvantage becomes entrenched. 
 
Variable and ineffective practice Identifying what works:  
We will systematically identify and promote interventions that work. 
To ensure effective adoption of best practice, we will build the 
capability of providers and commissioners. 
 
Poor coordination between 
services, and perverse incentives 
discouraging cooperation 
Multi-agency working:  
We will break down barriers and enhance flexibility so local providers 
and agencies can work together to meet the needs of excluded groups, 
especially those facing multiple problems. 
 
Multifaceted problems having to 
fit around services rather than 
services fitting around the 
individual’s needs, and with little 
persistence or follow-through 
Personalisation, rights and responsibilities:  
We will tailor services to the needs of the individual. We will empower, 
where it is appropriate, excluded groups to make choices or ensure 
there is an independent, trusted third party to work on their behalf. Our 
approach will be framed by a clear understanding of the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens, services and the community. 
 
Variable and poor outcomes 
across areas and service providers 
Supporting achievement and managing underperformance:  
Where local authorities and services are delivering, Government will 
leave them al But where there is underperformance, Government will 
intervene. 
 
Source: SETF (2006: 22) 
 
 
It also identified the need for a ‘lifetime approach’: 
  
‘System reform can take years to deliver, and results can take decades to show. We will 
supplement our drive for deeper reform with more focused and immediate action that we 
are confident will make a difference. This Action Plan establishes a range of specific 
proposals that we believe to be of pivotal importance throughout an individual’s lifetime, 
both in terms of their impact on the life chances of the most excluded and in order to 
strengthen the case for wider reforms’ (SETF, 2006: 10). 
 
Thus, in the Action Plan, a lifecycle approach is adopted, where policy/action is focused around 
age cohorts (see Figure 2.3). As can be seen, there are three age cohorts and, in the case of 
‘children and teenagers at risk’ and ‘adults facing chronic social exclusion’, these cohorts are 
further broken down into at-risk target groups. Programmes are focussed on addressing the 
multiple issues and/or barriers facing the age cohorts in general and minority groups in 
particular.  
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Figure 2.3: A ‘lifecycle approach’ with specific target groups 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
 The Action Plan stressed that breaking the cycle of disadvantage involves early 
intervention and prevention. A particular emphasis was placed on parenting and the early years 
(due to research showing their life-long impact on education, emotional wellbeing and 
resilience), and identification of the most at-risk households. The Action Plan argued that the 
process of identification should start before individuals are born and identified a number of 
‘risk factors’, which, it announced, community midwives, health professionals and social 
workers will use to diagnose an unborn child’s potential for future misbehaviour and exclusion 
(see Table 2.6). 
 
Table 2.6: Early years – risk factors                 
 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions 
Post-birth (age 0-2 years) 
 economic stress 
Source: SETF (2006: 46) 
 
Children & 
Teenagers at risk 
Children of teenage parents 
Children in care 
Children with mental health 
or behavioural problems 
Low educational 
achievement 
Families at risk 
 
Early 
Years 
 
 
Adults Facing 
Chronic Exclusion 
People experiencing mental 
health distress 
Care leavers 
Offenders and ex-offenders 
People with learning 
difficulties 
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The existence of any or a combination of these factors could be enough to trigger intervention. 
Initiatives aimed at families and children included:  
 
 health-led home visiting parenting support programmes based on the US Family-Nurse 
Partnerships (FNPs) model to provide intensive, home-based support for first-time mothers 
at risk during pregnancy and the first two years of a child’s life. FNPs sought to improve 
mother-baby attachments and breastfeeding rates, reduce smoking during pregnancy, 
improve maternal health and diet and promote education and employment opportunities 
(see SETF, 2006: 52); 
 
 Multi-Systemic Therapy programmes aimed at children and parents with emotional and 
behavioural problems (see SETF, 2006: 67); 
 
 Treatment Foster Care programmes (a home-based alternative to group homes for children 
in care) to improve outcomes for children (see SETF, 2006: 67); 
 
 a revised teenage pregnancy strategy (see SETF, 2006: 66); and, 
 
 the development of commissioning tools and databases on evidence-based parenting 
programmes and intensive interventions (see SETF, 2006: 28-31). 
 
 This focus and approach informed the Families at risk review, which set out the 
principles and guidelines for what would become known as New Labour’s Think Family 
approach to social exclusion. Reaching Out: Think Family was published in June 2007. This 
report identifies 140,000 severely disadvantaged families (about 2% of families across Britain) 
as a target group in recognition that: 
 
‘parental and wider family problems… cast a shadow that spans whole lifetimes and 
indeed passes down the generations. These family experiences can limit aspiration, 
reinforce cycles of poverty and provide poor models of behaviour that can have an impact 
on a child’s development and well-being, with significant costs for public services and 
the wider community’ (SETF, 2007a: 1).  
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While there was a tacit acknowledgement of wider societal barriers that inhibit inclusion (see 
SETF, 2007a: 15), overwhelming emphasis is placed upon the need to tackle what was 
perceived to be pathological family dysfunction. Parents and families were deemed a risk to 
children in the sense of unacceptable behaviour, values and intentions – in the main associated 
with substance misuse, high family conflict, domestic violence, parental neglect, anti-social 
behaviour, and criminality (see SETF, 2007a: 15). The SETF stated that Think Family ‘is not a 
debate on the shape of families and we will not try to incentivise or engineer particular family 
structures’ – rather, the emphasis was on the degree and severity of ‘risk factors children face 
from their environment’ (SETF, 2007a: 1). The report called for greater integration between 
adult and children’s services. For example, prisons and children’s social services, specifically 
ensuring a family gets the support it needs when a parent goes into jail, or comes out of jail. 
The report also called for more investment in family focused initiatives, such as Family 
Intervention Projects (FIPs). Introduced in 2006, FIPs are delivered by a combination of 
statutory agencies and social partners and 
 
‘provide holistic support designed to target some of the most disadvantaged and 
problematic families and improve their behaviour and deliver other outcomes. 
Interventions vary in intensity, partly reflecting the severity of the problems involved. 
These range from home visits and coordination of different service interventions, to full 
residential interventions where the family lives in adapted accommodation with 24-hour 
supervision and support’ (SETF, 2006: 39).  
 
Sanctions are seen as integral to the success of FIPs: 
 
‘The use of sanctions is an important lever for motivating families to change. Demoting 
tenancies or gaining possession orders suspended on the basis of compliance with the 
projects or, for some, the very real prospect of children being taken into care, can provide 
the wake up call to take the help on offer’ (HM Government, 2010b: 1).  
 
Premised on the idea that parental irresponsibility and family dysfunction are the main causes 
of social exclusion, FIPs have their origins within the moral underclass discourse. White et al 
(2008) undertook an independent evaluation of the 53 FIPs established during 2006 and 2007. 
They found that following participation in a FIP, levels of crime and anti-social behaviour 
declined considerably, the risk of eviction for families was reduced and several outcomes for 
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young people were improved, particularly with respect to truancy, exclusion and/or bad 
behaviour at school. However, no evidence was found for improved outcomes in relation to 
education, employment, health, or family functioning. 
 
 In summary, the SETF adopted as its core focus the ‘2.5 per cent of every generation 
caught in a lifetime of disadvantage and harm’ (SETF, 2006: 5). This intractability was 
understood to stem in part from the way policies and services are designed. The assessment was 
that, because this problem is deeply systemic, severe and multiple disadvantage had been 
insufficiently acknowledged and targeted. As a result, the SETF set out a new vision for social 
exclusion policy in which all responses are underpinned by five key principles (see Table 2.5). 
In this respect, the explicit linkage of policy to social exclusion objectives and principles has 
marked an observable shift from the SEU’s approach. With respect to the SEU, the focus was 
never at the people with the most complex needs. The SEU focused on highly visible social 
problems and particular groups. How the SEU, Tony Blair and other key ministers selected the 
groups was largely political: ‘it was partly led by who they felt was falling through cracks 
between departments; however, it was also led by who had the most political purchase, who 
attracted the interest of politicians at the time, for example on teenage pregnancy’ (McNeil, 
2012: 23). 
 
 For the SETF, references to ‘disadvantage and harm’ are accompanied by prioritisation 
of ‘specific hard-to-reach groups’ (SETF, 2006: 95) and an emphasis on early intervention. In 
this sense, the SETF focused strongly on young people ‘at risk’ and ‘problem families’, 
although there was also a concern with ‘adults facing chronic exclusion’. With respect to the 
latter, the SETF specified four target-groups who, together with young people ‘at risk’ and 
‘problem families’, constitute ‘the 2.5 per cent’ (see Figure 2.3). The SETF assumed that many 
members of these small groups are likely to have ‘chaotic lives and multiple needs’ (SETF, 
2006: 71). Although these terms were not defined, groups such as homeless people, asylum 
seekers, undocumented migrants, sex workers, travelling communities and addiction sufferers 
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may be variously identified in this sense. This list is not exhaustive and only aims to suggest 
some additional groups likely to experience multiple, entrenched and hidden needs. 
 
 The point of the list is to highlight that ‘the 2.5 per cent’ is far from a homogenous 
group, which raises a series of questions. For instance: what, if anything, do all these sub-groups 
have in common that warrants speaking about them in aggregate? Do these sub-groups have a 
considerably different experience of either social exclusion or of the provision of services to 
meet it? Furthermore, by identifying a number of sub-groups within ‘the 2.5 per cent’, is there 
a risk of over-simplifying the experiences and needs of those who fall within the same sub-
groups? The reasons why people are in a particular sub-group may differ considerably, as might 
their need for services and support. For example, within the homeless population, there will be 
individuals whose exclusion is much deeper than others. Another issue, closely linked to the 
previous one, is that one establishes a false distinction between someone suffering five counts 
of social exclusion and someone suffering six. There is a tension to be reconciled then, between 
severity of need and multiplicity of need. One partial solution to this problem is to approach 
social exclusion through the lens of different domains (e.g., in terms of a hierarchy of domains, 
topics and indicators), rather than its impact on disadvantaged groups, not least because their 
individual characteristics vary and are dynamic. 
 
 In conclusion then, in the period 2006-2010, New Labour understood that people who 
face severe and multiple disadvantage need different forms of support. The welfare state plus 
universal public services are not enough. This realisation led to more targeted and intensive 
interventions. The mistake made by New Labour was that it focused exclusively on ‘the 2.5 per 
cent’, which had the effect of diverting attention away from social exclusion within the wider 
context of poverty and societal disadvantage. The emphasis on ‘the 2.5 per cent’ can be seen as 
locating policy in general towards the ‘anti-egalitarianism’ emphasis of the right, rather than 
the ‘egalitarianism’ of the left. Specifically, it suggests that the problems of alienation, isolation 
and poor life chances are confined to a tiny minority people. The implication being that social 
exclusion policy only needed to concentrate on a small number of individuals and families. 
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With respect to the analysis and policy prescriptions which emerged from the SETF, they have 
much more in common with the moral underclass discourse than the redistributionist discourse. 
 
2.3.3 Social exclusion policy under the Coalition 
 
 With the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May 
2010, the social exclusion agenda entered a new phase. It was marked by the announcement of 
the closure of the SETF, with its staff being absorbed into a new Office for Civil Society (OCS). 
The remit of the OCS was to promote the Conservative Party’s "Big Society" agenda (Cabinet 
Office, 2010), which sought a retreat from state intervention and a greater role for citizens, 
communities, voluntary agencies and the private sector in problem solving and service delivery. 
Issues of multiple disadvantage were made the responsibility of the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) (Cabinet Office, 2010). A review of the DWP’s literature reveals the term 
‘social justice’ is substituted for ‘social exclusion’. The Coalition’s ‘social justice’ strategy also 
focuses on a narrow group facing entrenched social disadvantage and poverty, the causes of 
which are attributed to ‘family breakdown, educational failure, welfare dependency, debt, drug 
dependency, or some other relevant factor. Many people are beset by a combination of these 
factors, interlinking with one another and driving a cycle of deprivation’ (DWP, 2012: 10). As 
with Reaching Out, overwhelming emphasis is placed upon the health and stability of the family 
unit, which is perceived as being at the heart of the problem and the solution. Thus, FIPs 
continue to form a key part of the Coalition’s social exclusion strategy and, in December 2010, 
David Cameron announced he would extend the initiative to cover 120,000 ‘troubled’ families 
by March 2015. Local authorities wishing to access the programme’s funding (which amounts 
to up to £4000 per family) are to use a four point criteria for identifying eligible families, as set 
out in Table 2.3. 
  
 The location of intervention is therefore set at a family rather than societal level. Indeed, 
like New Labour, the Coalition neglected the role structural forces play in producing and 
worsening aspects of multiple disadvantage.  It articulated a strongly behavioural account of 
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poverty and disadvantage, as perhaps most evident from the setting up of the Behavioural 
Insight Team (BIT) in the Cabinet Office in 2010. As the forward of one early report published 
by the BIT argued, ‘many of the biggest policy challenges we are now facing… will only be 
resolved if we are successful in persuading people to change their behaviour, their lifestyles or 
their existing habits’ (Dolan et al., 2010: 4). The moral underclass discourse has permeated 
virtually every aspect of the Coalition’s welfare agenda, justifying ruthless policy responses 
such as the benefits cap, bedroom tax, the slashing of working tax credits, child tax credits, 
Council Tax relief, Housing Benefit payments and disability benefits, as well as the withdrawal 
of Health in Pregnancy Grant, the Sure Start Maternity Grant, Child Trust Funds and 
Educational Maintenance Allowance. The list goes on. Indeed, the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government introduced radical public spending cuts and asserted that 
‘reducing the national deficit’ is its social and economic policy priority. The Coalition’s deficit 
reduction agenda has not only involved unprecedented welfare reforms, but also drastic cuts in 
public services. Campaigners have particularly raised concerns about cuts in the following 
services: community midwife services, prevention initiatives in health promotion, mental health 
support, outreach work (e.g., substance misuse, rough sleeping), youth centres and services, 
family and parenting support, care and respite services as well as leisure and recreation services 
(e.g., community art projects, library services). Thus, the current economic and social turmoil 
being experienced in many spheres of society by many people across Britain makes the need 
for examinations of the patterns and processes of generalised disadvantage even more pressing.  
 
2.4 Summary 
 
 The evolution of the concept of social exclusion, from its origins in France in the 1970s, 
has been documented. Initially, this chapter reviewed the conditions in which the concept of 
social exclusion arose. It argued specifically that, in the context of globalisation and changing 
economic conditions, ‘social exclusion is related to the deep economic restructuring 
necessitated by growing competition in the emerging global economy’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 
1997: 415). Certainly, within the European context, there is an acceptance that economic change 
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serves to impoverish and alienate large sectors of the population in a multi-dimensional fashion. 
The European Union has varied over time in how it sees that process of alienation being 
overcome. Integration into employment is prominent in its reform agenda but civic, social and 
interpersonal integration is also present. However, the approach to social exclusion has, in 
practice, reflected a more limited concern with labour market exclusion. 
 
 This chapter has also examined how New Labour developed the concept of social 
exclusion to explain disadvantage in the UK since 1997. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
New Labour did not regard social exclusion as a characteristic feature of contemporary society, 
that is, an endemic phenomenon stemming from structural changes. Rather, the concept of 
social exclusion as used by New Labour reflects the idea that it is incumbent upon a kind or 
category of individual, and so does not signify a shift of perspective beyond the poverty 
paradigm. Furthermore, with regard to the claim made by New Labour of substantive change 
in the shift from poverty to social exclusion, significant limitations can be seen in New Labour’s 
approach. For a start, New Labour’s definition is focussed on outcomes and ‘makes no reference 
to the processes that create the problems identified in the definition’ (Percy-Smith, 2000: 4). A 
good example of New Labour’s key features approach is the emphasis on a range of indicators 
for social exclusion within the Opportunity for All reports. At first glance, the emphasis on a 
wide range of indicators can be seen as addressing the weaknesses of the poverty approach to 
societal disadvantage. However, the point here is that New Labour’s usage of social exclusion 
is atheoretical. As the analysis has shown, there is a lack of consistency and rigor in the 
understanding of how social exclusion comes about. Indeed, it is very difficult to identify what 
New Labour considers risk factors and outcomes, suggesting there is confusion of ‘causation’ 
with ‘correlation’. Another issue, closely related to the previous one, is the failure to specify 
the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may constitute the 
phenomenon, which to a large extent undermined New Labour’s ‘multidimensional’ approach.  
 
 New Labour’s specific articulation of the individual ‘causes’ of social exclusion makes 
itself readily apparent in policy, concentrating on the most visible and extreme issues which are 
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likely to capture the attention of the wider public such as street homelessness, teenage mothers, 
the problems of the most deprived neighbourhoods, crime and policies to tackle anti-social 
behaviour. Moreover, policies like the New Deal and Sure Start are also in keeping with the 
emphasis in its definition of social exclusion on specific problem groups. Thus, the 
downgrading of the SEU to the SETF in 2006 did not occur as a result of social exclusion being 
solved, but rather, from a realisation that the group-led approach had failed to reach the most 
severely excluded and some of the poorest, most isolated and vulnerable families. This shift to 
address the characteristics of ‘the 2.5 per cent’ and move away from the early, more universalist 
underpinnings of the social exclusion agenda represented a move away from considering social 
exclusion within the wider context of poverty and disadvantage and meant social exclusion 
policy was targeted at a relatively small group. New Labour, and subsequently the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and present Conservative government, assumed that 
the problems of isolation, alienation and poor life chances are confined to a tiny minority, rather 
than a larger population. Arguably, targeted policies concentrating on those with accentuated 
needs over a period of time are a complement but not a substitute for more generic polices.  
 
 The criticisms above specifically question the narrow focus of New Labour’s approach 
within which ‘problem selection’ is prioritised over ‘problem definition’. That such limitations 
are observable in New Labour’s approach can be seen as relating to its overall emphasis on 
‘equality of opportunity’ over ‘equality of outcome’. The former is a fragmented discourse – it 
is also a more conservative discourse, not least because the socially excluded are usually 
discussed in relatively isolated terms and as employed is a behavioural account of poverty and 
disadvantage. Ultimately, overwhelming emphasis on equality of opportunity meant 
individualistically-centred policies, and these policies mark out New Labour’s approach, and 
indeed the Coalition’s approach, as a weak form of social exclusion, rather than strong form 
(see section 1.1.3). In closing, it is crucial to make explicit a key point from the above review. 
Regarding the social exclusion agenda, the problems and challenges facing seaside residents 
are notable by their absence. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Understanding Seaside Resort Change  
 
 
 This review of the literature and existing evidence on seaside resorts aims to provide a 
statement about what is known about resort change in the UK at the present time. It argues that 
little attention has been paid to the non-touristic dimensions of resorts and develops a 
framework for understanding socio-economic resort change. The framework outlined in this 
chapter has two main purposes. First, it specifies the main variables which influence socio-
economic resort change more clearly. Second, it provides a basis for subsequent analysis, 
undertaken in the methodology, to determine how the variables are represented by the available 
data. The review followed the traditional approach used in the social sciences. Books, articles 
and reports were searched for, initially with a broad focus on the concept of ‘resort 
development’ (i.e., evolution, transformation and restructuring) and developing to explore more 
specific topics and ideas associated with ‘area change’, ‘area-based deprivation’ and 
‘concentrated social exclusion’. Given the context for the review, attention was concentrated 
on recent UK literature, and on seaside resorts and disadvantaged localities, although sources 
from other countries in the developed world were investigated where these appeared to provide 
evidence particularly relevant to the UK context. From this literature, three principal questions 
have been formulated (Figure 3.1). Perhaps the most immediate question from a policy 
perspective is how are seaside resorts changing? What aspects of resorts are changing and at 
what pace? However, it is also necessary to know what causes seaside resorts to change, and 
which causal factors seem to be driving the changes observed at present. Lastly, of interest 
might be the implications of seaside resort change for public policy on regeneration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Issues in socio-economic resort change 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
Causes of 
resort change 
 
Aspects and  
directions of 
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Implications of 
resort change 
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 These questions and particularly the first two form the focus of this review. To be clear, 
this chapter is concerned with the changing nature of English seaside resorts. The history of 
the development of these pleasure landscapes has already been extensively documented and 
discussed in the literature (e.g., Gilbert, 1939; Walvin, 1978; Walton, 1983, 2000; Huggins, 
1984; Farrant, 1987; Urry, 1990; Soane, 1992; Fletcher, 1993; Shaw and Williams, 1997; 
Morgan and Pritchard, 1999; Walton, 2000). Thus, it is not within the scope of this chapter to 
explore, in great depth, the large literature that covers the history of the seaside. However, what 
is necessary is a short background to inform the forthcoming investigation on contemporary 
socio-economic resort change. 
 
3.1 The development of seaside resorts in Britain 
 
 It is widely accepted that the idea of taking a seaside holiday dates back to the eighteenth 
century. The initial growth of the seaside holiday stemmed from a belief that the sea water, like 
that of the earlier spa, had medicinal properties (Walton, 1983; Walvin, 1978). The proletariat 
was excluded from such benefits, at least until the development of the railways and the 
Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. The democratisation of the seaside holiday 
resulted from specific aspects of general industrialisation. Several writers have thoroughly 
discussed the factors that culminated in attracting working-class residential tourists to the 
seaside (e.g., Walvin, 1978; Walton, 1983; Urry, 1990). In brief, these include: (1) cheap and 
effective transport to a suitable coastline; (2) the working classes had to have sufficient income 
to afford a holiday in times when holidays were not paid; (3) the seaside visitors would need 
several days holiday back-to-back in the summer; (4) the resorts had to have sufficient facilities, 
supply must meet demand; and, (5) the labour force must choose to spend their hard earned 
saved income at the seaside, so the resorts needed to be attractive.  
 
 Thus, various factors – including mobility, affluence, time, supply and demand – 
enabled the appeal of the seaside to trickle down through society. To satisfy demand, resorts 
were developed around the coastline to accommodate a variety of budgets and tastes (Urry, 
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1990; Shaw and Williams, 1997; Walton, 1983, 2000). Eventually, resorts became places where 
different classes of people mixed together and social conflict occurred between classes with 
very different lifestyles. As noted by Walton (1983: 3), ‘the seaside brought mutually 
incompatible modes of recreation and enjoyment into close proximity’. Many resorts were seen 
as liminal, that is, ‘as an exceptional and distinctive place where normal limitations did not 
apply, at least quite as much as normal’ (Walton, 2000: 104). Consequently, the behaviour and 
practices associated with these places also came to disturb people that lived in them. According 
to Farrant (1987: 137), ‘from the 1880s, the expectations of residents who wished to preserve 
the social tone and image of these places increasingly diverged from the aims of those whose 
livelihood depended upon providing tourist attractions’.  
 
 Many variables influenced resort development, including land ownership, local 
government, entrepreneurial activity, topography and transport (Huggins, 1984; Soane, 1992; 
Fletcher, 1993; Shaw and Williams, 2004). Some resorts were ‘fashioned on sandy wastes 
originally devoid of settlement’ (Barrett, 1958: 1). However, most resorts were grafted onto a 
pre-existing settlement (i.e., town, village, hamlet). Some of these settlements were not only 
resorts but had functions such as harbours, ports or market centres too (Barrett, 1958). Thus, in 
several instances, the development of resort activities coincided with the continued 
development of maritime activities. Changes in the relative importance of such economic 
activities meant some places had a short affair with tourism. For example, Bootle, Gravesend, 
Southampton, Swansea and Tynemouth flirted with tourism in 1800s, but their resort functions 
had edged away to take a back-stage role (relative to other economic activities) by Victorian 
times (Walton, 1983). The concentration of certain maritime activities in fewer and larger 
places resulted in the stagnation and decline of other places, which would be rescued by 
tourism. Old maritime towns rescued by resort development include, for example, Brighton, 
Deal, Folkestone, Margate, Newquay, St. Ives, Tenby, Weymouth and Whitby (Barrett, 1958). 
By the early twentieth century, there were nearly 150 resorts and 
 
 ‘Britain, and England in particular, had a system of coastal resorts whose scale and 
complexity was unmatched anywhere else in the world’ (Walton, 2000: 27).  
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 The growth of seaside resorts was to continue, driven by the expansion of the domestic 
seaside holidaymaking industry. However, the boom in tourism did not last. From the 1970s, 
many seaside resorts were experiencing a slow, but cumulative ‘decline’ (Agarwal, 2005). 
Although ‘decline’ is not really defined in the academic literature, it is a word that, in the context 
of destination development, conjures up a multitude of undesirable changes. Descriptions of 
‘resort decline’ variously emphasises decline in: tourist volumes and expenditure; tourism-
related employment and income; resorts’ market share; environmental quality of destination; 
quality of visitor experience; appeal and investment. However, the central issue is assumed to 
be decline in tourist volumes, expenditure and market share.  
  
 The statistics that quantify this decline deserve a thorough explanation and should be 
treated with caution. Agarwal (1997a) clearly outlines the deficiencies that hamper 
understanding of resort decline, such issues falling under the specific areas of temporal 
discontinuity, spatial scope of analysis, lack of standardisation and reliability. The problems 
identified include: 
 
‘tourism data are often collected on a district basis and that which is available for seaside 
resorts are often not directly comparable either over a period of time or between 
individual resorts as the parameters of the information collection vary greatly even 
between local governments. Also tourism statistics are particularly prone to errors, 
omissions and oversights that are frequently incorporated within the data’ (Agarwal and 
Brunt, 2006: 660). 
 
Large-scale seaside tourism surveys invariably gather information based on a sample (of 
registered accommodation; of individuals’ spend) which are then calculated for the population 
as a whole to produce statistics on trips or expenditure. Such estimates are further complicated 
by the fact that ‘staying visits to the seaside have been measured on a national basis since the 
1970s, but there is no equivalent data for day visits’ (Middleton, 2001: 86). However, day visits 
and informal accommodation establishments and enterprises are probably very important in 
some resorts. Another issue is that ‘seaside’ does not always correspond to seaside resorts. 
Some ad-hoc assessments from consultants and official bodies have focused on well-defined 
seaside resorts, while others have covered the surrounding hinterland or whole local authority 
79 
 
districts (Middleton, 2001). Consequently, as Agarwal and Brunt (2006) have pointed out, some 
assessments incorporate tourism centres, for example, caravan and camp sites and holiday 
parks, in essentially rural coastal locations. 
 
 The limitations associated with tourism-related data have serious implications. In terms 
of this research, demonstrating a link between resort decline and social exclusion is 
problematic. More broadly, the failure of resorts, historically and presently, to systematically 
collect tourism data has been, and is, a barrier to effective ‘decision-making’, which is ‘a factor 
that has contributed to their decline’ (Gale, 2007: 23). Furthermore, the extreme paucity of data 
relating specifically to seaside resorts and the non-standard way in which tourism information 
is collated means that any attempt to interpret tourism trends for English seaside resorts over 
the short term is fraught with difficulty. Nonetheless, such data do provide an indication of the 
overall scale of resort decline. For example, an England Tourism Council (2001) report showed 
that, in the period 1973-1998, English seaside tourism had fallen from 32 million to 22 million 
trips while total domestic tourism remained more or less constant at 100 million trips. Over the 
same time period, the number of nights (i.e., one or more nights) spent on English seaside 
tourism had almost halved from 193 million to 104 million. Another report, by English Heritage 
(2003), paints a similar picture. Outlining the challenges facing resorts, which include failing 
to satisfy visitor expectations, English Heritage noted that in 1968 holidays in seaside resorts 
accounted for 75% of main holidays, but by 1999 that figure was only 44%. Thus, the data 
suggests that the number of holidays taken by the seaside was in decline, but still very 
important. It is clear that resorts have been subject to much change, with the latter being studied 
through a number of different approaches. 
 
3.1.1 Approaches to studying resort development 
 
 Research evidence on resort development comprises three main strands of work. One is 
the morphology study, focusing on the detailed understanding of the form (i.e., the shape, 
appearance and configuration of the natural and built environment) and function of a resort, and 
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primarily using mixed methods to describe and explain change. Such studies have a relatively 
long history. Gilbert (1939) was one of the first geographers to discuss in general terms the 
layout and morphology of resorts. Gilbert (1939) recognised that tourism was modifying the 
landscape and transforming the settlement patterns on the English coast and distinguished resort 
towns from others. With a follow-up longitudinal study on Brighton, Gilbert (1949) drew 
attention to the changing spatial patterns and landscapes associated with resort development, 
and the reasons for these patterns, which included tourism urbanisation and transport evolution. 
Gilbert’s research was followed by some important descriptive work based on social histories 
and case studies, which appeared concurrently with the beginning of morphological modelling.  
 
 In brief, morphological models may be divided into three categories: (1) static models 
(spatial axis emphasised); (2) historical models (temporal axis emphasised – often linked to 
theoretical models of resort development); and (3) integrated models (wider contextual factors 
and general applicability emphasised) (see Liu and Wall, 2009 for a review). Existing models 
of coastal resorts fall within the former two categories. Census data, holiday brochures and field 
maps dominated the early research, which described the spatial location of resort infrastructure 
and tourism activity. While Gilbert (1939, 1949) studied individual resorts, Barrett (1958) 
developed a generic model based on observations of features common to many seaside resorts 
of England and Wales. He undertook the only major national study of the layout and 
morphology of eighty seaside resorts, which found common features such as linear 
development along the coast, with the ‘frontal strip’ surrounded by numerous zones of resort 
activity, including recreational, commercial and residential districts, and density and price 
hierarchy.  
 
 Beginning in the 1980s, the resort morphology research agenda shifted away from a 
focus on the forms and functions of resorts towards the relationships between them, and how 
they changed over time. This body of work, again mainly focusing on the detailed 
understanding of individual resorts, has employed additional techniques, such as the 
interpretation of aerial photography involving time-series data, to describe and explain within-
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resort change at different stages of resort evolution. Attention turned away from European 
coastal resorts but the focus on physical features and land use patterns remained. The neglect 
of the socioeconomic dimensions of coastal resorts, and the overwhelming emphasis on 
localised explanations (i.e., within-resort causal links) rather than wider change processes, has 
been criticism levelled at this body of work (Shaw and Agarwal, 2007).  
 
 A second strand of resort development studies, derived mainly from the sub-field of 
tourism geography, focuses on investigating the patterns (and processes, albeit to a lesser 
extent) whereby tourist areas evolve temporally through a number of stages or phases. This 
strand of work, which has developed mainly since the 1980s, has resulted in several theoretical 
models of resort development (e.g., Miossec, 1977; Butler, 1980; Gorsem, 1981; Wolfe, 1983; 
Young, 1983). Such representations ultimately are related to Christaller (1963) and his seminal 
work, which applied central place theory to tourism. Considering the spatial location of tourism 
within Europe, Christaller (1963) observed that tourism generally occurred in areas within 
countries away from industrial and urban agglomerations. Christaller’s work was significant in 
that he convincingly described how tourist resorts as peripheral places undergo a ‘typical course 
of development’, proceeding from exclusive development through expansion and into decline 
as fashions changed and competition developed (see Christaller, 1963: 103 for a description of 
this process). These ideas were particularly influential on some later theorists of tourism, 
namely Cohen (1972) and Turner and Ash (1975), who have stressed the significance of the 
‘explorer’ or ‘drifter’ in opening up peripheral areas to successive touristic intrusions, and Plog 
(1974), who related the rise and fall of destinations to the personal preferences and 
psychological characteristics of tourists. Thus, during the 1970s, several tourist typologies were 
devised (see Shaw and Williams, 1994: 68-75 for a review), all of which identified mass tourism 
as the final stage in the evolution of resorts.  
 
 Of the models devised to understand the dynamic nature of resort development, the 
Tourist Area Life Cycle (TALC) proposed by Butler (1980) is the most cited within the field of 
tourism studies (Hall, 2006; Gibson, 2008). The TALC (Figure 3.2) portrays change in both 
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tourism demand and supply, in stages and was initially based on the Costa Brava in Spain. 
Butler (1980) suggested that the pattern of visitor arrivals to a tourist area is similar to the S-
shaped curve of the ‘Product Life Cycle’ in classical marketing theory. Drawing also on models 
of wildlife populations and Plog’s (1974) cognitive-normative tourist typology, a six-stage 
hypothetical evolutionary sequence was described, consisting of exploration, involvement, 
development, consolidation and stagnation. In the final phase of the model (now routinely 
termed as the post-stagnation stage, although Butler does not actually use that term), various 
pathways from decline to rejuvenation are proposed. The potential for rejuvenation is dependent 
not only on intervention and investment, but also management, which was the main argument 
in the original model. As noted by Butler (2004: 162), the model was ‘a commentary on the 
inevitability of loss of quality by destinations in the absence of management, not… the 
inevitability of decline regardless of intervention’ (Emphasis added). 
Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Tourist Area Life Cycle 
Source: Modified from Butler (1980) 
  
  
 The TALC has been widely and frequently applied to various tourism products and 
environments (see Lagiewski, 2006 for a recent review). Where the TALC has been applied to 
individual English seaside resorts or destinations (i.e., seaside districts and regions), it has 
invariably been with intention of articulating their historical development and analysing the 
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evolution of their markets (e.g., Cooper and Jackson, 1989; Agarwal, 1997a; Cooper, 1997; 
Thornton, 1997). These studies have shown the model to be empirically relevant and that 
English seaside resorts are certainly in stagnation stage, if not the post-stagnation phase of the 
tourist area life-cycle. Overall, two main reasons were proposed to explain the steady reduction 
of demand for traditional seaside holidays since the 1970s, a more thorough account of which 
is provided by Shaw and Williams (1997), Agarwal (2002) and Gale (2007). The most 
commonly cited reason for the initial decline in tourism at English seaside resorts is the 
development of competition (i.e., problems of demand), although their decline is also attributed 
to a general deterioration of quality (i.e., problems of supply).  
 
 The English seaside has faced competition ‘from overseas sun, sea and sand resorts 
initially in the Western, then Eastern Mediterranean, and subsequently throughout the pleasure-
peripheries of the Caribbean and Latin America, southern Africa and Southeast Asia’ (Gale, 
2007: 24). However, in addition to competition from ‘seaside’ tourism products and 
destinations abroad, the English seaside has faced competition on the home front from non-
seaside destinations and products. Indeed, ‘the countryside and nowadays-rejuvenated inland 
cities are powerful competitors, chasing government funding, employment opportunities, 
education initiatives, leisure visitors, conferences and entertainment spectacles’ (Powell and 
Gray, 2009: 7). The proliferation of more attractive holidays elsewhere in Britain and overseas 
is undoubtedly an important factor, but there are other trends in tourism markets affecting 
resorts. The trends identified include the growth in short breaks (i.e., 1-3 nights) and day trips, 
shift to self-catering and ‘self-service’ generally (so employment and income lower), 
individualisation of tourism markets (i.e., post-Fordist tourism) and off-season holidays (Shaw 
and Coles, 2007; Visit England, 2010). In addition to these adverse competitive conditions, 
resource depletion has undermined the competitiveness of English seaside resorts. Cooper 
(1997) clearly outlines the key features that mark the decline of the English seaside resort from 
a supply perspective, such indicators falling under the broad parameters of accommodation, 
employment, transport, environment and organisation. For the most part, these problems of 
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supply are related to decades of underfunding and neglect by government (Shaw and Coles, 
2007). 
 
 Returning to the TALC, the idea of resorts or destination areas passing through stages 
of discovery, growth and stagnation is appealing. However, this model is not without its 
problems, chief amongst which is that it fails to take into account changes in the demand and 
supply sides (i.e., the internal and external factors that influence resort evolution, as explained 
later). There are six other primary criticisms of the model, a more thorough account of which 
is provided by Haywood (1986), Getz (1992) and Agarwal (1994). The problems identified 
include: scepticism that the evolution of a resort can be described through a single model; 
criticism of the product life cycle concept; criticism of the relationships between carrying 
capacity and the life-cycle; difficulties with the application of the model as a forecasting tool 
(e.g., the spatial unit of analysis, the unit of measurement, data availability, the relevant 
timeframe); and, criticism of the exact shape of the curve, sequence of stages and position of 
turning points. Furthermore, the post-stagnation phase of the model has provoked much 
discussion.  
 
 Agarwal (1994, 1997a) in particular has taken a key role in this discussion and her 
criticisms and contributions have found support (e.g., Priestley and Mundet, 1998; Knowles 
and Curtis, 1999; Hovinen, 2002). She applied Butler’s (1980) model to Torbay (English 
Riviera, Devon) and to its resorts (i.e., Torquay, Paignton, Brixham) and found the single-
product-dominated model too limited for dealing with the complexity and diversity of 
destination development. The application of the TALC is reasonably consistent with Butler’s 
(1980) model, although ‘each of the three resorts within Torbay varied greatly as regards the 
timing and speed of development’ (Agarwal, 1997a: 72). The crucial point, however, is that 
Agarwal (1997a) had difficulty in reconciling the experience of Torbay with the later stages of 
the life cycle model. Butler’s model predicts stagnation possibly followed by rejuvenation (i.e., 
growth in tourist volumes) or decline (in tourist volumes) and eventually the end or exit from 
tourism. However, the investigation revealed that the deterministic nature of the model did not 
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apply to the evolution of Torbay. ‘In all three resorts, the ‘post-stagnation’ phase is 
characterised by positive attempts to rejuvenate and re-orientate, in order to cater for changing 
market needs and expectations’ (Agarwal, 1997a: 72). Thus the on-going process of 
rejuvenation that was identified in Torbay did not fit the later stages of the model, which 
suggests that the consistent rising curve with a number of options after the stagnation stage 
needed rethinking in order to make it more applicable. Therefore, Agarwal (1994: 206) 
proposed the insertion of an ‘additional stage [between the stagnation and post-stagnation 
stages of the original model] in order to take into account the series of restructuring efforts [and 
success or otherwise, resulting in a series of peaks and troughs] that are inaugurated before 
decline sets in’.  
 
 However, unilinear models of resort development such as the TALC may be criticised 
for their simplistic treatment of the ‘local’. Again, these models assume that resorts have life 
cycles as different tourist types invade and establish themselves, causing other tourists to go 
elsewhere and resort characteristics to change (e.g., the structure and capacity of the resort’s 
tourism resource base and the types of tourist staying in the resort and the activities undertaken). 
Therefore, one problem of the TALC model is its sole focus on tourism development. Such a 
limited focus is inevitably going to produce only a partial understanding of the internal 
dynamics of resort change. It is crucial to not only analyse tourism in a place, but also the 
changing qualities of a tourist place. Within-resort explanations of change emphasise how one 
dimension of a resort affects another, and how changes made at the local level can achieve 
beneficial effects, or produce undesired consequences. They may include explanations relating 
to the changing demographic, social and economic ecologies of resorts, the extent and nature 
of collective action (that actors – resort authorities, political decision-makers, land owners, 
developers, local entrepreneurs, traders, residents, etc. – of different resorts respond differently 
to resort challenges and change), and public policy (including levels of public investment and 
effectiveness of local services, and effectiveness of governance and political arrangements). 
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 Unilinear models of resort development such as the TALC have also been criticised by 
theorists who argue that changes in resorts are the product of changes at higher spatial levels, 
for example, changes in economic structure. In this respect, Agarwal (2002) points to three 
processes associated with post-Fordism, namely the: (1) search for capital accumulation as 
exemplified by the growing internationalisation and arguably globalisation of the tourism 
industry; (2) flexibility of production made possible by new technologies; and (3) consumption 
changes toward preferences for more individual and bespoke forms of holiday. It is these 
processes, Agarwal (2002) contends, that have influenced the creation of new, and previously 
inaccessible and undeveloped destinations, a preference for independent and special interest 
holidays in non-resort environments, an increase in the popularity of rural and urban areas along 
with substitutes for the touristic experience, and the opportunity to customise products to a 
differentiated clientele. Taken together, these post-Fordist related processes have undermined 
the appeal of the mass packaged and standardised seaside resort holiday. 
 
 The rise and fall of destination areas is also attributed to what can be termed cultural 
shifts (Urry, 1990, 1997; Gale, 2005, 2007). These theorists acknowledge the role of 
competition from other tourism destinations and products, but argue that economic perspectives 
(at least in isolation) fail to ‘sufficiently interrogate changes in fashion, style and taste which 
have transformed [Western society] in the past few decades’ (Urry, 1997: 103). These theorists 
have loosely characterised such changes as ‘post-modern’. Followers of post-modernism 
believe that the development of, and continued growth in, the middle class, consisting of 
‘occupants of managerial and professional posts working in both the private and public sectors’ 
(Urry, 1997: 106) has brought with it cultural and political changes. The well-travelled middle 
class have imposed their values and beliefs onto society. These beliefs include the veneration 
of culture, nature and authentic experiences (Urry, 1997). The social diffusion of these values 
led to a restructuring of many social practices. Changes in ideology and taste meant the 
depreciation of resort infrastructure and amenities and disenchantment with the previous 
popular mass ‘working class’ resorts, which are no longer perceived as ‘special’ or 
‘extraordinary’ (Urry, 1997; Gale, 2005). However, in the absence of empirical evidence in 
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support of this opinion, the question arises of whether this negative profile is really valid (or 
too simplistic, even a myth). This criticism aside, followers of post-modernism believe changes 
in ideology and taste have not only produced a hierarchy of coastal tourism resorts, but also 
helped promote non-seaside tourism destinations, products and practices. 
 
 Thus, some theorists have played down the local and see resort change as a 
manifestation of much wider economic and sociocultural changes taking place in Western 
society. However, this approach has a serious drawback. The more structural approach 
designated resorts or destination areas as essentially passive spaces in which change was 
effected by successive rounds of capital investment or disinvestment. Put differently, ‘the 
circulation of capital within the global tourism system is the means by which resort 
development or decline takes place, as tourists and investments shift geographically over time’ 
(Shaw and Williams, 2004: 237). From this perspective both the variability of resort 
development and the potential significance of local action in influencing resort change were 
overlooked. In contrast, a central tenet of more recent attempts to conceptualise the 
restructuring of tourism space is an acknowledgement of the interactional nature of the process. 
Proponents of the more structural approach now locate resorts within wider urban and economic 
systems, emphasising not only the processes that occur at different spatial levels, but also the 
connections between levels. This latter approach emphasises the causal significance of local 
context – particularities of place, population and local governance (Agarwal, 2005). It espouses 
that social, economic and political conditions and actions ‘emanating from specific places will 
change, modify and transform the effects of global, international and national processes, 
resulting in specific outcomes, as well as contributing to these’ (Agarwal, 2005: 352). This re-
conceptualisation of resort change draws on different disciplinary achievements within 
geography, economics and sociology. It is detailed by Agarwal (2005) and summarised in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: The English seaside resort in its wider context 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
 Thus, increasing attention has been given to the resort setting in a wider context which 
has started to focus research efforts into understanding the international and national, social, 
economic and cultural trends and processes that operate on these tourism places. This strand of 
work has a more explicit focus on change but a less microscopic view of the resort. Within the 
British context, the problem raised has specifically been that of resort decline and the 
restructuring of tourism. Research on restructuring has focused on the consequences of 
exogenous demand and supply factors, including competition from foreign holidays, changing 
tourism consumption patterns, economic recession and restructuring, changing travel costs and 
demographic trends (Clegg and Essex, 2000; Gordon and Goodall, 2000; Agarwal, 1999, 2002; 
Beatty and Fothergill, 2004; Gale, 2005; Shaw and Coles, 2007; Rickey and Houghton, 2009). 
Apart from these social, economic and cultural processes, the role of the state (both at a national 
Globalisation and associated structural changes (i.e., deep 
changes in the geography of production and consumption). 
National context: political, economic and socio-cultural trends 
and processes 
Regional context:  industrial restructuring, institutionalism and 
policy (i.e., levels of investment, effectiveness of governance 
and political arrangements). 
Local context: particularities of place, population and local 
governance (i.e., institutional capacity and resources, including 
economic development, planning, housing allocations, social 
services, certain welfare arrangements etc.) 
Resort: legacy, area characteristics and future prospects 
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and local level, and the relationship between them) has also been an important factor in 
understanding the process of resort decline and redevelopment. 
 
 In relation to the debate on resort restructuring, Smith (2004: 19) points out that the 
extent to which tourism plays a role in regeneration is dependent on ‘the local authority’s degree 
of conviction that it is still a viable option (local authorities still tend to be responsible for the 
planning and management of resorts in the UK)’. Agarwal (1997b) has explored such factors 
in depth, her work also underlining the crucial importance of local authority commitment in 
determining effective/appropriate policy responses. Various local factors – including the 
importance attached to the maintenance and further development of tourism, the importance 
and degree of development of tourism, resort size and the number and function of seaside towns 
contained within the local administrative area – impact upon commitment levels. Agarwal 
(2007) also considers global-local interactions and questions the effectiveness of local 
government in managing the fortunes of tourism within resorts. A number of factors have been 
identified for the capacity of resorts to respond effectively to global forces. Factors that inhibit 
resort capacity include: appreciation of the problem (i.e., the nature, influence and 
consequences of global forces); civic commitment; shared interests and trust; strong 
institutional presence; high level of contact, co-operation and information exchange; and, 
development of mutual awareness and common cause. However, the most notable problem was 
the lack of co-operation and trust within and between the public and private sectors.  
 
 The reason for the lack of co-operation and trust is not clear, but Agarwal (2007: 70) 
questions whether the public sector is ‘helping or hindering’ resorts with its complex and 
fragmented institutional landscape. ‘What this now means for economic development is that 
decisions have to be made, and resources need to be shared across a range of public, quasi-
public and non-public agents. Thus the potential for duplication, inertia and financial wastage 
is high’ (Agarwal, 2007: 58). A similar concern is also raised by Shaw and Coles (2007). They 
found that ‘certainly at the resort level there are still many policy gaps between […] regional-
based strategies and those being formulated by local authorities’ (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 54). 
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A research priority is, therefore, to resolve these uncertainties concerning the gap between the 
local and the regional policy scenario, and the role of actors (including the complex network of 
relationships between central, regional, sub regional and local organisations) involved in the 
process of resort restructuring. 
 
3.1.2 Summary 
 
 This section provided a brief overview of the development of coastal resorts in Britain 
and then reviewed three key approaches to studying resort development. The first approach 
focuses on the morphological transformation of resorts. Such studies have a long history. Works 
by the British geographer Gilbert during the 1930s and 1940s marked the beginning of 
morphological research. Studies of this kind have focused on physical features and land use 
patterns in specific resorts. The neglect of the socioeconomic aspects of resorts, lack of details 
of development processes and failure to account for touristic differentiation over larger areas, 
especially complete nations or global regions, has been criticism levelled at this body of work. 
The second approach, which has developed mainly since the 1980s following Christaller’s 
(1963) seminal work, focuses on investigating the process of development of destinations and 
the possible causes and consequences of their dynamic pattern of tourism development. A 
number of models and typologies have been suggested to explain development, most of which 
recognise the evolutionary nature of destinations. However, unilinear models of resort 
development such as the oft-quoted TALC have since been criticised for their simplistic 
treatment of the ‘local’, for their neglect of external/exogenous factors and for failing to 
consider the interdependencies of macro-level national and international processes of change 
with local socio-political systems.  
 
 Recent research has tended to develop knowledge of resort development from a 
predominantly structuralist perspective. This approach has the advantage of allowing a broader 
focus, not only on those structural changes that are ultimately responsible for the rise and fall 
of destination areas, primarily economic restructuring and cultural change (Agarwal, 2002; 
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Gale, 2007). While emphasising the role of such trends and processes as the motors of change, 
this approach does not deny the importance of local context and human agency in negotiating, 
mediating and resisting these structural forces (Agarwal, 2005). To date, research efforts have 
concentrated on the consequences of exogenous demand and supply factors for English seaside 
resorts and the institutional capacity of resorts to respond to such change. However, resort 
development raises not only the question of consumption and production processes, the 
changing quality of coastal resort tourism and related restructuring strategies. Resorts also 
undergo a transformation of place quality during their development (Shaw and Williams, 2004). 
Changes in demographic, social and economic structure are potentially important for English 
seaside resorts as they impact upon their image, role and function (Agarwal, 2012). Moreover, 
changing structures may have different implications for different resorts, neighbourhoods and 
different social groups, so producing advantage and disadvantage, inclusion and exclusion. 
However, evidence on all these impacts is relatively sparse. Indeed, with the exception of Beatty 
and Fothergill (2004), Agarwal and Brunt (2005, 2006), Shaw and Coles (2007) and Agarwal 
(2012), there are few studies that have focused in detail on the nature of change in English 
seaside resorts. Therefore, much uncertainty still exists about the differing character, problems 
and prospects for these post-mature coastal tourism resorts. 
 
 It is crucial to make explicit a key point in the above discussion: little attention has been 
paid to the non-touristic dimensions of English seaside resorts. Commenting on the existing 
knowledge base, described as ‘superficial and general’, Agarwal (2012: 1470) concludes ‘the 
internal dynamics of English seaside resorts are poorly understood’. There is some evidence of 
recent resort change, but it is sparse. What such studies have exposed is how little is known in 
detail about the changing demographic, social and economic ecologies of English seaside 
resorts due to inadequate levels of information at the resort level. Moreover, debate has centred 
on the concept of resort itself, issues of space and time, and whether relative or absolute change 
is most relevant to measure. Before proceeding to examine the empirical evidence on socio-
economic resort change, it will be necessary to consider those conceptual issues important to 
an understanding of resort change. 
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3.2  Understanding socio-economic resort change: conceptual issues  
 
 Perhaps the most critical issue underlying the study of resort change is the concept of 
the ‘resort’ itself. What are resorts and what do they consist of? It is not possible to provide a 
precise definition of a resort because ‘a spectrum of resorts exists, ranging from those with a 
wholly tourist function to those where a significant amount of tourist activity occurs alongside 
a variety of other urban functions’ (Pearce, 1987: 167). Beyond this distinction between ‘tourist 
resort’ and ‘resort town’, few clear definitions have been given by academics because such 
tourism environments vary widely in their evolution, morphology and character (Pearce, 1987; 
Shaw and Williams, 2004; Prideaux, 2009). Robinson (1976: 155) suggested that resorts are 
 
‘places, which attract large numbers of tourists and which tourism endows with special 
characteristics so that direct and indirect revenue produced by tourism plays a very 
important and even decisive role in their existence and development’.  
 
 Certainly, within a European context, the term resort predominantly describes a specific 
territorial form of geographical places whose reliance on tourism and smaller size and shape 
distinguish them, for example, from cities with diverse economies (Shaw and Williams, 2005; 
Prideaux, 2009). In contrast, the concept of resort is narrower in North America, where it is 
often viewed as being a substantial tourism facility providing highly specialised forms of 
production and consumption, usually self-contained and under singular management or 
ownership (Shaw and Williams, 2004; Prideaux, 2009). In a European context, the tourism 
functions of the ‘resort town’ have often evolved over a considerable period of time whereas, 
in a North American context, the self-contained ‘tourist resort’ has often developed in 
accordance with a preconceived plan (Shaw and Williams, 2004). However, it is not an either-
or situation. Resorts that have evolved over time and resorts that were planned in their entirety 
may be found in both Europe and North America and indeed other regions of the world. 
 
 It is not possible, given the existing state of debate, to identify a global definition of 
resort, nor is it probably desirable to do so. However, at the national level, it is necessary to 
establish a clear definition. The report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Coastal 
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Towns brought this issue into sharp focus. It found that i) there is no standard definition of 
English seaside resorts and ii) government departments, local authorities and non-governmental 
organisations use a variety of typologies to define coastal settlements for their purposes (CLG, 
2007a). The various definitions used relied on criteria such as land use, population density, 
economic characteristics and remoteness or location. Consequently, in the absence of a 
standardised definition, it is extremely difficult to compare national, regional and local coastal 
town research over time, and between areas. This situation has serious implications. The reality 
of coastal tourism resorts is heavily obscured, poorly articulated and only partially available to 
inform national policy and programmes. With these concerns in mind, the DCLG 
commissioned a report from Sheffield Hallam University to help better define seaside resorts 
(Fothergill, 2008).  
 
 Fothergill (2008) deliberated the attempts by researchers and policymakers to divide the 
existing spectrum of British coastal settlements into coherent categories, noting ‘there has been 
much sloppy thinking on the definition of “coastal towns”’ (Fothergill, 2008: 2) and that a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach is inappropriate given their diversity. Fothergill (2008: 13) thus argued 
that ‘socio-economic research on seaside towns needs a consistent and defensible definition of 
the towns’, that is to say, ‘a clear geographical definition of the towns’ (Fothergill, 2008: 4). 
Drawing on the Seaside Economy report (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003), Fothergill (2008) made 
a distinction between the settlements ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’. It was argued that, although the 
report of the Select Committee on Coastal Towns has tended to use the terms interchangeably, 
which is misleading, coastal towns and seaside towns indicate different places. Accordingly, 
Fothergill (2008) divided coastal towns in three categories, namely: seaside resorts/towns 
(n=37), other significant coastal towns/cities (n=18) and estuary towns/cities (n=7). They are 
all large settlements with populations above 10,000, but the first group features a resort 
function, while the second and third are principally commercial or industrial in nature. 
 
 So, on the issue of definition, Fothergill (2008) did not contribute anything new to the 
debate, promoting only the approach employed by Beatty and Fothergill (2003) for the Seaside 
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Economy report. That report, apart from size of settlement (determined by population), did not 
specify any other criteria for the identification of seaside towns, despite entering into 
discussions with the British Resorts Association (now known as the British Resorts and 
Destinations Association). Consequently, it is unclear how the resorts were identified for 
inclusion in the Seaside Economy report. This criticism aside, Fothergill (2008) stated that a 
seaside resort implies i) concentration of tourist activities (especially in the coastal zone) and 
infrastructure (e.g., promenades, piers), especially holiday accommodation (e.g., hotels, 
boarding houses, caravan sites) and ii) specialisation in, and dependence on tourism. He 
concluded that the terms seaside resort and seaside town are more interchangeable as coastal 
towns are believed to be a wider and more diverse group than seaside resorts/towns. On the 
contrary, seaside resorts/towns vary in terms of size and importance, location and physical 
environment, and tourism (i.e., differentiation between seaside resorts in terms of scale of 
tourism, strategies, tourism markets served, resources, innovation and future prospects).  
 
 Tourism is fundamental, but challenges and problems extend beyond tourism alone. It 
should be noted at this point the DCLG commissioned not only a report from Sheffield Hallam 
University to help define seaside resorts (Fothergill, 2008), but also two reports from that 
university to better understand their socio-economic characteristics. The second (Beatty et al., 
2008) and third (Beatty et al, 2011) reports have provided data on, respectively, the 37 seaside 
towns with populations above 10,000 (total pop. 2.9 million), and on 37 smaller seaside towns 
with population between 1,500 and 10,000 (total pop. 170,000). These ‘benchmarking’ studies 
provide a useful insight into the varying fortunes of different seaside towns. However, they fail 
to consider the diversity within towns and the urban geography of individual resorts, as have 
other recent discussions and comparative seaside town studies. 
 
 Thus to date, no studies have taken advantage of the small area geography developed 
following the 2001 census to explore in detail the differences in local circumstances amongst, 
between and within resorts, and the potential reasons behind any variability. Even the most 
economically prosperous resorts are likely to contain disadvantaged socio-spatial environments 
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(i.e., neighbourhoods). According to Galster (2001: 2112), the concept of neighbourhood 
includes both geographic (i.e., place-oriented) and social (i.e., people-oriented) components, 
namely:  
 
• Environmental characteristics (e.g., topographical features, pollution); 
• Proximity characteristics (influenced both by location and transport infrastructure); 
• Characteristics of the buildings (e.g., type, design, materials, density, repair); 
• Infrastructural characteristics (e.g., roads, streetscape); 
• Demographic characteristics of the population; 
• The existence and quality of local services; 
• Political characteristics (e.g., political networks, involvement of residents); 
• Social-interactive characteristics (e.g., quantity, quality of friend and family networks); 
• Sentimental characteristics (e.g., sense of identification with place, historical significance. 
 
In order to address the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, policymakers need to 
recognise and understand both the spatial distribution of such neighbourhoods across areas, and 
the nature and diversity of such neighbourhoods (Lupton and Power, 2004). Measuring, 
mapping and classifying disadvantaged neighbourhoods thus becomes of paramount 
importance. This task is particularly relevant given that arguably, seaside resorts should not be 
regarded as just tourism places. Resorts must be seen as an urban type and, by extension, are 
made up of neighbourhoods. The fortunes and condition of resorts and their respective 
neighbourhoods are likely to be inextricably linked. That is to say, they are very closely related 
and affect each other. Considering the different characteristics of neighbourhood begins to raise 
awareness that different aspects of resorts may be changing in different directions and at 
different rates. The different characteristics of neighbourhood, furthermore, reinforce the 
contention here that resort change relates to a multitude of different change processes which 
occur at different temporal and spatial scales (see section 3.1.1 and Figure 3.3). 
 
 This discussion prompts three other, rather more practical, issues about how resort 
change should be measured. The first is about how seaside resorts should be spatially delineated 
for the purposes of analysing change. The approaches identified by Fothergill (2008) include 
using district-level data as a proxy for the seaside town within a district, which was adopted by 
government in its evidence to the Select Committee inquiry, and a ward-based definition of 
seaside towns, as developed by Sheffield Hallam University for the Seaside Economy report, 
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which ‘involved fine-grain maps overlaying ward boundaries on the underlying urban 
geography’ (Fothergill, 2008: 5). The former approach is nonsense. Just a few of the larger 
resorts can be matched to district boundaries, that is to say, the vast majority of resorts are only 
a part of a district. A small number of resorts straddle boundaries between local authority 
districts. Furthermore, as Powell and Gray (2009: 8) have pointed out, ‘information based on 
district boundaries also creates difficulties, for example, bypassing individual seaside resorts 
within each authority’. Noting some of these problems and that census and other statistical data 
are increasingly becoming available at ward level, Fothergill (2008: 5) insists: 
 
‘in order to take forward meaningful research a settled, ward-based definition of seaside 
towns needs to be adopted, and the starting point should probably be the Sheffield Hallam 
definition from the Seaside Economy report’. 
  
 However, it is questionable whether such an approach offers a way forward. One 
problem is that seaside resorts do not fit neatly with ward boundaries, as Agarwal and Brunt 
(2006: 660) discovered, ‘this is particularly the case with the small and medium sized resorts 
as sometimes the ward and resort boundaries did not directly correspond and encompassed 
some of the surrounding rural hinterland’. Another closely related problem is that wards can 
vary in terms of area and population. With regards population, ‘wards are of different sizes, 
averaging about 5,000 people, but ranging from 1,000 [in some rural areas] up to about 32,000 
[in big cities]’ (Lupton, 2001: 5). Therefore, information based on wards that form only a part 
of a resort distorts or threatens to distort, to a greater or lesser extent, the reality of seaside 
resorts. The call by Fothergill (2008) to employ a ward-based definition is surprising, 
particularly as lower-level super output areas (LSOAs) were developed by the Office for 
National Statistics in 2001. LSOAs are a sub-ward statistical geography averaging 
approximately 1,500 people and can be aggregated to form the resort with much greater 
accuracy. Furthermore, unlike wards, LSOAs are not subjected to regular boundary change, 
which can have serious implications when trying to keep track of statistics over time.  
 
 A second issue is that of the timescale over which resort change should be analysed. 
The importance of this question arises in relation to, for example, assertions about ‘tipping 
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points’ beyond which ‘an area’ may become subject to a vicious circle of decline (North and 
Syrett, 2006). A long-term perspective, built up over several decades, will deliver an 
understanding of broader causes and consequences of change than a short-term view. However, 
while a long-term perspective is appropriate for wider change processes, such as economic 
restructuring (as measured, for example, by sectoral or occupational shifts over time), too long 
a focus is unlikely to capture important short-term processes, such as fluctuating levels of 
deprivation, or migration/settlement patterns of different social groups in certain resorts or 
neighbourhoods. Therefore, in researching resort change and social exclusion, historical 
factors, direction and speed of change may be important, as well as current factors. A third issue 
is whether relative or absolute change is most relevant to measure. It may be argued that relative 
change is always important, because what matters for equity purposes is the difference between 
resorts and neighbourhoods. That said, it may be argued that it is absolute improvements that 
make a difference to people’s lives. For example, it might be relevant to know what position a 
resort has in the housing market, not just the absolute value of prices or rents. For these reasons, 
absolute improvements may matter more for some indicators and relative improvements for 
others. With these issues in mind, the final section of this chapter summarises the existing 
evidence on English seaside resorts and considers the role of socio-economic resort change in 
local area exclusion.  
 
3.3 Reviewing evidence of socio-economic resort change 
 
 The main conclusion from the review of the literature is that current knowledge of the 
directions of socio-economic resort change is very limited. In many ways, this dearth of 
knowledge is not surprising, given the difficulties of defining resorts and the boundary problem 
mentioned earlier, the multiple dimensions and attributes that comprise resort, the 
contemporaneous occurrence of compositional and in situ changes, and the many influences on 
resort change, occurring at different spatial levels. Many of the theoretical understandings 
derived from Agarwal’s (2005) conceptual framework for resort change have been difficult to 
translate into quantitative research designs. There have also been data problems, principally: 
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 Lack of data aggregated to resort level, whether from Census of Population, 
administrative sources or household surveys.  
 
 Problems with changes in ward boundaries over time. 
 
 Changes in indicators over time. For example, only one deprivation-related Census 
indicator (car access) has been consistent over all Censuses from 1971 to 2001 (Martin 
et al., 2002). 
 
 Inability to track individuals (or dwellings) over time, thus making it hard to tell 
whether changes at the resort level have arisen because of changes to people in situ or 
because of movement of people. 
 
 Inability to link census and other socio-economic data with tourism statistics for 
English seaside resorts which, as explained in section 3.1, is due to the dearth of 
tourism data relating specifically to English seaside resorts, and to the non-standard 
way in which tourism information is collated. As noted by Fothergill (2008: 10), ‘the 
absence of good information about the seaside tourist economy applies not just to its 
overall importance but also to trends through time and the differences between 
individual resorts’. Consequently, little is properly known about whether there are 
more declining resorts than previously, or fewer, and whether their populations are 
dwindling or growing. Again, there is no telling, given the extreme paucity of 
comparable and available tourism data at resort level. Evidence is therefore drawn 
from the supply side and primarily from labour market analyses of resorts (e.g., Beatty 
and Fothergill, 2003, 2004). However, other analysts have used commercial property 
values (Coles and Shaw, 2006; Gale, 2005) and planning application data (Clegg and 
Essex, 2000) to create a picture of resort ‘health’, although such information does need 
to be readily available for each individual resort, which is not always the case. 
 
 Lack of data disaggregated to resort level. In some cases, trends at the resort level can 
only be inferred from changes at higher geographical levels. For example, much of the 
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data on migration, migrant workers, earnings and business stock is at local authority 
level, whereas data on economic output and productivity is at sub-regional level and 
relate to counties or groups of unitary authorities. Thus, data on several key indicators 
is only available at local authority level and above, and it is hard to be sure of trends at 
the resort level. 
 
 
 It should be noted at this juncture that the ‘benchmarking’ studies published by the 
DCLG have helped to fill the evidence gap that existed on seaside resorts. They present a range 
of statistical evidence on socio-economic conditions in English seaside towns, and compare the 
figures with regional and English averages. However, the statistics are becoming dated. They 
provide a picture of trends from 1998/9 to 2005/6 (although only for some socio-economic 
variables) but there is a clear need for more up-to-date figures. Moreover, 
 
‘the report covers the key socio-economic issues for which data is reasonably readily 
available. The report is not intended to provide a comprehensive digest of all the statistics 
that might conceivably be assembled for seaside towns’ (Beatty et al., 2008: 10; Beatty 
et al., 2011: 8).  
 
In summary, there has been a dearth of socio-economic data specifically relating to English 
seaside resorts for many decades and where it is available the time-series is short, making a 
meaningful assessment of change very difficult. The national seaside resort database 
accompanying this thesis and product of the research, therefore, constitutes a significant and 
valuable resource (see section 1.4). 
 
3.3.1 How resorts are changing  
 
 This section draws chiefly from the Seaside Economy report (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2003, 2004). As mentioned earlier (see section 1.2), the only national study of the economies 
of seaside towns, by Beatty and Fothergill, covers the period 1971–2001. The study found, 
contrary to expectation, a surprising level of employment growth, with total employment 
increasing by about 317,000 jobs between 1971 and 2001. In contrast, levels of claimant 
unemployment (i.e., the numbers on Jobseeker’s Allowance) showed a relatively minor 
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increase of only 19,000 over the same period. Employment growth had been particularly 
marked in the 1980s and 90s, with higher rates of job growth than the national average. 
However, an above-average proportion of the jobs are part time, thus leading to strong female 
employment growth but falling male employment.  
 
 Table 3.1 shows the change in employment by sector in seaside resorts between 1981 
and 2001. It is apparent from this table that several primary industries (including shipbuilding, 
fishing, energy production and ports) have experienced relatively significant decline in recent 
decades. Thus, the seaside economy is largely characterised by service industries. Beatty and 
Fothergill (2003) found that 32 per cent of all jobs were in the accommodation, distribution and 
catering sector, and a further 26 per cent were in the public sector, thereby signalling an 
economy reliant on tourism and government. Both sectors recorded an increase in jobs, as did 
the construction sector albeit to a lesser extent, although the largest shift occurred in financial 
services (Shaw and Coles, 2007). Based on these findings, Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 7) 
conclude that: 
 
‘Seaside towns do not on the whole suffer from a downward spiral of decline. Whilst 
there has clearly been restructuring in the wake of the rise of the foreign holiday, the 
continuing resilience of employment in and around the parts of the local economy most 
dependent on tourism suggests that there has often been successful adaptation. The 
seaside tourist industry remains one to be nurtured, not written off as a lost cause’. 
 
Table 3.1: Employment in seaside towns, 2001                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shaw and Coles (2007: 45) 
 Seaside towns  
(n= 43) 
National % change  
Sector  Jobs 
(000) 
% % 1981-2001 
Agriculture and fishing  5 0.3 2 -68  
Energy and water  9 0.7 0.6 -49  
Manufacturing  131 10 14 -21  
Construction  92 7 6 +37  
Distribution, hotels and restaurants  413 32 25 +45  
Transport and communications  56 4 6 -11  
Banking, finance and insurance  196 15 20 +65  
Public administration, health, education  341 26 22 +42  
Other services  64 5 5 No data  
Total  1,306 100 100 +29  
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 However, there are many good reasons to be sceptical. For a start, the whole industry 
has changed, and that has resulted in less money spent by the tourists remaining in local 
economies. That point should be emphasised. There are an ever-increasing number of national 
pub, restaurant, supermarket and accommodation chains. In addition, rising car ownership has 
meant that visitors are not restricted to seaside resorts once they arrive there. All the time, less 
money from tourism stays in the local economy, and that has a big impact on average incomes. 
Job growth may be heating up, but low incomes depress areas as well. However, in 
concentrating on readily available labour market statistics, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) have 
totally missed that vital point. Employment is important, but economic challenges and problems 
extend beyond employment alone (e.g., incomes, earnings, enterprise, levels of investment and 
access to regeneration funds). In emphasising coastal employment growth, moreover, Beatty 
and Fothergill (2003) underplay the part-time, low-job quality and low-wage/skill nature of 
much employment. The Seaside Economy report may be criticised further. Beatty and Fothergill 
(2003) may be overstating the importance of tourism. The hotel, catering and distribution sector 
covers most of the tourist-related jobs, but it is also quite a lot wider, including wholesale, retail 
and the motor trade for instance, much of which will not depend directly on the tourist trade. 
Beatty and Fothergill (2003) should have isolated the tourism-related jobs, rather than relied on 
an all-encompassing, standard statistical category. The alternative argument to the decline 
thesis might then have found support. 
 
 Resort economies are facing not only structural difficulties (i.e., lack of economic 
diversity and reliance on a declining tourism industry), but also cyclical difficulties. The 
economies of seaside resorts are seasonal, peaking during the spring and summer months 
between April and September. Employment and economic activity peak during this period with 
a range of temporary and part-time jobs in tourism and other low-wage, low-skill seasonal 
industries like fruit picking and packaging. According to Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 13), ‘an 
annual cycle of claimant unemployment is still evident [for both men and women]’. They also 
found that, taking all seaside towns together, claimant unemployment is marginally higher than 
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the national average. However, a number of individual towns have claimant unemployment that 
is unusually high by national standards. The extent of disadvantage in seaside resorts shows up 
more clearly in comparison with neighbouring areas – 35 of the 43 seaside towns studied have 
claimant unemployment rates higher than those in surrounding areas, and sometimes much 
higher (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003).  
 
 However, the level of unemployment is higher than it initially appears. Even though 
Beatty and Fothergill (2003) were able to provide employment data for seaside resorts 
specifically, there is hidden unemployment not captured in the figures. Indeed, the figures 
presented in the Seaside Economy report fail to capture the large numbers of economically 
inactive working age residents, including the long-term sick, the disabled and people who are 
looking after family or home. With regards the long-term sick, the DCLG Select Committee 
Inquiry obtained data from both the DWP and the Department of Trade and Industry, which 
suggests that between 1997 and 2006 the number of Incapacity Benefit claimants in seaside 
resorts increased by 12.3 per cent compared to 2.2 per cent across Britain. In 2006, 150,000 or 
9.3 per cent of working age adults in seaside towns were in receipt of Incapacity Benefit (CLG, 
2007a). Note that these figures are for sickness benefit and do not necessarily include those 
claiming disability benefits. Nonetheless, the figures demonstrate that there is extensive 
joblessness in seaside towns beyond that recorded by claimant unemployment. 
 
 A further, more general finding is that the total population of seaside towns grew by 12 
per cent or 340,000 between 1971 and 2001, compared to 6 per cent nationally (Beatty and 
Fothergill, 2003). The vast majority of the 43 seaside towns have shared in this growth, but not 
all to the same extent. Population growth was attributable not so much to in situ changes (i.e., 
natural increase, which actually appears to be negative at least for adults of working age), but 
rather to in-migration. There was substantial in-migration from the working age population. 
Between 1971 and 2001, 360,000 people of working age moved into seaside towns (equivalent 
to nearly one quarter of the 1971 working age population). However, the migration into seaside 
towns is not distributed evenly across age groups. It can be seen from the data in Table 3.2 that 
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there was modest net in-migration amongst 16-24 year olds, notably more amongst women than 
men, but for 25-34 year olds there is virtually no in-migration. Each of the other age groups, up 
to state pension age, records substantial net in-migration. There is some evidence in the Seaside 
Economy report that in-migration to seaside towns is driven by residential preference. The 
Seaside Economy report contains a survey of 1,033 non-employed residents in four seaside 
towns (Blackpool, Great Yarmouth, Thanet and Southport). The survey found that a quarter of 
the non-employed had lived in the same town all their life. When the remaining three-quarters 
who had moved from elsewhere were asked to indicate reasons for moving into their present 
town, most of those surveyed indicated that it was not because of specific employment 
opportunities. Further analysis of the reasons for inward migration by duration of residence 
revealed subtle differences. It can be seen from the data in Table 3.3 that wanting to live by the 
coast and housing-related reasons were markedly more important for the ‘recent’ in-movers.  
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Table 3.2: Net in-migration of people of working age to seaside towns, 1971-1991 
  
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 
16-24 8,000 22,000 
25-34 0 2,000 
35-44 36,000 38,000 
45-54 30,000 29,000 
55-64 (m) 37,000 - 
55-59 (f) - 18,000 
Total 110,000 109,000 
 
Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 36) 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Reasons for moving to the seaside, by length of time in town 
 
Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 Recent in-movers 
(1998-2000) (%) 
Older in-movers 
(before 1998)  (%)  
 
Wanted to live here 47 32 
Family-related 26 38 
Work-related 17 30 
Housing-related 19 9 
Other reasons 4 1 
N.B. Respondents could give more than one reason 
 
Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 85) 
 
 
 The Seaside Economy report also demonstrates that the population structures of seaside 
resorts tend to be particularly uneven, as evidenced by the significant in-migration from the 
over-35 working age population. However, the DCLG (2007a) also note the inward migration 
of retired and semi-retired people, as have other recent discussions (Shaw and Coles, 2007), 
with the latter outlining their influence on resort economies. Many seaside resorts have 
experienced rapid rises in residential property prices that are well above the national average, 
‘as migrants seek either to move permanently to seaside resorts, or purchase second homes for 
individual use or as investment opportunities’ (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 47). Conversely, at the 
younger end of the age range, school leavers and college graduates tend to leave seaside resorts 
because of  ‘the shortage of employment opportunities, housing costs and the shortage of 
services and facilities for young people’ (CLG, 2007a: 17). A consequence of the out-migration 
of young (especially young skilled) is the lower educational attainment and entrepreneurial 
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culture in remaining population. In summary, ‘the net impact of these individual demographic 
trends is to leave many seaside towns with a higher than average older population and lower 
proportion of their population in the first half of their working age’ (CLG, 2007a: 13).  
 
 There is, however, another dimension to the social structure of many seaside resorts. 
The CLG Select Committee Inquiry found evidence of the in-migration of vulnerable adults 
(i.e., statutorily homeless families, care-leavers, ex-offenders, adults with mental health 
problems, European Union migrants, asylum seekers). Although vulnerable people of working 
age may move to seaside resorts voluntarily, ‘they may also be placed there by other authorities 
to identified suitable accommodation’ (CLG, 2007a: 15). According to the British Urban 
Regeneration Association (BURA, 2007: 5), many seaside resorts have become ‘dumping 
grounds for people facing problems such as unemployment, social exclusion and substance 
dependency’. The CLG Select Committee report identified the growth of Houses in Multiple 
Occupation (HMO) as a key factor for the inward migration of vulnerable adults. An HMO is 
a dwelling or converted residential building which is occupied by more than one household – 
households share basic amenities, such as kitchen, washroom or toilet (Housing Act, 2004). 
The decline in the traditional bed-and-breakfast and guesthouse market has led to either the 
closure or reuse of many of these premises as HMO. This private sector accommodation, often 
in poor repair, is (relatively) cheap, and that (the argument goes) suits Housing Benefit 
claimants from neighbouring areas and further afield. However, there is scant reliable evidence 
on this point.  
 
 Thus, the Seaside Economy report found that seaside resorts are experiencing increases 
in employment and population, the latter fuelled by steady flows of in-migration. Despite these 
upward trends in population and employment, a range of socio-economic problems have been 
identified (see Table 1.3) and many coastal areas suffer from high levels of deprivation. With 
respect to the latter, Figure 3.4 shows the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation rankings for every 
lower layer super output area in England. The least deprived areas are dark green and the most 
deprived areas are dark grey. It is apparent that high levels of deprivation are not limited to 
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inner-city areas of England and that many coastal areas are deprived to a greater or lesser extent, 
with the most pressing problems in general terms in Cornwall, Devon, the East, the North East 
and the North West. In terms of socio-economic problems, the issues for residents of seaside 
resorts are economic, physical and demographic.  
 
 From an economic perspective, seaside resorts are characterised by fragile economic 
conditions, including an overreliance on tourism-related businesses and other service sector 
businesses, (un)employment problems (i.e., seasonal, part-time, low-skill, low-wage), 
significant shares of residents in ‘skills poverty’ (i.e., those qualified below NVQ2), low rates 
of economic activity and large numbers of people claiming sickness benefit (Beatty et al., 
2008). However, there is considerable diversity between resorts. The benchmarking study of 
the 37 seaside resorts with populations above 10,000 found that, in terms of the three 
‘economic’ domains (i.e., income; employment; education, skills and training) of the Indices of 
Deprivation 2007, four resorts appear in the least deprived quartile every time and a further six 
appear twice. These resorts, which might therefore be seen as having the least economic 
problems among England’s larger seaside resorts, are in alphabetical order in Figure 3.5. What 
is notable about this list is that seven of the ten best performing resorts are located along a 
relatively short stretch of the south coast from Exmouth to Brighton. At the other end of the 
spectrum, six resorts fell into the most deprived quartile in all three of the ‘economic’ domains 
in the Indices of Deprivation, and a further five appear twice. In all, eleven seaside resorts were 
identified as having the greatest economic problems (Figure 3.5). Thus, on the basis of the three 
economic domains in the deprivation indices, sixteen resorts neither rank among the strongest 
or weakest seaside economies. 
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Figure 3.4: Most and least deprived LSOAs in England, 2007             
Source: ONS (2009: 98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Economic performance – the variation between the larger seaside resorts  
Source: Drawn from data contained in Beatty et al. (2008) 
Best - 
 
Bognor Regis, Exmouth, 
Bournemouth, Brighton, Worthing,  
Sidmouth, Southport, Swanage, 
Whitley Bay, Whitstable/Herne Bay 
 
 
Worst - 
 
Bridlington, Clacton, Great Yarmouth, 
Ilfracombe, Lowestoft, 
Morecambe/Heysham, Penzance, Skegness, 
Thanet, Torbay, Whitby 
- 100%    Least deprived 
- 75% 
- 50% 
- 25% 
- 0%        Most deprived 
London 
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 From a physical perspective, the housing market in seaside resorts is very unbalanced.  
There is a very large private rented sector, a proliferation of HMOs and poor housing 
conditions. Evidence from the English House Condition Survey reveals that, in 2001, nearly 
half of all stock was ‘non-decent’ (compared to 33 per cent elsewhere), 6 per cent was ‘unfit’ 
(compared to 4 per cent elsewhere) and 20 per cent fell into the privately rented category (twice 
the rate of elsewhere), with lower levels of social housing and owner occupation (CLG, 2007a). 
Research commissioned by CLG (Shared Intelligence, 2008) identified three key drivers which 
have led to this situation: 
 
 The decline of tourism which has resulted in the reuse of hotels and guest-houses as 
HMOs;  
 
 Lower than average house prices, the large size of the older properties, and the growth 
in the buy-to-let market have led to the conversion of houses into small units and 
growth of the private rented sector; and, 
  
 The high number of rented properties and absentee landlords has fuelled the decline in 
the condition of the housing stock. 
 
 
 From a demographic perspective, as mentioned earlier, the population structures of 
seaside resorts tend to be particularly uneven. The key drivers of population change are: 
outmigration of youth for education and opportunities; the in-migration of vulnerable adults, 
owing to the availability of cheap rented accommodation and the placement practices of other 
local authorities; the in-migration of working age adults aged 35 years and older; retirement in-
migration; and, an ageing population. Taken together, these demographic trends increase the 
strain on public services, particularly when the individuals concerned have high levels of need. 
Furthermore, a consequence of the in-migration of the low skilled and retired is ‘a mismatch 
between the affordability ratio of earnings against house prices’ (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 47). 
The lack of affordable housing is an issue in many seaside resorts, owing to ‘the increasing in-
migration of the retired, semi-retired and second-home owners who are drawn from more 
affluent groups’ (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 48). Based on data compiled from the Select 
Committee Inquiry (CLG, 2007a), Shaw and Coles (2007) note that house prices are above the 
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national average in seaside resorts that are not only retirement areas, but also commuter 
settlements. 
 
 This section has aimed to give an overview of the main issues and trends identified in 
the literature as impacting at resort level. It is clear from this review that there are some key 
explanatory factors that may account for poor performance: 
 
 Decline of traditional tourist industry and failure to diversify: many seaside resorts 
are over-reliant on public sector employment, the declining traditional tourism industry 
(i.e., domestic holiday market of 4+ nights) and other low-wage, low-skill and often 
seasonal sectors. The location (poor transport infrastructure, isolation and remoteness) 
of most seaside resorts, except for those within close commuting distance of major 
cities, does not make them an obvious first choice location for alternative industries (to 
traditional tourism) that can maintain the strength of the local economy; 
 
 Traditional building stock: many seaside towns have a large stock of former holiday 
accommodation (old hotels, boarding houses, even caravan sites) that is highly suitable 
for single-resident occupancy dwellings. The presence of high levels of inactivity in 
these areas might, to some extent, be explained by the nature of the benefit system 
driving the inactive into areas with high levels of suitable housing; and, 
 
 High levels of in-migration: there has been a growth in jobs in 41 of the 43 seaside 
towns over the period 1971-2001 (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003). However, job growth 
has not corresponded to increases in employment, due to in-migration by people 
wanting to live in seaside towns. This situation is leading to continuing imbalance in 
seaside labour markets. 
 
 
 Beatty and Fothergill (2003) found that poor economic performance (as expressed in 
relatively narrow terms, unemployment) was attributable not so much to local economic factors, 
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but rather to high in-migration. However, according to Shaw and Coles (2007: 47), ‘many of 
the difficulties appear to relate to patterns of migration and the low wage economy associated 
with many parts of the tourism sector (Emphasis added). While it is tempting to try to isolate 
which are the major drivers of change, and how much economic and social decline/change is 
accounted for by each of the factors, case studies of resorts show that what produces change is 
the interaction of factors. Work undertaken for the DCLG suggests that resort change is not the 
product of one factor alone but of a combination of demographic, economic, social and policy 
changes (Shared Intelligence, 2008). Based on the perceptions and views of regeneration and 
housing managers on the ground in ten seaside resorts in England (Blackpool, Bridlington, 
Clacton, Falmouth, Great Yarmouth, Morecambe and Heysham, Skegness, St. Ives, Thanet, 
Whitby), Shared Intelligence (2008) highlighted the way in which some of the before-
mentioned economic, physical and demographic factors interact with and reinforce one another 
(see Figure 3.4). According to Shared Intelligence (2008: 13), 
 
‘taken together, this combination of factors has created a cycle of decline. The interplay 
and relative importance of these factors will vary from place to place, but [the informants] 
highlight the lack of economic diversity as the key driver’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.6: Issues for residents of seaside resorts                   
Source: Shared Intelligence (2008: 13) 
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 These factors – including weak labour markets, poor stock condition and housing 
market imbalances, high levels of population transience and in-migration – impact both on 
existing residents and on changing population composition. In highly disadvantaged resorts, 
they may well set in train a series of other mechanisms, for example, lack of inward investment, 
stigmatisation, poor public service provision, declining physical and social environments, 
diminishing social networks, poverty traps caused by a combination of long term benefit 
dependency and low paid work, thriving informal and illegal economies, high levels of crime 
and teenage pregnancy, and so on. It therefore appears that the twin challenges in understanding 
resort change and performance are to further understand these interactions (by studying resorts 
in detail and over time) and to identify patterns and combinations of circumstances that 
repeatedly occur, by quantitative studies incorporating all these factors. 
 
3.3.2 Potential factors influencing social exclusion in English seaside resorts 
 
  Although it has been documented in the academic and policy literature that English 
seaside resorts are in decline and are exhibiting characteristics associated with social exclusion, 
these formerly busy destinations are an under-researched entity in geographical studies of 
poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. The introduction to this thesis emphasised the paucity 
of published research on social exclusion in English seaside resorts, noting that historically 
research has focused on ‘urban’ and, more recently, ‘rural’ locations. This research reveals that 
social exclusion is extensive in both environments, but there are some important differences in 
its nature and form. For example, socially excluded households in rural areas tend to be widely 
dispersed, whereas in inland inner-city areas they are often concentrated within social housing 
estates. Survey evidence suggests these estates have severe deprivation in breadth and depth, 
and all aspects of life are affected, including educational attainment, crime and safety, housing, 
jobs, skills, the environment, incomes and health. Benefit dependency is very high, employment 
is low (Brennan et al., 1998, 2000; Glennerster et al., 1999; Lupton, 2001). Some of the 
principal characteristics of rural exclusion include its invisibility, a perception that rural life is 
‘problem-free’, the out-migration of younger people, a high proportion of older people and 
social isolation, and a high level of property ownership which, although it accords status, often 
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masks the existence of low incomes in particular (Chapman et al., 1998; Commins, 2004; 
Countryside Agency, 2000; Shucksmith and Chapman, 1998). Indeed, social exclusion in rural 
areas is often hidden as socially excluded people tend to live alongside extreme affluence. Low 
incomes, seasonality of employment and access to services and housing are issues for residents 
in rural areas, whereas unemployment, housing quality and poor living conditions affect many 
residents of inner-city areas.  
 
 Thus, academic research of social exclusion has been geographically constrained to 
inner-city urban areas and some rural environments, and has neglected coastal locations. This 
research sets out to redress this imbalance by providing a descriptive analysis of the nature, 
intensity and distribution of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In doing so, it 
investigates whether there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities and explores 
the factors affecting social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In researching social exclusion 
in a spatial context, a key task is to think about the kinds of characteristics that areas have, and 
the reasons why these might be important. Theorists of local area exclusion suggest that area 
and neighbourhood characteristics are of two kinds: 
 
 Intrinsic or hard-to-change characteristics. These include location, transport 
infrastructure, housing and economic base. These are usually determined by local factors 
and broader sub-national influences (Lupton, 2001; North and Syrett, 2006). 
 
 Population characteristics. Changes in population composition are strongly linked to 
intrinsic characteristics, not least because ‘workers locate close to industry. People with low 
skills and earning capacity move into areas of lower quality, lower cost housing. New 
migrants tend to settle near ports or in major cities, from which some will disperse. In cities 
with growing economies, areas of low cost private housing close to city centres become 
gentrified’ (Lupton and Power, 2002: 29). Thus, population composition and dynamics are 
also attributed to sub-national influences, ‘mitigated by local factors such as high crime or 
the quality and availability of housing’ (Lupton, 2001: iv). 
113 
 
 Table 3.4 summarises this approach to thinking about area characteristics with reference 
to English seaside resorts. It incorporates many of those factors identified in the previous 
section and gives some examples of how they may influence social exclusion. The contribution 
of these factors can be categorised according to whether they relate directly to the environment 
in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the characteristics of the seaside residents 
(i.e., people-oriented factors). Thus, the multifaceted phenomenon of resort change relates to 
the socio-economic structure (i.e., people) and ‘health’ (i.e., place) of seaside resorts. This 
framework provides a basis for subsequent analysis, undertaken in the methodology, to 
determine how the variables are represented by the available data.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Understanding resort change: elements of ‘change’ and influences on social 
exclusion 
 
Type of characteristics Factors/facets Why important 
Intrinsic or hard to 
change characteristics of 
resort 
Geographical factors such as 
resort size, location and proximity 
 
Economic factors such as 
industrial structure, economic 
diversity, economic activity, 
business stock, household income, 
house prices 
 
Physical factors such as housing 
stock (type, tenure and condition) 
and existence of transport 
infrastructure 
 
Influence location of 
companies, access to jobs and 
services, how attractive an area 
is to live in 
 
(i.e., place based area effects) 
Population composition 
and dynamics 
Compositional variables such as 
age, ethnicity, family size and 
type, occupational class of 
residents, health 
 
Migration such as volumes, flows 
and age structure of migrants, 
immigrant workforce 
 
Influence labour supply, 
household structure, service 
needs, social networks and 
norms, culture and preferences 
 
(i.e., population rooted area 
effects) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
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3.4 Summary 
 
 This chapter has sought to provide a statement about what is known about socio-
economic resort change in the UK at the present time. Initially, it provided an overview of the 
development of seaside resorts in Britain and then reviewed three key approaches to studying 
resort development. The purpose of that review was to show the strengths and limits of existing 
resort development approaches. What all these approaches have in common is that they are to 
do with tourism activity, neglecting the socio-economic dimensions of tourist places. 
Consequently, ‘the internal dynamics of English seaside resorts are poorly understood’ 
(Agarwal, 2012: 1470). It is this body of knowledge, which can best be described as superficial 
and general, this study seeks to contribute to. Specifically, this study aims to make a 
contribution to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort change.  
 
 Resort change is a combination of two concepts: resort and change. The former refers 
to the unit of study; the latter indicates the object of study. The second section of the chapter 
sought to understand the challenges associated with these two concepts and the consequences 
of these challenges for seaside resort research. It identified three key issues of debate. The first 
of these is that there is no clear answer emerging as to what definition of seaside is most 
appropriate in the English debate. The division of settlements into coastal and seaside areas is 
both complex and problematic, as evidenced by the fact that no single classification system has 
been adopted in England. Moreover, what constitutes a seaside resort remains weakly defined. 
Consequently, it is unclear what should be measured when measuring resort change. Drawing 
on the concept of neighbourhood, it was suggested that resorts are physical spaces, with intrinsic 
characteristics such as economic base, housing, transport and environment, which may alter 
over time, comprising resort change. However, given that the concept of neighbourhood also 
has a social component, any analysis of resort change must also include the changing 
characteristics of residents. The second issue is the question of how resorts should be spatially 
delineated for the purposes of analysing change. The ward-based definition underpinning the 
Seaside Economy report is questionable. It was argued that, in order to better understand trends 
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and challenges, seaside resort research needs to go to the smallest available statistical outputs 
and build upwards from them. Third, there are issues relating to the selection and interpretation 
of appropriate indicators for the measurement of change. In researching resort change, historical 
factors, direction and speed of change may be important, as well as current factors. Furthermore, 
both absolute and relative variables may be relevant.  
 
 The final section of the chapter examined what is currently known about socio-
economic resort change and, in doing so, considered the role that such factors play in 
influencing local area exclusion. The main conclusion from the review of the literature is that 
current knowledge of the directions of resort change is very limited, principally because little 
data is available at the resort level, and because where it is available, the time-series is short, 
making a meaningful assessment of change very difficult. Such evidence as there is seems to 
suggest that English seaside resorts face a common and distinctive set of economic, physical 
and demographic problems. However, very little is known about the differing circumstances 
between and within resorts, and the potential reasons behind any variability. The principal 
factors identified through a review of the literature as being potentially important for social 
exclusion in seaside resorts may be categorised according to whether they relate directly to the 
environment in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the characteristics of the 
seaside residents (i.e., people-oriented factors). This framework for understanding resort socio-
economic change provides a basis for subsequent analysis (undertaken in the methodology) to 
identify the available datasets that represent the different variables of the framework. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Research Methodology 
 
 
 This chapter considers the how and why of the research that lies at the heart of this 
study. It begins by laying out the philosophical dimensions of the research, which is followed 
by an explanation of the three stage method adopted in this study. Each stage is then considered 
in turn, wherein the materials and methods employed to meet the objectives are detailed. The 
aims and objectives of the research were stated at the start of this thesis but they are repeated 
here for the benefit of the reader. The main aim of this research project is to contribute to 
knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside 
resorts, and of its relationship with resort change. The following model may serve as a guide to 
understand the structure of the empirical analyses (see Figure 4.1). Solid arrows in the model 
indicate relationships that will be directly studied in the analyses. Dashed lines indicate themes 
that have been discussed theoretically, but not studied directly empirically. The numbers on the 
model refer to the research objectives. This research seeks to: 
 
1. Identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In this 
respect, the research provides an account of how social exclusion differs between 
seaside and non-seaside areas, and how social deprivation varies within and between 
resorts; 
 
2. Determine how the socio-economic performance of seaside resorts differs from that of 
England as a whole and provide an assessment of whether there are “true” differences 
in socio-economic performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. In this 
respect, the research seeks to ascertain the degree to which place- and population-based 
factors might contribute to the presence of characteristics associated with social 
exclusion in English seaside resorts; and 
 
3. Investigate if there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities, and if so, 
whether a typology of excluded localities can be established. The typology building 
exercise undertaken in this thesis allows the socio-spatial structure of excluded resort 
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localities to be understood with reference to a broad number of factors or indicators. 
The third element of the research therefore provides a better understanding of some of 
the causes and consequences of local area exclusion, and of the variations in need 
between different areas. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Research model – social exclusion in English seaside resorts 
Source: Author’s own elaboration (see also Figure 3.3) 
 
 
4.1 Overview of research methodology 
 
 The research methodology for this study is summarised in Table 4.1. In this study, the 
paradigmatic perspective adopted is that of positivism. This paradigm holds certain beliefs 
about the nature of reality (i.e., ontology) and knowing (i.e., epistemology). Ontologically, 
positivism assumes that there is a single, external and objective reality that is separate from any 
knowledge of it and, epistemologically, this reality can be uncovered through the application 
of scientific methods (Guba, 1990). Positivist methodological approaches rely heavily on 
quantitative methods (Creswell, 1994). Research involves data collection that is invariably 
 
 
Resort 
Social 
exclusion 
(1) (3) 
Population-based 
factors (2) 
Globalisation and structural changes 
                National context 
Regional context 
Local context 
Place-based 
factors (2) 
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numeric and the researcher tends to use statistical and mathematical techniques as the 
methodology of data analysis. Positivist research searches for patterns and regularities and 
focuses on prediction and control (Creswell, 1994). The emphasis is placed on measuring 
variables precisely and testing hypothesis that are linked to casual explanations. The positivist 
research paradigm, therefore, entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory 
and research. It moves from the general to the specific, and its main aim is to test theory. 
  
 This research employs a non-experimental, quantitative approach in an attempt to 
develop understanding of the relationship (if any) between social exclusion and resort change. 
A progressive three stage approach is adopted which, as shown in Table 4.1, runs parallel to the 
three research objectives. These objectives led to the use of quantitative measures and 
secondary data analysis as a research method. Hakim (1982: 12) describes secondary data 
analysis as: 
 
‘any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions or 
knowledge additional to, or different from, those presented in the first report on the 
enquiry as a whole and its main results’. 
 
For social exclusion, the data in this study are primarily drawn from the Indices of Deprivation. 
Regarding the examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social 
exclusion, it was necessary to determine how the variables (of the framework for understanding 
resort socio-economic change, see Table 3.4) are represented by the available data. This task 
involved reviewing datasets available at both the ward level and LSOA level. The survey was 
necessary given that the benchmarking study for DCLG (Beatty et al., 2008) did not set out to 
cover socio-economic and community issues in any depth. It assessed larger seaside towns on 
a number of standard indicators, which have been used in other academic work – namely the 
Marine Management Organisation study of coastal areas (MMO, 2011). But these indicators do 
not allow for a comprehensive assessment of the socioeconomic structure and ‘health’ of 
seaside resorts. Thus, a list of available secondary data was compiled. Then, a wide range of 
data representing characteristics of socio-economic structure/composition and indicators of 
decline was assembled from a range of data sources, including Census of Population, Labour 
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Force Survey, Annual Business Inquiry, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and 
Customs, Experian, Land Registry, Home Office, ONS, Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix 
etc. The data was collated for seaside resort LSOAs and wards, and matched to all identifiable 
‘seaside’ resorts within each seaside district, and added to the newly created national seaside 
resort database. For the typological investigation of excluded seaside localities, the data 
compiled for resort LSOAs was used. 
 
 The data collation undertaken for this study, therefore, has been enormous. The 
construction of the national seaside resort database was a prime consideration from the outset. 
The design and construction of the database was determined by the information collected, and 
also by the manner in which recording of data took place. The purpose of the database was to 
host, first, Indices of Deprivation data for seaside and non-seaside local authority districts and 
LSOAs in England and, second, information relating to the themes of socio-economic 
performance for all identified ‘seaside’ resort wards and LSOAs, with data for the latter small 
area geographies being aggregated to the resort level. Thus, two main phases of data collection 
took place. The first phase involved the utilisation of the Indices of Deprivation database, area 
classification and implementation of a three step process to identify the resorts to be included 
in the analysis of social exclusion. Having identified seaside resorts, wards and LSOAs, the 
second phase of the data collection process was then initiated and involved researching the 
available datasets at the LSOA and ward level. Again, the purpose of the survey was to collect, 
first, socio-demographic data about the circumstances of people living in seaside resorts and, 
second, information relating to aspects of area decline. Thus, the second phase of data collection 
was lengthy.  
 
 The national seaside resort database was designed and created using Microsoft Excel. 
The database consists of seven spreadsheets, four of these relate to seaside regions, districts, 
wards and LSOAs, whereas the fifth relates to resorts (i.e., ward and LSOA data aggregated to 
resort level). The sixth sheet is a geographic look-up table, which details the LSOA names and 
codes, ward names and codes and postcodes for every seaside resort. The seventh sheet contains 
the Indices of Deprivation data for seaside and non-seaside areas. Microsoft Excel was utilised 
121 
 
as it is easy to use and readily available on most computers, thus allowing ease of data-migration 
and accessibility. Microsoft Excel is also easily compatible with other Microsoft applications, 
such as Microsoft Access, which is a relatively new tool that provides both the functionality of 
a database and the programming capabilities to create end-user screens. To anyone with basic 
knowledge of both Excel and Access, it will be immediately obvious that the latter is far 
superior in terms of storing and manipulating large amounts of information. Access is composed 
of tables, queries, forms, reports, macros and modules. Given these functions, a project is now 
underway to move the data from Excel to Access, thus enhancing the potential for future 
dissemination of parts of the database. Analyses of data have been undertaken using Excel 
(2013) and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0 programme. The 
methods of analysis, as indicated in Table 4.1, are discussed in detail in the following sections 
of this chapter, alongside the data to which they relate.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of research methodology 
  
Philosophy  Positivism 
Ontology Objectivism 
Epistemology Empiricism 
Approach Non-experimental, quantitative, exploratory-descriptive 
Design Three stage method 
 
Stage 1: Examination of social exclusion in all English ‘seaside’ resorts 
Stage 2: Examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance      
              on social exclusion 
Stage 3: Typological investigation of excluded resort localities 
 
Method and 
data 
  
Construction of a national seaside resort database 
 
Stage 1: Indices of Deprivation 
Stage 2: Datasets available at the LSOA and ward level 
Stage 3: Datasets available at the LSOA level 
Analysis 
 
Secondary data analysis 
 
Stage 1: A combination of univariate and bivariate analyses (i.e., chi-square  
              and Pearson’s correlation analyses) 
Stage 2: A combination of univariate and bivariate analyses (i.e., t-tests) 
Stage 3: Multivariate analysis (i.e., principal components analysis, cluster  
              analysis) and bivariate analyses (i.e., one-way analysis of variance  
              and chi-square analysis). 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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4.2 Examination of social exclusion in English ‘seaside’ resorts 
 
 ‘Social exclusion’ is universally regarded in the academic and policy literature as 
involving multi-dimensional disadvantage. It is important to note, however, that there is no 
generally accepted definition of social exclusion and so there is no universally agreed mix of 
indicators. Indeed, a chief characteristic of social exclusion studies to date has been the variation 
in indicators employed in constructing a composite measure of the concept (see Levitas et al., 
2007 for a review). Previous area-based studies of social exclusion have used various indicators 
from a range of data sources such as administrative sources, ONS and the Census of Population. 
Such variation serves to exemplify the absence of a generally approved approach to the concept 
and measurement of social exclusion. 
 
 This study draws principally on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The IMD was 
considered the most suitable vehicle through which to examine the occurrence, nature and 
extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts for four main reasons. First, it covers a 
range of different and related aspects of deprivation that together are indicative of social 
exclusion. Second, it is based on a robust, transparent methodology. Third, although the data 
are not available at a resort level, it is possible to collate and apply the LSOA level data to 
resorts. Fourth, it is easily accessible and understandable. Thus, the IMD was adopted for both 
pragmatic and conceptual reasons. This section first provides an overview of the IMD and its 
construction. It will then go on to describe the process used by the study to identify the seaside 
resorts to be included in the analysis. Then, the analysis strategy is detailed.  
 
4.2.1 Data source 
 
 The IMD forms part of a package of indices – the English Indices of Deprivation – 
produced by the Department of Social Policy and Intervention at the University of Oxford, on 
behalf of the DCLG. A detailed document describing the purpose, methodology and sources 
for construction of the indices is available for download from the DCLG website (McLennan 
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et al., 2011). According to the DCLG, the IMD and its component indices are the main 
mechanisms used in government to distinguish between small areas for the purposes of 
analysing area change, monitoring performance, setting targets and allocating funding 
(McLennan et al., 2011). The IMD is based on the premise that multiple deprivation consists 
of individual components which can be measured separately, but also combined to form an 
overall single index measure. Each of the component domains of deprivation is comprised of a 
number of indicators which cover aspects of this deprivation as comprehensively as possible. 
Based on these indicators, every LSOA in England is then given a score. The scores in each 
domain are standardised, and each domain is weighted. The DCLG note that the weights applied 
were the result of a combination of analysis of the data, expert opinion and consultation 
(McLennan et al., 2011). These weighted scores are combined to give a composite score (or 
index value) for each LSOA. As shown in Figure 4.2, the IMD is a composite score based on 
38 indicators grouped across seven domains. Each domain’s contribution to the overall score is 
weighted differently, with income and employment deprivation weighted the most. Income and 
employment deprivation make up 45% of the IMD between them. Once domain scores have 
been established for each area the individual areas are ranked. Areas are ranked for each domain 
and for the combined IMD measure according to their position relative to all others in the 
country. There are 32,482 LSOAs in England; the LSOA with a rank of 1 is the most deprived 
and 32,482 the least deprived. 
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Figure 4.2: Index of Multiple Deprivation – indicators, domains and relative weighting (out of 100)        
 
Source: Compiled from McLennan et al. (2011)
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A number of summary measures which describe differences in the IMD between local authority 
districts are also available. These measures are: 
 
 Average of LSOA scores which describes the district as a whole, taking into account the 
full range of LSOA scores across a district. It is the population weighted average of the 
combined scores for LSOAs in each district and takes into account that the more deprived 
LSOAs may have more extreme scores.  
 
 Average of LSOA ranks which summarises the overall measure of deprivation across the 
district taken as a whole, including both deprived and less deprived LSOAs. It is the 
population weighted average of the combined ranks for the LSOAs in a district.  
 
 Extent which shows how widespread high levels of deprivation are in a district and is the 
proportion of a district’s population living in the most deprived LSOAs in the country. It 
only includes districts containing LSOAs which fall within the most deprived 30% of 
LSOAs in England. 
 
 Local concentration which identifies hot spots of deprivation within a district. It is the 
population weighted average of the ranks of the district's most deprived LSOAs that capture 
exactly 10% of the district's population (which may not always capture a whole number of 
LSOAs).  
 
 Scale (2 measures) which captures the number of people experiencing (1) income and (2) 
employment deprivation at district level. 
 
No single summary measure is favoured over another as there is no best way of describing or 
comparing districts. There are less local authority districts in the 2010 indices (n = 326) than 
there were in 2007 and 2004 (n = 354) due to local government reorganisation in 2009, which 
resulted in the formation of a number of single, or unitary, authorities. For each measure, the 
district is given a rank. Again, when considering ranks, low numbers are always worse than 
high ones. 
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 The Indices of Deprivation were first published at ward level in 2000, then at the smaller 
LSOA level in 2004, 2007 and 2010. Thus, the latter three versions measure pockets of 
deprivation more accurately than the Indices of Deprivation 2000. A second improvement is 
that the Indices of Deprivation 2004, 2007 and 2010 include two additional domains of 
deprivation: ‘crime’ and ‘living environment’. Given that the Indices of Deprivation which 
relate to 2004, 2007 and 2010 are based on the same approach, structure and methodology, 
comparison between the indices is possible. The data in this study are primarily drawn from the 
Indices of Deprivation 2010, although the previous two versions are also referred to. An 
important point to note here is that there is typically a two year time lag between the publication 
of deprivation indices and the period covered by the data which comprise those indices. Thus, 
the most recent Indices of Deprivation typically rely on 2008 data, which should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results. 
 
 There are, however, a number of other limitations to be aware of when using the Indices 
of Deprivation to analyse areas. For a start, the indicators identify areas with characteristics 
associated with deprivation – not deprived people. It follows that not all people living in areas 
classified as ‘deprived’ necessarily reflect the characteristics of the area they live in. Making 
an erroneous assumption in this regard is known as an ‘ecological fallacy’ and is more likely 
when larger spatial units of analysis are used. Therefore, this study mainly uses data at the 
LSOA level but reference is also made to local authority districts. Another important point is 
that the Indices of Deprivation provide a good overview of relative patterns of deprivation in 
England but they do not, on their own, allow absolute statements about the level of deprivation 
within individual areas. For example, it is not possible to say that LSOA X, ranked 20 is twice 
as deprived as LSOA Y, which is ranked 40. However, it is possible to say that X is more 
deprived than Y. Furthermore, care must also be exercised over the interpretation of indices. 
The Income domain, for instance, does not measure income. Its main inputs are measures of 
the number of people on particular benefits in each area (and so assumed deprivation in terms 
of income). It follows that the indices is not a measure of affluence. Low levels of income 
deprivation do not necessarily mean an area is affluent. Finally, as well as questioning the 
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suitability of indicators to summarise deprivation, it is also important to remember that not all 
deprivation indices are weighted equal, as shown in Figure 4.2. Income deprivation and 
employment deprivation are weighted the most, resulting in an increased IMD score for income 
and employment deprived LSOAs relative to less-deprived ones. It follows that the pattern of 
multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – across England might appear different if the weights 
applied to combine the scores from each of the domains were balanced or less biased. However, 
despite such difficulties, the IMD remains the most appropriate composite multi-dimensional 
measure available for investigation of the multifaceted problem of social exclusion. Thus, 
having described the data source used to indicate the occurrence, nature and extent of social 
exclusion characteristics in English seaside resorts, it is next necessary to explain how the 
seaside resorts were identified for inclusion in the study. 
 
4.2.2 Identification of seaside resorts – criteria and methods 
 
 There is no standard definition of England’s seaside resorts. An empirical investigation 
therefore needs a working definition to be constructed. This study has defined a seaside resort 
as any sizeable coastal settlement in which tourism is a significant source of economic activity 
and whose visitor product is primarily linked to the seaside. To capture the economic activity 
element (in the absence of data at a resort level), only settlements within ‘seaside’ districts were 
considered. Specifically, settlements within ‘seaside’ districts were deemed a resort if they met 
all of the following inclusion criteria: 
 
(i)  Settlements must be adjacent to the sea; 
(ii)  Settlements must have a beach; and, 
(iii)  Settlements must have a population above 10,000 in the 2001 Census. 
 
 There were two stages to the process of identification. The first consisted of identifying 
‘seaside’ districts, which involved classifying the local authority districts of England. Pre-2009 
local authority boundaries (from 2001) were used in this study since some local authority 
districts were merged in the 2009 local government reorganisation, influencing local 
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geographies in the North East, the West Midlands and the South West. Thus, this study has 
defined seaside resorts using pre-2009 local authority boundaries, when the number of 
authorities was greater and boundaries were drawn more tightly around resorts in the North 
East and the South West. Based simply on proximity to the coast, the 354 local authority 
districts of England were sub-divided into two categories: ‘coastal’ and ‘inland’. A total of 84 
districts were classified as ‘coastal’ and these districts were subject to further area classification 
in order to enable a distinction to be made between those districts that are ‘seaside’ as opposed 
to ‘coastal’. ‘Seaside’ reflected tourism as an important form of employment (i.e., above 
average levels of employment in tourism-related businesses).  
 
 The available data on employment is rooted in the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC), which is based on industry group activity. An important point to note here is that, as 
argued in section 3.3.1, the share of employment in the hotel, catering and distribution sector 
does not adequately reflect the importance of tourism (because it is too broad). However, there 
is no defined set of tourism industries, with several having been used for institutional or 
statistical purposes. In this study, the definition of ‘tourism-related industries’ is that adopted 
by the ONS in ‘Labour Market Trends’, namely SIC groups 551 to 554, 633 and 925 to 927. It 
includes, for example, employee jobs in hotels, restaurants, bars, libraries, attractions, sport and 
other recreation activities. Thus, the ONS approach results in a much narrower definition of 
tourism given that its calculation excludes employment in other service industries (i.e., 
wholesale, retail, the motor trade) of the hotel, catering and distribution sector. The figures, 
based upon data from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) published by the ONS, were 
assembled from the National On-line Manpower Information System (NOMIS) website, which 
provides labour market profiles for local authority districts in England. 
 
 So, ‘seaside’ reflected tourism as an important form of employment, that is, 8.2% or 
above employed in tourism-related businesses according to the ABI (2001). ‘Coastal’ districts 
that recorded tourism-related employment below this national average had more diverse 
economies. Of the 84 local authority districts initially classified as coastal, 24 were re-classified 
as ‘coastal’ because they appeared to be less reliant on tourism and 60 as ‘seaside’. (However, 
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as indicated in Figure 4.3, not all these ‘seaside’ districts contained places with resort status. Of 
the 60 districts classified as ‘seaside’, 39 contained resorts and 21 did not. These districts are 
termed, respectively, ‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’. The location of the 
districts is shown in Figure 4.4.) 
  
 Having identified the ‘seaside’ districts (n = 60), the second stage of the identification 
process was then initiated and involved applying the criteria to the settlements located within 
those districts. The first step involved creating a list of all places along the coast in each 
‘seaside’ district. This list was informed by careful scrutiny of Ordnance Survey maps. As a 
second step, each place was checked to establish whether a beach is a dominant feature. This 
exercise relied upon information sourced from both the UK Coast Guide website (2010) and 
the beaches and coastline section of the Enjoy England website (2010). Having identified places 
along the coast with a beach, attention then turned toward establishing the population of each 
place.  
 
 As Census 2001 data does not correspond directly to seaside resorts, but instead to local 
authority, ward and output geographies, a ward-based definition was initially adopted to enable 
the population of each place to be established.  Essentially, there are two types of ward in 
England – electoral wards and census wards. Electoral wards change their boundaries over time, 
as populations and local areas change. Census wards, however, provide a fixed geographical 
area. Consequently, census wards are useful for comparison of data over time. It is for this 
reason, and because LSOAs are nested within the boundaries of census wards, Census Area 
Statistics (CAS) wards were examined. Thus, for each ‘seaside’ district, the codes and names 
of all CAS wards were exported from the ONS Ward History Database (2009). CAS wards 
within the 60 ‘seaside’ districts were examined by a visual study of Ordnance Survey maps, 
local authority internet sites and resort brochures to ascertain which wards formed part of, or 
wholly encompassed, the underlying urban geography of each place in question. Population 
figures were then assembled from the Neighbourhood Statistics website, allowing for the status 
of settlements to be established and, consequently, settlements excluded from, or included in, 
the study.  
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 The boundaries of the resorts, defined by CAS wards, were also matched to LSOAs to 
enable the use of data compiled at LSOA level. Identifying the names and codes of the LSOAs 
within each CAS ward involved extracting the information from ‘Output Area Look-up Tables’, 
which are available from the ONS website. Again, the respective population figures were 
sourced from the Neighbourhood Statistics website. Then, each seaside resort was defined using 
its constituent LSOAs. All LSOAs within each CAS ward that covered less than half of the 
urban geography were excluded and the population figures revised. In all, 58 individual seaside 
resorts were identified as a result of this process (see Table 4.2) and they are the basis of the 
subsequent analysis in this study. Figure 4.5 shows how the seaside resorts are distributed 
around the coastline. They are listed in Table 4.3, ranked by their total resident population (of 
constituent LSOAs) in 2001. With a population of above 10,000, all the resorts included here 
qualify as ‘urban’ settlements on official criteria (ONS, 2001). Thus, the population threshold 
meant the inclusion of all the major seaside resorts.  
 
 In summary, this study identified 58 seaside resorts through the use of the newly created 
specific seaside resort definition, together with the local authority district area classification 
and small area geography. Indeed, each seaside resort has been defined in terms of the resident 
population of constituent LSOAs, which involved fine-grain maps overlaying LSOA 
boundaries on the underlying urban geography. This approach is much superior to the 
‘subjective judgement’ and ward-based definition of seaside towns (n = 37 with a population 
of more than 10,000) developed by Sheffield Hallam University for the Seaside Economy report 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2004: 463). The approach of this study is also an improvement on that 
deployed in Agarwal and Brunt (2006). They used a district classification similar in principle 
to this study, but only differentiated between coastal and seaside districts (failing to recognise 
‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts). Moreover, like Beatty and Fothergill 
(2004), Agarwal and Brunt (2006) also matched ward and resort boundaries. They identified 
32 ‘seaside’ districts and 87 seaside resorts, but did not name all these resorts or specify in 
which districts they are located. Another deficiency is that Agarwal and Brunt (2006: 662) claim 
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to have investigated deprivation by resort size, but provide little evidence of this analysis, 
including how the 87 resorts were split in the analysis.  
 
 Within this study analysis is undertaken for the 58 largest seaside resorts split between 
the 25 larger seaside resorts and 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. This split has been determined 
based on the resident population of the LSOAs which comprise the seaside resorts. While the 
use of thresholds of population size can be arbitrary in its division of settlements of different 
sizes, that proposed by ONS (2001) has attained widespread acceptance and is adopted here. 
As indicated above, urban settlements are defined as those with population of more than 10,000 
in 2001. However, ONS has proposed a classification of urban settlements according to the 
amount of population they contain. As shown in Table 4.4, the core of the classification is a 
four-fold grouping of areas. With a population ranging from 10,124 to 163,351, the resorts fall 
into the ‘larger market town’ and ‘other urban’ categories. Therefore, it was felt that the 
threshold figure of above 39,999 was appropriate to determine ‘large’ seaside resorts. Thus, 
using the 2001 census population figures at LSOA level, the ‘large’ resorts are those resorts 
with a population more than or equal to 40,000; the ‘mid-sized’ resorts are defined as those 
which have a population between 10,000 and 39,999.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The area classification of local authority districts 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 4.4: The location of ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ districts, England, 2001 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 4.2: Identifying seaside resorts 
 
Region All coastal local authority districts   % >8.2 Resorts 
South West 
 Isles of Scilly 30.7 S  
 West Somerset 24.9 S Minehead 
 Penwith                                       20.6 S Penzance 
 Restormel 19.7 S Newquay 
 Weymouth & Portland 17.3 S Weymouth 
 Torbay                    16.7 S 
Torquay 
Paignton 
Brixham 
 Purbeck 14.8 S Swanage 
 North Cornwall 14.2 S  
 North Devon 13.7 S Ilfracombe 
 Caradon 13.4 S  
 East Devon                                  12.9 S 
Exmouth 
Sidmouth 
 Bournemouth  12 S Bournemouth 
 Teignbridge 12 S 
Teignmouth 
Dawlish 
 South Hams 11.8 S  
 Torridge 11.6 S  
 Carrick 10.5 S Falmouth 
 Christchurch 10.4 S Christchurch 
 Sedgemoor 9.8 S Burnham-on-Sea 
 West Dorset 9.1 S  
 Kerrier 8.5 S  
 North Somerset                          8.3 S 
Weston-s-Mare 
Clevedon 
 Plymouth                        8 C  
 Poole  7.7 C  
South East     
 Isle of Wight  15 S Ryde 
 Rother 13.1 S Bexhill-on-Sea 
 New Forest 12.8 S  
 Brighton and Hove  11.9 S 
Brighton 
Hove 
 Shepway 11.6 S 
Folkestone 
Hythe 
 Arun 10.8 S 
Littlehampton 
Bognor Regis 
 Wealden 10.4 S  
 Eastbourne 10.3 S Eastbourne 
 Chichester 10 S  
 Portsmouth  9.5 S Southsea 
 Canterbury 8.9 S 
Herne Bay 
Whitsable 
 Dover 8.9 S 
Deal 
Dover 
 Thanet 8.9 S 
Margate 
Ramsgate 
Broadstairs 
 Gosport 8.4 S  
 Hastings 8.4 S Hastings 
 Havant 8.2 C  
 Swale 7.4 C  
 Lewes 7.2 C  
 Medway 7 C  
 Worthing 7 C  
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 Adur 6.2 C  
 Fareham 5.5 C  
East     
 Great Yarmouth 15.4 S Great Yarmouth 
 North Norfolk 13.1 S  
 Waveney 11.1 S Lowestoft 
 Tendring 10.5 S Clacton-on-Sea 
 Maldon 10.2 S  
 Suffolk Coastal 9.7 S  
 Rochford 9.2 S  
 Southend-on-Sea  8.9 S Southend-on-Sea 
 King’s Lynn & West Norfolk 8.4 S  
 Thurrock  7 C  
 Castle Point 7 C  
East Midlands     
 East Lindsey 16.1 S Skegness 
 Boston 5.6 C  
 South Holland 4.4 C  
Yorkshire & the Humber     
 Scarborough 18.9 S 
Scarborough 
Whitby 
 East Riding of Yorkshire  7.7 C  
 N.E. Lincolnshire  7.2 C  
North East     
 Berwick-upon-Tweed 19.2 S Berwick 
 Alnwick 17.7 S  
 Castle Morpeth 9.9 S  
 South Tyneside 9.3 S South Shields 
 Hartlepool  8.3 S  
 North Tyneside 8.2 C  
 Blyth Valley 7.9 C  
 Redcar & Cleveland  7.8 C  
 Wansbeck 7.4 C  
 Sunderland 6.6 C  
 Easington 5.9 C  
North West     
 South Lakeland 20 S  
 Blackpool  16.4 S Blackpool 
 Allerdale 12.7 S  
 Lancaster 10.4 S 
Morecambe 
Heysham 
 Wyre 9.9 S 
Thorton-Cleveleys 
Fleetwood 
 Sefton 9.5 S 
Southport 
Crosby 
Formby 
 Fylde 9.1 S Lytham St Annes 
 Wirral 8.6 S 
New Brighton 
Hoylake 
West Kirby 
 Copeland 7.8 C  
 Barrow-in-Furness 7.4 C  
 West Lancashire 6.5 C  
 
 
 
 
Continued overleaf 
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Region n=C % n=S n=R 
South West  23 9 21 19 
South East 22 8.2 15 18 
East 11 7.7 9 4 
North East 11 8.4 5 2 
North West 11 8.2 8 12 
East Midlands  3 7.6 1 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber  3 7.7 1 2 
England 84 8.2 60 58 
 
Notes: 
 
C = all coastal local authority districts (as opposed to inland). 
S = all seaside local authority districts (as opposed to coastal). 
% = Number of tourism-related jobs as a proportion of total employee jobs. Tourism-related includes the 
following sectors: 
 Hotels; 
 Camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation; 
 Restaurants; 
 Bars; 
 Activities of tour operators, travel organisers and travel agencies; 
 Library, archives, museums and other cultural activities; 
 Sporting activities; and 
 Other recreational and entertainment activities. 
 
Employee jobs exclude self-employed, government-supported trainees and HM Forces. 
 
8.2 = The national average for employment in tourism-related businesses (ABI, 2001) 
R = Settlements granted resort status 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 4.5: Location of England’s seaside resorts 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 4.3: Population of England’s seaside resorts, 2001 
 
Resort District Population  
Bournemouth Bournemouth 163,351 
Southend-on-Sea Southend-on-Sea 160,257 
Brighton Brighton & Hove 155,587 
Blackpool Blackpool 142,283 
Hove Brighton & Hove 92,230 
Southport Sefton 90,336 
Eastbourne Eastbourne 89,667 
Hastings Hastings 85,029 
South Shields South Tyneside 81,583 
Weston-s-mare North Somerset 71,758 
Torquay Torbay 63,998 
Lowestoft Waveney 61,999 
Great Yarmouth Great Yarmouth 54,153 
Clacton-on-Sea Tendring 51,284 
Weymouth Weymouth & Portland 50,868 
Southsea Portsmouth 50,346 
Scarborough Scarborough 50,135 
Paignton Torbay 48,251 
Crosby Sefton 48,119 
Folkestone Shepway 45,064 
Christchurch Christchurch 44,325 
Lytham St Annes Fylde 41,327 
Bexhill-on-Sea Rother 40,495 
Margate Thanet 40,386 
Ramsgate Thanet 40,339 
Herne Bay Canterbury 35,188 
Exmouth East Devon 32,972 
Morecambe Lancaster 32,091 
Thornton-Cleveleys Wyre 31,157 
Whitstable Canterbury 30,979 
Deal Dover 28,768 
Dover Dover 28,156 
Fleetwood Wyre 26,841 
Littlehampton Arun 25,593 
Formby Sefton 24,996 
Broadstairs Thanet 24,370 
Ryde Isle of Wight 23,788 
Bognor Regis Arun 22,555 
Clevedon North Somerset 21,957 
Newquay Restormel 21,953 
Penzance Penwith 21,168 
Falmouth Carrick 20,775 
Skegness East Lindsey 18,910 
Burnham-on-Sea Sedgemoor 18,401 
Brixham Torbay 17,457 
Heysham Lancaster 16,136 
Hoylake Wirral 15,662 
West Kirby Wirral 15,548 
New Brighton Wirral 14,450 
Teignmouth Teignbridge 14,413 
Hythe Shepway 14,170 
Whitby Scarborough 13,594 
Sidmouth East Devon 13,135 
Dawlish Teignbridge 12,819 
Minehead West Somerset 11,699 
Berwick Berwick-upon-Tweed 10,882 
Ilfracombe North Devon 10,840 
Swanage Purbeck 10,124 
Seaside resorts  2,544,017 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Census of Pop. 2001 
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Table 4.4: The urban classification of areas                                                        
 
Categories Population range 
Larger Market Town an urban area with between 10,000 and 39,999 population in 2001 
Other Urban an urban area with between 40,000 and 249,999 population in 2001 
Large Urban an urban area with between 250,000 and 749,999 population in 2001 
Major Urban an urban area with population above 750,000 in 2001 
Source: Modified from ONS (2001) 
 
 
4.2.3 Analysis strategy 
 
 One objective of this study is to identify the nature and extent of social exclusion 
in English seaside resorts. In order to achieve this objective, the research was conducted in 
three stages. The process of the work and the tasks of each stage are detailed in this section. 
Due to the fact that the IMD data are not collected for seaside resorts specifically, the research 
began at the local authority district level. 
 
Stage 1: District-level analysis 
 
Task:  To establish the factual basis regarding whether local authority districts 
classified in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ differ from other district types, or from the 
general situation in England, with regard to a range of measures of deprivation.   
 
Process: There were two phases to the district-level analysis. The first phase involved 
analysis of the local authority district level indicators of multiple deprivation. The six summary 
measures for districts in each area classification category (see Figure 4.3) were recoded into 
national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation 
databases (see Table 4.5) and cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses were 
undertaken to ascertain whether there are “true” differences in the incidence and level of 
multiple deprivation between the types of districts. In the second phase of the district-level 
analysis, data at LSOA level is used to examine how different types of districts perform on the 
IMD and its constituent domains. To enable comparison between the indices, it was necessary 
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to use pre-2009 local authority boundaries. LSOAs were matched to their respective districts 
and grouped using the area classification of district. The LSOAs within each district type were 
then recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices 
of Deprivation databases (see Table 4.6) and, in a similar fashion to the previous district-level 
analysis, a combination of univariate and bivariate analyses illuminates the differential 
incidence of deprivation. But the second phase also examined the distribution of LSOAs by 
district classification and IMD deprivation decile, thus providing a more precise picture of 
deprivation. Deciles are created by ranking all LSOAs from most to least deprived and then 
dividing into ten groups, each containing an equal number of LSOAs (see Table 4.7). For 
instance, decile number one is England’s most deprived 10 per cent of LSOAs. Decile number 
two contains the LSOAs falling in the range of 10-20 per cent worst, and so on. The tenth decile 
represents England’s 10 per cent least deprived LSOAs. 
 
 
Table 4.5: National deprivation quartiles for local authority districts 
 
Quartiles ID 2004, 07 ID 2010 
Q1 Most deprived 1-88 1-81 
Q2 Above average 89-177 82-163 
Q3 Below average 178-266 164-245 
Q4 Least deprived 267-354 246-326 
  
Note:  Quartiles were applied as they provide a good robust general overview of deprivation variation. As 
quartile groupings are broader they are less subject to minor change, making them a reliable comparator over time. 
However, as there are less local authorities in the 2010 index than there were in 2007/04 due to the formation of 
unitary authorities in 2009, no meaningful time series analysis of the district measures of deprivation could be 
undertaken. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
Table 4.6: National deprivation quartiles for LSOAs 
 
Quartiles ID 2004, 07, 10 
Q1 Most deprived 1-8120 
Q2 Above average 8,121-16,241 
Q3 Below average 16,242-24,362 
Q4 Least deprived 24,363-32,482 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 4.7: National deprivation deciles for LSOAs 
 
Deciles ID 2004, 07, 10 
D1 Most deprived 1-3,248 
D2 3,249-6,496 
D3  6,497-9,744 
D4  9,745-12,992 
D5 12,993-16,240 
D6 16,241-19,488 
D7 19,489-22,736 
D8 22,737-25,984 
D9 25,985-29,232 
D10 Least deprived 29,233-32,482 
 
Note: Unlike quartiles, deciles provide more detailed analysis. However, decile groupings are more sensitive to 
small fluctuations in deprivation and should be interpreted with some caution; they will show more of the short 
term fluctuations in deprivation as well as the longer term trends shown by quartiles. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
Stage 2: LSOA-level analysis 
 
Task:  To establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social exclusion 
occur within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics. 
 
Process: In order to establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social 
exclusion occur within seaside resorts, all LSOAs within each ‘seaside with resort’ district were 
categorised as ‘resort’ or ‘other’ depending on their correspondence with identifiable resort 
areas. The ‘resort’ and ‘other’ LSOAs were then recoded into national quartiles based on their 
rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases and cross-tabulations and 
chi-square analyses were undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be 
ascertained. This work also provided the basis for subsequent univariate analysis to identify, 
first, the overall distribution of deprivation for the resorts and how this compares with England 
and, second, the type and level of deprivation that resort LSOAs appear to be experiencing. 
Then, in order to establish the extent to which multiple deprivation is associated with other 
aspects of deprivation in seaside resorts, a series of scatterplots of the ‘resort’ LSOAs were 
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produced. A scatterplot visually represents the correspondence between two variables – in this 
instance the overall IMD rank and the individual domain ranks. Each scatterplot reports a value 
‘r’ (also called a ‘correlation co-efficient’), which indicates whether there is a relationship and, 
if so, whether the relationship is positive or negative. Thus, the results of the correlational 
analysis shed light on the character of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. 
 
Stage 3: Resort-level analysis 
 
Task:  To provide an account of how multiple deprivation varies between and within 
seaside resorts. 
 
Process: There were three phases to the resort-level analysis. Initially, there was further 
investigation of the nature and severity of multiple deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts 
through the manipulation and analysis of data produced at the LSOA level. Univariate statistical 
analysis was used to ascertain, first, the number of resorts with at least one LSOA in the upper 
quartile and, second, the number of component domains on which each resort LSOA ranks 
within the most deprived 25% of LSOAs nationally. This work provided a basis for subsequent 
analysis to identify the seaside resorts experiencing particular problems of multiple deprivation. 
 
 The second set of analyses examined the distribution and characteristics of multiple 
deprivation and how these vary by resort size. In order to establish whether there is a 
relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation, 
the LSOAs initially classified as ‘resort’ were reclassified as either ‘large’ or ‘medium’ resort 
LSOAs. The LSOAs in each classification category were then recoded into national quartiles 
based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases, and cross-
tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses against all of the ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resort 
LSOAs were undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be ascertained. Data 
analysis continued by investigating whether there were differences in the nature of multiple 
deprivation between the larger and mid-sized resorts. In this analysis, the correlation 
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coefficients between the overall IMD rank and the individual domain ranks for the ‘large’ and 
‘medium’ resort LSOAs were examined.  
 
 In the third and final phase of the analysis, the variation in multiple deprivation between 
and within the seaside resorts was explored. As a first step, in order to ascertain whether the 
levels of multiple deprivation were similar between the resorts, the overall IMD measure was 
applied in national quintiles at the LSOA level for the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-
sized seaside resorts separately. A quintile contains one fifth the total number of LSOAs; there 
are five quintiles in total: most deprived, above average deprivation, average, below average 
deprivation, and least deprived. The reason for adopting this approach is because the DCLG 
and many analyses of discrete places (i.e., towns and cities) use the most deprived 20% of 
LSOAs as a cut-off, as areas that fall in the top 20% most deprived in the country are able to 
access grants and funding from government and other organisations (McLennan et al., 2011). 
Based on the quintile distribution of LSOAs, the seaside resorts were compared with England 
as a whole and to each other, to establish whether there are any differences in the levels of 
multiple deprivation.  
 
 As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the differences in the levels of 
multiple deprivation between the resorts, the median LSOA rank for each of the seaside resorts 
was calculated. The median rank is a better measure than the average (i.e., arithmetic mean) 
rank which can be distorted by extreme values. This measure, however, does not take account 
of the difference in population size between LSOAs in each resort. Consequently, it only 
provides indicative data on resort level deprivation. Thus, the average LSOA rank for each of 
the seaside resorts was calculated following the methodology used by the DCLG when 
calculating the ranks for local authorities. The average ranking of each resort is a population-
weighted average of the ranking of each constituent LSOA. The proportion of the population 
for a resort within an LSOA is multiplied by the rank of that LSOA and then the results are 
added together for all LSOAs in that resort. The above methodology was also applied to 
calculate the average rank for England. The purpose of calculating this average was to assess, 
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first, how the resorts fare on the individual deprivation domains and compare with England as 
a whole and, second, the variation in the nature of deprivation within and between resorts. The 
latter involved ranking the resorts by the average LSOA rank for each deprivation domain and 
overall IMD. Then, in order to illuminate differences in the patterns of deprivation between the 
resorts, the incidence of the deprivation measures was plotted in a series of radar charts for the 
25 larger seaside resorts and 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. 
 
4.3 Examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social 
 exclusion 
 
 Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, 
the next objective was to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on 
social exclusion. The main task was therefore to try to identify one or more indicators that can 
represent each of the factors/facets of the framework outlined in the previous chapter (see Table 
3.4). Again, based on the framework for understanding resort socio-economic change, this 
study is using two main types of indicators of resort fortunes. The first type measures features 
of the area that impinge on the fortunes of residents and also influence population mix (e.g., 
economic factors such as industrial structure, physical factors such as housing stock). The 
second type of indicator is that of population composition and dynamics. Population 
characteristics are important because of their determining influence on labour supply, 
household structure, service needs, social networks and norms, culture and preferences. It 
follows that the list of indicators for inclusion in the analysis ended up being substantial – with 
67 indicators included. 
 
 As with any use of data for the purpose of measuring the socio-economic composition 
of a population and/or health of a place, it can only be a general indicator. No measure is perfect 
and ‘data availability often has to determine what is included’ (Lupton et al., 2011: 29). Indeed, 
data availability at both the LSOA level and the ward level is far more limited than for districts. 
In some cases, the data available is a good match for the characteristics described in the 
literature. For example, DWP publishes data on benefit claimants at the LSOA level and 
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therefore it is possible to include a range of good quality indicators on worklessness/benefit 
dependency. In other cases, the indicators chosen are a proxy or ‘closest fit’ for the 
characteristic. For example, limited robust data on health is available at LSOA and ward level 
and therefore Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance and Disability Living 
Allowance/Attendance Allowance claimant rates have been used as a proxy for poor health. In 
a small number of cases (e.g., social networks, lack of civil society, stigma, fear of crime, 
migrant workers, earnings, business stock), relevant data is not available at LSOA and ward 
level and therefore it has not been possible to suggest indicators to represent these 
characteristics. 
 
 Table 4.8 outlines the indicators that have been included in the analysis. The rationale 
for including each indicator is given in Table 4.9. As can be seen from Table 4.8, datasets that 
are available on an annual basis (and for 2010) have been prioritised over those that are 
published less frequently (because the deprived and less-deprived seaside resorts were 
identified using the IMD 2010). That is not to say that the decennial Census has no value. On 
the contrary, it remains the most valuable and comprehensive data set available for 
investigations of the multidimensional concept of social exclusion. This point is exemplified 
by reference to the work of Levitas et al. (2007). They reviewed the literature, including 
previous studies of area-based deprivation, and provided a list of 64 Census-based variables 
from which to select indicators to investigate the multifaceted problem of social exclusion. 
Although the relevant Census data available for LSOAs and wards was collated for, and 
matched to, identifiable ‘seaside’ resorts within each ‘seaside’ district, and added to the newly 
created specific seaside resort database, only a fraction of the Census data is used in this analysis 
because other (non-Census) data was available for the year 2010. The research used data from 
the 2001 Census, which was unavoidable because of the absence of disaggregated 2011 Census 
data at the time of undertaking the analysis. (Data from the 2011 Census at LSOA and ward 
level was released in batches at different times. ONS released the first batch of disaggregated 
Census data into the public domain at the beginning of February 2013.)  
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 Thus, data was collated for those LSOAs and wards previously identified in the study 
as comprising a seaside resort. The data were then aggregated to produce means for the 58 
seaside resorts, including the 33 less deprived seaside resorts and 25 most deprived resorts. The 
most deprived resorts were identified during the resort level analysis of social exclusion. These 
resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, in terms of the 
proportion of LSOAs falling within the most deprived national quintile. Again, this measure 
was chosen as it has been used within government and more widely to analyse patterns of 
deprivation, to identify areas that would benefit from special initiatives or programmes and as 
a tool to determine eligibility for specific funding streams (McLennan et al., 2011). The 
analyses of data begin by examining the levels of socio-economic performance experienced by 
seaside resorts compared with England as a whole. It went on to investigate whether there were 
differences between deprived and less deprived resorts, including whether the place- and 
population-based variables tend to operate as resort advantages or disadvantages and whether 
they have a large or significant effect. Unrelated t-tests were used to determine if the mean 
values of the variables were different for deprived and less-deprived resorts. The appropriate 
effect size metric for a t test is Cohen’s d, which indicates whether or not the difference between 
two groups’ means is large enough to have practical meaning, whether or not it is statistically 
significant. Due to the fact that Cohen’s d is not available in SPSS, it was necessary to calculate 
the value of d based on the following formula: d = 2t/√(degrees of freedom). A number of 
textbooks cite the work of Cohen (1988) in their guide to effect sizes: below 0.2 as ‘very small’, 
0.2-0.49 as ‘small’, 0.5-0.79 as ‘moderate’, and 0.8 or above as ‘large’. It is widely 
acknowledged that effect sizes of 0.5 or above are meaningful on a practical level.  
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Table 4.8: Summary list of indicators of resort socio-economic performance 
 
 
Measures of area factors 
 
Factors/facets Indicator Source Date Geography 
Industrial structure % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in primary industries Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in secondary industries Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tertiary industries Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
Economic diversity  % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public sector  Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants  Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tourism-related jobs  Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 Location quotient for public sector Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 W 
 Location quotient for distribution, hotels and restaurants sector Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 W 
 Location quotient for tourism jobs Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 W 
Employment rate % of pop. aged 16+ in employment Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 W 
Employment base % of all employee jobs that are full-time  Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
 % of all employee jobs that are part-time Annual Business Inquiry / ONS 2010 L & W 
Enterprise % of working age pop. self-employed  Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Prosperity and wealth Median gross annual household income  Experian 2010 L & W 
Housing – prices Mean house prices Land Registry  2010 W  
Housing – tenure % of all occupied household spaces owned Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of all occupied household spaces rented privately Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Housing – condition % of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of households with no central heating Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of households living in overcrowded conditions Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Housing – unoccupied % of household spaces vacant Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Community safety  Total recorded crimes per 1,000 residents Home Office 2010 W 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
See overleaf for measures of population composition
   
  
   
1
4
7
 
Measures of population composition and dynamics 
 
Factors/facets Indicator Source Date  
Age Median age of population Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Age structure % pop. children  ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. working age  ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. pensionable age  ONS 2010 L & W 
 % pop. retired Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Ethnicity % pop. white Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Household composition % of households single person Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of households single pensioner Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of households lone parent with dependent children Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of dependent children in lone parent families HMRC 2010 L & W 
Occupational class % of working age pop. in employment, classified as professionals, white collar workers Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of working age pop. in employment, classified as manual workers Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Poverty and low income % of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families HMRC 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming Income Support DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element  DWP 2010 L & W 
Worklessness % of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months DWP 2010 L & W 
 JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop. DWP 2010 L & W 
Health and disability % of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance DWP 2010 L & W 
 % of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance DWP 2010 L & W 
Education and skills % of working age pop. with no qualifications Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
 % of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications) Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Connectivity  % of households without access to a car or van Census / ONS 2001 L & W 
Migration Inflow rate, total and by broad age group Census / ONS 2001 W 
 Outflow rate, total and by age broad age group Census / ONS 2001 W 
 Net flow rate, total and by age broad age group Census / ONS 2001 W 
 
Note: L = data available at the LSOA level, W = data available at the ward level 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 4.9: Rationale for use of indicators     
 
Measures of area factors 
 
Indicator Rationale 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in primary industries  Measure of type of employment (where primary industries = agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries and mining).  
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in secondary industries As above (where secondary industries = manufacturing, construction, energy and 
water).  
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tertiary industries As above (where tertiary industries = transport and communications, 
banking/finance, public sector, distribution, hotels and catering) 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public sector Resident exposure to a growing sector / counter-cyclical 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants Resident workforce exposure to a growing sector / seasonal employment 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tourism-related jobs Resident workforce exposure to a vulnerable sector / seasonal employment 
Location quotient for public sector Sectors which have both high LQ typically form an area’s economic base. Less 
resilient to change, low value sectors often have inherent structural problems 
(e.g., seasonal employment) which are themselves constraints to growth. 
Location quotient for distribution, hotels and restaurants sector As above. 
Location quotient for tourism jobs As above. 
% of all employee jobs that are full-time Full-time employment may be considered a prerequisite for quality employment. 
Measure of job quality. 
% of all employee jobs that are part-time There are two possible interpretations of high part-time work: that it reflects 
individual choice and a range of opportunities available to people to domestic 
and other preferences; or that it reflects a lack of opportunities for full-time work. 
% of working age pop. self-employed A high proportion of self-employment in a labour market may be an indicator of 
a dynamic labour market with a strong entrepreneurial culture and a high rate of 
new firm generation. (Although this may also indicate insecure employment in 
some areas). 
Median gross annual household income Measure of prosperity, wealth and material well-being of an area.  
Mean house prices Measure of how attractive an area is to live in (i.e., ‘quality of a place’), where 
high prices equal better well-being. This is because high prices normally reflect 
the quality of an area, for example, transport links, schools, greenspace, safety. 
% of all occupied household spaces owned While home ownership levels may indicate economic security, it is also likely to 
indicate how transient a population is. 
 
Continued overleaf
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% of all occupied household spaces rented privately This is a contextual indicator of households with limited means, mobility and 
reduced responsibility. People living in privately rented tenure include those 
who can't afford to become owner occupiers, students and those who choose to 
live a mobile lifestyle for personal or professional reasons. The occupier has 
freedom from the responsibility to maintain and invest in the property. 
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social This is a contextual indicator of households with high need, vulnerability and 
limited means. Social housing is allocated according to need. The criteria is 
different for every local authority but can include homelessness, overcrowding, 
medical or welfare issues, financial circumstances and number of dependents. 
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet The conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between 
household members, and the development of children. 
% of households with no central heating The conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between 
household members, and the development of children. 
% of households living in overcrowded conditions Lack of housing availability can manifest itself in overcrowding, homelessness 
and rough sleeping. Overcrowding almost invariably occurs in households with 
large numbers of children. It is associated with a higher rate of child accidents 
and the resulting lack of privacy can be a considerable cause of mental stress. 
% of household spaces vacant Empty homes may be an indicator of low housing demand and the decline of 
particular neighbourhoods.  
Crime rate This is an indicator of how safe and secure people are in the places where they 
live and work. Measure of community safety. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
See overleaf for measures of population composition 
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Measures of population composition and dynamics 
 
Indicator Rationale 
Median age of population Age can impact both on the nature of goods and services demanded and their delivery. 
% pop. children  This is a contextual indicator of child dependents. The under 16-age group may require 
specific services to be tailored to meet the unique needs of children and young people. 
Some children become vulnerable and may be under increased risk in places where 
greater poverty and social inequalities exist. 
% pop. working age  Scale of local area labour force 
% pop. pensionable age  This is a contextual indicator of older people. The over 65-age group may require 
specific services to be tailored to meet the unique needs of vulnerable older people. 
Older people within this age group are more likely to be at risk of ill health, loneliness 
and fraud. They may be more reliant on others for their health, social care, transport and 
accessibility needs. Older people may be at increased risk in places where poverty and 
high crime rates exist. 
% pop. retired As above. While retirees may make significant contributions to their communities and 
the economy, they also demand quality-of-life services, such as leisure and healthcare, 
and they have an impact on the resort through, say, increased development to cater for 
their needs, tastes, preferences etc. 
% pop. white Relates to ethnic composition / diversity. 
% of households single person Single person households are both more likely to be poor and more likely to be rich than 
the average – implications for poverty and inequality. 
Living costs are often higher for single person households.  
People living alone can face greater isolation and worse health and mental health. Single 
person households are more vulnerable to crime. 
% of households single pensioner This is a contextual indicator of vulnerable older people. Single pensioners are 
vulnerable to distraction burglary, fraud, fire, ill health, loneliness and isolation. Single 
pensioners will have specific needs that need to be met to mitigate against these 
vulnerabilities. 
% of households lone parent with dependent children This is a contextual indicator of vulnerable families with reduced means. In order to 
bring up children as a lone parent and secure an income additional support is often 
needed. Lone parents with dependent children tend to be at particular risk from poverty, 
unemployment and health inequalities. 
% of dependent children in lone parent families Measure of strength of families. 
 
Continued overleaf 
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% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers, professionals and white 
collar workers 
Measure of ‘knowledge workers’. 
Higher social classes may be more likely to be involved in local area.  
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as manual workers Lower social classes may be less likely to be involved in local area. 
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families Measure of children’s economic stability and family role models 
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support Measure of economic security 
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element  Measure of economic security 
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits This is an indicator of worklessness and benefit dependency. People on out of work 
benefits are not able to generate enough income to support themselves and are 
dependent on their benefits for their income security. 
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) Measure of unemployment 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months Measure of long-term unemployment 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months Measure of long-term unemployment. It is thought that those who have been out of 
employment the longest are least likely to possess the skills and experience that 
employers are seeking. 
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop. Measure of youth unemployment 
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance Measure of health of population 
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance Measure of health of population 
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance Measure of disability. Scale of working age pop. that has care and/or mobility needs 
as a result of a mental or physical disability. 
% of working age pop. with no qualifications Job opportunities for resident labour depend on skills and qualifications. 
The level of qualification held by people of working age in the population provides 
an indication of the quality of labour supply. It can be surmised that a healthy labour 
market is one with a high proportion of the workforce qualified to a high level. The 
converse is also true, in the sense that a healthy labour market would have fewer 
people with lower level qualification or no qualification at all. 
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications) See above. Also, a measure of ‘knowledge workers’. 
% of households without access to a car or van This is a contextual indicator of mobility. Households with no car are reliant on 
public transport, cycling and walking to get about and access key services or 
dependent on services coming to them. 
Migration, total and by broad age group 
- Inflow rate 
- Outflow rate 
- Net flow rate 
Measure of in-migration, outmigration and net flow. Rate is the flow count as % of 
number of residents at the 2001 Census. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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4.4 Typological investigation of excluded seaside resort localities 
 
 Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts 
and investigated the influence of resort socio-economic performance, the final objective was 
to establish whether there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities. Cluster 
analysis was employed as the mechanism for achieving this objective. Cluster analysis is a 
statistical technique which groups cases (in this study, deprived areas) so that the cases within 
a group are similar to each other, but different to those in other groups. As such, it can be useful 
tool in helping understand the nature of particular groups which can in turn enable better 
targeting. In the context of deprived areas, cluster analysis can help understand which deprived 
areas are similar to each other (and why). This improved understanding should enable better 
approaches to regeneration to be developed. The approach taken to developing a typology of 
excluded resort localities is described in this section. First, however, an important decision is 
required: how to define the excluded localities to be included in the analysis?  
 
4.4.1 Defining excluded localities 
 
 As the objective is to establish whether there are different types of excluded resort 
localities, it is important to start by determining which areas should be included in the analysis. 
The geography chosen must represent a meaningful definition of ‘local area’ in terms of 
deprivation and the potential for regeneration. Taking the lead from DCLG (2008) 
Transforming Places; Changing Lives, deprivation is best identified using the smallest 
geographical units available. The smaller the geographies used, the less likely pockets or 
neighbourhoods of deprivation are ‘hidden’. Therefore, it was decided to use LSOA areas for 
the analysis. The reasons for adopting this spatial unit include: (1) the IMD is available at LSOA 
level; (2) LSOAs are the smallest geographical unit at which population, employment and 
benefits data is available; (3) LSOAs can be easily grouped to form larger neighbourhoods, 
estates or areas where appropriate; and, (4) compared to other small area geographies such as 
electoral wards, they are stable (i.e., not subject to administrative changes) and have a 
uniformity of size.  
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 Having selected the most appropriate spatial unit of analysis, the next task was to 
identify excluded resort localities. Here, the research opted to make use of the most recent IMD. 
Thus, the ‘resort’ LSOAs were cross-tabulated with the overall IMD 2010. While a upper 
quartile threshold (i.e., resort LSOAs in England’s most deprived 25 per cent) was initially 
envisaged as the point in the national IMD rankings above which resort LSOAs would be 
classed as ‘excluded’, the research eventually opted for a upper quintile threshold, partly to 
focus the study on the most disadvantaged places and partly because, as noted earlier, DCLG 
and other organisations use the most deprived 20% of LSOAs as a cut-off, for example, when 
assessing applications to access regeneration funds. The results obtained from the examination 
of social exclusion in all English seaside resorts facilitates this stage of the work by allowing 
the identification of excluded resort localities. This section is not the place to set out the results, 
except to say that there are 1,686 resort LSOAs and of these LSOAs, 399 were in the worst 
performing 20% of LSOAs in England on the IMD 2010. Thus, 24% of all resort LSOAs were 
included in the analysis. 
 
4.4.2  Producing the typology 
 
 This section provides an account of the development of a classification designed to 
provide greater insight into the different circumstances of excluded resort localities. The 
statistical and mathematical processes used in the classification process are well established and 
have been widely applied to many different types of situation in the social sciences (see Lupton 
et al., 2011 for a review of place typologies). The description of these processes can be 
simplified (although it is difficult to remove the technical jargon entirely) and set out in terms 
of the following steps: 
 
(1) The selection of variables; 
(2)  The preparation of variables; 
(3)  Finding patterns of variation in the data; 
(4)  Scoring excluded resort localities on the dimensions of variation; and, 
(5)  Grouping the localities according to their scores on the main dimensions in the 
 data. 
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Step 1: The selection of variables 
 
  The first step was to decide which variables should be included in the cluster analysis, 
that is, what characteristics of the excluded resort localities should be explored for 
similarity/difference. As the framework for understanding resort socio-economic change 
highlighted, the causes and consequences of local area exclusion are complex and therefore a 
wide range of characteristics are important to consider. It follows that the list of indicators for 
inclusion in the analysis ended up being substantial – with 50 indicators proposed (under two 
main headings: measures of area factors, measures of population composition and dynamics). 
Table 4.8 presents the variables included in the analysis, and a brief explanation of each variable 
is set out in Table 4.9. When inspecting Table 4.8 and 4.9, it should be noted that only datasets 
available at the LSOA level were used in this analysis (because the excluded resort localities 
are themselves LSOAs). As a result, ward-level data characterising migration and several 
measures of area factors (i.e., location quotient for sectors, mean house prices, crime rate) were 
not included in the analysis. Unfortunately, migration and house price data is not available at 
the LSOA level and therefore it has not been possible to suggest indicators to represent these 
characteristics. But it was possible to represent crime (using the crime rank measure provided 
by the IMD 2010, see Figure 4.2) and industrial structure (using ABI data on employment in 
different sectors). Thus, the typology building approach is started using 50 indicators of resort 
socio-economic performance obtained from ONS Census data and other administrative datasets 
and is applied to 399 excluded resort localities. 
 
Step 2: The preparation of variables 
 
Cluster analysis requires normally distributed data. Therefore, missing values, highly 
skewed distributions and distributions with outliers can create problems. In this data set, there 
are no missing data for the variables. All the variables (except the crime domain rank and 
median gross annual household income) are measured as percentages, generally expressed in 
terms of numbers of residents, households, claimants and employee jobs. However, because the 
range of each percentage across the 399 LSOAs can be widely different for each variable, a 
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standardised measure comparable between variables is actually input into the analysis. If left 
un-standardised, those variables with larger values will swamp the effect of indicators with 
smaller values. Thus, in order to ensure that all variables have the same weight in the 
classification, the variables included in the analysis were standardised to a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. Standardisation was accomplished in SPSS during the course of 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which was used to reduce the 50 variables to a smaller 
set of variables for cluster analysis. 
 
Step 3: Finding patterns of variation in the data 
 
Patterns of variation in the data are identified by the way in which groups of variables 
are related to each other. PCA is used to identify such relationships. At the start, a numerical 
relationship (correlation coefficient) between each variable and every other variable in the data 
is calculated. The resulting table of coefficients (the correlation matrix, as it is known) displays 
a more or less complex pattern with some pairs of variables correlating high and positive (high 
values with high values) with each other and others high and negative (high values with low 
values). Other pairs of variables will display little relationship. This inter-correlation structure 
is useful as it suggests that certain types of variables are measuring a common underlying 
dimension. The intent of PCA is to elicit these underlying dimensions from the inter-
relationships between the variables. The resulting ‘principal components’ can then be 
interpreted/named from the variables of which they are comprised. Usually, a small number of 
such components will be representative of a large amount of the total variation that exists in the 
data. 
 
Prior to undertaking the PCA, the suitability of the data for PCA was assessed. Six 
conditions must be satisfied for a dataset to be considered suitable: 
 
1. Minimum number of cases 
2. Sample to variable ratio 
3. Factorability of the correlation matrix 
4. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
5. Sampling adequacy for set of variables 
6. Sampling adequacy of individual variables 
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Thus, there are two sample size requirements (i.e., items 1 and 2). In terms of the minimum 
number of cases, it is widely acknowledged that the use of larger samples in PCA is necessary 
to yield distinct and reliable principal components. However, a wide range of recommendations 
regarding sample size in PCA have been proposed. For instance, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) 
state that a minimum of 300 cases are needed, whereas Hair et al. (1995) suggest that sample 
sizes should be 100 or greater. The lack of agreement is noted in a number of PCA textbooks, 
which invariably cite the work of Comrey and Lee (1992). They provided the following scale 
of sample size (100 = poor, 200 = fair, 300 = good, 500 = very good, 1,000 or more = excellent) 
and urged researchers to obtain samples of 300 or more observations whenever possible. As 
such, the literature suggests that the sample size of 399 LSOAs is adequate. Regarding the 
sample to variable ratio, the work of Gorsuch (1983) is widely referenced in the PCA literature. 
The ratio of cases to variables in a PCA should be at least 5 to 1. With 399 cases and 50 
variables, the ratio of cases to variables is 7.9 to 1, which exceeds the requirement for the ratio 
of cases to variables. 
 
 When performing PCA in SPSS, the first body of output concerns data screening, 
assumption testing and sampling adequacy. The initial output is the correlation matrix, which 
should be screened for two reasons. One reason is because PCA requires that there be some 
correlations greater than 0.3 between the variables included in the analysis. If there are few 
correlations above 0.3, it is a waste of time carrying on with the analysis, as PCA attempts to 
clump subgroups of variables together based upon their correlations (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). For this set of variables, there are 351 correlations (out of 1,225) in the matrix greater 
than 0.3, satisfying this requirement. Second, it is important to check the correlation between 
variables to verify that there are no serious multicollinearity problems. If there are more 
correlations in the matrix that are above 0.8 than 0.3, then the PCA function in SPSS will not 
produce valid component loading values (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). For this set of 
variables, there are 9 correlations in the matrix greater than or equal to 0.8 (see Table 4.10), 
which is very small number compared to the 351 correlations above 0.3. Although common 
sense suggests that one of each pair of highly correlated variables should be removed because 
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much of the information is redundant, there is actually another way of thinking about highly 
correlated variables: 
 
‘It is likely that variables that can predict the value of other variables would enable the 
classification to predict other behaviours. Therefore, there is an advantage in retaining a 
high proportion of highly correlated variables as they can be seen as powerful predictors’ 
(Voas and Williamson, 2001: 64). 
 
 
Ultimately (and strictly speaking), because PCA is being used and the components themselves 
are actually input into the cluster analysis, the presence of a small number of highly correlated 
variables is not an issue. 
 
Table 4.10: Highly correlated variables 
 
Demographic dependency ratio % pop. working age -0.976 
% of all employee jobs that are full-time % of all employee jobs that are part-time -0.926 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 
months 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 
months 
0.925 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA % of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 0.859 
% of working age pop. in employment, 
classified as managers and professionals 
% of working age pop. in employment, 
classified as other manual  
-0.855 
Median age % pop. pensionable age 0.850 
% of working age pop. self-employed % of working age pop. in employment, 
classified as managers and professionals 
0.826 
% of working age pop. with higher education 
(i.e., level 4/5 qualifications) 
% of working age pop. with no qualifications -0.810 
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support   % of working age pop. claiming Incapacity 
Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance 
0.809 
 
Note: two variables appear twice: % of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months; and % of working age 
pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
Besides assessing the correlations, several statistical tests should be used to evaluate the 
suitability of the data for PCA. These tests include Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity and Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO MSA). The Bartlett Test of Sphericity 
tests whether the correlations between variables are sufficiently large for PCA to be appropriate. 
It does so by comparing the correlation matrix with a matrix of zero correlations (technically 
called the identity matrix, which consists of all zeros except the 1’s along the diagonal). PCA 
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requires that the probability associated with the test statistic be less than the level of significance 
(i.e., p = less than 0.05). In this case the test statistic is significant, χ2 = 36320.217 (df. 1225) p 
<0.001, indicating that the correlations within the correlation-matrix are sufficiently different 
from zero to warrant PCA. Regarding the KMO MSA, the test statistic takes values between 0 
and 1, with small values meaning that overall the variables have too little in common to warrant 
a PCA. Kaiser (1974) recommends a bare minimum of 0.5 (for each individual variable as well 
as the set of variables) and that values between 0.6 and 0.69 are ‘mediocre’, values between 0.7 
and 0.79 are ‘good’, values between 0.8 to 0.89 are ‘great’ and values above 0.9 are ‘superb’. 
The overall MSA for the set of variables included in the analysis was 0.81, which exceeds the 
minimum requirement of 0.5 for overall MSA and falls into the range of being ‘great’, thus 
indicating that the sample size is adequate for PCA. The MSA for the individual variables is 
located along the diagonal of the ‘anti-image correlation matrix’ (another output returned by 
the PCA function in SPSS). On iteration 1, the MSA for 42 of the individual variables included 
in the analysis was greater than 0.5, supporting their retention in the analysis. Thus, 8 variables 
had values below 0.5 (Table 4.11). Consequently, these variables were removed and the PCA 
was computed again. 
 
 
Table 4.11: Variables with an MSA value below 0.5 
 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in agriculture and fishing 0.300 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in energy and water 0.144 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in manufacturing 0.264 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in construction 0.256 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants 0.435 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in transport and communications 0.138 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in banking, finance and insurance 0.265 
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public administration, education and health 0.348 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
 To be clear, PCA is an iterative process. If conditions are not met and the remedial 
action meant the removal of variables, then the PCA must be computed again. On iteration 2, 
with 399 cases and 42 variables, the ratio of cases to variables is 9.5 to 1, which exceeds the 
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requirements for the ratio of cases to variables. For this set of variables, there are 861 
correlations in the matrix and of these, 346 are greater than 0.3 and 9 are greater than or equal 
to 0.8, which indicates the presence of substantial correlations. The probability associated with 
the Bartlett Test of Sphericity is less than 0.001 (χ2 = 34798.620, df. 861), which satisfies this 
requirement. Lastly, PCA requires that the KMO MSA be greater than 0.5 for each individual 
variable as well as the set of variables. The MSA for all of the individual variables included in 
the analysis was greater than 0.5, supporting their retention in the analysis. In addition, the 
overall MSA for the set of variables included in the analysis was 0.84, which exceeds the 
minimum requirement of 0.5 for overall MSA. Thus, all conditions regarding the 
appropriateness of PCA were met on iteration 2. The next task, therefore, was to extract the 
components. 
 
In PCA, the number of components extracted is equal to the number of variables being 
analysed. Thus, an issue which confronts all PCA-based investigations is how many 
components are truly meaningful and worthy of being retained, interpreted, and used in 
subsequent analyses. Numerous extraction approaches have been proposed to determine the 
optimum number of components, including:  
 
1. Kaiser’s stopping rule; 
2. Scree test; 
3. Percent of cumulative variance; and, 
4. Number of non-trivial components. 
 
No single method should be relied on to determine component extraction (Gorsuch, 1983; Hair 
et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). It is widely acknowledged that ‘the simultaneous 
use of multiple decision rules is appropriate and often desirable’ (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001: 
200). Each of the four ways of deciding on the appropriate number of components is now 
considered in turn.  
 
Again, the number of components extracted in a PCA is equal to the number of observed 
variables being analysed. So, because 42 variables were analysed in the present PCA, 42 
components were initially extracted. However, SPSS also extracted components based on 
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Kaiser’s stopping rule, which states that only the number of components with eigenvalues over 
1.0 should be included in the analysis. The rationale for this criterion is neatly summarised by 
Rourke and Hatcher (2013: 17): 
 
‘Each observed variable contributes one unit of variance to the total variance in the data 
set. Any component that displays an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 is accounting for a greater 
amount of variance than had been contributed by one variable. Such a component is 
therefore accounting for a meaningful amount of variance, and is worthy of being 
retained. On the other hand, a component with an eigenvalue less than 1.0 is accounting 
for less variance than had been contributed by one variable. The purpose of principal 
component analysis is to reduce a number of observed variables into a relatively smaller 
number of components; this cannot be effectively achieved if you retain components that 
account for less variance than had been contributed by individual variables. For this 
reason, components with eigenvalues less than 1.0 are viewed as unimportant, and are not 
retained’. 
 
 
Table 4.12 shows the importance of each of the 42 principal components. Only eight 
components have eigenvalues over 1.0, and together these explain 80% of the total variability 
in the data. Kaiser’s criterion has been shown to produce the correct number of components 
when the sample size exceeds 300 observations and the mean communality is greater than or 
equal to 0.60 (Stevens, 1986). Thus, the output called ‘communalities’ was checked. The 
communalities help explain the total amount an individual variable shares with other variables 
included in the analysis. The average of the communalities was found by adding them up and 
dividing by the number of communalities (i.e., 33.5/42 = 0.797). This finding leads to the 
conclusion that an eight component solution is probably appropriate. 
 
A second, more subjective method for determining the number of components to retain 
is the scree test, which involves the visual exploration of a graphical representation of the 
eigenvalues. In this method, the eigenvalues associated with each component are plotted against 
their ordinal numbers (i.e., first eigenvalue, second eigenvalue, etc.). Afterwards, the graph is 
examined to determine the point at which the last significant drop or break takes place, in other 
words, where the line levels off. The recommendation is to ignore all of the points along the 
level part of the line including the transition point, and count the points along the precipitously 
dropping part of the line to ascertain the number of important or major components (Hair et al., 
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1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). The scree plot is shown in 
Figure 4.6. It can be seen that the curve begins to tail off after four components, but there is 
another drop after six components before a stable plateau is reached. Thus, this scree plot 
indicates that a six-component solution would be appropriate. 
 
The third approach is to retain enough components so that the cumulative percent of 
variance is equal to some minimal value. Reading down the far right column in Table 4.12 
reveals the percentages of cumulative variance for the components in the analysis. The addition 
of each component adds some new variance to the cumulative variance. The question that arises 
is at what point the adding process should be stopped. While no absolute threshold has been 
adopted, for the social sciences a minimum of 70% cumulative variance is recommended (Hair 
et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). In the case of the 42 
measures on the 399 excluded resort localities, 6 components summarise just over 70 % of the 
total variation in the original data. 
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Table 4.12: Initial PCA for the 42 variables of resort socio-economic performance 
 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 10.476 24.943 24.943 
2 8.849 21.069 46.012 
3 4.496 10.705 56.716 
4 2.696 6.419 63.135 
5 2.433 5.793 68.928 
6 2.043 4.865 73.792 
7 1.364 3.247 77.04 
8 1.146 2.729 79.769 
9 0.927 2.206 81.975 
10 0.738 1.757 83.733 
11 0.697 1.66 85.392 
12 0.618 1.471 86.864 
13 0.599 1.426 88.289 
14 0.533 1.269 89.558 
15 0.5 1.191 90.749 
16 0.47 1.119 91.868 
17 0.405 0.963 92.831 
18 0.34 0.811 93.642 
19 0.322 0.766 94.408 
20 0.305 0.726 95.134 
21 0.285 0.68 95.814 
22 0.242 0.576 96.389 
23 0.2 0.476 96.866 
24 0.184 0.438 97.304 
25 0.161 0.384 97.688 
26 0.147 0.35 98.038 
27 0.135 0.32 98.359 
28 0.124 0.296 98.655 
29 0.113 0.27 98.925 
30 0.098 0.233 99.158 
31 0.076 0.182 99.34 
32 0.065 0.154 99.495 
33 0.056 0.134 99.629 
34 0.046 0.109 99.738 
35 0.042 0.101 99.839 
36 0.031 0.075 99.913 
37 0.014 0.032 99.946 
38 0.013 0.03 99.976 
39 0.01 0.024 100 
40 1.70E-05 4.05E-05 100 
41 4.30E-07 1.02E-06 100 
 
Source: Author’s own work  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of components 
to extract: 
 
The eigenvalue-one 
criterion for number of 
factors to derive would 
indicate that there were 
8 components to be 
extracted for these 
variables.  
Number of 
components to 
extract: 
  
The cumulative 
proportion of 
variance criteria 
can be met with 6 
components to 
satisfy the criterion 
of explaining 70% 
or more of the total 
variance.  
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Component number 
 
Figure 4.6: Scree plot from a PCA of 42 variables of resort socio-economic performance 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
A final criterion for solving the number of components problem is the assessment of 
component triviality. This strategy involves proceeding to component rotation and assessing 
the number of ‘loadings’ and their absolute magnitude. Component loadings are a measure of 
the importance of the variable to the component. If a component does not have at least three 
variables loading above the threshold of 0.40 on it, then it is a ‘trivial’ component and the 
variables should be eliminated and the analysis repeated (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). Again, in order to identify whether there were any 
trivial components, it was necessary to proceed to component rotation. 
 
Rotation maximises high variable loadings and minimises low variable loadings, 
therefore producing a more interpretable and simplified solution. There are two rotation 
techniques: orthogonal rotation and oblique rotation. Researchers have several methods to 
choose from both rotation options (see Hair et al., 1995 for a review). Orthogonal rotations 
produce component structures that are uncorrelated. In contrast, oblique rotations produce 
components that are correlated. Orthogonal ‘varimax’ rotation was used in this study. 
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Compared to other rotation methods, ‘a varimax rotation tends to maximise the variance of a 
column of the factor pattern matrix (as opposed to a row of the matrix). This rotation is the most 
commonly used orthogonal rotation in the social sciences’ (Rourke and Hatcher, 2013: 21).  
 
The rotated component matrix is displayed in Table 4.13. By default, SPSS returns all 
loadings. However (following convention), it was requested that all loadings less than 0.4 be 
suppressed in the output and so there are blank spaces for many of the loadings. It is apparent 
from this table that only one component (i.e., component 8) had less than three meaningful 
variables loading on it. This finding leads to the conclusion that neither an eight (i.e., based on 
the eigenvalue-one criterion) nor six (i.e., based on the scree test; the cumulative proportion of 
variance) component solution is appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Table 4.13: PCA (with varimax rotation) loadings for eight components                                                                       Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
Variables 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other white collar -0.877        
% of working age pop. with no qualifications 0.773        
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications) -0.767      
 
 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other manual 0.765         -0.405     
Median gross annual household income -0.731        
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as skilled manual 0.526        
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)  0.919       
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months  0.895       
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months  0.842       
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work benefits claimants  0.823       
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.  0.764       
% of household spaces vacant  0.685       
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance   0.904      
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support   0.87      
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance   0.771      
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits   0.535 0.704           
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance   0.614      
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element     0.597 0.522         
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families   0.511      
% of dependent children in lone parent families   0.417      
% pop. working age    0.847     
Demographic dependency ratio     -0.847     
% of households living in overcrowded conditions       0.56   0.515     
% of households without access to a car or van   0.454   0.541        
% of all occupied household spaces owned     -0.442 -0.507     0.5   
% pop. White 0.418     -0.491         
% of households single pensioner     0.872    
Median age of population       -0.476 0.775       
% pop. Children     -0.728    
% of households single person     0.704    
% pop. pensionable age       -0.667 0.676       
% of households lone parent with dependent children     -0.593    
% of working age pop. self-employed      0.817   
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals -0.506         0.715     
% of all employee jobs that are tourism-related      0.691   
Crime rank      0.596   
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet      0.449   
% of households with no central heating       0.806  
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social 0.441           -0.718   
% of all occupied household spaces rented privately           0.484 0.535   
% of all employee jobs that are full-time        -0.991 
% of all employee jobs that are part-time        0.991 
Number of components to 
extract: 
 
Component 8 has less than 
three meaningful variables 
loading it, thus indicating that 
it is a ‘trivial’ component. So, 
seven components should be 
extracted 16
5
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 Thus, the two variables loading above the threshold of 0.40 on component 8 were 
removed and the analysis repeated. Again, the first phase of a PCA is devoted to assessing the 
suitability of the dataset. A PCA requires: 
 
 The ratio of cases to variables must be 5 to 1 or larger; 
 The correlation matrix for the variables must contain 2 or more correlations of 0.3 or 
greater 
 The correlation matrix for the variables must contain more correlations above 0.3 than 
0.8; 
 The Bartlett Test of Sphericity is statistically significant; 
 The overall MSA is 0.50 or higher; and, 
 Variables with a MSA less than 0.50 must be removed. 
 
Table 4.14 presents the results obtained from the assumption tests. All requirements were met.  
 
 
Table 4.14: Appropriateness of PCA – results from the assumption tests 
 
Tests Results 
Sample to variable ratio 399 cases / 40 variables = 9.97 
 
Factorability of the correlation matrix Of the 780 correlations in the matrix, 346 were greater than 0.3 
and 8 were greater than or equal to 0.8 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity <0.001 (χ2 = 33427.766, df. 780) 
 
Sampling adequacy for set of variables The overall MSA for the set of variables included in the 
analysis  was 0.812 
Sampling adequacy of individual variables The MSA for all of the individual variables included in the 
analysis was greater than 0.5 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Given these overall indicators, PCA was conducted with all 40 variables. The 
eigenvalue and component loading were set at conventional high values of 1.0 and 0.4 
respectively. Applying the eigenvalue-one criterion on the number of principal components to 
be extracted suggest that seven components should be extracted as their respective eigenvalues 
are greater than 1.0. This conclusion is supported by the test of communalities. Earlier it was 
stated that Kaiser’s criterion is accurate when, first, the communality value for each variable is 
0.50 or higher and, second, the average communality is greater than 0.6. It is apparent from 
Table 4.15 that there are no variables with communalities less than 0.50 (the average 
communality of the variables was 0.79). It is also apparent from Table 4.15 that the seven 
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components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 together accounted for 78.7% of the total 
variance, thus satisfying the cumulative proportion of variance criteria (which says that the 
extracted components together should explain at least 70% of the variation). Furthermore, there 
are at least three variables with significant loadings on each component. 
 
 So far this section has described the process of PCA for the 50 variables of resort socio-
economic performance. To recap, on iteration 1, eight variables were removed from the analysis 
because they failed to meet a minimum criteria of having a MSA value of 0.50 or above. On 
iteration 2, one component only had two variables loading above the cut-point of 0.40 and, 
therefore, these variables were removed. A PCA of the remaining 40 variables produced seven 
components which together summarise almost 80% of the total variation in the original data. 
Having obtained a component model that satisfies all requirements, it was next necessary to 
interpret this final solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Table 4.15: PCA (with varimax rotation) loadings for seven components                                   Source: Author’s own work 
 
 Component  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Communality 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other white collar -0.872       0.851 
% of working age pop. with no qualifications 0.774       0.845 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other manual 0.770       0.876 
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications) -0.768       0.838 
Median gross annual household income -0.740       0.807 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as skilled manual 0.528       0.501 
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)  0.919      0.912 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months  0.894      0.892 
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months  0.841      0.771 
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work benefits claimants  0.823      0.879 
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.  0.764      0.722 
% of household spaces vacant  0.685      0.719 
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance   0.905     0.886 
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support   0.867     0.896 
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance   0.772     0.749 
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits  0.535 0.708     0.819 
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance   0.617     0.609 
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element   0.596 0.526    0.708 
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families 0.402  0.504     0.702 
% of dependent children in lone parent families   0.409     0.512 
Demographic dependency ratio    -0.852    0.880 
% pop. working age    0.851    0.938 
% pop. pensionable age    -0.677 0.669   0.938 
% of households living in overcrowded conditions    0.557  0.517  0.786 
% of households without access to a car or van  0.454  0.535    0.829 
% pop. White 0.407   -0.492    0.606 
% of households single pensioner     0.873   0.833 
Median age of population    -0.485 0.768   0.918 
% pop. Children     -0.727   0.838 
% of households single person     0.708   0.936 
% of households lone parent with dependent children     -0.589   0.748 
% of working age pop. self-employed      0.810  0.790 
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals -0.515     0.708  0.896 
% of all employee jobs that are tourism-related      0.710  0.552 
Crime rank      0.603  0.570 
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet      0.450  0.593 
% of households with no central heating       0.804 0.743 
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social 0.446      -0.719 0.928 
% of all occupied household spaces rented privately      0.482 0.533 0.895 
% of all occupied household spaces owned   -0.437 -0.501   0.504 0.862 
Eigenvalue 10.476 8.846 4.481 2.661 2.432 1.445 1.157  
Variance Explained (%) 26.190 22.115 11.202 6.653 6.081 3.612 2.892  
1
6
8
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Table 4.15 shows which variables (or indicators) comprise each of the components. 
Again, following convention, only those loadings with a value of 0.4 or greater are included. 
Notice that 12 of the 40 variables have a relationship to two or more of the derived components; 
the presence of cross-loading variables is referred to as ‘complex structure’. There are a variety 
of prescriptions for handling complex variables (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; 
Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). One approach is to leave as is (i.e., include the variables in multiple 
components). A second approach is ignore the complexity and treat the variable as belonging 
to the component on which it has the highest loading. Another simple solution to complexity is 
to scratch the variables out and ignore them in the interpretation. Other prescriptions are to 
remove all variables with complex structure and repeat the PCA or try different methods of 
component rotation to see if a more interpretable solution can be found. The recommendation 
is to repeat the analysis only if the overall solution demonstrates complex structure (Hair et al., 
1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). Thus, given that the overall 
solution demonstrated simple structure (i.e., 28 of the 40 variables have one substantial loading 
on a component), it was not necessary to eliminate the complex variables from the PCA. Since 
the purpose of undertaking the PCA was to reduce the large number of indicators to a smaller 
set of variables for cluster analysis (and not dimension reduction of data per se), a strict 
interpretation of the components is not warranted. If, say, the components were not going to be 
used in subsequent analysis then it would, for the sake of interpretability, be sensible to assign 
the complex variables based on their loadings to a particular component or ignore such variables 
in the interpretation of the components (both of these options provide easier interpretation of 
results, but sacrifice information just for interpretability sake). Thus, this study chose to include 
variables with complex structure as a variable in multiple components. Summary descriptions 
of each component are provided in Table 4.16.  
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Table 4.16: Summary descriptions of component characteristics 
 
 High score on this component means: 
Component 1 
 
 
 High proportion of persons with no qualifications and consequently a lower proportion 
with a degree or higher. 
 High proportion of jobs held in manual occupations and consequently a lower 
proportion in professional/managerial and other white collar occupations 
 Lower than average household income 
 High proportion of children in out-of-work families 
 High proportion of white ethnic groups 
 High proportion of social rented housing 
 
Component 2 
 
 
 High level of Jobseekers Allowance claimants 
 High level of youth unemployment  
 High level of long-term unemployment 
 High proportion of car-less households 
 High proportion of household spaces vacant 
 
Component 3 
 
 
 High proportion claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Disability Living Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Employment and Support Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Income Support 
 High proportion of older people claiming Pension Credit 
 High proportion of children in out-of-work families 
 High proportion of children in lone parent families 
 Low proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 
Component 4 
 
 
 High proportion of persons of working age 
 Low proportion of persons of pensionable age, but many older people that are resident 
claim Pension Credit 
 Low average age 
 Low proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions 
 High proportion of car-less households 
 High proportion of population non-white 
 
Component 5 
 
 Low proportion of persons of young age 
 High proportion of persons of pensionable age 
 High average age 
 High proportion of single-person households 
 High proportion of single-person households with occupants above pensionable age. 
 Low proportion of lone parent households with dependent children  
 
Component 6  High level of self-employment 
 High proportion of jobs held in professional/managerial occupations 
 High proportion of tourism-related jobs 
 High proportion of private rented housing 
 High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions 
 High proportion of households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet 
 High levels of burglary, theft, criminal damage and violence 
 
Component 7 
 
 
 High proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 High proportion of private rented accommodation and consequently a lower proportion 
of social rented housing 
 High proportion of households without central heating  
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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The label attached to each component/dimension is as follows: 
 
Component 1 White, working-class social housing neighbourhoods with disadvantages 
Component 2 Limited access to employment opportunities 
Component 3 High levels of benefit claimants, much poor health 
Component 4 Prime age demographic 
Component 5 Older demographic profile 
Component 6 Professionals, tourism jobs, private renters and poor housing conditions 
Component 7 Mixed private housing neighbourhoods with high levels of home ownership 
 
 
 
Step 4: Scoring excluded resort localities on the dimensions of variation 
 
The next stage in the process calculates a ‘score’ on the identified dimensions in the 
data as if they were variables in their own right – which they are, but of a much more general 
nature than the original input variables. Scoring the excluded resort localities was accomplished 
in SPSS using the ‘Factor Score’ command, as shown in Figure 4.7. Three different procedures 
may be used to calculate component scores. However, the regression method provided the most 
appropriate method for two main reasons. One reason is because the PCA was based on a 
correlation matrix as opposed to a covariance matrix. The second reason is because the score it 
provides is a linear composite of the optimally-weighted observed variables (Rourke and 
Hatcher, 2013). In other words, it includes all the observed variables, as opposed to only the 
variables that demonstrated meaningful loadings for the component in question. Once the 
scores were calculated and saved as variables, they were standardised to a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. Those values were then entered into the cluster analysis. 
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Figure 4.7: Obtaining each LSOA’s component scores  
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
Step 5: Grouping localities according to their scores on the main dimensions in the data 
 
The final task is to group the 399 excluded resort localities according to their scores on 
the 7 dimensions in the data. The statistical procedure used to form groups that share similar 
characteristics is called cluster analysis. Before the cluster analysis can be undertaken, three 
important decisions are required. These decisions relate to: 
 
(i) Choice of clustering procedure; 
(ii) Choice of clustering method; and, 
(iii) Choice of similarity or distance measure. 
 
In SPSS, cluster analysis can be performed using hierarchical methods (with <1,000 
cases) or non-hierarchical methods (with 100 to 100,000 cases), each of them relying on a 
different algorithm to create the clusters. In hierarchical procedures the clustering process 
begins with each case representing an individual cluster (i.e., there are as many clusters as 
cases). These clusters are then successively merged depending on their similarity. At each step 
in the hierarchical procedure, either a new cluster is formed or one case joins a previously 
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grouped cluster. This process continues until only one cluster is left (see Figure 4.8). After 
clustering is complete, the optimum number of clusters is then chosen based on the 
agglomeration schedule. The alternate procedure of non-hierarchical clustering is very different 
from the hierarchical clustering procedure, which is applied when there is no prior knowledge 
of how many clusters there may be. Another difference is that non-hierarchical clustering is not 
based on distance measures. Whereas hierarchical clustering uses the between-cluster variation 
as measure to form homogenous clusters, non-hierarchical clustering uses the within-cluster 
variation (see Figure 4.9). The procedure starts by randomly assigning cases to the number of 
clusters specified by the researcher. After calculating the means of the temporary clusters, it 
will move cases between the clusters, trying to minimise variation within clusters. If the 
reallocation of a case to another cluster decreases the within-cluster variation, this case is 
reassigned to that cluster. This iterative process continues until no transfer of a case to a cluster 
results in improvement in the within-cluster variation. After clustering is complete, the means 
of each cluster for each variable can be checked to assess how distinct the clusters are. 
 
Figure removed due to copyright restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Hierarchical cluster analysis 
 
Source: Mooi and Sarstedt (2011: 244) 
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  Between-cluster variation = Maximise (Hierarchical cluster analysis) 
  Within-cluster variation = Minimise (Non-hierarchical cluster analysis) 
 
Figure 4.9: Three cluster diagram showing between-cluster and within-cluster variation 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
 
In this project, hierarchical clustering provided the most suitable procedure to form the 
groups of LSOAs for two main reasons. First, the number of clusters in the solution need not 
be specified in advance and second, the procedure allows for the comparison of the clustering 
result with an increasing number of clusters. Within this approach to cluster analysis there are 
a number of different methods available to determine which clusters should be joined at each 
stage. Hierarchical methods (also referred to as algorithms or linkage measures) include, for 
example, single linkage (nearest neighbour), complete linkage (furthest neighbour), median 
linkage and centroid clustering. Figure 4.10 illustrates these methods for two randomly framed 
clusters. However, the most commonly used hierarchical clustering method is Ward’s method. 
This method is preferred because: 
 
‘it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. In 
general, this method is very efficient. Cluster membership is assessed by calculating the 
total sum of squared deviations from the mean of a cluster. The criterion for fusion is that 
it should produce the smallest possible increase in the error sum of squares’ (Burns and 
Burns, 2008: 557). 
 
 
To be clear, the main advantage of Ward’s method is its statistical power. Indeed, it is widely 
acknowledged that Ward’s method returns more accurate agglomeration coefficients than any 
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other hierarchical cluster method (see Gore, 2000 for a review). The coefficients represent the 
‘distance’ (i.e., similarity) of the clusters combined at every stage in the hierarchical cluster 
analysis. An agglomeration schedule with accurate coefficients means a more robust overall 
solution. For this reason, Ward’s method was selected as the clustering method. This decision 
meant that the question of how to measure ‘distance’ (in other words, how similar are different 
LSOAs to each other?) is entirely sidestepped. A number of different measures have been 
proposed to measure ‘distance’ for interval data (see Figure 4.11). However, when the Ward, 
Centroid or Median method is requested it is not possible to use any other measure but the 
squared Euclidean distance measure. The squared Euclidean distance is the sum of the squared 
differences over all the variables. At each step in the procedure, the squared Euclidean distance 
between all pairs of cases and clusters is calculated and the pair of cases or clusters with the 
smallest squared Euclidean distance will be combined with one another.                
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a. Single linkage (or nearest neighbour) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Complete linkage (or furthest neighbour) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Average linkage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. Centroid clustering 
 
Figure 4.10: Hierarchical clustering methods 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
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Figure 4.11: Measures of similarity or distance for interval data 
 
Source: Author’s own screenshot 
 
 
 
In practice, since it cannot be known at the outset the number of clusters that will 
emerge, a two-step sequence of analysis is undertaken: 
 
1) Hierarchical cluster analysis was completed using Ward’s method applying squared 
Euclidean distance as the distance measure, in order to determine the optimum number of 
clusters within the sample.  
 
2) Hierarchical cluster analysis was repeated with the selected number of clusters, in order to 
allocate every LSOA in the sample to a particular cluster. 
 
 
So, the main objective is determining how many clusters exist. The hierarchical cluster analysis 
calculated every possibility between every LSOA forming their own cluster (as many clusters 
as there are LSOAs) and every LSOA belonging to the same cluster, giving a range in the set 
of data from 1 to 399 clusters. The results of the hierarchical cluster analysis are summarised 
in the agglomeration schedule (Table 4.17). Each row in the schedule shows a stage at which 
either two LSOAs are combined, individual LSOAs are added to existing clusters, or two 
existing clusters are combined. For example: 
 
 At stage 1, LSOA 374 is clustered with LSOA 380. The squared Euclidean distance 
between these two LSOAs is very small at 0.075. Neither LSOA has been previously 
clustered (as indicated by the two zeros under Cluster 1 and Cluster 2), and the next stage 
when this cluster of two LSOAs combines with another LSOA or LSOA cluster is Stage 
260. 
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 At stage 10, LSOA 115 joins the LSOA-123 cluster (LSOA 123 was previously clustered 
with LSOA 195 back in Stage 6, thus creating a cluster of 3 cases: LSOAs 115, 123, and 
195). The squared Euclidean distance between LSOA 115 and LSOA-123 cluster is 1.311. 
LSOA 115 has not been previously clustered (as indicated by the zero under Cluster 1), and 
LSOA 123 was previously clustered at Stage 6. The next stage when the LSOA-115 cluster 
combines with another LSOA or LSOA cluster is stage 91. 
 
 
Thus, the first stage in the procedure combined the two most similar LSOAs, resulting in a very 
small agglomeration coefficient. The last stage combined the final two aggregate clusters into 
a single cluster, containing every LSOA in the sample. The agglomeration coefficient 
associated with this final grouping is therefore the largest. (The agglomeration schedule shown 
in Table 4.17 has been cropped. Only the top and the bottom of the schedule are shown as it 
becomes quite long with a large number of LSOAs.) 
 
Analysis of the agglomeration coefficient provides direction in the choice of the number 
of clusters. It is necessary to stop cluster formation when the increase in the coefficients 
between two consecutive stages is large. A large difference between the coefficients of two 
adjacent stages is an indication that the clusters being combined are too dissimilar to form a 
homogeneous group. The recommendation is to look at this figure from the last row upwards, 
as the goal is to identify the lowest possible number of clusters. So, reading from the bottom 
upwards (Table 4.17), it is apparent that for one cluster there is agglomeration coefficient of 
2786, for two clusters 2545.733, for three clusters 2320.689, etc. To get a better overview of 
the changes in the coefficients as the number of clusters increase, the coefficients were rewritten 
as in Table 4.18. The final column, headed ‘Change’, indicates to stop at the four cluster 
solution, after stage 394, as succeeding clustering adds very much less to distinguishing 
between clusters. Once the number of clusters was identified, the hierarchical cluster analysis 
was repeated to place the 399 LSOAs into one of the four clusters. This action meant a new 
variable was generated at the end of the SPSS data file, providing the cluster membership for 
each LSOA in the sample. In the results chapter, the composition and characteristics of each 
cluster will be explored using analysis of variance. 
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Table 4.17: Agglomeration schedule 
 
       
 Cluster combined  Stage cluster first appears  
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next stage 
1  374 380 0.075 0 0 260 
2  193 233 0.171 0 0 42 
3 315 397 0.27 0 0 234 
4 210 347 0.38 0 0 101 
5 334 389 0.522 0 0 245 
6 123 195 0.666 0 0 10 
7 176 197 0.811 0 0 222 
8 173 239 0.975 0 0 133 
9 188 236 1.142 0 0 84 
10 115 123 1.311 0 6 91 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
391 2 24 1573.527 382 388 392 
392 2 71 1695.175 391 387 395 
393 5 37 1821.219 385 390 396 
394 1 21 1950.038 389 380 396 
395 2 16 2109.838 392 384 397 
396 1 5 2320.689 394 393 398 
397 2 18 2545.733 395 386 398 
398 1 2 2786 396 397 0 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.18: Reformed agglomeration table (not provided on SPSS) 
 
No of clusters Agglomeration last step Coefficients this step Change 
2 2786 2545.733 240.267 
3 2545.733 2320.689 225.044 
4 2320.689 2109.838 210.851 
5 2109.838 1950.038 159.8 
6 1950.038 1821.219 128.819 
7 1821.219 1695.175 126.044 
8 1695.175 1573.527 121.648 
 
The first large difference in coefficient values, a clear demarcation point. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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4.5 Summary 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to contribute to knowledge and understanding of social 
exclusion in a post-mature mass tourism coastal resort context. It does so by investigating 
characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts, factors that influence 
social exclusion of resident populations and the nature and incidence of localised problem 
complexes. This chapter has explained the process and methodology of the research, which 
adopts a positivist paradigmatic perspective and a non-experimental, quantitative approach 
given that there is a dearth of knowledge of social exclusion in seaside resorts. Using the 
working definition of a seaside resort, a progressive three stage method was devised, with each 
stage corresponding to a research objective. These objectives led to the use of quantitative 
measures and secondary data analysis as a research method. It follows that a national seaside 
resort database was constructed in order to facilitate the analysis. The most logical and 
pragmatic first step was to begin the analysis of social exclusion with an examination of its 
nature and extent, using the newly invented local authority district area classification, small 
area geography and relevant, well-established deprivation measures. As a second step, in order 
to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion, a resort-
level analysis of a set of population- and place-based measures for deprived and less-deprived 
resorts was undertaken. These measures were identified by reviewing datasets available at the 
ward level and the LSOA level. This work also affords a basis for subsequent cluster analysis 
to identify the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Thus, a combination of 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate empirical analyses were undertaken at several geographic 
scales to illuminate variations in the incidence of a number of key exclusion-related variables. 
Having detailed the procedures and methods guiding this investigation, it is next necessary to 
document the study’s results. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Nature and Extent of Social Exclusion in English Seaside Resorts 
 
 
 To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, analyses 
were undertaken on Indices of Deprivation data at several geographic scales (for details Section 
4.2). First, due to the fact that such data are not available for seaside resorts specifically, a 
statistical analysis at district level was employed to illuminate geographical variations in the 
incidence of a number of key deprivation-related variables. This work addresses the question 
of whether multiple deprivation corresponds to ‘seaside’ districts in general and ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts in particular. The results of these analyses are given in Section 5.1. Second, a 
small-area analysis of the local authority districts classified as ‘seaside with resort’ was 
completed in order to establish the extent to which deprivation characteristics associated with 
social exclusion occurred within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these 
characteristics. The results are given in Section 5.2. Third, a resort-level analysis was 
undertaken and, in particular, there was further investigation of the nature and severity of 
deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts corresponding to the 1,686 ‘resort LSOAs’. These 
resorts are then analysed, put into the context of the national picture and compared with each 
other. The focus here is on the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts 
which this study has defined based on resident population. Comparisons of deprivation patterns 
for the seaside resorts with England as a whole are drawn for 2004 and 2010. The seaside resorts 
were compared with each other both in terms of overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and using 
the individual deprivation domains, to assess if there are any differences in the patterns of 
deprivation. The results of these analyses are set out in Section 5.3. Finally, a summary drawing 
together the results of all the above-mentioned analyses, and providing a basis for the discussion 
in Chapter 7, is provided in Section 5.4. 
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5.1  District-level analysis  
 
 The aim of the analyses presented in this section is to establish the factual basis 
regarding whether local authority districts classified in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ differ 
from other district types, or from the general situation in England, with regard to a range of 
measures of deprivation. It sought to assess whether there were differences between seaside and 
non-seaside districts, and if so, the scale and the extent of the differences. The analysis is split 
into two sections here. The first looks at the six district level summary measures, as many of 
these summarise different aspects of multiple deprivation, and the second analyses the overall 
Index of Multiple Deprivation and individual domains, in order to understand the channels 
through which deprivation might affect different types of district and in particular, seaside 
districts with resorts. 
 
5.1.1  Local authority district level indicators of multiple deprivation 
 
 In 2010 there were 326 districts in England as opposed to 354 for the two previous 
indices. Examination of the spatial distribution of the districts defined as ‘seaside’ or ‘coastal’ 
reveals that the majority of ‘seaside’ districts are located in southwest England, whilst the 
majority of ‘coastal’ districts are situated in England’s southeast. Both the South West and 
South East regions, however, contain the majority of seaside districts with resorts (see Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Distribution of districts by region, 2010 
 
District type Inland Coastal Seaside Seaside (-R) Seaside (+R) 
Region      
East Midlands 37 2 1 0 1 
East of England 36 2 9 5 4 
London 33 0 0 0 0 
North East 5 4 3 1 2 
North West 28 3 8 2 6 
South East 45 7 15 4 11 
South West 19 2 16 4 12 
West Midlands 30 0 0 0 0 
Yorkshire & the Humber 18 2 1 0 1 
Total 251 22 53 16 37 
 
Note:  
1. Non-inland districts were classified as either ‘coastal’ or ‘seaside’ based on the proportion of their 
workforce employed in tourism-related businesses. Using the Annual Business Inquiry employee estimates 
for 2001, the ‘coastal districts’ are those districts which had a proportion lower than the national average of 
8.2%; the ‘seaside districts’ are defined as those which had 8.2% or above employed in tourism-related 
businesses. 
2. ‘Seaside’ districts were subdivided according to whether the districts contained identifiable seaside resorts.  
3. See section on identification of seaside resorts – criteria and methods, in the methodology, for a fuller 
explanation of the items above. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
  
 
 Univariate analysis is a sensible starting point for the investigation of the geography of 
deprivation, providing both insight into the incidence of multiple deprivation and the major 
individual components of multiple deprivation. With respect to the former, which is the focus 
of this section, the extent of multiple deprivation is substantially greater in both ‘coastal’ and 
‘seaside’ districts than in ‘inland’ ones (see Table 5.2). In terms of the average of LSOA scores 
indicator of multiple deprivation, which is most commonly used to make comparisons as it 
records the population weighted average of the combined scores for the LSOAs in a district, 
only 43.8% of inland districts are among England’s most deprived fifty per cent. The 
corresponding figure for seaside districts is 69.8% and coastal districts 72.1%. Similar patterns 
are evident with regard to the other five indicators of multiple deprivation. However, although 
it may appear at first glance that England’s ‘coastal’ districts appear to be suffering more from 
multiple deprivation, seaside districts with resorts score overwhelming worse than other district 
types (i.e., ‘inland’, ‘coastal’, ‘seaside without resort’) on all six summary measures of overall 
multiple deprivation.  
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Table 5.2: Per cent of districts in England’s most deprived 50 per cent, 2010 
 
Deprivation domain 
Inland 
districts 
Coastal 
Districts 
Seaside 
Districts 
Seaside (-R) 
Districts 
Seaside (+R) 
Districts 
Av. rank of LSOA scores 43.8 72.7 69.9 43.8 81.1 
Av. rank of LSOA ranks 43.4 77.3 69.8 43.8 81.1 
Extent rank 45.8 68.2 62.3 25.0 78.4 
Local concentration rank 45.8 68.2 60.4 25.0 78.4 
Income rank 47.8 59.1 56.6 18.8 73.0 
Employment rank 47.4 63.6 56.6 18.8 73.0 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
  
 The analysis reported in Table 5.2 is based on the proportion of districts falling within 
England’s worst fifty per cent. Results may differ at different levels of deprivation. Table 5.3 
therefore reports results for the six summary measures of overall multiple deprivation by upper 
quartile. Here, while ‘coastal’ districts, when compared with ‘inland’ and ‘seaside’ districts, 
contain a greater share of local authorities in England’s most deprived 25 per cent, local 
authorities with very high levels of deprivation are also more prevalent in seaside districts with 
resorts, particularly with regard to the first two indicators of overall multiple deprivation and 
the measure of local concentration. These findings suggest that: i) the degree of multiple 
deprivation in seaside districts with resorts (27.0% / 32.4% respectively) is contributed to not 
only by income and employment (both 18.9%) but also by other elements; and, ii) although 
seaside districts with resorts contain few local authorities with widespread high levels of 
deprivation (18.9%), they are characterised by hotspots of severe multiple deprivation (37.8%). 
It is noticeable that very few seaside districts without identifiable resorts exhibit a level of 
multiple deprivation in the upper quartile, which indicates social exclusion is not a major or 
widespread problem in the local authorities associated with this type of district. 
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Table 5.3: Per cent of districts in England’s most deprived 25 per cent, 2010 
 
Deprivation domain 
Inland 
districts 
Coastal 
Districts 
Seaside 
Districts 
Seaside (-R) 
Districts 
Seaside (+R) 
Districts 
Av. rank of LSOA scores 25.1 31.8 20.8 6.3 27.0 
Av. rank of LSOA ranks 23.9 36.4 24.5 6.3 32.4 
Extent rank 26.3 31.8 15.1 6.3 18.9 
Local concentration rank 22.3 40.9 30.2 12.5 37.8 
Income rank 27.1 27.3 13.2 0.0 18.9 
Employment rank 26.7 31.8 13.2 0.0 18.9 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 The remainder of this section is concerned with the question of whether or not 
deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion correspond to ‘seaside’ districts in 
general and ‘seaside with resort’ districts in particular. To assess whether there are true 
differences in deprivation level between seaside and non-seaside districts, the six local authority 
summary measures of multiple deprivation were recoded into national quartiles based on their 
rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases and cross-tabulations and 
Pearson chi-square analyses were undertaken. Cross tabulations of deprivation quartiles with 
district type as a binary variable are given in Appendix Tables A1–18. Results of these tests 
have been summarised within the forthcoming tables.  
 
 Although this section is concerned primarily with the districts defined as ‘seaside with 
resort’, it commences with a brief analysis of multiple deprivation in ‘seaside’ and ‘coastal’ 
districts. No significant differences were found between the two aforementioned district types 
as both exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. As shown in 
Table 5.4, valid results were obtained with the 2004 data and some 2007 data on four of the six 
summary measures of multiple deprivation. When compared with ‘inland’ districts, ‘coastal’ 
and ‘seaside’ districts had higher levels of multiple deprivation, in which the focus is placed on 
the average rank of LSOA scores and average rank of LSOA ranks indicators of multiple 
deprivation These results are significant at the p = 0.05 level. However, it is apparent from the 
data in Table 5.4 that there are stronger associations within ‘seaside’ districts, which indicates, 
albeit crudely, that they are experiencing generally higher levels of deprivation. Furthermore, 
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in terms of the income and employment indicators of deprivation, while the chi-square test did 
not show any significant differences in the case of ‘coastal’ districts, statistically significant 
associations were found with respect to ‘seaside’ districts. When compared with ‘inland’ 
districts, ‘seaside’ districts had higher income and employment deprivation levels.  
 
 Turning now to the evidence on whether deprivation characteristics associated with 
social exclusion correspond to the districts of ‘seaside with resort’, when compared with 
‘seaside without resort’ and ‘coastal’ districts, and where the six summary district measures of 
deprivation were recoded into quartiles, the chi-square test results were invalid because the 
expected counts for the cells are very small. This problem, however, did not occur in the case 
of ‘inland’ districts. Indeed, analysis of multiple deprivation in ‘inland’ and ‘seaside with 
resorts’ districts revealed that there are statistically significant differences between the two 
district types. As Table 5.5 shows, the degree of multiple deprivation, as portrayed by the 
average rank of LSOA scores and average rank of LSOA ranks indicators, is generally higher 
in ‘seaside with resorts’ districts than in ‘inland’ ones. When compared with ‘inland’ districts, 
‘seaside with resort’ districts also had more districts with LSOAs that contained pockets of 
severe deprivation.  
 
 The fact that there are statistically significant differences between ‘inland’ and ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts was further confirmed by collapsing both the upper two quartiles and the 
lower two quartiles (see Table 5.6). However, the rationale for recoding the data were because 
of the results in Table 5.5, which suggest there might be an association between district type 
(i.e., the districts ‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’) and deprivation level. 
Further analysis revealed that there are statistically significant differences between the two 
district types as ‘seaside with resort’ districts exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation 
than might be expected. The most striking result to emerge from the data in Table 5.6 is that 
the effect sizes, as denoted by the value of phi, indicate there are stronger associations in 
‘seaside without resort’ than in ‘inland’ districts. Thus, when compared with ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts, while ‘inland’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts are experiencing generally 
     
187 
 
lower levels of multiple deprivation, the magnitude of difference between ‘seaside with resort’ 
and ‘seaside without resort’ is more pronounced.  
 
 Given the two aforementioned district types are places apart in terms of level of multiple 
deprivation yet united by tourism-related employment at or above the national average, the 
differential incidence of multiple deprivation may be due to the nature of the seaside district 
itself. The seaside destinations in those districts that did not contain identifiable resorts have a 
population of less than 10,000 and all are therefore officially ‘rural’ settlements according to 
ONS definitions. It follows that the seaside resorts included in this study are significant urban 
areas in their own right. Thus, when taken together, these seaside resorts resemble an urban 
type and, as a result, the districts defined in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ share common 
characteristics with some inland districts that contain large urban centres, which may account 
for the greater variation in the levels of deprivation between the district types. 
 
 Having established that there are statistically significant differences in deprivation 
levels when comparing those districts defined as ‘seaside with resort’ with ‘seaside without 
resort’ and ‘inland’ districts, it is now necessary to examine the district level indicators of 
multiple deprivation within ‘seaside with resort’ districts. Table 5.7 shows ‘seaside with resort’ 
districts grouped ‘domain’ ranking and deprivation level. With respect to the average rank of 
LSOA scores measure, 30 out of 37 districts fell into the upper ranked half of all districts 
categorised as ‘most deprived’ and ‘above average’, while the remaining 7 districts fell into the 
‘below average’ category. Thus, no districts exhibit a level of multiple deprivation in the lower 
quartile. Of those that fell into the ‘most deprived’ (MD) and ‘above average’ categories, ten 
were in Southeast England (MD, n=5), seven in the Southwest (MD, n=1), five in the Northwest 
(MD, n=2), four in the East (MD, n=1), two in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the 
East Midlands (MD, n=1) and the Yorkshire and the Humber (MD, n=0). Although it would 
seem at first glance that districts in the southern regions of England and the Northwest region 
of England appear to be experiencing acute levels of multiple deprivation, this regional pattern 
may be explained by the fact that there are more resorts and therefore more incidences of 
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multiple deprivation. When viewed against the total number of districts defined as ‘seaside with 
resorts’ located in each English region, the East (4/4), the Northeast (2/2), the East Midlands 
(1/1) and Yorkshire and the Humber (1/1) appear to be suffering more from multiple deprivation 
than the Southeast (10/11), the Northwest (5/6) and the Southwest (7/12). A similar regional 
distribution pattern is evident with regard to the average rank of LSOA ranks measure. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that all ‘seaside with resort’ districts in all regions, taking into 
account both deprived and less deprived LSOAs, as a whole are experiencing multiple 
deprivation.  
  
 In terms of both the extent rank and local concentration rank indicators of multiple 
deprivation, 29 out of 37 districts fell into the upper two quartiles. Regarding the extent rank, 
nine were in the Southeast (MD, n=2), seven in the Southwest (MD, n=0), five in the Northwest 
(MD, n=3), four in the East (MD, n=1), two in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the 
East Midlands (MD, n=0) and the Yorkshire and the Humber (MD, n=0). In contrast, the 
remaining eight districts fell into the ‘below average’ and ‘least deprived’ categories, with the 
majority (5) occurring in the Southwest, two in the Southeast, and one in the Northwest. With 
respect to the local concentration rank, nine were in the Southeast (MD, n=4), seven in the 
South west (MD, n=1), five were in the Northwest (MD, n=1), four in the East (MD, n=3), two 
in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the East Midlands (MD, n=0) and the Yorkshire 
and the Humber (MD, n=1). The previous extent rank figures given for the lower two quartiles 
also apply to the local concentration rank. Perhaps the most striking observation to emerge from 
the data here is that, in terms of extent, seven districts (in four of seven regions) populate the 
highest deprivation quartile whereas, in the case of local concentration, the corresponding figure 
is fourteen (in six of seven regions). Accordingly, it appears that the high levels of multiple 
deprivation in ‘seaside with resort’ districts is less widespread as it is spatially concentrated. 
These pockets of severe deprivation are to be found in numerous districts located in all but one 
of England’s coastal regions. 
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 The analysis so far has focussed on those district-level measures which illustrate the 
degree, extent and local concentration of multiple deprivation. The results obtained on the scale 
of employment and income deprivation can be found in Table 5.7. Incidentally, the analysis 
reported in Table 5.7 is based on the most recent 2010 data. Results on a measure-by-measure 
basis, which include the analysis of 2004 and 2007 data, are given in Appendix Tables A19-24. 
The reader is reminded, though, that it is impossible to compare deprivation ranks over time, as 
there are less local authorities in the 2010 index than there were in 2007/04 due to the formation 
of unitary authorities in 2009. Thus, no meaningful time series analysis of the data could be 
undertaken. Another criticism to be levelled at the summary measures of multiple deprivation 
is that they conceal small pockets of deprivation in districts associated with the district types. 
For these reasons, attention now turns to the LSOA indices of deprivation and, in particular, the 
overall Index of Multiple Deprivation.  
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Table 5.4: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test (Inland v Coastal; Inland v Seaside; Coastal v Seaside) 
Source: Author’s own work 
 Inland Coastal 
 Coastal Seaside Seaside  
Deprivation level 
Domain 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level  
(C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level  
(C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level 
(C.V) 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
2004 
2007 
2010 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.043 (0.167) 
0.014 (0.190) 
0.018 (0.192) 
I 
I 
I 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.001 (0.231) 
0.000 (0.273) 
0.000 (0.292) 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
C 
S 
C 
S 
S 
S 
0.150 NS 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
2004 
2007 
2010 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.032 (0.173) 
0.003 (0.220) 
0.012 (0.200) 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.002 (0.213) 
0.000 (0.263) 
0.000 (0.262) 
C 
C 
C 
S 
C 
S 
= 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
0.762 NS 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Extent rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.128 NS 
0.053 (0.162) 
0.125 NS 
I 
I 
I 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.014 (0.180) 
0.004 (0.203) 
0.000 (0.245) 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C 
S 
S 
S 
0.114 NS 
0.064 NS 
Invalid 
Local concentration 
rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
C 
I 
I 
I 
0.026 (0.178) 
0.016 (0.187) 
0.063 NS 
I 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.077 NS 
0.227 NS 
0.191 NS 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
= 
S 
C 
S 
S 
S 
0.100 NS 
0.244 NS 
Invalid 
Income rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
C 
C 
I 
I 
I 
0.337 NS 
0.227 NS 
0.471 NS 
I 
I 
I 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.004 (0.199) 
0.005 (0.196) 
0.004 (0.209) 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Employment rank 
2004 
2007 
2010  
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
I 
I 
C 
I 
I 
I 
0.140 NS 
0.087 NS 
0.289 NS 
I 
I 
I 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.009 (0.188) 
0.004 (0.202) 
0.004 (0.210) 
C 
C 
C 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C 
S 
S 
S 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Note: 
 1) In this table as well as in all similar forthcoming tables within this chapter the yellow highlighted cells represent non-statistically significant relationships existed between the two 
variables. Furthermore, ‘invalid’ refers to instances where the expected value is too small due to low frequency of the observed count. The equals sign (=) indicates that both district 
types share the same percentage in the quartile and there is therefore no difference. MD ‘most deprived’, AA ‘above average’, BA ‘below average’, LD ‘least deprived’ denote quartiles 
1-4 respectively. 
2) Detailed results are available in Appendix Tables A1-9. 
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Table 5.5: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test – ‘seaside with resort’ districts vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort districts 
Source: Author’s own work 
 Inland Coastal Seaside (-Resorts) 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level 
(C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level 
(C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level 
(C.V) 
Average rank of LSOA 
scores 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.292) 
0.000 (0.298) 
0.000 (0.318) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Average rank of LSOA ranks 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.264) 
0.000 (0.289) 
0.000 (0.292) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Extent rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
= 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.251) 
0.000 (0.268) 
0.000 (0.319) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Local concentration rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.001 (0.234) 
0.002 (0.218) 
0.002 (0.226) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Income rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.001 (0.238) 
0.001 (0.234) 
0.000 (0.259) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Employment rank 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.001 (0.239) 
0.000 (0.246) 
0.000 (0.261) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Invalid 
Note:  
1) In this table as well as in Tables 5.6 and 5.11 within this chapter the blue highlighted cells represent those districts defined in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ and where statistically 
significant results were detected. 
2) Detailed results are available in Appendix Tables A10-18. 
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Table 5.6: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test – ‘seaside with resort’ districts vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort districts 
Source: Author’s own work 
  Inland Coastal Seaside (-Resorts) 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
MD LD  
Sig-level (Phi) 
MD LD  
Sig-level (Phi)                     
MD LD  
Sig-level (Phi) 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
2004 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.225)*** S(+R) C 0.256 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.457)*** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.238)*** S(+R) C 0.677 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.011 (0.327)** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.249)*** S(+R) C 0.524 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.010 (0.373)** 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
2004 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.213)*** S(+R) C 0.590 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.008 (0.341)** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.240)*** = = 0.976 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.011 (0.327)** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.252)*** S(+R) C 0.748 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.010 (0.373)** 
Extent rank 
2004 S(+R) I 0.001 (0.186)*** S(+R) C 0.759 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.487)*** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.003 (0.169)** C S(+R) 0.781 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.001 (0.416)*** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.218)*** S(+R) C 0.384 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.506)*** 
Local concentration 
rank 
2004 S(+R) I 0.001 (0.186)*** S(+R) C 0.759 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.001 (0.443)*** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.001 (0.189)*** C S(+R) 0.955 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.001 (0.443)*** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.000 (0.218)*** S(+R) C 0.384 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.506)*** 
Income rank 
2004 S(+R) I 0.005 (0.160)** S(+R) C 0.441 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.460)*** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.006 (0.157)** S(+R) C 0.271 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.460)*** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.004 (0.168)** S(+R) C 0.270 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.502)*** 
Employment rank 
2004 S(+R) I 0.012 (0.142)** C S(+R) 0.893 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.479)*** 
2007 S(+R) I 0.004 (0.164)** S(+R) C 0.935 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.460)*** 
2010 S(+R) I 0.004 (0.171)** S(+R) C 0.451 NS S(+R) S(-R) 0.000 (0.502)*** 
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Table 5.7: Seaside with resort districts grouped ‘domain ranking’ and deprivation level, 2010         Source: Author’s own work 
 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
Very deprived (Rank 1-81) Above average (Rank 82-163) Below average (Rank 164-245) Least deprived (Rank 246-326) 
Av. rank of LSOA scores Blackpool 6 NW Eastbourne 84 SE Canterbury 166 SE    
 Hastings 19 SE Scarborough 85 Y&H Teignbridge 184 SW    
 Thanet 49 SE Tendring 86 E North Somerset 201 SW    
 South Tyneside 52 NE West Somerset 90 SW East Devon 215 SW    
 Great Yarmouth 54 E Sefton 92 NW Purbeck 218 SW    
 Wirral 60 NW Weymouth & Port. 94 SW Christchurch 230 SW    
 Torbay 61 SW Shepway 97 SE Fylde 236 NW    
 Brighton and Hove 66 SE Bournemouth 102 SW       
 East Lindsey 73 EM Southend-on-Sea 106 E       
 Portsmouth 76 SE Cornwall 110 SW       
    Waveney 115 E       
    Lancaster 116 NW       
    Isle of Wight 126 SE       
    Dover 127 SE       
    Northumberland 135 NE       
    North Devon 137 SW       
    Rother 139 SE       
    Sedgemoor 152 SW       
    Arun 154 SE       
    Wyre 163 NW       
Av. rank of LSOA ranks Blackpool 10 NW Cornwall 82 SW Teignbridge 175 SW    
 Hastings 23 SE Scarborough 83 Y&H Wyre 185 NW    
 West Somerset 45 SW Weymouth & Port.  88 SW Purbeck 199 SW    
 South Tyneside 47 NE Shepway 89 SE East Devon 209 SW    
 Torbay 49 SW Bournemouth 96 SW North Somerset 224 SW    
 Thanet 50 SE Wirral 103 NW Christchurch 228 SW    
 Great Yarmouth 57 E Isle of Wight 106 SE Fylde 235 NW    
 East Lindsey 58 EM Waveney 112 E       
 Brighton and Hove 67 SE Sefton 114 NW       
 Eastbourne 68 SE Southend-on-Sea 117 E       
 Portsmouth 76 SE Dover 122 SE       
 Tendring 81 E North Devon 126 SW       
    Rother 132 SE       
    Lancaster 133 NW       
    Northumberland 144 NE       
    Arun 151 SE       
    Sedgemoor 154 SW       
    Canterbury 163 SE       
  
   
1
9
4 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
Very deprived (Rank 1-81) Above average (Rank 82-163) Below average (Rank 164-245) Least deprived (Rank 246-326) 
Extent rank Blackpool 16 NW Torbay 82 SW Isle of Wight 165 SE East Devon 250 SW 
 Hastings 24 SE Brighton and Hove 84 SE Canterbury 170 SE Purbeck 294 SW 
 South Tyneside 39 NE Weymouth & Port. 90 SW West Somerset 173 SW    
 Wirral 54 NW East Lindsey 91 EM Teignbridge 192 SW    
 Thanet 57 SE Portsmouth 93 SE Christchurch 197 SW    
 Great Yarmouth 64 E Southend-on-Sea 97 E Fylde 218 NW    
 Sefton 80 NW Scarborough 99 Y&H       
    Eastbourne 101 SE       
    Lancaster 104 NW       
    Bournemouth 105 SW       
    Tendring 112 E       
    Shepway 120 SE       
    Waveney 123 E       
    Northumberland 124 NE       
    Dover 131 SE       
    Wyre 135 NW       
    Sedgemoor 148 SW       
    Rother 153 SE       
    Cornwall 154 SW       
    North Devon 157 SW       
    Arun 158 SE       
    North Somerset 159 SW       
Local concentration rank Blackpool 1 NW Northumberland 87 NE Canterbury 170 SE East Devon 246 SW 
 Wirral 14 NW Waveney 92 E Isle of Wight 178 SE Purbeck 294 SW 
 Hastings 19 SE East Lindsey 94 EM West Somerset 183 SW    
 Thanet 26 SE Bournemouth 96 SW Teignbridge 192 SW    
 Great Yarmouth 30 E Weymouth & Port. 99 SW Christchurch 201 SW    
 Sefton 43 NW Wyre 101 NW Fylde 220 NW    
 Portsmouth 52 SE Shepway 102 SE       
 Brighton and Hove 54 SE North Somerset 115 SW       
 Scarborough 56 Y&H Eastbourne 116 SE       
 Lancaster 59 NW North Devon 146 SW       
 Torbay 61 SW Dover 147 SE       
 Southend-on-Sea 73 E Arun 148 SE       
 Tendring 74 E Cornwall 152 SW       
 South Tyneside 77 NE Sedgemoor 153 SW       
    Rother 155 SE       
 
 
  
   
1
9
5 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
Very deprived (Rank 1-81) Above average (Rank 82-163) Below average (Rank 164-245) Least deprived (Rank 246-326) 
Income rank Cornwall 9 SW Portsmouth 84 SE Sedgemoor 165 SW Weymouth & Port. 255 SW 
 Wirral 22 NW Southend-on-Sea 88 E Wyre 174 NW Fylde 280 NW 
 Sefton 45 NW Thanet 95 SE North Devon 190 SW Christchurch 308 SW 
 Northumberland 53 NE Bournemouth 96 SW East Devon 192 SW West Somerset 311 SW 
 Brighton and Hove 57 SE Torbay 97 SW Rother 202 SE Purbeck 318 SW 
 Blackpool 74 NW Tendring 99 E       
 South Tyneside 77 NE East Lindsey 107 EM       
    North Somerset 109 SW       
    Isle of Wight 116 SE       
    Hastings 124 SE       
    Great Yarmouth 126 E       
    Lancaster 127 NW       
    Waveney 128 E       
    Arun 131 SE       
    Scarborough 133 Y&H       
    Canterbury 137 SE       
    Shepway 144 SE       
    Dover 153 SE       
    Eastbourne 158 SE       
    Teignbridge 162 SW       
Employment rank Cornwall 8 SW Portsmouth 88 SE Sedgemoor 167 SW Fylde 253 NW 
 Wirral 10 NW Southend-on-Sea 92 E Teignbridge 171 SW West Somerset 313 SW 
 Sefton 26 NW Bournemouth 93 SW East Devon 204 SW Christchurch 315 SW 
 Northumberland 29 NE North Somerset 98 SW North Devon 205 SW Purbeck 322 SW 
 Brighton and Hove 48 SE Torbay 99 SW Rother 218 SE    
 South Tyneside 62 NE Thanet 101 SE Weymouth & Port. 219 SW    
 Blackpool 63 NW East Lindsey 104 EM       
    Tendring 107 E       
    Lancaster 113 NW       
    Isle of Wight 114 SE       
    Hastings 126 SE       
    Great Yarmouth 127 E       
    Waveney 134 E       
    Scarborough 135 Y&H       
    Arun 145 SE       
    Canterbury 146 SE       
    Shepway 154 SE       
    Dover 157 SE       
    Wyre 162 NW       
    Eastbourne 163 SE       
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5.1.2  LSOA level indices of deprivation 
 
 As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the differences in the levels of 
multiple deprivation between seaside and non-seaside areas, the incidence of the LSOA-level 
domain variables and overall Index of Multiple Deprivation was examined for each of the 
district types in England. To enable comparison between the indices, it has been necessary to 
use pre-2009 local authority boundaries. LSOAs (a sub-ward geography averaging 
approximately 1,500 people) were matched to their respective districts and then grouped 
depending on their correspondence with type of district. Table 5.8 shows the breakdown of 
LSOAs according to district type. Overall, there are 32,482 LSOAs in England. The vast 
majority of LSOAs were classified as ‘inland’. Of those LSOAs that were categorised as 
‘seaside’, 9.7% were in ‘seaside with resort’ districts.  
 
 Table 5.8: Data profile of ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ local authority districts 
 
District type 
 
Inland Coastal Seaside Seaside (-R) Seaside (+R) 
LSOAs 
- Number 
- Percent 
 
26,048 
80.2 
 
2,107 
6.5 
 
4,327 
13.3 
 
1,186 
3.6 
 
3,141 
9.7 
 
  Source: Author’s own work  
 
 
 In a similar fashion to the previous section, first, univariate analysis is employed to 
illuminate geographical variations in the incidence of multiple deprivation. The section then 
goes on to analyse the extent to which deprivation characteristics associated with social 
exclusion occur within ‘seaside’ districts and ‘seaside with resort’ districts in particular. Finally, 
in relation to the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, it is useful to consider the distribution 
of LSOAs across deprivation deciles, in order to complete the general overview.  
 
 The geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in all coastal district types than 
in ‘inland’ districts. It can be seen from the data in Table 5.9 that less than 50% of LSOAs in 
‘inland’ districts are among England’s most deprived fifty per cent. The corresponding figures 
for ‘seaside’ districts and ‘coastal’ districts are 52.5% and 54.1% respectively. This pattern is 
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not dissimilar to that which emerged from the data in Table 5.2. However, the LSOAs of coastal 
districts do not exhibit the highest deprivation levels on all of the domains. In terms of the 
barriers to housing and services and living environment indicators of deprivation, ‘seaside’ 
districts contained a greater share of LSOAs in England’s most deprived fifty percent. With 
respect to the crime domain, ‘inland’ districts had a higher proportion of high crime 
environments. 
 
 The LSOAs associated with ‘seaside with resort’ districts had the greatest incidence of 
multiple deprivation at 57.1%. In fact, LSOAs that correspond to ‘seaside with resort’ districts, 
when compared with ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside without resort’, score worse on the 
domains of income, employment, health, and living environment. However, the localities 
within ‘seaside with resort’ districts appear depressed particularly with regard to health and 
disability (62.0%) and employment (61.9%). Another interesting observation is that ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts score overwhelmingly worse than ‘seaside without resort’ districts, on all 
measures except for that of barriers to housing and services. It is important to note, however, 
that the difference is not markedly so. That said, when examining the proportion of LSOAs 
falling within England’s worst 25 per cent, it does certainly seem that access to housing and 
services is a more pressing issue within ‘seaside without resort’ districts (see Table 5.10). 
 
   Table 5.9: Per cent of LSOAs in England’s most deprived 50 per cent, 2010 
Deprivation domain Inland Coastal Seaside Seaside (-R) Seaside (+R) 
Overall Index of M.D. 49.3 54.1 52.5 40.2 57.1 
Income 49.6 52.0 51.6 38.1 56.7 
Employment 48.4 57.9 55.8 39.7 61.9 
Health 48.7 58.5 53.8 32.0 62.0 
Education 48.5 63.1 52.8 46.3 55.3 
Housing / Services 50.7 36.8 52.2 54.2 51.4 
Crime and disorder 53.9 41.6 30.6 17.3 35.6 
Environment 50.4 36.7 54.3 48.6 56.5 
 
   Source: Author’s own work 
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   Table 5.10: Per cent of LSOAs in England’s most deprived 25 per cent, 2010 
Deprivation domain Inland Coastal Seaside Seaside (-R) Seaside (+R) 
Overall Index of M.D. 25.7 26.4 20.3 9.3 24.5 
Income 25.9 25.0 19.7 9.4 23.6 
Employment 24.6 30.1 25.1 12.9 29.8 
Health 24.9 31.0 22.8 9.6 27.8 
Education 24.7 34.5 22.4 16.1 24.8 
Housing / Services 25.5 14.7 27.1 35.7 23.8 
Crime and disorder 27.7 18.9 11.9 5.6 14.4 
Environment 25.1 15.5 28.7 22.3 31.2 
 
   Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 From the data in Table 5.10, it is apparent that inland areas are remarkably consistent 
across all aspects of deprivation. All deprivation domains are in the range 24.6 – 27.7 per cent. 
In contrast, there is more variation in the nature of social deprivation within each coastal district 
type. For instance, poor education, health and employment are greater problems in ‘coastal’ 
districts compared to other aspects of deprivation, while living environment and housing are 
less prevalent. In the case of ‘seaside’ districts, when compared to other aspects of deprivation, 
poor quality of people’s immediate surroundings both within and outside the home, poor access 
to housing and services and high unemployment are considerable issues, while crime is less 
significant. More specifically, with regard to those districts defined as ‘seaside without resorts’, 
poor access to housing and services (followed by poor quality of the local environment) presents 
as an inordinate problem and, in the case of ‘seaside with resorts’, poor living environment, 
high unemployment and bad health are substantial issues.  Overall, these results suggest that 
the problems of bad health and low employment are common to both ‘seaside with resorts’ and 
‘coastal’ districts, whereas deprivation in the quality of the local environment is more specific 
to seaside type districts. Otherwise, there appear few similarities in the type and level of 
deprivation among the three coastal district types.  
 
 To explore whether there are “true” differences in the extent of deprivation across 
domains between ‘seaside with resort’ districts and other district types (i.e., ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ 
and ‘seaside without resort’), 72 Pearson’s chi-square tests were carried out to investigate the 
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significance of the observed frequencies of LSOAs in each deprivation quartile in relation to 
the expected values, in order to determine whether the observed cases fit the expected 
distribution. The results show that all but one of the 72 tests are statistically very strongly 
significant at the p = 0.001 level. Full results of the chi-square tests performed are available in 
Appendix Tables A25-48. These results are summarised in Table 5.11 and below. 
 
 Table 5.11 shows the channels through which deprivation might affect social exclusion 
in the following three types of local authority districts: Seaside without resort, Coastal, Inland. 
Furthermore, the table shows the results from the comparison of the observed and expected cell 
counts. That is to say, the district type which had more LSOAs (by deprivation quartile) than 
might be expected. It can be seen from the table that, when compared to ‘seaside without resort’ 
districts, ‘seaside with resort’ districts had higher levels of deprivation than might be expected 
across the majority of the domains of deprivation. The only exception was the barriers to 
housing and services domain as, in this case, the results were reversed. LSOAs within ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts had better than expected access to housing and services. Another 
interesting observation is that ‘seaside with resort’ districts are characterised by strong over-
representation of LSOAs with ‘high’ and ‘middling’ levels of crime deprivation (i.e., quartiles 
1-3). However, when compared to ‘coastal’ districts, ‘seaside with resort’ districts had lower 
crime levels and more districts with LSOAs that contained very high levels of deprivation in 
terms of both the living environment and barriers to housing and services domains of multiple 
deprivation. In relation to inland districts, ‘seaside with resort’ districts are characterised by 
strong over-representation of LSOAs with ‘high’ and ‘middling’ levels of deprivation in terms 
of the following three domains: employment; health and disability; and education, skills and 
training (in order of their prevalence).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 5.11: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test – ‘seaside with resort’ LSOAs vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort LSOAs 
Source: Author’s own work 
 Inland Coastal Seaside (-Resorts) 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level (C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level (C.V) 
MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level (C.V) 
Overall IMD 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.116) 
0.000 (0.112) 
0.000 (0.099) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.113) 
0.000 (0.105) 
0.000 (0.111) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.237) 
0.000 (0.214) 
0.000 (0.197) 
Income 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.116) 
0.000 (0.119) 
0.000 (0.112) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.107) 
0.000 (0.130) 
0.000 (0.125) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.224) 
0.000 (0.189) 
0.000 (0.207) 
Employment 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.154) 
0.000 (0.136) 
0.000 (0.129) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.143) 
0.000 (0.120) 
0.000 (0.103) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.288) 
0.000 (0.264) 
0.000 (0.256) 
Health 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.152) 
0.000 (0.141) 
0.000 (0.137) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.169) 
0.000 (0.155) 
0.000 (0.139) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.381) 
0.000 (0.355) 
0.000 (0.321) 
Living Environment 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.252 NS 
0.000 (0.050) 
0.000 (0.048) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.188) 
0.000 (0.242) 
0.000 (0.218) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.170) 
0.000 (0.113) 
0.000 (0.098) 
Housing / Services 
2004 
2007 
2010 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.045) 
0.000 (0.023) 
0.000 (0.030) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
0.000 (0.186) 
0.000 (0.132) 
0.000 (0.158) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.109) 
0.000 (0.128) 
0.000 (0.132) 
Education 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
I 
I 
I 
0.000 (0.075) 
0.000 (0.081) 
0.000 (0.074) 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
0.000 (0.132) 
0.000 (0.126) 
0.000 (0.108) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.127) 
0.000 (0.124) 
0.000 (0.101) 
Crime and disorder 
2004 
2007 
2010 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
0.000 (0.121) 
0.000 (0.090) 
0.000 (0.129) 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
C 
C 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
0.000 (0.114) 
0.000 (0.096) 
0.000 (0.091) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(+R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
S(-R) 
0.000 (0.264) 
0.000 (0.274) 
0.000 (0.217) 
2
0
0
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 The analysis reported above is based on the proportion of LSOAs falling within 
England’s worst 25 per cent. Results may differ at different levels of deprivation. The 
forthcoming figures therefore depict results for the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation by 
deprivation deciles. Detailed results of the per cent of LSOAs in England’s most deprived 10 
per cent and other deciles are given in Appendix Table A49. However, in order to facilitate the 
comparison between the district types, the decile results are presented here separately: first, for 
the three major district categories (i.e., ‘inland’, ‘coastal’, ‘seaside’); and second, for the 
different coastal district types (i.e., ‘coastal’, ‘seaside with resort’, ‘seaside without resort’). 
 
 Figure 5.1 depicts the decile distribution of LSOAs across the three main district types 
of England. In the decile distribution, for England as a whole, there are 10% of LSOAs in each 
decile. If those districts that are defined as ‘seaside’ are reflective of England as a whole, they 
will have a similar proportion of LSOAs in each decile. If there are more than 10% of LSOAs 
in the most deprived decile then the ‘seaside’ districts are likely to be more deprived than 
England as a whole. If there are less than 10% of LSOAs in the most deprived decile, then the 
‘seaside’ districts are likely to be less deprived than England as a whole. However, it is the 
overall pattern in the decile distribution that will determine whether the districts have similar 
or different levels of multiple deprivation than England in general. 
 
 It is apparent from Figure 5.1 that, while ‘inland’ districts contain a greater share of 
LSOAs in England’s most deprived 10 per cent, LSOAs with very low levels of deprivation are 
also more prevalent in inland districts. In other words, although ‘seaside’ districts contain few 
LSOAs of extreme deprivation (i.e., deciles 1-2), they have few areas of very low deprivation. 
Rather, ‘seaside’ districts are characterised by strong over-representation of LSOAs with 
‘lowish’ and ‘middling’ levels of deprivation (i.e., deciles 4-8). 
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Index of M.D. decile (1= most deprived) 
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of deprivation across ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ districts, 2010  
Source: Author’s own work 
 
  
 Figure 5.2 shows the decile distribution of LSOAs across all three coastal district types. 
It can be seen that the districts defined in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ contain a higher 
proportion of LSOAs (10%) in the most deprived decile than ‘coastal’ (9.7%) and ‘seaside 
without resort’ (3.3%) districts. However, although the level of extreme multiple deprivation 
(i.e., deciles 1-2) in ‘seaside with resort’ districts is broadly similar with that of England as a 
whole, it is noticeable that, when viewed against other district types, ‘seaside with resort’ 
districts contain fewer LSOAs with very low levels of deprivation. Indeed, this district type had 
smaller proportions of LSOAs in the least deprived deciles (i.e., deciles 8-10). Another 
interesting finding is that there is a general downward trend, with a greater proportion of LSOAs 
in the fifth decile (13.6%) compared with the least deprived decile (3%). The two other district 
types followed broadly the same pattern, especially ‘seaside without resort’ districts. Overall, 
these results show that, while ‘seaside with resort’ and coastal’ districts share similar levels of 
extreme multiple deprivation on a par with that of England, multiple deprivation varies 
considerably in the two seaside district types. However, although the overall deprivation pattern 
for both types of seaside district was not consistent across all deciles, ‘seaside with resort’ 
districts had a higher proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived decile. 
0
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Index of M.D. decile (1= most deprived) 
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of deprivation across ‘coastal’, ‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside 
without resort’ districts, 2010  
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 More in-depth examination of the overall index of multiple deprivation within ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts revealed that, of the 39 districts, 30 have at least one LSOA in the most 
deprived 10% of areas nationally (see Table 5.12). Thus, more than three quarters (77 per cent) 
of the districts contained localities that were extremely deprived. Ten of the 30 local authority 
districts are located in the South East region, eight in the South West, five in the North West, 
four in the East, with the other three districts located in the North East, Yorkshire and the 
Humber and the East Midlands. However, although it may appear at first glance that the 
Southeast ‘seaside with resort’ districts appear to be suffering more from severe multiple 
deprivation, when viewed against the total number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent 
for ‘seaside with resort’ districts as a whole, this number being 314, the Northwest (n=134, 
42.7%) had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived 10% and, as such, these 
districts contain more of the LSOAs with the very highest levels of multiple deprivation in 
England. Second in rank is the Southeast (n=79, 25.2%), which is followed by the Southwest 
(n=41, 13.1%), the East (n=34, 10.8%), the Northeast (n=11, 3.5%), Yorkshire and the Humber 
(n=8, 2.5%) and the East Midlands (n=7, 2.2%). Indeed, the Northwest district of Blackpool 
was the local authority with the highest proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived decile of the 
0
5
10
15
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Coastal
Seaside (-R)
Seaside (+R)
 204 
 
 
Index of Multiple Deprivation in both 2004 and 2010. Wirral, also in the North West, is the 
local authority with the largest number of LSOAs that are amongst the most deprived in 2010, 
this was also the case in 2004.  
 
 Perhaps the most striking result to emerge from the data in Table 5.12 is that, of the 30 
‘seaside with resort’ districts, four have fewer LSOAs amongst the most deprived decile in 2010 
than in 2004. Moreover, in relation to England, in 2004 the 30 local authorities with the highest 
proportions of deprived LSOAs accounted for 259 (8%) of the most deprived decile, which has 
risen to 314 (10%) in 2010. The number of local authorities with at least one LSOA in the most 
deprived decile in 2010 is 30 (8.5%), out of 354 authorities, compared to 28 (7.9%) in 2004. 
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Table 5.12: Seaside with resort districts with the highest proportion of their LSOAs in the 
most deprived decile of Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 and change since 2004 
 
 IMD 2010 Change from 2004 
District Region All LSOAs in 
district 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
10% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
10% 
Number of 
least deprived 
LSOAs 
Percentage 
Blackpool NW 94 35 37.2 10 10.6 
Hastings SE 53 15 28.3 3 5.7 
Wirral NW 207 48 23.2 -4 -1.9 
Great Yarmouth E 61 13 21.3 2 3.3 
Sefton NW 190 35 18.4 -2 -1.1 
Thanet SE 84 14 16.7 4 4.8 
Torbay SW 89 12 13.5 8 9.0 
Brighton and Hove SE 164 19 11.6 5 3.0 
Portsmouth SE 123 14 11.4 1 0.8 
Scarborough Y&H 71 8 11.3 1 1.4 
Lancaster NW 89 10 11.2 2 2.2 
South Tyneside NE 103 11 10.7 -9 -8.7 
Weymouth and Portland SW 39 4 10.3 3 7.7 
Bournemouth SW 107 10 9.3 4 3.7 
East Lindsey EM 80 7 8.8 2 2.5 
Wyre NW 69 6 8.7 3 4.3 
Eastbourne SE 59 5 8.5 4 6.8 
Southend-on-sea E 107 9 8.4 4 3.7 
Tendring E 90 7 7.8 3 3.3 
North Somerset SW 124 9 7.3 4 3.2 
Waveney E 73 5 6.8 0 0 
Shepway SE 65 4 6.2 1 1.5 
Penwith SW 38 2 5.3 0 0 
North Devon SW 58 2 3.4 0 0 
Rother SE 58 2 3.4 2 3.4 
Arun SE 94 3 3.2 3 3.2 
Sedgemoor SE 68 2 2.9 1 1.5 
Carrick SW 58 1 1.7 1 1.7 
Restormel SW 64 1 1.6 -1 -1.6 
Dover SE 67 1 1.5 0 0 
Berwick-upon-Tweed NE 17 0 0 0 0 
Canterbury SE 90 0 0 0 0 
Christchurch SW 30 0 0 0 0 
East Devon SW 82 0 0 0 0 
Fylde NW 51 0 0 0 0 
Isle of Wight SE 89 0 0 0 0 
Purbeck SW 29 0 0 0 0 
Teignbridge SW 84 0 0 0 0 
West Somerset SW 23 0 0 0 0 
Seaside districts 3,141 314 10 55 1.8 
 
Note: Further summaries of the 2010, 2007 and 2004 overall Index of Multiple Deprivation are presented in 
Appendix Tables A50-52. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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5.1.3  Summary of district-level results 
 
 Section 5.1 of this chapter has sought to provide a factual overview for understanding 
multiple deprivation within ‘seaside with resort’ districts by comparing such districts, as a 
whole, to other district types in England. ‘Inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts 
were used here in order to provide an understanding of ‘seaside with resort’ districts relative 
status nationally. The intention was not merely to assess how deprivation varies across different 
types of district, but to ascertain whether multiple deprivation corresponds to ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts and identify the districts which were experiencing significant problems. 
 
 Statistically significant differences in the level of deprivation across each of the 
summary indicators of multiple deprivation were observed when the upper and lower quartiles 
were combined (section 5.1.1). The degree, extent and local concentration of multiple 
deprivation was significantly lower in ‘inland’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts than in 
‘seaside with resort’ districts. However, the differences between ‘seaside with resort’ and 
‘coastal’ districts were not statistically significant as both district types exhibited higher levels 
of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Further analysis revealed that all districts in all 
regions, taking into account both deprived and less deprived LSOAs, as a whole are 
experiencing multiple deprivation.  
 
 With respect to the LSOA level indices of deprivation (section 5.1.2), as above, when 
the ‘most deprived’ and ‘above’ average quartiles were combined, ‘coastal’ districts and 
‘seaside with resort’ districts both exhibited higher levels of deprivation than might be expected. 
The geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in ‘seaside with resort’ districts than 
in other district types, although this result changes when looking at the upper quartile. Here, 
while marginal, coastal and inland districts have a higher proportion of deprived areas than 
‘seaside with resort’ districts. Perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from the data is 
that the overall level of multiple deprivation and the level across each of the separate domains 
of deprivation are of similar magnitude in inland districts. In contrast, there is more variation 
 207 
 
 
in the nature of social deprivation across each type of coastal district. These results would seem 
to suggest that such local authorities face different types of deprivation. However, what can be 
said with a greater degree of certainty is, some aspects of deprivation are worse in ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts than other district types. In particular, deprivation of the quality of people’s 
immediate surroundings both within and outside the home is more of an issue in ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts. Other dominant aspects of deprivation include, in order of their prevalence, 
low employment and poor health. The inferential statistics results revealed that higher levels of 
deprivation are associated with seaside districts that contain sizeable resorts as opposed to those 
seaside districts with smaller destinations. Moreover, these results indicate that, ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts, despite their high levels of multiple deprivation, actually compare quite 
favourably to coastal and inland districts on some but not all domains of deprivation. Looking 
at national deciles for the index of multiple deprivation, however, a disturbing result emerged. 
When viewed against other district types, ‘seaside with resort’ districts contained a greater share 
of LSOAs in England’s most deprived 10 per cent and had fewer LSOAs with very low levels 
of deprivation.  
 
 The results of the district-level analysis provide a useful overview of the intensity and 
distribution of multiple deprivation in England, especially in coastal areas. However, the main 
goal of Section 5.1 was to determine whether multiple deprivation corresponds to ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts. It is clear from the results obtained from the analysis of the Indices of 
Deprivation data and presented here that multiple deprivation is a problem in such districts. 
Indeed, the results indicate that ‘seaside with resort’ districts are on average more acutely 
affected by multiple deprivation than ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts. 
The majority of districts defined as ‘seaside with resort’ are experiencing high levels of multiple 
deprivation. The form of multiple deprivation is, on average, as much widespread as it is 
concentrated, although this result differs when considering the upper quartile as a level of 
analysis. Here, ‘seaside with resort’ districts score overwhelming worse on the measure of local 
concentration.  
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 Having explored some of the general characteristics of multiple deprivation in ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts at a general level in relation to other district types, the intention now is to 
take a detailed consideration of ‘seaside with resort’ districts at the local level. The next section 
therefore examines patterns of deprivation at the lower super output level within ‘seaside with 
resort’ districts, in order to establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social 
exclusion occur within seaside resorts. 
 
5.2  Lower-level super output area analysis 
 
 The main aim of the analyses presented in this section is to establish the extent to which 
deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within seaside resorts and to 
ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics. In pursuit of this goal, first, all lower 
level super output areas within each ‘seaside with resort’ district were categorised as ‘resort’ or 
‘other’ depending on their correspondence with identifiable resort areas. The outcome of this 
exercise was that a total of 3,141 LSOAs comprised the 37 English ‘seaside with resort’ 
districts, of which 1,686 corresponded directly to 58 identifiable English seaside resorts and 
were coded as ‘resort LSOAs’, while the other 1,455 were labelled, ‘other LSOAs’. Second, 
the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the seven indices of deprivation were recoded 
into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of 
Deprivation databases. Third, cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses against all of 
the seaside district’s ‘resort’ and ‘other’ LSOAs were undertaken so that their association with 
deprivation may be ascertained. Full results of the chi-square tests performed are available in 
Appendix Tables A53-60. These results are summarised in Table 5.13. It is apparent from this 
table that all 24 tests are statistically very strongly significant at the p = 0.001 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 209 
 
 
Table 5.13: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test – deprivation level by settlement type 
 
Deprivation level 
 
Domain 
 MD AA BA LD  
Sig-level (C.V) 
Overall IMD 
2004 R R O O 0.000 (0.167) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.165) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.179) 
Income 
2004 R R O O 0.000 (0.200) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.193) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.204) 
Employment 
2004 R R O O 0.000 (0.190) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.211) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.216) 
Health and disability 
2004 R R O O 0.000 (0.223) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.254) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.274) 
Living environment 
2004 R O O O 0.000 (0.117) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.103) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.096) 
Barriers to housing and services 
2004 O O R R 0.000 (0.116) 
2007 O R R O 0.000 (0.185) 
2010 O R R O 0.000 (0.173) 
Education 
2004 R R O O 0.000 (0.090) 
2007 R R O O 0.000 (0.083) 
2010 R R O O 0.000 (0.099) 
Crime and disorder 
2004 R R R O 0.000 (0.244) 
2007 R R R O 0.000 (0.277) 
2010 R R R O 0.000 (0.298) 
 
Note: The blue highlighted cells represent those LSOAs defined in this study as ‘resort’. O = ‘other LSOAs’. 
 
   Source: Author’s own work 
 
  
 Examination of multiple deprivation at small area level within this study’s 39 ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts found that there are significant differences between the two settlement 
types as ‘resort’ areas exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. 
In 2010, a quarter of LSOAs in the sample fell within the upper quartile, but for ‘resort’ LSOAs 
the figure is higher at 30.8% and for ‘other’ LSOAs it is lower at 17.2%. Furthermore, the 
results, as shown in Table 5.13, indicate that the highest levels of deprivation, in terms of six 
out of seven aspects of disadvantage related to multiple deprivation, are more likely to be 
associated with seaside ‘resort LSOAs’ as opposed to ‘other LSOAs’ within the seaside 
districts. The only exception concerned the barriers to housing and services domain, which 
measures both the financial accessibility to housing and the physical accessibility to key local 
services including general practitioner premises, primary schools, post office branches and 
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supermarket/convenience stores. When compared with ‘other’ LSOAs, areas within the seaside 
resorts had better than expected access to such facilities and housing. This result is not 
surprising given that, in many cases, the ‘other LSOAs’ within ‘seaside’ districts were located 
in remote rural areas. Notwithstanding the latter, these findings suggests that not only are 
‘seaside with resort’ districts associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation, but also 
within them, those areas that comprise the seaside resorts are shown to be where it is 
concentrated. 
 
 Further analysis of the LSOA level indicators of deprivation revealed: i) the overall 
distribution of deprivation for seaside resorts and how this compares with England; and, ii) the 
type and level of deprivation that resort LSOAs appear to be experiencing (see Figure 5.3). This 
analysis found that, for the index of multiple deprivation, seaside resorts had higher proportions 
of LSOAs in the ‘most deprived’ and ‘above average’ quartiles than England overall. A similar 
pattern is evident with respect to the following deprivation domains: employment; health and 
disability; living environment; income; and, education, training and skills (in order of their 
prevalence in the upper quartile). Thus, five out of seven LSOA-level domains had more than 
the England average of LSOAs in the upper two quartiles in 2010. When viewed against the 
proportion of resort LSOAs in the upper quartiles for the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, 
this being 64.1%, it is apparent that ‘health and disability’ (73.4%), ‘employment’ (70.4%) and 
‘income’ (65.7%) were greater problems in English seaside resorts compared to ‘living 
environment’ (60.6%) and ‘education, skills and training’ (59.2%) deprivation, while access to 
housing and services and crime were much less prevalent. Indeed, with respect to the latter two 
indicators of deprivation, there was a greater proportion of LSOAs in the least deprived 
quartiles, compared with the two most deprived quartiles. Moreover, the proportion of LSOAs 
which fell within each deprivation quartile in the crime domain and to a lesser extent, the access 
domain, was more evenly distributed and therefore more reflective of England as a whole. Thus, 
although the overall deprivation pattern for the seaside resorts was not consistent across all 
domains, the deprivation levels for five out of seven domains were found to be broadly similar 
to that of the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation.  
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of ‘resort’ LSOAs by deprivation quartile against domains, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Before proceeding to examine changes in deprivation between 2004 and 2010, it will 
be necessary to reflect on the relationship between the domain ranks and the overall Index of 
Multiple Deprivation. The reason is because the evidence presented so far suggests that multiple 
deprivation in English seaside resorts might be characterised by poor health and disability, high 
unemployment rates, low income households, poor environment conditions and low 
educational attainment rates. In order to test this evidence as well as the correspondence 
between the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the other individual domains, a series of 
‘scatterplots’ (see Appendix Figures A1-7) of the 1,686 resort LSOAs were produced. A 
scatterplot visually represents the correspondence between two variables – in this instance the 
overall Index of Multiple Deprivation (plotted on the horizontal axes) and each of the seven 
domains (plotted on the vertical axes). Each scatterplot provides a value ‘r’, which is also 
known as a Pearson product moment ‘correlation coefficient’. The correlation coefficient varies 
from 0, where no relationship between the variables is found, to -1 or 1 where a perfect linear 
relationship between the variables occurs. Thus, it also provides information not only about the 
strength of the relationship, but also the direction of the relationship, which can be positive, 
negative or zero. When high values on one factor are associated with high values on the other 
factor, and low values on one factor are associated with low values on the other factor, the 
direction of the relationship is positive. A negative relationship is where a higher value in one 
18.0
20.0
28.1
28.5
34.8
35.7
37.0
30.8
25
30.4
26.2
31.1
37.2
25.8
37.7
33.4
33.3
25
31.4
29.7
24.3
25.3
21.3
22.2
23.7
24.3
25
20.2
24.1
16.4
9.0
18.1
4.4
5.9
11.6
25
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Housing
Crime
Education
Income
Living Environment
Health
Employment
Multiple deprivation
England
MD
AA
BA
LD
 212 
 
 
factor implies a lower value in the other. Coefficients lying more towards 0 (either positive or 
negative) indicate little or no statistical relationship between the variables under investigation. 
The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 5.14. 
 
 Given the weight allocated to income (22.5%) and employment (22.5%) deprivation in 
the calculation of the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation score, it is not surprising to find 
that these two domains are most strongly associated with the IMD2010. The correspondence of 
overall deprivation with health and education deprivation and crime is somewhat weaker 
(domain weights of 13.5%, 13.5% and 9.3% respectively). The relationship with living 
environment and barriers to housing and services is weaker still (domain weights of 9.3% and 
9.3% respectively). To put it another way, environmental conditions and geographical access 
to services and housing affordability have a much weaker association with overall deprivation 
in English seaside resorts. In summary, these results indicate that areas that rank highly on the 
overall Index of Multiple deprivation also tend to rank highly on the income, employment, 
health, education and crime domains. It would therefore seem that seaside resorts with a 
relatively high level of multiple deprivation are also likely to be characterised by disadvantage 
in the before mentioned aspects of deprivation, although the characteristics of each affected 
resort may differ. Moreover, as there are obvious links between the deprivation types, it also 
appears that seaside resorts are suffering from social exclusion. 
 
Table 5.14: Correlation coefficients between IMD and domain ranks in seaside resorts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Correlations are significant at the p = <0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
Overall IMD2010 with Income Domain 0.96 
Overall IMD2010 with Employment Domain 0.95 
Overall IMD2010 with Health Domain 0.88 
Overall IMD2010 with Education Domain 0.78 
Overall IMD2010 with Crime & Disorder Domain 0.74 
Overall IMD2010 with Living Environment Domain 0.63 
Overall IMD2010 with Barriers to Housing/Services Domain 0.24 
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5.2.1  Changes since 2004 and 2010 at LSOA level 
 
 Finally, in order to provide as comprehensive an insight as possible to the problems of 
English seaside resorts, the remainder of this section considers how resort LSOAs have changed 
in recent years, by means of looking more closely at changes in the Indices of Deprivation 
between 2004 and 2010. Indeed, as the English Indices of Deprivation 2010 are based on 
broadly the same methodology as the previous versions, and as the total number of LSOAs in 
England has remained the same, it is possible to compare the current pattern of deprivation with 
the pattern in 2004. When comparing the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation for 2004 with 
2010, the levels of deprivation in the seaside resorts were broadly similar (see Table 5.15). That 
said in 2010 the overall distribution of LSOAs was a little more widely spread than in 2004, 
with a smaller proportion of LSOAs in the more deprived quartiles (64.5% in 2004 compared 
with 64.1% in 2010) and a greater proportion of LSOAs in the lesser deprived quartiles (35.5% 
in 2004 compared with 35.9% in 2010). More in-depth examination, however, of the overall 
Index of Multiple Deprivation at LSOA level revealed the movement of resort LSOAs across 
national quartile groups between 2004 and 2010. Table 5.15 illustrates this movement and 
shows that approximately four-in-five (81.7%) LSOAs remained in the same quartile, 8.7 per 
cent (147 areas) became relatively less deprived (went into a higher numbered quartile) and 9.5 
per cent (161 areas) became relatively more deprived (went into a lower numbered quartile). 
Summarising this movement, it can be said that overall there has been a slight deterioration in 
the seaside resorts deprivation status relative to other areas in England, with a greater proportion 
of LSOAs in the most deprived quartile (30.8% in 2010 compared with 28.4% in 2004).  
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Table 5.15: Cross tabulation of resort LSOAs in IMD quartiles in 2004 and 2010 
 
 IMD2004    
IMD2010 MD AA BA LD    
MD 448 71    519  (30.8%)  
AA 32 478 51   561  (33.3%)  
BA  60 311 39 410  (24.3%)  
LD     55 141 196  (11.6%)  
  
480 
(28.4%) 
609 
(36.1%) 
417 
(24.7%) 
180 
(10.8%) 
1,686 
(100%)  
 
Note: Cells shaded yellow represent resort LSOAs where there was no change in quartile grouping between 
2004 and 2010. Green indicates a movement to lesser deprivation, red indicates a movement to more deprivation. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Quartile composition change was also investigated for the LSOA indicators of 
deprivation (although they have not been presented here in the interests of space and clarity). 
Detailed cross-tabulations are given in Appendix Table A61. The results, as summarised in 
Table 5.16, indicate that overall seaside resorts have become relatively more deprived on five 
out of the seven LSOA-level domains of deprivation. The differences between the results of the 
Indices of Deprivation 2010 and 2004 are mostly fairly moderate, though there have been some 
notable changes. First, there are increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived 50% 
in the health and disability, living environment, access and education domains, which must 
contribute to the increased relative deprivation noted earlier. Second, with respect to the before 
mentioned domains, the crime domain and to a lesser extent, employment, the changes have 
been somewhat erratic. As can be seen from the data in Appendix Table A61, the resort LSOAs 
which improved or worsened have done so by more than one quartile and, in many cases, by 
three quartiles. Even though the indices of deprivation are about relative deprivation not 
absolute changes, such changes in deprivation levels of resort LSOAs cannot be due to the 
improvement or worsening of deprivation rankings of other small areas elsewhere in England 
alone. Indeed, the remarkable changes in deprivation levels, both positive and negative, might 
lead one to infer that resort-level influences in general and neighbourhood factors in particular 
are instrumental in shaping the fortunes of the resort LSOAs.  
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Table 5.16: Comparison of Indices of Deprivation 2004 and 2010: Resort LSOAs 
 
Domain % of LSOAs that are: Overall 
change 
from 
2004 
% of LSOAs in 
upper quartiles: 
Change 
from 
2004 
Similar Getting 
worse 
Getting 
better 
2004 2010 
Health 68.4 21.2 10.4 -10.8 68.7 73.4 4.7 
Living environment 74.0 17.2 8.8 -8.4 57.5 60.6 3.1 
Housing and services 52.9 26.2 20.9 -5.3 43.5 48.4 4.9 
Education 78.2 13.2 8.6 -4.6 56.7 59.2 2.5 
Crime and disorder 55.9 23.8 20.3 -3.5 45.3 46.2 0.9 
Employment 77.3 10.6 12.1 1.5 73.3 70.4 -2.9 
Income 79.9 8.5 11.6 3.1 66.6 65.7 -0.9 
 
Note: Green indicates a movement to lesser deprivation, red indicates a movement to more deprivation 
 
      Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Lastly, considering now briefly national percentiles and in particular, upper deciles, 
gives a better impression (compared to national quartiles) of the extent and severity of 
deprivation. It is apparent from the data in Table 5.17 that, when comparing the number of 
LSOAs in the first two deciles, deprivation in English seaside resorts has increased both in 
extent (number) and concentration (severity), with 37 more (2.2% more) LSOAs being in the 
20% most deprived nationally since 2004. Moreover, there has been an increase in resort 
LSOAs in the most deprived 10% of areas nationally – 12.3% of LSOAs in 2010 fell into the 
most deprived 10 per cent compared to 8.8% in 2004 and 10.1% in 2007. Again, a comparison 
of the Index Multiple Deprivation data for 2004 and 2010 at LSOA level reveals not only did 
seaside resorts generally have greater levels of deprivation than the rest of England in 2010, but 
also that seaside resorts as a whole have become relatively more deprived.  
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Table 5.17: Change in distribution of resort LSOAs by IMD percentiles, 2004 and 2010 
 
 Most deprived   Least deprived  
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 50-100% Total 
Number of resort LSOAs falling into national percentiles     
IMD 2004 148 214 249 260 218 597 1,686 
IMD 2010 207 192 249 232 200 606 1,686 
Change 59 -22 0 -28 -18 9  
Percentage of resort LSOAs falling into national percentiles     
IMD 2004 8.8 12.7 14.8 15.4 12.9 35.4 100 
IMD 2010 12.3 11.4 14.8 13.8 11.9 36 100 
Change 3.5 -1.3 0 -1.6 -1 0.6   
 
Note: The % of resort LSOAs in each decile group for 2004, 2007 and 2010 is given in Appendix Table A62. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2  Summary of LSOA-level results 
 
 
 Section 5.2 of this chapter employed bivariate analysis using cross-tabulations and 
statistical tests at small area level within this study’s 39 ‘seaside with resort’ districts to 
illuminate variations in the incidence of a number of key deprivation-related variables. This 
analysis found that, within the seaside ‘resort LSOAs’, in addition to the overall Index of 
Multiple Deprivation, six out of the seven LSOA-level domains (employment, income, health 
and disability, living environment, crime and disorder and education, skills and training) 
recorded an observed significance value of < 0.001. These results indicate that the highest 
levels of deprivation are associated with seaside ‘resort LSOAs’ as opposed to ‘other 
LSOAs’ within the districts defined as ‘seaside with resort’. Further interrogation of the 
LSOA-level data revealed the type and level of deprivation that ‘resort LSOAs’ seem to be 
experiencing. This examination showed that seaside resorts had greater levels of deprivation 
than England as a whole with respect to: employment; health and disability; living environment; 
income; and, education, training and skills. In light of these findings, a Pearson’s product 
moment correlation were used to determine the correspondence between overall deprivation as 
measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation and each specific ‘domain’ of deprivation for 
all resort LSOAs. The results of the statistical analysis show highly significant positive 
associations (p = < 0.01) between the index of multiple deprivation and the seven domains. 
Moreover, some strong positive relationships were found to exist. Resort areas that score highly 
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on the overall index of multiple deprivation also tend to score highly on the income (r = 0.96) 
employment (r = 0.95), health (r = 0.88), education (r = 0.78) and crime (r = 0.74) domains. 
Due to the linked nature of the problems being experienced, it can therefore be assumed that 
social exclusion is very much an issue within English seaside resorts.  
 
 Changes in levels of deprivation also were explored with reference to the 2004 and 2010 
versions of the Indices of Deprivation. Even though a relatively short time frame, it offers an 
important insight into where positive and negative change is occurring. Analysis of quartile 
composition change demonstrated that for the Index of Multiple deprivation and for five out of 
seven deprivation domains (health and disability, living environment, housing and services, 
education and crime and disorder), overall seaside resorts had become relatively more deprived. 
Since 2004, there had been a slight improvement in the proportion of resorts LSOAs suffering 
from income and employment deprivation. However, (along with health and disability) 
employment and income still remain the more pressing aspects of deprivation in seaside resorts, 
as indicated by the per cent of LSOAs in the upper quartiles. With respect to the erratic (+/-) 
changes that have occurred, as quartile groupings are broader and therefore they are less subject 
to minor change, it is contended here that resort-level and neighbourhood effects must influence 
multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. The changes cannot be due to the relative nature 
of the Indices of Deprivation database alone. Another striking result to emerge from the data is 
that, in relation to national percentiles and in particular, the most deprived 20% and 10% of 
LSOAs in England on the Index of Multiple Deprivation, overall deprivation has increased both 
in extent (number) and concentration (severity). This finding is particularly disturbing as it 
suggests not only are seaside resorts suffering from acute levels of multiple deprivation, but 
also the problem is deepening.  
 
 Taken together, these results provide a useful overview of the nature, intensity and 
distribution of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. Further insight may be gained, 
and the formulation of remedial policies advanced, by investigating the variation in multiple 
deprivation between and within seaside resorts. The section that follows seeks to address this 
important objective. 
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5.3  Resort-level analysis 
 
 The analysis presented so far has related to seaside resorts as a whole. This section of 
the chapter presents findings on the variation in multiple deprivation between and within 
seaside resorts. The analysis is split into three sections here. First, there is further investigation 
of the severity of multiple deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts. Second, there is an 
assessment of whether there are “true” differences in deprivation between the larger and mid-
sized seaside resorts. Third, there is a more in-depth examination of deprivation within the 25 
larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. Here, the resorts are compared with 
each other, to see if there are any differences in the patterns of deprivation. A summary of the 
results of all the above mentioned analyses is then provided. 
 
5.3.1  Experience of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts 
 
 This study found that the 1,686 ‘resort LSOAs’ related to 58 seaside resorts and that 
more than four-in-five resorts (86.2%) have at least one LSOA in the upper quartile of most 
deprived LSOAs of England when tested against the index of multiple deprivation at LSOA 
level (see Table 5.18). With the exception of the access to housing and services domain and to 
a lesser extent, crime, a similar pattern is evident for the seven other domains. These findings 
reinforce the foregoing analysis that the majority of seaside resorts appear to be experiencing 
similar types of multiple deprivation, which when linked together relate to social exclusion. 
 
Table 5.18: Number of resorts with at least one LSOA in the upper quartile 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Domain 2010 2004 
Change since 
2004 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 50 48 2 
Employment 54 53 1 
Income 51 52 -1 
Education, skills and training 51 50 1 
Health and disability 50 47 3 
Living environment 50 52 -2 
Crime and disorder 43 36 7 
Barriers to housing and services 42 41 1 
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 As explained in the methodology, the Indices of Deprivation allow examination of the 
composition of deprivation in an area. Taking the most deprived 25% (upper quartile) of resort 
LSOAs on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010, it is possible to ascertain the number 
of component domains on which each resort LSOA ranks within the most deprived 25% of 
LSOAs nationally. The results obtained from this detailed investigation are summarised in 
Table 5.19. This table is quite revealing in several ways. First, thirty-one of the most deprived 
519 resort LSOAs on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation rank in the most deprived 25% 
of LSOAs on all seven component domains. Second, the majority (55.7%) of the 519 resort 
LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on five or more domains. Third, almost all 
(98.1%) of the 519 resort LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on three or more 
domains. Fourth, all of the 519 resort LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on at 
least two domains.  
 
Table 5.19: Number of domains on which the most deprived 25% of resort LSOAs are in the 
most deprived quartile, 2010 
 
Number of domains Number of LSOAs 
(Number of resorts) 
Percentage of LSOAs Cumulative percentage 
of LSOAs 
7 31     (7) 6.0 6.0 
6 117   (27) 22.5 28.5 
5 141   (38) 27.2 55.7 
4 146   (45) 28.1 83.8 
3 74   (30) 14.3 98.1 
2 10     (8) 1.9 100.0 
1 0 0.0 100.0 
0 0 0.0 100.0 
Total 519   (50) 100.0  
 
Note: Refer to the Indices of Seaside Resort Performance for details of the LSOAs deprived by number of 
domains. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Thus, many of the most deprived seaside resort areas in England face multiple issues 
with the majority of these LSOAs amongst the most deprived in at least three of the seven 
composite domains in the Indices, and over half being amongst the most deprived in at least 
five of the domains. Based on the latter measure, a number of seaside resorts were identified 
also as experiencing particular problems of multiple deprivation. In all, 289 LSOAs fell into 
this classification and are located within 39 individual resorts, which are located within 30 (out 
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of 39) seaside districts scattered around England. Table 5.20 lists the 39 most deprived seaside 
resorts ranked by number of LSOAs. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that, 
thirteen seaside resorts had more than 25% of their neighbourhoods affected by deprivation. 
Furthermore, seven seaside resorts had a third or more of their small areas suffering from 
deprivation. The seven seaside resorts are (in order of their prevalence) Margate, Blackpool, 
Hastings, Ilfracombe, Dover, Fleetwood and Skegness. None of these resorts share the same 
seaside district and all are situated in different regions of England.  
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Table 5.20: Particularly deprived English seaside resorts, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Resort                     
 
 
            
           Size 
 
 
 
‘Seaside’ district 
 
 
 
Region 
Number of LSOAs 
in most deprived 
quartile on five or 
more LSOA level 
domains 
Total number 
of LSOAs 
within the 
seaside resort                                                     
          
   (n)          (%) 
Blackpool                 *(22) L Blackpool  NW 44 94 46.8 
Brighton                 *(3) L Brighton and Hove  SE 28 101 27.7 
Hastings  L Hastings  SE 23 53 43.4 
Bournemouth  *(1) L Bournemouth  SW 16 107 15.0 
Southend-on-Sea  L Southend-on-Sea  E 15 107 14.0 
Margate  *(1) L Thanet  SE 13 27 48.1 
Scarborough  L Scarborough  Y&H 11 34 32.4 
Great Yarmouth  L Great Yarmouth  E 11 36 30.6 
Torquay  *(1) L Torbay  SW 11 43 25.6 
Eastbourne  *(2) L Eastbourne  SE 10 59 16.9 
Folkestone  L Shepway  SE 9 31 29.0 
Weston-s-mare  L North Somerset  SW 8 48 16.7 
Lowestoft  L Waveney  E 7 42 16.7 
Dover  M Dover  SE 6 18 33.3 
Fleetwood  M Wyre  NW 6 18 33.3 
Ramsgate  L Thanet SE 6 26 23.1 
Clacton-on-Sea  L Tendring  E 6 32 18.8 
Morecambe  M Lancaster NW 5 21 23.8 
South Shields  L South Tyneside NE 5 55 9.1 
Hove  L Brighton and Hove SE 5 63 7.9 
Skegness  M East Lindsey EM 4 12 33.3 
Penzance  M Penwith SW 4 13 30.8 
Littlehampton *(1) M Arun SE 4 17 23.5 
Weymouth  L Weymouth & Portland SW 4 31 12.9 
Ilfracombe  M North Devon SW 3 8 37.5 
Bexhill-on-Sea  L Rother SE 3 28 10.7 
Southsea  L Portsmouth SE 3 32 9.4 
Paignton  L Torbay SW 3 34 8.8 
Heysham  M Lancaster NW 2 11 18.2 
Bognor Regis  M Arun SE 2 15 13.3 
Ryde  M Isle of Wight SE 2 16 12.5 
Whitstable  M Canterbury SE 2 21 9.5 
Herne Bay  M Canterbury SE 2 23 8.7 
Whitby  M Scarborough Y&H 1 9 11.1 
Brixham  M Torbay SW 1 12 8.3 
Burnham-on-Sea  M Sedgemoor SW 1 12 8.3 
Thorton-Cleveleys  M Wyre NW 1 21 4.8 
Crosby  L Sefton NW 1 32 3.1 
Southport  L Sefton NW 1 60 1.7 
Notes: 
 
1) Resorts highlighted in yellow had more than 25% of their neighbourhoods affected by multiple deprivation 
2) * (n) denotes resorts that had LSOAs rank among the 25% most deprived nationally on all seven deprivation 
domains (and the number of LSOAs). 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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5.3.2  Multiple deprivation and resort size 
 The research question addressed in this section is whether or not there is a relationship 
between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation. To answer 
this question, the 58 seaside resorts were classified as either ‘large’ or ‘mid-sized’ based on 
resident population. Using the 2001 census population figures at LSOA level, the ‘large’ resorts 
are those which had a population more than or equal to 40,000; the ‘mid-sized’ resorts are 
defined as those which had a population between 10,000 and 39,999. Employing this population 
threshold revealed that, of the 1,686 resort LSOAs, 1,235 LSOAs corresponded to 25 ‘large’ 
seaside resorts, while the other 451 related to 33 ‘mid-sized’ resorts. After determining the 
population size of the resorts, the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the seven indices 
of deprivation were recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the 
respective Indices of Deprivation databases. Cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses 
against all of the ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resort LSOAs were then undertaken so that their 
association with deprivation may be ascertained. More specifically, chi-square tests were 
conducted to compare the percentages for large/medium resort LSOAs with the percentage of 
the total column across each deprivation quartile. Cross tabulations of deprivation quartiles with 
resort size as a binary variable are given in Appendix Tables A63–70. These results are 
summarised in Table 5.21.  
 
 The results, as shown in Table 5.21, indicate that, although both the large and the 
medium-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, 
the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with ‘large resort LSOAs’ (p = < 
0.001). In 2010, 30.8% resort LSOAs fell within the upper quartile, but for ‘large resort LSOAs’ 
the figure is higher at 33.8% and for ‘medium resort LSOAs’ it is lower at 22.6%. A similar 
pattern is evident not only for both the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 and the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation 2004, but also for each of the seven LSOA-level domains (see Figure 5.4). 
It can be seen from this figure that the medium-sized seaside resorts have lower levels of 
deprivation compared with large seaside resorts as shown by a smaller percentage of LSOAs in 
the most deprived quartile. However, differences in the extent of deprivation across the domains 
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vary in magnitude. The differences between resort size categories are greater for health and 
disability deprivation (15.2%), crime (8.8%), education, training and skills deprivation (8.4%), 
living environment deprivation (8.4%) and employment deprivation (8.2%), while barriers to 
housing and services (3.7%) and income deprivation (2.8%) are less significant in terms of size. 
With regard to the extant literature and the general hypothesis that medium (and small) sized 
resorts were more likely to have higher levels of multiple deprivation, there was weak support 
(although this study did not include seaside destinations with populations below 10,000). This 
study found that, overall, medium-sized seaside resorts are less deprived than their larger 
counterparts. 
 
Table 5.21: P values of the Pearson’s chi-square test – deprivation level by resort size 
 
Deprivation level 
Domain 
 MD AA BA LD   
Sig-level (C.V) 
Overall IMD 
2004 L L M M  0.000 (0.118) 
2007 L M M M  0.000 (0.122) 
2010 L M M M  0.000 (0.120) 
Income 
2004 L M M M  0.012 (0.081) 
2007 L M M M  0.000 (0.110) 
2010 L L M M  0.000 (0.128) 
Employment 
2004 L M L M  0.072 NS 
2007 L M M M  0.090 NS 
2010 L M M M  0.008 (0.084) 
Health and disability 
2004 L M M M  0.000 (0.125) 
2007 L M M M  0.000 (0.147) 
2010 L M M M  0.000 (0.171) 
Living environment 
2004 L M M M  0.008 (0.084) 
2007 L M M M  0.000 (0.123) 
2010 L L M M  0.000 (0.108) 
Barriers to housing and 
services 
2004 L L M M  0.000 (0.148) 
2007 M L L M  0.000 (0.118) 
2010 L L M M  0.000 (0.116) 
Education, skills and 
training 
2004 L M M L  0.002 (0.095) 
2007 L M M L  0.002 (0.002) 
2010 L M M L  0.000 (0.106) 
Crime and disorder 
2004 L L M M  0.000 (0.231) 
2007 L L M M  0.000 (0.279) 
2010 L L M M  0.000 (0.176) 
 
Note: L = ‘large’, M = ‘medium’ resort LSOAs. Cells are shaded blue simply to aid comparison. 
 
           Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 5.4: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution of LSOAs for the ‘medium’ 
sized English seaside resorts, the ‘large’ seaside resorts and England, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Having established that people living in large seaside resorts do generally face higher 
levels of multiple deprivation than those living in medium-sized resorts, it now needs to be 
ascertained whether the nature of multiple deprivation is similar in both large and medium-
sized resorts. As before with the LSOA-level analysis of resorts as a whole, the correlation 
between the Index of Multiple Deprivation rank and the individual domain ranks, this time for 
the 1,235 ‘large resort LSOAs’ and 451 ‘medium resort LSOAs’, was calculated. Table 5.22 
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reports the correlation coefficients between the variables for ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resorts. The 
overall correlation coefficients (i.e., medium-sized and large resorts combined) are also 
presented for comparison and context. As can be seen, the great majority of domains are 
positively correlated to the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation. There is strong positive 
correlation between the multiple deprivation measure and income, employment, health, 
education and crime. The correlation is at least 0.72 for these five deprivation measures in both 
the ‘large’ and the ‘medium’ resorts, which is consistent with resorts as a whole. Living 
environment also has a positive correlation with multiple deprivation. The degree of 
association, however, is not as strong in large resorts compared with medium-sized resorts. 
Perhaps the most striking result to emerge from the data comparison is that the relationship 
between overall deprivation and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. 
Withstanding the latter, these findings suggest that both the ‘large’ and the ‘medium’ seaside 
resorts are experiencing similar types of multiple deprivation and as there are obvious links 
between deprivation types, it also appears that they both are suffering from social exclusion.  
 
Table 5.22: Correlation coefficients (r) between Index of Multiple Deprivation and 
deprivation domains 
       
 Note:  
1. Correlations are significant at the p = <0.01 level (2-tailed). 
2. r = 1.0 equates to identical rankings; -1.0 to perfectly inverted rankings 
 
           Source: Author’s own work 
 
 The remainder of this section gives a summary of changes between the Indices of 
Deprivation 2004 and 2010. The proportion of ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resort LSOAs that fall 
within national quartiles is shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 respectively. As can be seen, the 
Deprivation domain All resorts Large resorts Medium resorts 
Income  0.96 0.96 0.97 
Employment  0.95 0.95 0.95 
Health  0.88 0.88 0.85 
Education 0.78 0.78 0.79 
Crime & Disorder  0.74 0.74 0.72 
Living Environment  0.63 0.59 0.72 
Barriers to Housing/Services  0.24 0.30 0.00 
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differences between the results of the Indices of Deprivation 2010 and 2004 are mostly fairly 
minor. Considering first the Index of Multiple Deprivation, the levels of deprivation were 
broadly similar in both the larger and medium-sized resorts. Since 2004, there has been a slight 
contraction in the proportion of LSOAs classed nationally as above average deprived (i.e., 
quartiles one and two) and a slight expansion in the proportion classed nationally as below 
average deprived (i.e., quartiles three and four). Nonetheless, there remain high levels of 
multiple deprivation, with increases in the proportion of LSOAs populating the upper quartiles 
in both the large and the medium-sized seaside resorts. When inspecting the data for the 
domains, in the larger seaside resorts there were increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the 
most deprived quartiles on five out of the seven domains (health, living environment, income, 
education and housing and services). The crime domain and, to a much lesser extent, 
employment, became more evenly distributed when comparing 2004 with 2007, with a slight 
contraction in the proportion of LSOAs exhibiting a level of deprivation in the upper quartiles. 
The domains which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the upper quartiles in both 2004 
and 2010 were the ‘health deprivation and disability’ domain and the ‘employment deprivation’ 
domain. The latter domain had the greatest proportion of all domains in 2004 (73.4% compared 
with 71.1% for the ‘health deprivation and disability’ domain) whereas the former had the 
greatest proportion of all domains in 2010 (77.5% compared with 72.2% for the ‘employment 
deprivation’ domain).  
 
 Regarding the medium-sized seaside resorts, there were increases in the proportion of 
LSOAs in the most deprived quartiles on all but one of the seven deprivation domains, this 
exception being employment. The domains which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the 
upper quartiles in both 2004 and 2010 were, in order of their prevalence in 2004, ‘employment 
deprivation’, ‘health deprivation and disability’ and ‘income deprivation’. However, income 
deprivation became the more pressing aspect of deprivation in 2010, followed by health and 
employment deprivation. It is important to bear in mind the differences between the results, as 
measured by the percentage change, are minor. Perhaps the most striking observation of the 
data comparison is that crime and the barriers to housing and services domain had 
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overwhelmingly more than 50% of LSOAs in the lower quartiles as a whole in both 2004 and 
2010, although since 2004 there were increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the upper 
quartiles.  
 
 Summarising these findings, it can be said that overall the ‘large’ seaside resorts have 
become relatively more deprived on five of the domains, whereas the ‘medium’ seaside resorts 
have become relatively more deprived on six of the domains. Across most aspects of 
deprivation, the medium-sized seaside resorts were more similar to England than the larger 
seaside resorts. It is clear that the larger seaside resorts have the highest levels of deprivation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution for the large 
English seaside resorts and England, 2004 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
Figure 5.6: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution for the medium-
sized English seaside resorts and England, 2004 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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5.3.3  Deprivation in large and mid-sized seaside resorts 
 
 This section considers in more detail the different dimensions of deprivation in the 25 
larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. It begins by investigating whether 
the levels of multiple deprivation are similar between the resorts. At this stage, in order to gain 
a meaningful insight into differences in deprivation, the ‘large’ and the ‘medium’ resort LSOAs 
are grouped together based on national deprivation quintiles (as opposed to quartiles). However, 
the matter of establishing how deprived the larger and the mid-sized seaside resorts are is only 
one part of the story. It is also important to consider how deprivation manifests itself. Here, the 
variation between the resorts is further explored by calculating the average rank of the LSOAs 
in each seaside resort on the Index of Multiple Deprivation and domains, which provides a basis 
for subsequent analysis to identify the pattern of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts. 
 
 Looking at national deprivation quintiles first of all, this study found that there was no 
consistent pattern of deprivation among the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized 
seaside resorts in 2010 when tested against the Index of Multiple Deprivation, in terms of the 
proportion of LSOAs within each resort falling in the most deprived and the least deprived 20% 
of LSOAs in England. Put another way, there is variation in the levels of multiple deprivation 
in the resorts. Consider Figure 5.7, which shows the 25 larger seaside resorts and their local 
LSOAs split by Index of Multiple Deprivation rank national quintiles. A total of 324 (26.2%) 
‘large resort LSOAs’ fall within the most deprived 20% nationally. However, these LSOAs are 
not distributed evenly. Although all 25 of the larger seaside resorts had an LSOA exhibiting a 
level of multiple deprivation in England’s most deprived 20%, every one of the first 15 resorts 
on the list down as far as Southend-on-Sea had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might 
be expected. Moreover, a number of the 15 resorts had at least a third of their LSOAs being 
‘most deprived’. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that, while the vast majority 
of resorts do not have many areas with very low levels of multiple deprivation, only one resort 
(Clacton-on-Sea) is without an LSOA exhibiting a level of deprivation in the two least deprived 
quintiles. Another interesting observation is that two resorts (i.e., Southend-on-Sea, Crosby) 
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have a broadly equal proportion of LSOAs in each deprivation quintile and represent a mirror 
image of England.  
 
 Figure 5.8 shows that distribution of LSOAs by deprivation quintiles differs greatly 
between mid-sized resorts too. None of the individual 33 mid-sized resorts display a pattern of 
deprivation similar to England as a whole. Considering the upper quintile, a total of 75 (16.6%) 
‘medium resort LSOAs’ fall within the most deprived 20% nationally, but correspond to 22 
(out of 33) resorts, of which every one of the first 10 resorts on the list down as far as Falmouth 
had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. When viewed against the total 
number of seaside resorts in each size category, the larger seaside resorts (15/25) had higher 
levels of multiple deprivation than England, double the proportion of mid-sized seaside resorts 
(10/33). However, when comparing Figure 5.8 with Figure 5.7, it can be seen that the 
geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in three of the mid-sized resorts (Skegness, 
Dover, Heysham) than any of the large resorts. It is necessary to emphasise that five medium-
sized seaside resorts (i.e., West Kirby, Swanage, Sidmouth, Formby, Clevedon) had no LSOAs 
in the two most deprived quintiles. Thus, there are more mid-sized resorts with many areas of 
very low deprivation. Taken together, these results indicate that there is more variation in the 
levels of deprivation in mid-sized seaside resorts.  
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Figure 5.7: Index of Multiple Deprivation quintile distribution for the ‘large’ seaside resorts 
and England, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 5.8: Index of Multiple Deprivation quintile distribution for mid-sized seaside resorts and 
England, 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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 The analysis so far has been based on the quintile distribution of LSOAs for the seaside 
resorts. Inevitably, this approach provides a difficult pattern to interpret. A single measure to 
compare the seaside resorts is required to facilitate further investigation. One way to compare 
the seaside resorts in terms of deprivation is to use the median rank for the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation and then rank the resorts by this measure. Figure 5.9 summarises the range of 
LSOA rankings within each resort. The resorts are ranked from lowest to highest on the basis 
of the median LSOA rank; the median ( ~x ) is the ‘middle’ LSOA with half the LSOAs ranked 
above and below. Ranks range from 1 to 32,482 and the black line running across the centre of 
the diagram indicates the middle of this range – the dividing line between more and less 
deprived LSOAs. Median values below the black line indicate that a resort is more deprived 
than the national average while those above it indicate that a resort is less deprived. It is clear 
there is considerable variation in the overall level of deprivation between resorts. The least 
deprived resort, West Kirby ( ~x  = 25,168), has almost all of its range lying above the national 
average ( ~x = 16,242), while the most deprived resort, Skegness ( ~x = 5,175), has most of its 
range lying below the average. Other resorts fall between these two and the order is interesting 
in its own right. As can be seen, many seaside resorts (24/58, 41.3%) have a wide spread of 
rankings and contain LSOAs in the most and least deprived 20% of areas nationally. Moreover, 
the vast majority of seaside resorts (42/58, 72.4%) have greater overall deprivation than the 
England average (i.e., a ranking below 16,242). Although an equal number of large and mid-
sized resorts fall into this classification, when viewed against the total number of resorts in each 
size category, the larger resorts score worse than mid-sized ones. 63.4 per cent (21/33) of the 
mid-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of deprivation than the England average. The 
corresponding figure for larger seaside resorts is 84 per cent (21/25).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  Large resorts 
  Mid-sized resorts 
  Median LSOA rank (in each resort)  
 
Figure 5.9: Range of LSOA ranks on Index of Multiple Deprivation for seaside resorts, 2010                                                 Source: Author’s own work 
Most 
deprived 
Least 
deprived 
LSOA rankings 
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 The median rank is a better measure than the average (i.e., arithmetic mean) rank which 
can be distorted by extreme values. However, the analysis reported in Figure 5.9 does not take 
account of the difference in population size between LSOAs in each resort. Consequently, it 
only provides indicative data on resort level deprivation. Thus, the average LSOA rank for each 
of the seaside resorts was calculated following the methodology used by the DCLG when 
calculating the ranks for local authorities. The average ranking of each resort is a population-
weighted average of the ranking of each constituent LSOA. The derived rankings for the 58 
seaside resorts by deprivation measure can be seen in Appendix Table A71. As before, a low 
rank indicates higher deprivation; a high rank indicates lower deprivation. There are 32,482 
LSOAs across England as a whole. Accordingly, an average ranking between 1 and 16,242 
indicates that a resort is more deprived than the national average. An average ranking below 
8,120 indicates that a resort is among the most deprived in England. Table 5.23 presents the 
summary statistics for the 58 seaside resorts, 33 mid-sized resorts and 25 large resorts by 
deprivation domain. 
 
Table 5.23: Number and per cent of seaside resorts with above average levels of deprivation 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 However, the intention here is not to evaluate how the resorts fare on the individual 
deprivation domains and relate to England as a whole. Rather, it is to illuminate the variation 
in domain rankings with respect to the overall Index of Deprivation between and within the 
 
Number (and per cent) of resorts 
that have greater deprivation than 
the English average 
Number of resorts that exhibit a 
level of deprivation in the most 
deprived national quartile 
Domain Total 
Large 
resorts 
Medium 
Resorts 
Total Large 
resorts 
Medium 
Resorts 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 41  (71) 21  (84) 20  (61) 2 1 1 
Employment 47  (81) 23  (92) 24  (73) 10 5 5 
Health and disability 46  (79) 23  (92) 23  (70) 8 4 4 
Income 44  (75) 23  (92) 21  (64) 2 1 1 
Education, skills and training 40  (69) 18  (72) 22  (67) 6 3 3 
Living environment 37  (64) 19  (76) 18  (55) 7 2 5 
Crime and disorder 25  (43) 14  (56) 10  (30) 1 1 0 
Barriers to housing and services 25  (43) 12 ( 48) 13  (39) 2 1 1 
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large and mid-sized seaside resorts. In this analysis, the domains within the Indices of 
Deprivation are split into two groups. In the first assessing the income, employment, and 
education, skills and training domains, as these three domains offer a guide to the more 
‘economic’ dimension of exclusion in seaside resorts, and the second analysing the other four 
domains, which relate to the more ‘social’ and ‘neighbourhood’ dimensions of exclusion. This 
decision to divide the seven deprivation domains into the before mentioned groups both for the 
large and the mid-sized resorts reflects a pragmatic approach. As can be seen, there is a wealth 
of data located in Appendix Table A71 that is spread over seven pages. Consequently, when 
considering 58 seaside resorts and the seven deprivation domains against the overall Index of 
Multiple Deprivation at once, it is difficult to assess how deprivation varies between and within 
seaside resorts.   
 
 The radar charts on the following pages show relative resort-level deprivation as 
measured by each of these domains for both the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts within 
England. In the radar charts, each spoke represents one of the resorts. The resorts are ordered 
by Index of Multiple deprivation rank, so that the Index of Multiple Deprivation line appears 
to spiral from the middle (most deprived) outwards (less deprived). If the individual domains 
follow the pattern for Index of Multiple Deprivation, then they too will spiral out. If the rank 
for a domain is inside the spiral then the seaside resort is ranked relatively worse for that domain 
than for overall deprivation, if it is outside the spiral then it is ranked relatively better for that 
domain than for overall deprivation. It is important to remember that the rankings (i.e., rank of 
average LSOA rank) are for the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts and show how the resorts 
in each size category relate to one another and are not representative of how a seaside resort 
relates to England.  
 
 Considering first the 25 large seaside resorts, Blackpool is the most deprived resort on 
the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and Christchurch is the least deprived resort. In terms 
of the ‘economic domains’, Figure 5.10 shows that these three domains of deprivation, whilst 
displaying some variation, were broadly in accordance with the Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
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Thus, resorts with high levels of overall deprivation tend to have high levels of employment, 
income and education, skills and training deprivation, while resorts that are relatively well 
ranked in terms of overall deprivation are generally well ranked across these three domains. 
This finding occurs in stark contrast to the four deprivation domains that are indicative of social 
and neighbourhood exclusion. Consider Figure 5.11, on the left of the figure it is noticeable that 
many larger seaside resorts with relatively good rankings of multiple deprivation have relatively 
poor rankings across the four domains. The right of the chart shows the reverse situation. 
Similar findings were found when the analyses were restricted to the 33 mid-sized seaside 
resorts – the most deprived seaside resort here is Skegness and least deprived is Formby. When 
comparing Figure 5.12 with Figure 5.13, it can be seen that there is more variation in the domain 
rankings pertaining to the social and neighbourhood dimensions of exclusion in mid-sized 
seaside resorts compared to economic aspects of exclusion. In short, these results show that the 
rankings for the domains do not always follow the Index of Multiple Deprivation. It is clear 
from the diagrams that some domains of deprivation affect individual seaside resorts more than 
others. Thus, the evidence indicates that seaside resorts face different types of deprivation and 
hence different needs that might undermine their performance as tourism destinations. 
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Figure 5.10: Ranking of the large seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (economic) domains, 2010               
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 5.11: Ranking of the large seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (social) domains, 2010                    
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 5.12: Ranking of the mid-sized seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (economic) domains, 2010        
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 5.13: Ranking of the mid-sized seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (social) domains, 2010              
Source: Author’s own work
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5.3.4  Summary of resort-level results 
 
 
 Section 5.3 has used a number of analytical techniques and approaches to shed further 
light on the occurrence, character, intensity and distribution of multiple deprivation in English 
seaside resorts. It began by investigating the nature and severity of deprivation within the 58 
seaside resorts that corresponded to the 1,686 ‘resort LSOAs’. This investigation found that the 
vast majority of seaside resorts have at least one LSOA in the upper quartile of most deprived 
LSOAs of England when tested against seven domains of deprivation at LSOA level. In 
addition, a number of seaside resorts were identified as experiencing particular problems of 
multiple deprivation. This outcome was achieved by identifying resorts which had LSOAs in 
the highest deprivation quartile on at least five of the seven LSOA-level domains. In all, 289 
LSOAs fell into this classification and are located within 39 individual resorts scattered around 
England.  
 
 In the second part of the section, attention turned to whether there were true differences 
in deprivation between large and mid-sized seaside resorts. A chi-square analysis was used to 
test the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence 
and level of multiple deprivation. The results of this analysis suggest that, although both the 
large and the mid-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be 
expected, the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with ‘large resort LSOAs’. 
This finding holds true when each domain is looked at separately. However, differences in the 
extent of deprivation across domains were not of a similar magnitude. The differences between 
resorts are greater for health and disability deprivation compared to other aspects of deprivation, 
while barriers to housing and services and income deprivation are much less significant. The 
section then went on to analyse variation in the nature of deprivation within the large and mid-
sized seaside resorts by examining the correspondence of overall multiple deprivation with each 
of the seven specific aspects of deprivation contained within the Indices of Deprivation. The 
results of the correlational analysis indicate that strong positive relationships between variables 
exist in both large and mid-sized resorts, although the relationship between overall deprivation 
and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. Further analysis of the LSOA-
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level indicators of deprivation revealed that, although the overall deprivation pattern for the 
large and the mid-sized seaside resorts was not consistent across all domains, the geographic 
extent of deprivation in both the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts was broadly similar for 
2004 and 2010.    
 
 In the third part of the section, the first set of analyses sought to ascertain whether the 
levels of multiple deprivation were similar between the resorts. Here, the LSOA data for the 25 
large and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts were looked at in quintile groups, to determine how 
the levels of deprivation in seaside resorts are distributed compared with those for England. In 
terms of the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived quintile, the large seaside resorts (15/25) 
had higher levels of multiple deprivation than England, double the proportion of mid-sized 
seaside resorts (10/33). That said the geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in 
three of the mid-sized resorts than any of the large resorts. In addition, there are more mid-sized 
resorts with many areas of very low deprivation. Taken together, these results suggest that there 
is greater variation in the levels of deprivation in mid-sized seaside resorts. The second set of 
analyses sought to illuminate the variation in deprivation levels between and within resorts. 
This objective was achieved by summarising the range of Index of Multiple Deprivation 
national rankings for LSOAs in each resort and calculating the population-weighted average 
rank of deprivation. In terms of the former, 42 of the 58 seaside resorts have greater overall 
deprivation than the England average in 2010. Although this exercise confirms what is already 
known in that the large resorts score worse than mid-sized resorts, it has revealed some 
subtleties with regard to both the order of the resorts and the polarity and variation within 
resorts. The variation between the resorts was further explored by calculating the average rank 
of deprivation, which enabled the resorts to be ranked and a series of radar charts to be 
produced. These charts illustrate that the patterns for the domains differ, particularly the ‘social’ 
and neighbourhood’ aspects of deprivation, with some of the most deprived large and mid-sized 
seaside resorts having relatively low levels of deprivation for these domains. Thus, the rankings 
for the domains do not always follow the Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
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5.4  Summary  
 
A principal objective of the present research was to shed light on the nature, intensity 
and distribution of multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – in English seaside resorts. This 
objective was achieved by using the seaside and non-seaside classification, relevant deprivation 
measures and small area geography. The analysis of data was conducted in three stages. The 
first stage of the work investigated whether local authority districts classified in this study as 
‘seaside with resort’ differ from other district types, or from the general situation in England, 
with regard to a range of measures of deprivation (section 5.1). It was found that, when 
compared with ‘inland’, ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts, ‘seaside with resort’ 
districts are associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation. 
 
Second, a LSOA-level analysis of the 39 local authority districts classified as being 
‘seaside with resort’ was completed in order to establish the extent to which characteristics 
associated with social exclusion occurred within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and 
severity of these characteristics (section 5.2). The study findings reveal that within ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts, those LSOAs that constitute the seaside resorts are where multiple 
deprivation is concentrated. Deprivation in employment, income, health, education, living 
environment and crime are greater problems in resort areas, while deprivation in housing and 
services is less prevalent. Further analysis showed that resort areas that score highly on the 
overall Index of Multiple Deprivation also tend to score highly on all aspects of deprivation 
simultaneously (with the exception of access to housing and services). These findings suggest 
that the majority of seaside resort LSOAs are experiencing similar types and high levels of 
multiple deprivation and as there are obvious links between deprivation types, it also appears 
that majority are suffering from social exclusion. Furthermore, it is clear from the 2004 to 2010 
change analysis that many of the problems of multiple deprivation experienced by those areas 
have persisted.  
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The third and final stage of the work provided an account of how multiple deprivation 
varies between and within seaside resorts (section 5.3). The research found, by calculating the 
average LSOA rank for each resort, that there were higher levels of multiple deprivation in 
2010 than the deprivation measures for England on average. Evidence of a relationship between 
the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation was detected. English 
seaside resorts, albeit of medium or large size, are experiencing similar problems of multiple 
deprivation, but large resorts tend to have significantly higher levels. However, mid-sized 
resorts exhibited a wider range of deprivation levels. Many of the commonly experienced 
deprivation problems are deeply embedded. They have persisted and intensified over the last 
decade. Taken together, the findings summarised here and the detailed insights within the 
chapter add to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts, which once thrived on seaside resort tourism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Resort Socio-economic Performance and Social Exclusion 
 
 
 Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, 
the next objective is to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social 
exclusion. To address this objective, a comparative analysis of the national averages of a set of 
variables selected as measures of area factors and population composition for the 58 seaside 
resorts was undertaken, providing both insight into the socio-economic performance of resorts 
and the differences in performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. The analysis – 
based on the manipulation of available datasets at LSOA and ward level – sought to establish 
whether the variables operate as positive or negative influences and whether they have a large 
or significant effect. This analysis aids the understanding of the causes and consequences of 
exclusion, but it also enhances comprehension of the way in which place- and population-based 
factors might influence social exclusion in English seaside resorts. The results of these analyses 
are set out in Section 6.1. 
 
 Further insight may be gained, and the formulation of remedial policies advanced, by 
investigating the manifestation of social exclusion within local areas. The final objective, 
therefore, is to identify, classify and map deprived areas in England’s seaside resorts. To 
address this objective, the research employed PCA with forty variables selected as measures of 
area factors and population composition in the 399 ‘excluded seaside resort localities’. The 
PCA produced seven components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 which together accounted 
for 78.7 per cent of the total variance. The 399 excluded resort localities by seven components 
matrix of component scores formed the data matrix for an agglomerative hierarchical cluster 
analysis. The cluster analysis suggested that the 399 excluded resort localities can be allocated 
to four clusters. Section 6.2 explores the composition and characteristics of each cluster. This 
section also presents findings on the variation in multiple deprivation between clusters and the 
distribution of excluded resort localities across the country. These analyses were undertaken to 
reveal the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes.   
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6.1 Assessment of the socio-economic structure and ‘health’ of resorts 
 
Within this section, analysis is undertaken for the 58 seaside resorts in England split 
between the 25 most deprived resorts and 33 less deprived resorts. The most deprived resorts 
had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, in terms of the proportion of 
LSOAs falling within the most deprived national quintile (for details, see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). 
The aim of the analysis is to determine how the socio-economic performance of seaside resorts 
differs from that of England as a whole and provide an assessment of whether there are “true” 
differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. In 
order to assess performance, measures of population composition and measures of area factors 
were used (for details, see Tables 4.8 and 4.9). 
 
6.1.1 Measures of population composition and dynamics 
 
 Table 6.1 presents a comparative analysis of the resorts’ position within England in 
terms of the incidence of the twenty-six indicators related to population composition. For five 
of these indicators, seaside resorts record lower scores compared to England as whole. The 
indicators include residents aged 0-15, residents of working age, single-parent households, and 
educated professionals, with the latter being measured by the percentage of residents with a 
degree qualification or above and who are employed as managers, professionals or para-
professionals. With the exception of the latter two measures, which were respectively 5.1 and 
4.1 percentage points below the national average, no difference greater than 4.0 was observed. 
Likewise, in terms of the twenty-one indicators on which seaside resorts record higher scores, 
the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the English average is not 
particularly large. The indicators that showed the largest difference were low education (+7.2), 
white ethnic composition (+6.5), pensionable-age residents (+4.9) and one-person households 
above pensionable age (+4.1). Thus, for the most part, across seaside resorts as a whole, the 
mean values for measures of population composition are not fundamentally different to the 
English average.  
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Unrelated t-tests were used to explore the composition of the deprived and less deprived 
resorts in terms of the variables in Table 6.1. A t-test allows the mean for each group to be 
compared to the mean for all 58 seaside resorts. Where the differences between these two means 
are statistically significant, this result tells that a variable is more important (in either a positive 
or negative way) to the group than the 58 seaside resorts as a whole. Full results of the t-tests 
performed are available in Appendix Table B1. These results are summarised in Table 6.2, 
which indicates whether the population composition variables operate as resort advantages or 
disadvantages and whether they have a large or significant effect. By evaluating the number of 
significant differences and magnitude of each difference, it is possible to identify the factors 
that influence multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – in seaside resorts.  
 
Table 6.2 shows that effect sizes were significant for all but two of the twenty-six 
variables (p = less than 0.05). No significant differences were found between the deprived and 
less deprived resorts in terms of ethnic composition and one person households. Regarding the 
twenty-four variables that had statistically significant effect sizes, eighteen variables record 
effect sizes that are meaningful on a practical level (i.e., Cohen’s d = more than 0.5). Effects on 
all eighteen variables were moderate, with deprived resorts having a higher than average score 
on sixteen variables. It was found that, in terms of employment, skills and qualifications, 
deprived seaside resorts have an above-average proportion of people employed in routine and 
low skill occupations (53.4%) and consequently a below-average proportion of professional 
and managerial workers (46.6%). Commensurately, the deprived seaside resorts have, on 
average, a higher proportion of persons with no qualifications (32.9%) and a lower proportion 
with a degree or higher (14.0%). Regarding worklessness/benefit dependency across deprived 
seaside resorts as a whole, the share of working age adults claiming the four main benefits for 
the non-employed (i.e., Jobseeker’s Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Income 
Support paid to lone parents, and Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disablement Allowance) is above 
average (18.0%). Incapacity claimants are the largest group of non-employed working age 
claimants. As far as health is concerned, there are more resort residents than the average who 
receive state-funded welfare because of ill-health or disability problems (IB/SDA, 8%; 
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DLA/AA, 6.7%; ESA, 2.8%). Claimant unemployment in deprived seaside resorts is also above 
average (JSA 4.7%), including long-term unemployment (>6 months, 1.8%; >12 months, 0.9%) 
and youth unemployment (1.3%). Regarding economic security, deprived seaside resorts have 
higher than average claimant rates in terms of the three main benefits for the economically 
disadvantaged (i.e., Child Tax-Credit paid to out-of-work families, 24.7%; Income Support paid 
to people who have low incomes and are not required to be available for employment, 7.6%; 
Guarantee Credit paid to pensioners living on low incomes, 11.5%). With respect to households 
within deprived seaside resorts, while the proportion of lone parent households is slightly above 
the average (10.2%), the proportion of children living in lone parent families is greater (32.7%). 
There is also an above-average incidence of households without access to a car or van. (33.3%). 
 
Thus, the deprived resorts are differentiated from the less deprived resorts by sixteen 
measures of population composition (p = less than 0.05; d = more than 0.5). In general, the 
deprived resorts are characterised by problems in terms of: unemployment and disadvantaged 
occupational characteristics; lack of qualifications; poor health; poverty and lack of access to 
material resources; and, family breakdown. However, in relation to the sixteen differentiating 
variables, it is valuable to identify the extent to which the deprived resorts differ from the 
national average, in order to provide further insight into the incidence of each problem. This 
analysis revealed that six of the sixteen differentiating variables recorded a difference greater 
than 4.0. The variables identified include: no qualifications (+9.9); routine and low skill 
occupations (+7.1); lack of car/van (+6.5); out-of-work benefits (+5.5); children in lone parent 
families (+4.8); and, children in out-of-work families (+4.1). It may be the case therefore that 
these facets of population composition have more of a determining influence on social 
exclusion in seaside resorts.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 6.1: Comparative analysis of mean values for selected population composition variables 
 
 England English seaside resorts 
n = 58 
Most deprived resorts 
n = 25 
Less deprived resorts 
   n = 33 
Variable Mean Mean Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
Average age, 2001 38.6 41.6 5.8 40.5 5.2 42.9 6.2 
Children, 2010 18.7 17.1 4.8 17.9 4.8 16.1 4.6 
Working age, 2010 61.8 58.3 8.8 59.6 7.3 56.8 10.1 
Pensioners, 2010 19.5 24.4 10.0 22.5 8.9 26.6 10.7 
Retired, 2001 13.5 16.6 6.7 15.4 5.7 17.9 7.4 
White, 2001 90.9 97.4 2.5 97.4 2.7 97.5 2.4 
One person household, 2001 30.1 34.1 7.9 34.4 7.7 33.8 8.2 
One person household pensionable age, 2001 14.4 18.5 4.3 17.7 3.7 19.4 4.9 
One person household lone parent, 2001 9.5 9.3 3.2 10.2 3.4 8.3 2.7 
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010 27.9 29.8 11.2 32.7 11.2 26.5 10.2 
IB/SDA claimants, 2010 5.2 7.1 4.0 8.0 4.4 6.2 3.3 
ESA claimants, 2010 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.8 1.7 2.1 1.2 
DLA/AA claimants, 2010 5.0 6.1 2.7 6.7 2.9 5.3 2.3 
No qualification, 2001 23.0 30.2 9.3 32.9 9.8 27.1 7.7 
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001 21.2 16.1 8.9 14.0 8.8 18.6 8.2 
In managerial occupation, 2001 53.7 49.7 12.6 46.6 12.5 53.3 11.7 
In manual occupation, 2001 46.3 50.3 12.6 53.4 12.5 46.7 11.7 
Out-of-work benefits claimants, 2010 12.5 15.5 8.8 18.0 9.7 12.7 6.7 
JSA claimants, 2010 3.6 4.0 2.7 4.7 3.1 3.1 1.8 
JSA 6 months, 2010 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.9 
JSA 12 months, 2010 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 
JSA Youth, 2010 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.6 
Children in workless families, 2010 20.8 21.1 12.2 24.7 13.3 17.1 9.4 
Income Support claimants, 2010 4.8 6.4 4.6 7.6 5.1 5.0 3.4 
Pension Credit claimants, 2010 8.0 10.0 7.0 11.5 7.5 8.2 6.0 
Have no car or van, 2001 26.8 29.9 13.4 33.3 14.1 25.9 11.3 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 6.2: Factors of population composition influencing deprivation in seaside resorts  
 
Factor 
Resort advantage 
or disadvantage? 
 
Size of effect Significant? 
 
Average age, 2001 Advantage Small Yes 
Children, 2010 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Working age, 2010 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Pensioners, 2010 Advantage Small Yes 
Retired, 2001 Advantage Small Yes 
White, 2001 Advantage Very small No 
One person household, 2001 Disadvantage Very small No 
One person household above pensionable age, 2001 Advantage Small Yes 
One person household lone parent, 2001 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
IB/SDA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
ESA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
DLA/AA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
No qualification, 2001 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001 Advantage Medium Yes 
In managerial occupation, 2001 Advantage Medium Yes 
In manual occupation, 2001 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Out-of-work benefits claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
JSA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
JSA 6 months, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
JSA 12 months, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
JSA Youth, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Children in workless families, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Income Support claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Pension Credit claimants, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Have no car or van, 2001 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
 
Note: In this table as well as in Table 6.5:  
 
- Where a variable is labelled an advantage, it indicates that the less deprived resorts have, on average, 
higher scores on this variable than the 58 resorts as a whole.  
 
- Where a variable is labelled a disadvantage, it indicates that the deprived resorts have, on average, 
higher scores on this variable than the 58 resorts as a whole. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 Another facet of population composition is that of migration. To assess how the 25 
deprived seaside resorts as a whole fare in terms of migration exchanges with the rest of the 
UK, Census 2001 data at the ward level was used. The data were aggregated to produce absolute 
flow values, from which rates were calculated. The analyses of data begin by focusing on all 
people and then examining the patterns by age. The figures, as shown in Table 6.3, are restricted 
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to people moving from known origins within the UK, thus excluding people who had been 
living outside the UK one year before the census and also those who ticked the box on the 
census form indicating that they had no usual address then.  
 
 It can be seen from the data in Table 6.3 that, in the 12 months before the census, the 25 
deprived seaside resorts combined recorded inflows from the rest of the UK totalling just over 
140,000 people and outflows totalling nearly 132,000. As a result, deprived seaside resorts 
recorded an overall net gain of almost 9,000 from the rest of the UK. In terms of their total 
number of residents, the latter is equivalent to a gain of 0.62% in this one year (that is, an 
enlargement of 6.2% if this pattern was repeated across a full decade). Another way of 
portraying this pattern is to say that there were nearly eleven people moving to these 25 resorts 
for every ten people leaving them, as shown by the in/out ratio of 1.06. Further analysis showed 
that deprived seaside resorts have a lower net flow rate than England (0.72), all 58 English 
seaside resorts (0.79) and the 33 less deprived resorts combined (0.99). Therefore, in 
comparison to less deprived resorts, the gains that have been made in deprived resorts have 
been relatively marginal. However, these net migration figures disguise the size of the gross 
flows from which they result. When compared with less deprived resorts, deprived seaside 
resorts had the largest in and out flows, not only in absolute terms but also in relation to the 
resident population. Thus, the most striking result to emerge from the data is that there are 
substantial flows of migrants into and out of the deprived resorts and that, by comparison, net 
flow is small.  
 
 Table 6.3 also provides the same measures by age, based on groups that represent life 
stages associated with particular migration behaviour. In relation to the 58 seaside resorts 
combined and the 25 deprived resorts and the 33 less deprived resorts, all age groups recorded 
a net inflow. Furthermore, the net gains tend to come from the age groups 45 and over. This in-
migration of the pre-retired and the retired will come as no surprise. Indeed, this pattern would 
appear to mirror the pattern of in-migration revealed by Beatty and Fothergill (2004). Further 
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analysis, however, of net in-migration to deprived and less deprived resorts, detected some 
subtle differences. It was found that: 
 
 The under-16s account for 15% of migrants in seaside resorts, but for deprived resorts the 
figure is higher at 16% and for less deprived resorts it is lower at 14%. 
 
 Those aged 16-29 and 30-44 account for 36% of migrants in seaside resorts, but for deprived 
resorts the figure is higher at 38% and for less deprived resorts it is lower at 35%.  
 
 Those aged 45-59 and 60+ account for 49% of migrants in seaside resorts, though this figure 
is higher in the less deprived resorts at 51% and lower in deprived resorts at 46%. 
 
 
 So, the net in-migration to seaside resorts, including both deprived and less deprived 
resorts, is especially strong among those aged 45+. However, the less deprived resorts were 
found to have a proportionally greater number of migrants aged 45+ than the 58 seaside resorts 
as a whole. In contrast, the deprived resorts have higher proportions of their migrant population 
aged up to 15 and aged 16-44 than the 58 seaside resorts as a whole. These migrants will add 
to the working age population. The 16-44 year old age group is also the main child bearing age 
group and therefore it is also likely that the net increase of 0‐15 year olds is linked to the net 
increase of 16‐44 year olds. Although these differences appear relatively small, the cumulative 
effect over several years could help explain deprivation levels in seaside resorts. Indeed, 
although the inflow of older people creates and perpetuates a relatively old age distribution, this 
in-migration is important as many are drawn from more affluent groups (Shaw and Coles, 2007) 
and can fuel economic development. Thus, the inflow to resorts of children and young adults 
may exacerbate deprivation levels. In considering this analysis, it is worth re-iterating that, 
while above-average proportions of young and working-age residents operate as resort 
disadvantages (and an above-average proportion of persons of pensionable age a resort 
advantage), the effect of the population age structure on deprivation is small (p = less than 
0.05).  
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Table 6.3: Migration, total and by age (2000-01) 
 
Migration for England 
 
Measure 0-15 16-29 30-44 45-59 60+ All ages 
Residents 9,901,581  8,630,216  11,127,511  9,279,693  10,199,830  49,138,831  
Inflows 69,687  225,235  112,304  33,720  15,943  456,889  
Outflows 16,439  40,548  23,715  11,549  8,519  100,770  
Net flow 53,248  184,687  88,589  22,171  7,424  356,119  
Inflow rate 0.70 2.61 1.01 0.36 0.16 0.93 
Outflow rate 0.17 0.47 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.21 
Net flow rate 0.54 2.14 0.80 0.24 0.07 0.72 
In/out ratio 4.24 5.55 4.74 2.92 1.87 4.53 
 
Migration for 58 seaside resorts combined 
 
Measure 0-15 16-29 30-44 45-59 60+ All ages 
Residents 469,881   405,243  524,419  476,956  668,937  2,545,436  
Inflows  47,184    93,066   58,761   29,639  31,116  259,766  
Outflows   44,233    89,393          55,085    25,243  25,699  239,653  
Net flow    2,951     3,673      3,676    4,396       5,417  20,113  
Inflow rate 10.04 22.97 11.20 6.21 4.65 10.21 
Outflow rate 9.41 22.06 10.50 5.29 3.84 9.42 
Net flow rate 0.63 0.91 0.70 0.92 0.81 0.79 
In/out ratio 1.07       1.04              1.07        1.17      1.21  1.08 
 
Migration for 25 most deprived resorts combined 
 
Measure 0-15 16-29 30-44 45-59 60+ All ages 
Residents 265,287  222,994  288,141  256,275  335,430  1,368,127  
Inflows 27,884   49,601  31,976  15,833  15,090  140,384  
Outflows  26,508  47,667  30,663   14,080  12,972  131,890  
Net flow 1,376  1,934   1,313      1,753    2,118  8,494  
Inflow rate 10.51 22.24 11.10 6.18 4.50 10.26 
Outflow rate 9.99 21.38 10.64 5.49 3.87 9.64 
Net flow rate 0.52 0.87 0.46 0.68 0.63 0.62 
In/out ratio 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.12 1.16 1.06 
 
Migration for 33 less deprived resorts combined 
 
Measure 0-15 16-29 30-44 45-59 60+ All ages 
Residents 204,594  182,249     236,278  220,681  333,507  1,177,309  
Inflows  19,300      43,465    26,785     13,806       16,026     119,382  
Outflows   17,725    41,726      24,422        11,163       12,727     107,763  
Net flow      1,575      1,739        2,363     2,643        3,299    11,619  
Inflow rate 9.43 23.85 11.34 6.26 4.81 10.14 
Outflow rate 8.66 22.90 10.34 5.06 3.82 9.15 
Net flow rate 0.77 0.95 1.00 1.20 0.99 0.99 
In/out ratio 1.09 1.04 1.10 1.24 1.26 1.11 
 
Note: Rate is the flow count as % of number of residents at the 2001 Census. In/out ratio is calculated by 
dividing the inflows by the outflows. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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6.1.2 Measures of area factors 
 
 
 The analysis presented so far has highlighted a number of detailed insights, particularly 
in relation to the characteristics of population composition within deprived English seaside 
resorts.  In order to provide further insight into the circumstances of these resorts, the deprived 
and less deprived were compared to each other in terms of the incidence of the twenty-three 
indicators related to area condition. Table 6.4 provides the means for each of the variables 
included in the analysis. Comparing the average data across 58 seaside resorts with the averages 
for England showed that: 
 
 In terms of economic performance, the employment rate among 16 to 64 year olds in seaside 
resorts was 68.1%, compared to 74.1% for England. The share of employed residents who 
are self-employed is relatively similar in seaside resorts (8.9%) and England overall (8.3%). 
However, residents of seaside resorts are more likely to work part-time (42.3%) than 
residents of England (32.0%). Those in employment are engaged predominantly in tertiary 
industries (87.4%). Principal sources of employment are in ‘public administration, 
education and health’ (38.7% versus 28.2% in England) and in ‘accommodation, 
distribution and catering’ (25.8% versus 22.9% in England). Not surprisingly, jobs in 
tourism are over-represented in seaside resorts (12.2% versus 7.9% in England). Thus, the 
economic fortunes of residents are strongly linked to a few major service industries. 
Differences in income, as distinct from earnings or overall wealth (which is difficult to 
measure at resort level in the absence of small area level data), are a useful indicator of 
economic wellbeing. The average annually incomes of seaside resort households are 
markedly below the English average (£26,540 compared to £31,280). 
 
 In terms of built environment, the housing stock is predominantly owner occupied (71.0% 
versus 68.7% in England). Levels of privately rented accommodation are also above 
average (15.9% versus 12.0% in England), with only 13.1% rented from the local authority 
(versus 19.3% in England). Household overcrowding rates correspond to the English 
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average. However, the incidence of housing lacking basic facilities and of empty 
households are both above the average. House price values can be seen as picking up on the 
condition of the built environment and place attractiveness. In seaside resorts, mean house 
prices were £187,330 compared to £239,642 in England. Another measure of how attractive 
an area is to live in is the crime rate. Specifically, crime rates are a measure of community 
safety and reflect economic circumstances. In terms of the number of crimes recorded as a 
proportion per 1,000 population, seaside resorts as a whole have a higher-than-average 
crime rate (152 versus 146 in England). 
 
 Overall, the data illustrate that there are differences between the average conditions of 
areas in seaside resorts and areas in the rest of England. However, as with the measures of 
population composition, the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the 
English average is not always large. Of the twenty-three measures of area factors, just under 
half (n = 10) recorded a difference value greater than 4.0. In general, seaside resorts are 
markedly different in terms of: house price values (-21.8%); household incomes (-15.2%); 
public sector employment (+10.6%); part time/full time employment (+/-10.5%); social rented 
housing (-6.2%); employed persons (-6.1%); crime (+6.0%); tourism-related jobs (+4.3%); and, 
private rented housing (+4.1%). However, this general picture does not reflect the significant 
differences between the deprived and less deprived resorts. An analysis of the significant 
variables and the individual means for each group provides insights into the differences. 
 
 Thus, comparisons between the two groups were made using unrelated t-tests. Full 
results of the t-tests performed are available in Appendix Table B2. These results are 
summarised in Table 6.5, which indicates whether the area factors tend to operate as resort 
advantages or disadvantages and whether they have a large or significant effect on the 
relationship with deprivation level. Fifteen of the twenty-three variables were found to have a 
significant effect (p = less than 0.05). For the most part, no significant differences were found 
between the deprived and less deprived resorts in terms of diversity in the economy and 
structure of employment. The exception to this generalisation was the rate of public sector 
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employment. However, although deprived seaside resorts had significantly higher levels of 
public sector employment compared to less deprived resorts, the effect size was small.  
 
 In relation to the fifteen differentiating variables, mean effect sizes were very small to 
large. Effect sizes were significant but higher (i.e., d = more than 0.5) for seven variables. 
Compared to the seaside resort average, deprived seaside resorts have a lower-than-average 
employment rate (59.2%), a higher-than-average part-time employment rate (42.9%) and 
consequently a lower-than-average full-time employment rate (57.0%). Not surprisingly, 
average household incomes are below the average (£24,930). Apart from these variables, the 
deprived resorts are also differentiated from less deprived resorts in terms of having below-
average house price values (£162,626), an above-average crime rate (181 crimes per 1,000 
population) and above-average proportion of empty homes (4.3%). Excepting the latter, the 
indicators show marked differences when compared with the average for England: average 
house prices (-32.1%); crime rate (+24.0%); average household income (-23.0%); employment 
rate (-14.9%); full-time employment rate (-11.1%); part-time employment rate (+10.9%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 6.4: Comparative analysis of mean values for selected area condition variables 
 
 England English seaside resorts 
n = 58 
Most deprived resorts 
n = 25 
Less deprived resorts 
   n = 33 
Variable Mean Mean Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
Emp. in primary industries, 2010 1.8 0.9 4.1 0.9 4.2 0.9 4.1 
Emp. in secondary industries, 2010 13.1 11.7 14.4 11.2 14.3 12.3 14.5 
Emp. in tertiary industries, 2010 85.1 87.4 15.1 88.0 15.0 86.8 15.1 
Emp. in public sector, 2010 28.2 38.7 28.1 40.6 29.0 35.2 27.0 
Emp. in hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010 22.9 25.8 20.4 25.7 20.9 25.9 19.9 
Employment in tourism-related jobs, 2010 7.9 12.2 15.4 12.0 15.2 12.5 15.6 
LQ for public sector, 2010 1.0 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.2 1.2 0.2 
LQ for hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010 1.0 1.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.4 0.3 
LQ for tourism, 2010 1.0 1.9 0.9 1.6 0.8 2.0 1.0 
Employment rate, 2001 74.1 68.1 11.2 59.2 9.4 71.2 10.1 
Full-time, 2010 68.1 57.6 12.8 57.0 13.0 58.4 12.4 
Part-time, 2010 32.0 42.3 12.7 42.9 12.9 41.6 12.4 
Self-employed, 2001 8.3 8.9 3.2 8.5 3.5 9.5 2.7 
Household income, 2010 31,280 26,540 6,884 24,930 6,473 28,383 6,882 
House prices, 2010 239,642 187,330 60,717 162,626 52,686 217,780 56,059 
Owner-occupied housing, 2001 68.7 71.0 18.5 67.8 19.6 74.7 16.3 
Social rented housing, 2001 19.3 13.1 16.0 15.5 18.2 10.4 12.5 
Private rented housing, 2001 12.0 15.9 12.4 16.7 12.9 14.8 11.8 
Overcrowded households, 2001 7.1 6.9 5.7 7.3 5.6 6.6 5.8 
Households without central heating, 2001 8.5 10.7 7.9 11.7 8.8 9.5 6.6 
Households lacking bath, shower or toilet, 2001 0.5 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.6 1.4 
Vacant dwellings, 2001 3.4 3.7 2.0 4.3 2.2 3.0 1.4 
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010 146 152 133 181 152 115 92 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 6.5: Factors of area condition influencing deprivation in seaside resorts 
 
Factor 
Resort advantage 
or disadvantage? 
 
Size of effect Significant? 
 
Emp. in primary industries, 2010 Advantage Very small No 
Emp. in secondary industries, 2010 Advantage Very small No 
Emp. in tertiary industries, 2010 Disadvantage Very small No 
Emp. in public sector, 2010 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Emp. in hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010 Advantage Very small No 
Emp. in tourism-related jobs, 2010 Advantage Very small No 
LQ for public sector, 2010 Disadvantage Small No 
LQ for hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010 Advantage Small No 
LQ for tourism, 2010 Advantage Small No 
Employment rate, 2010 Disadvantage Large Yes 
Full-time, 2010 Advantage Medium Yes 
Part-time, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Self-employed, 2001 Advantage Small Yes 
Household income, 2010 Advantage Medium Yes 
House prices, 2010 Advantage Large Yes 
Owner-occupied housing, 2001 Advantage Small Yes 
Social rented housing, 2001 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Private rented housing, 2001 Disadvantage Very small Yes 
Overcrowded households, 2001 Disadvantage Very small Yes 
Households without central heating, 2001 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Households lacking bath, shower or toilet, 2001 Disadvantage Small Yes 
Vacant dwellings, 2001 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010 Disadvantage Medium Yes 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
6.1.3 Summary of people and place effects 
 
 The outcome of the statistical analyses depicted in Tables 6.2 and 6.5 affords a clear 
indication of the socio-economic differences between deprived and less deprived seaside resorts 
in England. Evaluating the number of significant differences and magnitude of each difference 
enabled the factors influencing area-based deprivation to be identified. While two out of twenty-
six (8%) population composition variables recorded an observed significance value above 0.05, 
eight of the twenty-three (35%) area condition variables fell into this category. Thus, twenty-
four measures of population composition and fifteen indicators related to area condition 
differentiate the deprived and less deprived resorts. While seven out of fifteen (47%) area 
condition variables recorded an observed effect size above 0.50, eighteen out of the twenty-four 
(75%) population composition variables fell into this category. Thus, a proportionally greater 
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number of population composition variables recorded an observed effect size above 0.50. But 
two measures of area factors (employment rate, house price values) were found to have the 
largest effect sizes. Furthermore, when viewed against the English average, the deprived resorts 
registered markedly worse scores on a greater number of indicators related to area condition.  
Nonetheless, the evidence based on a statistical analysis of mean values for selected variables 
in deprived and less deprived resorts is pointing towards the relative significance of 
compositional effects (i.e., the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
population that compose the resort) in reinforcing the problems of these urban areas. However, 
further insight into the causes and consequences of social exclusion within seaside resorts can 
be obtained by means of multivariate analytical techniques. In this respect, cluster analysis was 
applied to the data for those resort localities (n = 399) previously identified in the study as 
experiencing acute levels of multiple deprivation. The statistical results of a four-cluster 
solution are presented in Section 6.2. 
 
6.2 Social exclusion at the intra-resort level – analysis of clusters 
 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-tests were used to explore the composition 
of each cluster in terms of the seven components identified in the PCA. ANOVA is a statistical 
procedure which compares different sources of variance within a dataset. The purpose of the 
comparison is to determine if significant differences exist between three or more groups. In 
SPSS, the one-way ANOVA output consists of three major parts – Descriptives, ANOVA and 
Multiple Comparisons. The table of means is the most helpful part of the output, because it 
provides a description of the LSOAs in each individual cluster, in terms of their average score 
and standard deviation on each of the seven dimensions in the data. Moreover, it allows the 
mean for each cluster to be compared to the mean for all 399 excluded localities. Table 6.6 
provides the means for each of the principal components included in the analysis across each 
of the four clusters. Where a component is labelled positive for a cluster, it indicates that the 
LSOAs in the cluster have, on average, higher scores on this component than the excluded 
localities as a whole. Where a component is labelled negative for a cluster, it indicates that the 
LSOAs in the cluster have, on average, lower scores on this component than the excluded 
localities as a whole.  
  
 
 
Table 6.6: Overview of clusters – cluster means and standard deviations for principal components 
 
Variable High score on this component means: Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Component 
1 
 
 
 High proportion of persons with no qualifications and consequently a lower proportion with a 
degree or higher. 
 High proportion of jobs held in manual occupations and consequently a lower proportion in 
professional/managerial and other white collar occupations 
 Lower than average household income 
 High proportion of children in out-of-work families 
 High proportion of white ethnic groups 
 High proportion of social rented housing 
 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.3633 
(σ) 0.9753 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.0341 
(σ) 0.8033 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.0216 
(σ) 1.1399 
Negative 
(x̄) -1.4584 
(σ) 1.2044 
Component 
2 
 
 
 High level of Jobseekers Allowance claimants 
 High level of youth unemployment  
 High level of long-term unemployment 
 High proportion of car-less households 
 High proportion of household spaces vacant 
 
Positive 
(x̄) 1.2280 
(σ) 0.9153 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.3202 
(σ) 0.7053 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.3123 
(σ) 0.8081 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.6457 
(σ) 0.4673 
Component 
3 
 
 
 High proportion claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Disability Living Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Employment and Support Allowance 
 High proportion claiming Income Support 
 High proportion of older people claiming Pension Credit 
 High proportion of children in out-of-work families 
 High proportion of children in lone parent families 
 Low proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.2249 
(σ) 0.8941 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.1047 
(σ) 0.9576 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.0004 
(σ) 1.1337 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.2090 
(σ) 1.3415 
Component 
4 
 
 
 High proportion of persons of working age 
 Low proportion of persons of pensionable age, but many older people that are resident claim 
Pension Credit 
 Low average age 
 Low proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions 
 High proportion of car-less households 
 High proportion of population non-white 
 
 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.2825 
(σ) 0.7232 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.1466 
(σ) 0.5524 
Negative 
(x̄) -1.1404 
(σ) 1.4036 
Positive 
(x̄) 2.1307 
(σ) 0.6693 
  
 
 
Component 
5 
 
 Low proportion of persons of young age 
 High proportion of persons of pensionable age 
 High average age 
 High proportion of single-person households 
 High proportion of single-person households with occupants above pensionable age. 
 Low proportion of lone parent households with dependent children  
 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.4810 
(σ) 0.7985 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.3916 
(σ) 0.8279 
Positive 
(x̄) 1.0640 
(σ) 1.2091 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.3416 
(σ) 0.6478 
Component 
6 
 High level of self-employment 
 High proportion of jobs held in professional/managerial occupations 
 High proportion of tourism-related jobs 
 High proportion of private rented housing 
 High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions 
 High proportion of households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet 
 High levels of burglary, theft, criminal damage and violence 
 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.1140 
(σ) 0.9775 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.2741 
(σ) 0.5438 
Positive 
(x̄) 1.49855 
(σ) 1.5661 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.5633 
(σ) 0.9828 
Component 
7 
 
 
 High proportion of owner-occupied housing 
 High proportion of private rented accommodation and consequently a lower proportion social 
rented housing 
 High proportion of households without central heating  
 
Negative  
(x̄) -0.0274 
(σ) 1.0381 
Positive 
(x̄) 0.0832 
(σ) 1.0101 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.0715 
(σ) 0.7151 
Negative 
(x̄) -0.5515 
(σ) 1.0123 
 Number of LSOAs 
% of LSOAs 
88  
(22%) 
243  
(61%) 
41  
(10%) 
27 
(7%) 
 
Note:  
Positive mean values are shaded yellow simply to aid comparison.  
Due to standardisation, the overall mean is 0. 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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 The differences between the means of the clusters for each component in Table 6.6 are 
explored in Appendix Table B3, which offers F values and significance levels to show whether 
any of these mean differences are significant. The ‘between groups’ means are all significant 
(p = less than 0.05), indicating each of the seven components distinguish between the four 
clusters. However, the results from the one-way ANOVA do not indicate which of the four 
clusters differ from one another. So, to determine specifically which clusters are different from 
each other, post-hoc tests were performed. Full results of all multiple comparisons using 
Tukey’s post-hoc test are available in Appendix Table B4. This table lists homogeneous subsets 
(i.e., clusters that did not differ using p = less than 0.05). Thus, within each subgroup the 
difference in means is statistically insignificant. The results of the post-hoc comparisons 
indicate that: 
 
 On component 1 (i.e., white, working-class social housing neighbourhoods with 
disadvantages), cluster 4 is significantly different from all other clusters as it does not 
appear in a subset together with any of the clusters. Specifically, cluster 4 LSOAs score 
significantly lower than LSOAs in clusters 1, 2, and 3. 
 
 On component 2 (i.e., limited access to employment opportunities), cluster 1 is 
significantly different from all other clusters as it does not appear in a subset together with 
any of the clusters. Specifically, cluster 1 LSOAs score significantly higher than LSOAs in 
clusters 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 On component 3 (i.e., high levels of benefit claimants, much poor health), all four clusters 
appear in the same subset or group. Thus, the post-hoc Tukey test determined that there was 
not a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of the four clusters.  
 
 On component 4 (i.e., prime age demographic), because all four clusters differ 
significantly, there are four such subsets or groups, containing the cluster 3 (lowest), cluster 
2 (low-mid), cluster 1 (mid-high) and cluster 4 (highest) LSOAs respectively. 
 
 On component 5 (i.e., older demographic profile), there are three subsets, containing 
cluster 2 (lowest), clusters 1 and 4 (mid-high) and cluster 3 (highest) LSOAs respectively. 
The mean of cluster 1 is not significantly different from the mean of cluster 4. 
 
 On component 6 (i.e., professionals, tourism jobs, private renters and poor housing 
conditions), there are three subsets. Clusters 1 and 2 do not differ significantly from one 
another, but score significantly lower than clusters 3 and 4. The mean for cluster 3 is 
significantly higher than the mean for cluster 4. 
 
 On component 7 (i.e., mixed private housing neighbourhoods with high levels of home 
ownership), there are two subsets. The mean for cluster 4 is significantly lower than the 
means for the other three clusters, which do not differ significantly from one another.  
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 Table 6.7 provides an overview of the main differentiating components. The columns 
of Table 6.7 reflect the results obtained from the ANOVA where components that differentiate 
one cluster from others are presented, as well as components that, while not strongly 
differentiating a particular cluster, are important in understanding the overall differences. It is 
clear from this table that component 4 (i.e., prime age demographic) is important in determining 
the composition of all four clusters. Clusters 1 and 4 contain localities which scored highly 
against this measure, compared to the excluded resort LSOAs as a whole. In contrast, having a 
lower than average score on this measure helped determine which localities were in clusters 2 
and 3. However, the majority of components are only important in determining the composition 
of one or two of the clusters. The most striking result to emerge from the data comparison 
relates to component 3 (i.e., high levels of benefit claimants, much poor health). This 
component is not important in determining which localities are in a cluster.  
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Table 6.7: Matrix of outcomes, individual components, four clusters 
 
 Differentiating components Important components 
Cluster 1 Component 2 (+) 
Component 4 (+) 
Component 1 (+) 
Component 3 (–) 
Component 5 (+) 
Component 6 (–) 
Component 7 (–) 
 
Cluster 2 Component 4 (–) 
Component 5 (–) 
 
Component 1 (+) 
Component 2 (–) 
Component 3 (+) 
Component 6 (–) 
Component 7 (+) 
 
Cluster 3 Component 4 (–) 
Component 5 (+) 
Component 6 (+) 
Component 1 (–) 
Component 2 (–) 
Component 3 (–) 
Component 7 (–) 
 
Cluster 4 Component 1 (–) 
Component 4 (+) 
Component 6 (+) 
Component 7 (–) 
 
Component 2 (–) 
Component 3 (–) 
Component 5 (+) 
 
 
  (+) 
(–) 
 
Mean values for components above average 
Mean values for components below average 
 
 
          Source: Author’s own work 
 
 The significant differences between the components for the clusters suggest the ways in 
which the clusters differ or on which classifying variables they are essentially based. To further 
assess the distinctiveness of the clusters, one-way ANOVA F-statistics were also calculated 
between each of the four clusters with respect to the original raw data relating to the forty 
variables analysed by the PCA. Appendix Table B5 shows that statistically significant 
differences were recorded among the four clusters for all forty variables. The main 
differentiating variables are shown in Table 6.8 and the mean values for variables included in 
the analysis are provided in Table 6.9. Calculation and plotting of Z-scores of these individual 
measures for each cluster enabled both the character of the clusters and the nature of localised 
problem complexes to be identified. The resulting cluster profiles are provided in Figures 6.1–
4. Each profile is a radar chart with each spine representing a different variable. The numbers 
on the scale represent the difference from the mean value for that variable. The mean is denoted 
by the red ring at 0, the value of each variable for that cluster can be seen by the amount that 
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the blue line (showing the difference from the mean for each value) is above or below the red 
one. To facilitate the visualisation of the cluster profiles, the average points were connected.  
 
 This analysis makes it possible to describe each of the clusters. First, however, a word 
of caution is necessary. It is important to emphasise that the description of each group of LSOAs 
in terms of the original input variables does not necessarily mean that the resort localities 
comprising that cluster exhibit all of the characteristics that defined that cluster to the same 
degree, nor that there are not localities in other clusters that have the characteristics described 
for a cluster. The LSOAs in a cluster are defined by component scores that make them generally 
more like each other than members of other groups, but the way in which the original ONS 
census and other administrative data define the group of LSOAs is via a group average which 
is derived from the values for individual LSOAs comprising that group. When interpreting the 
character of the clusters it should also be remembered that the basis of comparison is with the 
sample average (i.e., all 399 excluded resort LSOAs), but the sample average itself is inevitably 
different from both the resort average (i.e., all 1,686 resort LSOAs in England) and the national 
average (i.e., all 32,482 LSOAs in England). It follows that the clusters might appear different 
if the base data were a set of national averages.  
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Table 6.8: Matrix of outcomes, original input variables, four clusters 
 
 
 Differentiating variables Important variables 
Cluster 1 Average age (+) 
Residents aged 0-15 (–) 
Residents of working age (+) 
Empty households (+) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants (+) 
JSA 6 months or more (+) 
JSA 12 months or more (+) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (+) 
 
Residents of pensionable age (–) 
Age dependency (–) 
Population white (–) 
Single person households (+) 
Single pensioner households (+) 
Single parent families (–) 
Employed as managers and professionals (–) 
Employed as manual workers (+) 
Employed in tourism (+) 
Self-employed (–) 
Average household income (–) 
Owner-occupied (–) 
Private-rented (+) 
Social-rented (+) 
Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) 
No central heating (–) 
Overcrowded households (+) 
Children in out-of-work families (+) 
Income Support claimants (+) 
Pension Credit claimants (+) 
Incapacity Benefit claimants (+) 
Employment/Support claimants (+) 
Disability Living Allowance claimants (–) 
Out-of-work benefit claimants (+) 
No qualifications (+) 
Level 4/5 qualifications (–) 
No car (+) 
Children in lone parent families (+) 
Crime (+) 
Cluster 2 Residents aged 0-15 (+) 
Residents of working age (–) 
Single person households (–) 
Private-rented (–) 
Lacking/sharing basic amenities (–) 
Overcrowded households (–) 
Crime (–) 
 
Average age (–) 
Residents of pensionable age (–) 
Age dependency (+) 
Population white (+) 
Single pensioner households (+) 
Single parent families (+) 
Employed as managers and professionals (–) 
Employed as manual workers (+) 
Employed in tourism (–) 
Self-employed (–) 
Average household income (–) 
Owner-occupied (+) 
Social-rented (+) 
No central heating (–) 
Empty households (–) 
Children in out-of-work families (+) 
Income Support claimants (+) 
Pension Credit claimants (–) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) 
JSA 6 months or more (–) 
JSA 12 months or more (–) 
Incapacity Benefit claimants (–) 
Employment/Support claimants (–) 
Disability Living Allowance claimants (+) 
Out-of-work benefit claimants (–) 
No qualifications (+) 
Level 4/5 qualifications (–) 
No car (–) 
Children in lone parent families (+) 
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Cluster 3 Average age (+) 
Residents of working age (–) 
Residents of pensionable age (+) 
Age dependency (+) 
Single pensioner households (+) 
Average household income (+) 
Empty households (–) 
Pension Credit claimants (–) 
Level 4/5 qualifications (+) 
Children in lone parent families (–) 
 
 
Residents aged 0-15 (–) 
Population white (+) 
Single person households (+) 
Single parent families (–) 
Employed as managers and professionals (+) 
Employed as manual workers (–) 
Employed in tourism (+) 
Self-employed (+) 
Owner-occupied (+) 
Private-rented (+) 
Social-rented (–) 
Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) 
No central heating (+) 
Overcrowded households (+) 
Children in out-of-work families (–) 
Income Support claimants (–) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) 
JSA 6 months or more (–) 
JSA 12 months or more (–) 
Incapacity Benefit claimants (+) 
Employment/Support claimants (+) 
Disability Living Allowance claimants (+) 
Out-of-work benefit claimants (+) 
No qualifications (–) 
No car (–) 
Crime (+) 
Cluster 4 Residents of working age (+) 
Residents of pensionable age (–) 
Age dependency (–) 
Population white (–) 
Single person households (+) 
Average household income (+) 
Private-rented (+) 
Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) 
Overcrowded households (+) 
Pension Credit claimants (+) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) 
Disability Living Allowance claimants (–) 
No qualifications (–) 
Level 4/5 qualifications (+) 
 
Average age (–) 
Single pensioner households (+) 
Single parent families (–) 
Employed as managers and professionals (+) 
Employed as manual workers (–) 
Employed in tourism (+) 
Self-employed (+) 
Owner-occupied (–) 
Social-rented (–) 
No central heating (+) 
Empty households (–) 
Children in out-of-work families (–) 
Income Support claimants (–) 
Out-of-work benefit claimants (–) 
Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) 
JSA 6 months or more (–) 
JSA 12 months or more (–) 
Incapacity Benefit claimants (–) 
Employment/Support claimants (–) 
No car (+) 
Children in lone parent families (–) 
Crime (+) 
 
(+) 
(–) 
 
Mean values for variables above average 
Mean values for variables below average 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270 
 
 
Table 6.9: Mean values for original input variables in four-cluster solution 
 
Variable PC* Clusters Mean** 
  1 2 3 4  
Median age 4,5 38.8 36.2 50.0 34.0 38.0 
Young people 5 17.3 21.3 11.7 11.0 18.8 
Working-age people 4 63.1 60.2 55.8 76.1 61.4 
Pensionable age 4,5 19.6 18.5 32.4 12.9 19.8 
Age dependency 4 59.7 66.9 84.4 32.2 64.8 
Population 'white' 1,4 96.5 97.6 98.1 92.6 97.1 
Single person household 5 24.7 16.3 25.9 31.0 20.1 
Single pensioner household 5 10.2 7.7 12.8 9.6 8.9 
Lone parent household 5 12.9 14.5 7.3 8.3 13.0 
Professional/managerial occupation 1,6 18.2 15.4 29.3 27.9 18.3 
Other white collar occupation 1 20.1 21.2 20.4 27.9 21.3 
Skilled manual occupation 1 12.8 13.6 11.3 8.5 12.9 
Other manual occupation 1 48.9 49.7 39.0 35.7 47.5 
Distribution, hotels and restaurants *** 29.7 24.1 41.1 36.4 27.9 
Public admin  *** 36.3 42.1 29.1 29.6 38.7 
Tourism 6 15.2 8.5 29.4 22.8 13.1 
Full-time work  *** 56.6 57.0 54.0 58.3 56.7 
Part-time work  *** 43.4 42.6 46.0 41.8 43.1 
Self-employed 6 6.6 6.5 13.4 8.8 7.4 
Average household income 1 19,021 19,840 21,635 23,767 20,110 
Owner-occupied 3,4,7 41.0 50.9 56.2 38.5 48.4 
Private-rented 6,7 30.0 17.8 31.3 39.2 23.1 
Social-rented 1,7 29.0 31.4 12.5 22.3 28.5 
Lacking/sharing facilities 6 1.6 0.8 1.8 4.0 1.3 
No central heating 7 15.9 15.8 16.5 17.2 16.0 
Overcrowded conditions 4,6 12.7 9.7 13.2 23.7 11.7 
Empty dwellings 2 8.6 5.4 4.5 5.6 6.0 
Crime rank 6 7275.6 8464.0 5769.0 4662.2 7667.7 
Children living in out-of-work families 1,3 39.4 37.1 28.1 30.8 36.3 
Income Support 3 12.2 12.2 10.1 9.2 11.8 
Pension Credit 3,4 19.7 17.9 13.7 24.9 18.3 
Out-of-work benefit claimants 2,3 31.6 26.4 28.5 22.5 27.5 
Job Seekers Allowance 2 10.4 6.1 6.6 5.7 7.0 
JSA as proportion of benefit claimants 2 32.6 23.0 23.0 26.8 25.4 
JSA 6 months or more 2 4.6 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.9 
JSA 12 months or more 2 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 
Youth unemployment 2 2.7 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.9 
Incapacity Benefit 3 12.4 12.3 13.4 10.7 12.3 
Employment and Support Allowance 3 3.8 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.4 
Disability Living Allowance 3 9.2 9.6 9.7 7.0 9.4 
No qualifications 1 40.6 39.7 37.7 22.9 38.5 
Higher education 1 10.5 9.4 13.6 29.0 11.4 
No car 2,4 54.5 42.4 43.1 53.0 45.8 
Children in lone parent families 3 44.8 42.5 36.2 40.5 42.2 
 
* Variables related to principal components. 
** Mean values of all dataset with regard to the variable. 
*** Four variables that were removed from the PCA and not included in the cluster analysis, but 
included here because of their relevance to resort socio-economic performance. 
 
Cells with text in bold indicate variables which strongly characterise the clusters (see 
Table 6.8). 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Cluster profile for cluster 1                                                                                                                         Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.2: Cluster profile for cluster 2                                                                                                                         Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.3: Cluster profile for cluster 3                     Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.4: Cluster profile for cluster 4                                                                                                                                       Source: Author’s own work
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 Cluster 1 is the second largest cluster group incorporating 88 excluded seaside resort 
localities or 22% of the total. Significantly, this cluster is differentiated from other groups by a 
slightly above-average score for component 4 (prime age demographic) and very high score for 
component 2 (limited access to employment opportunities). The demographic structure is 
characterised by an above-average proportion of residents of working age and a below-average 
proportion of young people and persons of pensionable age. However, the differentiating 
variables with high values correspond to component 2. The cluster is significantly different 
from others in terms of an above-average proportion of empty dwellings and an above-average 
proportion of Jobseekers Allowance claimants, including long-term unemployment and youth 
unemployment. Apart from these variables which strongly differentiate this cluster from the 
three others, the localities are also characterised by above-average proportions of census 
measures that have been used to identify social and economic disadvantages of various kinds. 
These measures include routine and low-skill occupations, lack of qualifications, lack of a car 
or van, children in lone-parent families, children in out-of-work families, accommodation 
lacking basic facilities and overcrowded households. Not surprisingly, given the unemployment 
associated with this cluster, it has the lowest level of household income and highest level of 
out-of-work benefit claimants. 
 
Problem complex: Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages. 
 
 Cluster 2 is by far the largest cluster of excluded seaside resort localities in this study 
(243 localities, 61%). Characterised by its averageness, this group has few values which are 
high or low in comparison to the other groups. However, the cluster is significantly different 
from others in terms of mean values for components 4 and 5. The negative status of both the 
‘older demographic profile’ component and the ‘prime age demographic’ component suggest 
there are fewer residents of working-age and older people, and more children and young people 
than on average. The proportion of children living in out-of-work families is above the mean as 
is the proportion of children in lone-parent families. In fact, this cluster exhibits the highest 
incidence of lone-parent households. It also exhibits the highest incidence of social housing 
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(and lowest incidence of private-rented housing), although the proportion of households 
lacking/sharing amenities and living in overcrowded conditions is below average. Crime is also 
less of an issue than in excluded localities as a whole.  
 
Problem complex: Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families.  
 
 Cluster 3 consisted of 41 excluded seaside resort localities (or 10% of the total) and is 
differentiated from others in terms of an extremely low score on component 4, extremely high 
score on component 5 and extremely high score on component 6. The negative status of the 
‘prime age demographic’ component and positive status of the ‘older demographic profile’ 
component indicate this cluster is characterised by an elderly age structure with few persons in 
the 0-15 age group and a below-average proportion of persons of working age. Indeed, the 
cluster has the highest average age and demographic dependency rate of any cluster. There is 
also an above-average incidence of single-person households with occupants above pensionable 
age. Poorer than average health is associated with an older population. As well as having the 
highest score for people over pensionable age, the cluster includes both the highest proportion 
of working age residents claiming Incapacity Benefit and the highest proportion of working age 
residents claiming Disability Living Allowance. Occupations tend to be in the higher 
managerial and professional groups and in distribution, hotels and restaurants (including 
tourism) and of these many part-time. In terms of housing, the incidence of owner-occupied 
housing is the highest of any cluster. Levels of privately rented accommodation and households 
living in overcrowded conditions, lacking/sharing amenities and without central heating are 
also above average, though not as much so as cluster 4. 
 
Problem complex: Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems. 
 
 Cluster 4, the smallest of the cluster groups (27 localities, 7%), is differentiated from 
others in terms of having the highest score on the ‘prime age demographic’ component. The 
predominance of working-age residents means that there are few young people and people over 
pensionable age. Minority ethnic groups (that is, ethnic groups other than white) form a much 
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larger percentage of the population of the cluster than they do of the population of any other 
cluster and the excluded resort localities as a whole. Apart from these demographic variables 
which strongly differentiate this cluster from the three others, the cluster is also differentiated 
by a number of housing-related variables. Places in this group are particularly characterised by 
persons living alone, many renting privately, and housing conditions in particular are poor. 
Indeed, the cluster has the highest proportions of any cluster in terms of people living in rented 
accommodation (which accounts for the negative status of the ‘mixed private housing 
neighbourhoods with high levels of home ownership’ component), one person households but 
conversely households living in overcrowded accommodation (defined as more than one person 
per room) and households with no central heating and lacking/sharing basic amenities. Crime 
is also more of an issue than in any other cluster and in excluded localities as a whole. However, 
illustrating the cluster’s advantaged position, the cluster is differentiated from others in terms 
of lower levels of benefit claimants/poorer health (although many older people that are resident 
claim Pension Credit), an above-average level of household income and few working-age 
residents with no educational qualifications.  
 
Problem complex: Areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters living in 
poor housing conditions.  
 
 
 Thus, a statistical analysis of the composition and characteristics of the clusters has 
revealed the nature of particular problem complexes. Before proceeding to examine the 
geographic incidence of each problem, an important question requires attention. The question 
is whether some clusters are more deprived than others. To assess whether there are true 
differences in deprivation level between the clusters, the LSOAs comprising each cluster were 
allocated to a five per cent band (i.e., most deprived 0-5% of all LSOAs, 5-10%, 10-15% and 
15-20%) based on their rankings calculated in the IMD 2010 and a cross-tabulation and chi-
square analysis was undertaken. This analysis found that there are significant differences 
between the clusters (χ2 = 16.9, df = 9, p = 0.037) as cluster 1 exhibited higher levels of multiple 
deprivation than might be expected. It can be seen from the data in Table 6.10 that 26.8% of 
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LSOAs in the sample fell within the worst performing 5% of LSOAs in England on the IMD 
2010, but for cluster 1 LSOAs the figure is higher at 40.9% and for each of the other clusters 
the figure is lower. Furthermore, when viewed against the most deprived 0-10%, cluster 1 
emerges as the most deprived cluster (68.2%), followed by cluster 2 (48.5%), cluster 3 (43.9%) 
and cluster 4 (40.9%). A similar distribution pattern is evident regarding the most deprived 0-
15%. Thus, cluster 1 is the worst off in terms of multiple deprivation and cluster 4 is the least 
deprived of the clusters.  In considering this finding, it is worth reiterating that 24% of all resort 
LSOAs are in the worst performing 20% nationally and have been included in this analysis.  
 
Table 6.10: Distribution of most deprived resort LSOAs by cluster and deprivation level 
Deprivation level Cluster 1 
n = 88, 22% 
Cluster 2 
n = 243, 61% 
Cluster 3 
n = 41, 10% 
Cluster 4 
n = 27, 7% 
Total 
399 
0-5% Observed 
Expected 
% within cluster 
36 
23.6 
40.9% 
56 
65.2 
23.0% 
10 
11.0 
24.4% 
5 
7.2 
18.5% 
107 
 
26.8 
5-10% Observed 
Expected 
% within cluster 
24 
22.1 
27.3% 
62 
60.9 
25.5% 
8 
10.3 
19.5% 
6 
6.8 
22.2% 
100 
 
25.1 
10-15% Observed 
Expected 
% within cluster 
17 
21.6 
19.3% 
62 
59.7 
25.5% 
11 
10.1 
26.8% 
8 
6.6 
29.6% 
98 
 
24.6 
15-20% Observed 
Expected 
% within cluster 
11 
20.7 
12.5% 
63 
57.2 
25.9% 
12 
9.7 
29.3% 
8 
6.4 
29.6% 
94 
 
23.6 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
 Mapping at LSOA level enabled the geography of particular problem complexes to be 
identified (Figure 6.5). This objective was achieved in ArcMap (a geographic information 
system programme) and by grouping the constituent LSOAs of each affected resort and using 
the centroid of the group as the location for a pie chart to represent each resort. Thus, to facilitate 
the visualisation of the classification, each resort has a pie chart and the total value of the pie is 
equal to the sum of the combined number of LSOAs in each cluster. Table 6.11 provides this 
information and the breakdown of LSOAs according to cluster for each resort. For example, 
the resort of Great Yarmouth had 11 LSOAs in cluster 1 and 5 LSOAs in cluster 2, thus giving 
a total of 16 resort LSOAs (or 44% of the resort total) affected by high levels of multiple 
deprivation. It follows that the pie chart for Great Yarmouth is comprised of two sectors 
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representing the values of cluster 1 (i.e., (11 / 16) * 100 = 68.8%) and cluster 2 (i.e., (5 / 16) * 
100 = 31.2%). The mapping procedure described represents a necessary but less than 
satisfactory methodological compromise. The preferred method for illuminating the national 
pattern of excluded resort locality types is mapping using the geographic extent of all LSOAs. 
An attempt was made to map the 1,686 resort LSOAs, including the 399 excluded resort 
localities, but the small number of LSOAs meant that they did not appear visible on a national 
map in A4 size. Indeed, there are problems with the mapping of LSOAs. As previous 
typological investigations have reported, ‘mapping at such a small scale has inherent scaling 
problems, problems wrapped up in the design of the LSOAs and problems in adding locational 
information to aid the identification of places along with the information about the classification 
membership’ (Vickers et al., 2005: 61).  
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Figure 6.5: The national pattern of excluded resort locality types  
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 6.11: Number of LSOAs in each resort in each cluster 
 
 Cluster Resort LSOAs 
Resort Size District Region 1 2 3 4 Total Total % 
Skegness M East Lindsey EM  2 5  7 12 58.3 
Dover M Dover  SE  9 1  10 18 55.6 
Heysham M Lancaster NW 1 5   6 11 54.5 
Margate  L Thanet  SE 5 9   14 27 51.9 
Fleetwood M Wyre  NW  9   9 18 50 
Blackpool                 L Blackpool  NW 4 34 8  46 94 48.9 
Penzance M Penwith SW  6   6 13 46.2 
Hastings L Hastings  SE 9 14 1  24 53 45.3 
Great Yarmouth L Great Yarmouth  E 11 5   16 36 44.4 
South Shields L South Tyneside NE 23 1   24 55 43.6 
Ramsgate L Thanet SE 3 7   10 26 38.5 
Ilfracombe M North Devon SW  1 2  3 8 37.5 
Folkestone L Shepway  SE 3 7 1  11 31 35.5 
Scarborough L Scarborough  Y&H 4 7 1  12 34 35.3 
Clacton-on-Sea L Tendring  E 4 6 1  11 32 34.4 
Morecambe M Lancaster NW 2 5   7 21 33.3 
Brighton                 L Brighton and Hove  SE  15 1 13 29 101 28.7 
Lowestoft L Waveney  E 6 5 1  12 42 28.6 
Weston-s-mare L North Somerset  SW  10 3  13 48 27.1 
Weymouth L Weymouth & Portland SW  6 2  8 31 25.8 
Torquay  L Torbay  SW 2 7 2  11 43 25.6 
Littlehampton M Arun SE  4   4 17 23.5 
Whitby M Scarborough Y&H  1 1  2 9 22.2 
Southend-on-Sea L Southend-on-Sea  E 3 19 1  23 107 21.5 
Falmouth M Carrick SW 1 2   3 14 21.4 
Bognor Regis M Arun SE  3   3 15 20 
New Brighton M Wirral NW  2   2 10 20 
Crosby L Sefton NW 2 4   6 32 18.8 
Eastbourne  L Eastbourne  SE  7 1 2 10 59 16.9 
Bournemouth  L Bournemouth  SW  11  6 17 107 15.9 
Paignton L Torbay SW  4 1  5 34 14.7 
Bexhill-on-Sea L Rother SE   4  4 28 14.3 
Herne Bay M Canterbury SE 2 1   3 23 13 
Hove L Brighton and Hove SE  6  2 8 63 12.7 
Dawlish M Teignbridge SW   1  1 8 12.5 
Ryde M Isle of Wight SE 1  1  2 16 12.5 
Teignmouth M Teignbridge SW  1   1 9 11.1 
Whitstable M Canterbury SE  2   2 21 9.5 
Southsea L Portsmouth SE    3 3 32 9.4 
Burnham-on-Sea M Sedgemoor SW  1   1 12 8.3 
Newquay M Restormel SW   1  1 14 7.1 
Lytham St Annes L Fylde NW  1  1 2 30 6.7 
Southport L Sefton NW 2 2   4 60 6.7 
Exmouth M East Devon SW  1   1 21 4.8 
Thornton-Cleveleys M Wyre NW   1  1 21 4.8 
Christchurch L Christchurch SW  1   1 30 3.3 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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 This analysis found that the 399 ‘excluded resort localities’ related to 46 (out of 58) 
seaside resorts and that 40 of these resorts contain excluded localities characterised by ‘social 
housing neighbourhoods with young population living in unstable families’ (cluster 2). Thus, 
this group is well-scattered across the seaside resorts of the country but particularly in the 
Southeast, in the Northwest and the Southwest. Furthermore, when viewed against the total 
number of ‘excluded resort localities’ located in each English region, the Northwest (62/83, 
75%), the Southwest (51/72, 72%), the Southeast (84/137, 61%), Yorkshire and the Humber 
(8/14, 57%) and the East (35/62, 57%) appear to be suffering more from this form of local area 
exclusion than the East Midlands (2/7, 29%) and the Northeast (1/24, 4%). Deprived areas 
characterised by ‘older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems’ 
(cluster 3) corresponded to 22 seaside resorts and had a locus mainly in the Southwest, the 
Southeast and the Northwest. Although it may appear at first glance that these regions appear 
to be suffering more from this form of local area exclusion, this regional pattern may be 
explained by the fact that there are more resorts and therefore more incidences of this exclusion 
type. Indeed, when viewed against the total number of ‘excluded resort localities’ located in 
each English region, a proportionally greater number of localities occurred in the East Midlands 
(5/7, 71%), followed by the Southwest (12/72, 17%), Yorkshire and the Humber (2/14, 14%), 
the Northwest (9/83, 11%), the Southeast (10/137, 7%) and the East (3/62, 5%). Households 
experiencing the most severe social and economic problems were grouped into cluster 1 which 
manifested itself in 19 resorts, but revealed a particularly strong incidence in resorts located in 
the East, the Northeast and the Southeast. Again, when viewed against the total number of 
‘excluded resort localities’ located in each English region, the Northeast (23/24, 96%) was 
suffering more from this form of local area exclusion than the East (24//62, 39%), Yorkshire 
and the Humber (4/14, 29%), the Southeast (23/137, 17%), the Northwest (11/83, 13%) and the 
Southwest (3/72, 4%). Finally, cluster 4 reflected a grouping of deprived ‘areas in flux with 
ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters in poor housing’ and was concentrated in 6 
resorts located in the Southeast (20/137, 15%), the Southwest (6/72, 8%) and Northwest (1/83, 
1%). 
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 Thus, the outcome of the univariate statistical analyses (Table 6.11) and mapping 
exercise depicted in Figure 6.5 sheds light on the geographic incidence of each problem 
complex. It shows the extent to which excluded resort localities are scattered across the country, 
rather than being confined to specific coastal regions. But it also shows a marked geographical 
variation between the coastal regions. Indeed, some clusters appear to be much more prevalent 
in some regions than others. Regarding the largest cluster, representing ‘social housing 
neighbourhoods with young population living in unstable families’, no coastal region was 
unaffected by this form of local area exclusion, but a proportionally lower number of such 
excluded resort localities occurred in the Northeast and East Midlands. With respect to the 
second largest and most deprived cluster, representing ‘unemployed households with low 
incomes and social disadvantages’, while being widely scattered around England, it revealed a 
particularly strong incidence in resorts located along the east coast regions, particularly the 
Northeast. The geography of the localities characterised by ‘older population, lower 
unemployment but higher health-related problems’ is also nationally widespread, but a 
proportionally greater number of such excluded resort localities occurred in the East Midlands 
and its resort of Skegness. Finally, ‘areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private 
renters in poor housing’ were confined to resorts in three English regions, namely the Southeast, 
the Southwest and Northwest. However, most localities in this group were found in resorts 
located on England’s southeast coast. 
 
 Further interrogation of the LSOA-level data (in Table 6.11) revealed the complexity of 
the problems that resorts with higher levels of multiple deprivation appear to be experiencing. 
Indeed, groupings of factors to do with local area exclusion emerge in the 25 resorts previously 
identified in the study as most deprived, but in different combinations. It was found that, of the 
399 LSOAs classified in this study as ‘excluded resort localities’, approximately four-fifths 
(321) of these localities corresponded to the 25 most deprived resorts. None of these resorts had 
LSOAs in all of the four clusters. But nine resorts have LSOAs in three of the four clusters. 
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These resorts, which might therefore be seen as experiencing more serious and complex 
multiple deprivation problems, are (according to their level of deprivation): 
 
1. Blackpool                 
2. Hastings 
3. Folkestone 
4. Scarborough 
5. Clacton-on-Sea 
6. Brighton                 
7. Lowestoft 
8. Torquay  
9. Southend-on-Sea 
 
The majority of the nine resorts are located along the east coast of England (4), followed by 
three in the Southeast and one in the Southwest and Northwest. With a population of above 
40,000, all the resorts qualified as ‘large’ resorts in this study and, with the exception of 
Brighton, exhibited the following complex localised problems:  
 
 Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages;  
 Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families; and,  
 Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems.  
 
The latter two area types – together with ‘areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and 
private renters in poor housing’ – affected Brighton.  
 
 However, the majority of the 25 most deprived resorts were identified as experiencing 
two problem complexes. A total of thirteen resorts fell into this classification, with seven resorts 
containing localities characterised by ‘social housing neighbourhoods with young population 
in unstable families’ and ‘unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages’. 
These resorts are (according to their level of deprivation): 
 
1. Heysham 
2. Margate  
3. Great Yarmouth 
4. South Shields 
5. Ramsgate 
6. Morecambe 
7. Falmouth  
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Spatially, the seven resorts are scattered around England and, with the exception of Heysham, 
Morecambe and Falmouth, are ‘large’ in terms of population size.  Regarding the other six 
resorts, they were characterised by a combination of ‘social housing neighbourhoods with 
young population in unstable families’ and ‘older population, lower unemployment but higher 
health-related problems’. These resorts are (according to their level of deprivation): 
 
1. Skegness 
2. Dover 
3. Ilfracombe 
4. Weston-Super-Mare 
5. Weymouth 
6. Whitby 
 
However, when compared to the previous list, the resorts are nationally less widespread, with 
three occurring in Southwest, two in the East and one in the Southeast. Furthermore, with the 
exception of Weston-Super-Mare and Weymouth, most of these resorts are medium-sized 
towns. That leaves three seaside resorts that were identified as experiencing a singular problem 
complex. These resorts – Fleetwood, Penzance and Littlehampton – are all medium-sized towns 
and had deprived areas characterised by ‘social housing neighbourhoods with young population 
in unstable families’.  
 
 Overall, there is no clear pattern emerging as to the geographical distribution of multiple 
deprivation problems. There are deprived seaside resorts in all regions experiencing different 
combinations of two or more problem complexes, albeit to a greater or lesser extent. What is 
clear, however, is that the larger seaside resorts are suffering from a wider range of problems. 
Given the policy and academic focus on concentrated deprivation in urban areas and its 
presumed pernicious effects, it is also useful to have some understanding of exactly how 
concentrated excluded localities are and where exactly such areas are in the worst hit resorts. 
Appendix Figures B1–25 provide maps of the clusters for each of the 25 most deprived resorts. 
During the final production of the maps using ArcMap, detailed layers of locational 
information, including the boundaries for resort LSOAs, were supressed for greater clarity. 
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(However, more detailed resort maps of the clusters cross referenced against the boundaries for 
Census wards and LSOAs for instance can be obtained from the author.) 
 
 Inspection of the maps revealed that, in the majority of resorts, similar excluded 
localities are spatially clustered and that different excluded localities are, if not neighbouring 
each other, in close proximity. In relation to the nine large sized resorts that were identified as 
experiencing three problem complexes, a common pattern, as exemplified by Blackpool (Figure 
6.6), includes the localities of cluster 1 (i.e., ‘unemployed households with low incomes and 
social disadvantages’) and cluster 3 (i.e., ‘older population, lower unemployment but higher 
health-related problems’) being mainly located along and behind the central seafront. This 
pattern is not surprising given that some of the former commercial holiday accommodation has 
been turned into care homes, hostels, HMOs and small flats. In the middle and outer suburbs of 
the same resorts, the built environment is more secure and the population appears relatively 
problem-free, as indicated on the maps by the grey space representing unclassified resort 
LSOAs. However, the local authority estates in the middle and outer suburban localities 
provided the principal loci for the ‘young working-class households and unstable families’ of 
cluster 2, which is the largest cluster of excluded seaside resort localities in this study. The 
smallest cluster, representing ‘areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private 
renters in poor housing’ (cluster 4), related to six resorts overall, but only one of these resorts 
(Brighton) exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Nonetheless, 
as exemplified by Brighton (Figure 6.7), localities in this group spatially tended to be located 
mainly in near-seafront areas, reflecting the prevalence of cheap rental accommodation. There 
are, however, examples of these types of localities in some outer areas of the resorts of Brighton, 
Bournemouth and Eastbourne, owing to the prevalence of low cost student accommodation in 
these resorts. 
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Figure 6.6: Area deprivation in Blackpool, Northwest England 
 
(46 clustered LSOAs / 94 resort LSOAs, 49%) 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.7: Area deprivation in Brighton, Southeast England 
 
(29 clustered LSOAs / 101 resort LSOAs, 29%) 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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6.3 Summary 
 
 The research was set out to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic 
performance on social exclusion and, by employing a comparative analysis of socio-economic 
performance in deprived and less deprived seaside resorts, has revealed some substantial 
differences between the two groups. In relation to population composition, the deprived resorts 
are significantly different from less deprived resorts in terms of high levels of 
worklessness/benefit dependency, disadvantaged occupational characteristics, low levels of 
skills and education, poor health, family breakdown, poverty and lack of access to material 
resources. With regards to indicators of decline, the deprived resorts are differentiated by low 
rates of employment and high proportion of part-time jobs, low levels of household income, 
high rates of crime, low house prices and a high proportion of vacant dwellings. However, it is 
also the case that, on many of these measures, the deprived resorts as a group differ to a great 
degree from England overall, indicating the polarising trends which have characterised English 
seaside resorts and which have been widely discussed in the literature. The scale of population 
composition disparities are generally small when compared to the area condition disparities. 
Nonetheless, while the evidence is not wholly conclusive and it is based on, admittedly, a 
comparative and simple statistical analysis of mean values for selected variables in deprived 
and less deprived resorts, it is pointing towards the conclusion that there are compositional 
effects reinforcing the problems of these urban areas. 
 
 The research has also sought to identify, classify and map excluded localities in 
England’s seaside resorts. Four distinct deprived area types are identified that represent 
different aspects of the socio-spatial structure of resorts. It appears that social exclusion is 
extensive in these environments as not only are deprived areas geographically concentrated in 
the near-seafront region, but also located in the middle and outer suburban regions of the resorts. 
The analysis  has  confirmed  the  inaccuracy  of  the  widely-held  assumption  that  urban 
disadvantage in England is  exclusively  associated  with  the  location  of  social  housing.  At 
the suburb-scale, such housing is only a major presence in one of the four distinct ‘excluded 
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resort locality’ typology categories emerging from the analysis. However, the ‘social housing 
neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families’ is by far the largest cluster of 
excluded resort localities and, moreover, the problems associated with these estates have rarely 
been mentioned in the academic and policy literature on seaside resorts. It also suggests that 
socio-spatial disadvantage is a somewhat more complex and multi-faceted phenomenon in 
seaside resorts than in other urban areas of England. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 Academic study of social exclusion in post-mature mass tourism resorts is 
conspicuously absent and, as a result, little is known about its occurrence, nature and extent, its 
cause or causes, or whether and to what extent it inhibits resort restructuring. The present 
research aimed to develop understanding of social exclusion in a post mature resort context and 
has identified the anatomy, level and extent of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts, 
the factors significant for their deprivation and the nature and incidence of localised problem 
complexes. Not only are the research findings of paramount importance in understanding both 
the character of social exclusion and the prospects for socio-economic regeneration, but they 
also contribute to understanding of the outcomes of post-mature resort development, 
particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort change. Thus, the results presented in 
this thesis are of both academic and policy relevance. In an attempt to demonstrate the relevance 
and significance of the research, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section 
will provide a synthesis of the empirical findings from the study with respect to the research 
objectives, and relate the findings to previous research. Attention turns in the second section to 
the contribution of these findings. In the third section, the limitations of the study are 
highlighted. Finally, consideration is given to areas for further research. 
 
 
7.1 Empirical findings 
 
 The study was set out to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion 
in English seaside resorts and has had the following research objectives: 
 
(i) To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in seaside resorts; 
 
(ii) To describe differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-
deprived resorts and the factors that may explain these differences; and, 
 
(iii) To identify, classify and map deprived areas in seaside resorts. 
 
 
These objectives have been met as follows: 
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7.1.1 Nature, level and extent of social exclusion in seaside resorts 
 
 
 The study constructed a national seaside resort database, drawing, in the first instance, 
on the Indices of Deprivation, with the latter comprising a number of key deprivation-related 
measures for local authority districts and lower layer super output areas (LSOAs). In order to 
identify the nature, level and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, the study 
applied the seaside and non-seaside area classification to all local authority districts in England, 
defined the 58 largest English ‘seaside’ resorts in terms of resident population, and conducted 
analysis on them using the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the individual deprivation 
domains published for LSOAs in 2004, 2007 and 2010. Analysis of multiple deprivation in the 
following types of local authorities – inland, coastal, seaside with resort, seaside without resort 
– revealed that ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside with resort’ districts are experiencing higher levels of 
multiple deprivation than might be expected. Further analysis showed that not only are ‘seaside 
with resort’ districts associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation, but also within them, 
those LSOAs that constitute the seaside resorts are where it is concentrated. Indeed, there are 
relatively few deprived LSOAs outside of the resorts. Seaside resort areas that score highly on 
the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation also tend to score highly on all aspects of deprivation 
simultaneously (with the exception of access to housing and services). Most aspects of life are 
affected, including educational attainment and skills, crime and safety, the environment, health, 
and incomes; benefit dependency is very high, employment is low. The results are unequivocal; 
the majority of seaside resort LSOAs are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple 
deprivation. Due to the linked nature of the problems being experienced, it is clear that residents 
living in seaside resorts are at risk of, or suffering from, social exclusion.  
 
 These findings are consistent with those of Agarwal and Brunt (2006) who also reported 
that the incidence and level of multiple deprivation differs across types of local authorities. The 
degree, extent and local concentration of multiple deprivation was found to be significantly 
lower in ‘inland’ districts than in ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ districts. Even though Agarwal and 
Brunt (2006) used a district classification similar in principle to this study, they only 
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differentiated between ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ districts, thus failing to recognise ‘seaside with 
resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts. Furthermore, the lowest level of information 
available was for census wards and the absence of environmental and crime indicators within 
the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 meant that Agarwal and Brunt (2006) were unable to 
draw out more detailed conclusions regarding the manifestations of social exclusion within 
English seaside resorts. The present study, therefore, provides an important update and 
methodological improvement.  
 
 In addition though, the study has used a number of analytical techniques and approaches 
to answer several other vital questions within the discourse. It sought to know whether seaside 
resorts were more susceptible to multiple deprivation than the rest of England, whether there 
were differences in the level and nature of multiple deprivation between large and medium size 
resorts and whether the levels of deprivation were similar between the resorts. In doing so, the 
changes in levels of deprivation were explored with reference to the 2004 and 2010 versions of 
the Indices of Deprivation. Although a relatively short time frame,  it  offers  an  important  
insight  into  where  positive  and  negative  change  is occurring  and  what  trajectories  of  
change  might  be. The present study, therefore, provides additional evidence in relation to the 
evolving economic and social fortunes of seaside resorts. Three key research insights emerged. 
 
 First, England’s principal seaside resorts are rather more deprived than the rest of the 
country. The research followed the methodology used by the DCLG when calculating the ranks 
for local authorities to calculate the average LSOA rank (population-weighted) for each of the 
seaside resorts. On the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, the vast majority of seaside 
resorts display an overall level of deprivation greater than the English average. With the 
exception of crime and access to housing and services, a similar pattern is evident for the five 
other domains (income; employment; education, skills and training; health and disability; living 
environment). Thus, the most striking result to emerge from the data is that the vast majority of 
seaside resorts in England rank poorly on all aspects of ‘economic’ deprivation (income; 
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employment; education, skills and training). This consistency may be due to a number of 
factors, including the physical isolation of many English seaside resorts (which can act as a 
barrier to economic growth), low diversity in the economy and the large number of low-skill, 
low wage jobs concentrated in the service sector of the economy. These sectors often also 
require temporary, part-time, and seasonal workers. The shortcomings in the job markets have 
four main effects. One consequence of the character of employment is that local people struggle 
to create wealth and escape from the low wages cycles. Second, the seasonal nature of much of 
the employment on offer in the seaside tourist sector means that workers are less likely to 
progress in terms of qualifications or career advancement, as each period of employment may 
be with a different employer. Third, instability of income and insecure employment reinforce 
low expectations and aspirations, and provide few incentives for people to engage with formal 
employment and move off of state benefits. A fourth consequence is the out-migration of large 
numbers of able and ambitious young people to pursue education and employment 
opportunities elsewhere. In doing so, they leave behind a poorly qualified working-age 
population to support an increasing population of elderly residents. Not surprisingly, then, 
resorts that rank poorly on the ‘economic’ domains also rank poorly on the overall Index of 
Multiple deprivation. In contrast, the patterns for the ‘social’ domains – health, barriers to 
housing and services, living environment, and crime – differ, albeit slightly, with some resorts 
that rank poorly on the Index of Multiple Deprivation relatively well ranked for these domains. 
In considering this variation in domain rankings, it is worth reiterating that these particular 
rankings are for the seaside resorts and how they relate to one another and are not representative 
of how a seaside resort relates to England. Nonetheless, the importance of the nature of the 
seaside/resort itself as a cause of social exclusion is becoming clear. 
 
 Second, there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level 
of multiple deprivation. The relative importance of size has been subject to debate. Initial 
discussions of the extent to which size affects performance emerged during the 1990s, owing 
to a report produced by the former English Tourist Board (1991) on ‘The Future for England’s 
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small and medium sized seaside resorts’ which surmised that these environments were 
experiencing the most severest socio-economic problems. The differing character, problems 
and prospects for small, medium and large size seaside resorts are also emphasised in Shaw and 
Williams’ (1997b) conclusion that many of the smaller and medium size resorts face serious 
difficulties regarding their tourism product. More recently though, the British Resorts and 
Destination Association giving evidence to the Select Committee on Coastal Towns (CLG, 
2007a) sided with Beatty and Fothergill (2004: 475), claiming ‘size seems not to be a key 
factor’. However, the Beatty and Fothergill (2004) study has been criticised on a number of 
grounds (see Sections 1.2, 3.2 and 3.3). What is relevant here is that, as Shaw and Coles (2007: 
50) have pointed out, ‘smaller resorts were omitted from Beatty and Fothergill’s study and 
therefore the overall influence of resort size would not be fully measured’. Another relevant 
issue is that Beatty and Fothergill (2004) conflate a number of seaside resorts within larger 
administrative and data collection units, thus bypassing individual seaside resorts within some 
local authority districts. The latter practice also occurred in the benchmarking study of 
England’s larger seaside resorts (Beatty et al., 2008), which was followed by a benchmarking 
study of smaller seaside resorts (Beatty et al., 2011).  
 
 In commenting on these benchmarking studies, Beatty et al. (2011: 105) concluded that 
‘smaller seaside towns appear to be marginally less disadvantaged than their larger 
counterparts’, noting that ‘on the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007, and on all the indices for 
individual domains, the proportion of smaller seaside towns with deprivation above the England 
average is less than the equivalent proportion of larger seaside towns’. Such expositions are 
unsatisfactory because information based on local authority boundaries creates difficulties and 
no statistical measures of association were used. Questions may also be raised about the study 
by Agrawal and Brunt (2006: 662), who identified 87 seaside resorts and reported ‘there appears 
to be no relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple 
deprivation; both smaller and large sized resorts appear to suffer from high levels of multiple 
deprivation’. Agarwal and Brunt (2006) failed to provide evidence of this analysis, not even 
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specifying how the resorts were split in the analysis. Thus, the generalisability of published 
research on this issue is problematic. There is a lack of transparency and previous research 
findings have been inconsistent and contradictory and, for the most part, based on speculation 
or simple statistical analysis. 
 
 While the evidence is not wholly conclusive (this study excludes the very smallest 
seaside settlements with a population of less than 10,000) and it is based on, admittedly, a 
sample of 58 seaside resorts, it is pointing towards the conclusion that there is an association 
between the size of the resort and the degree of multiple deprivation. On the overall Index of 
Deprivation, and in each of its constituent domains, mid-sized resorts record significantly lower 
levels of deprivation than larger resorts and a wider range of deprivation levels. Further 
analysis, however, of the correspondence of overall deprivation with each of the deprivation 
domains, revealed strong associations, although the relationship between overall deprivation 
and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. Thus, with the exception of 
access, there are no significant differences in the patterns of deprivation between large and 
medium size resorts. Overall these findings demonstrate that English seaside resorts, albeit of 
medium or large size, are experiencing similar problems of multiple deprivation, but large 
resorts tend to have higher levels. The latter finding is surprising given that large urban resorts 
might be expected to attract more employment opportunities, even in times of economic strife. 
 
 A third insight is that the commonly experienced problems are deeply embedded. The 
patterns of deprivation faced by seaside resorts in 2010 were similar to those in 2004, but there 
were changes in levels of deprivation. Analysis of quartile composition change revealed that 
the majority of the resort LSOAs experienced a modest change in their national rank but a small 
number did experience significant change. For all domains, except income, several resort 
LSOAs improved or worsened by two quartiles and, in some instances, by three quartiles. Even 
though the indices of deprivation are about relative deprivation not absolute changes, such 
changes in deprivation levels of resort LSOAs cannot be due to the improvement or worsening 
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of deprivation rankings of other small areas elsewhere in England alone. Indeed, the erratic 
changes in deprivation levels, both positive and negative, suggests that resort-level influences 
in general and population composition and dynamics in particular are instrumental in shaping 
the fortunes of many resort LSOAs. That said it should be emphasised that the majority of resort 
LSOAs experienced a modest change in their national rank. This pattern holds true when the 
most deprived quartiles are considered separately. Overall these results match those observed 
in previous longitudinal studies of urban deprivation (e.g., Brennan et al., 1998, 2000; 
Burchardt et al., 1999; Lupton, 2001; Orford, 2004), which showed that there is typically little 
significant change through time in the characteristics and performance of the most deprived 
areas.  
 
 Consequently, at an aggregate level, the changes in levels of deprivation were not 
particularly dramatic. Overall LSOA movement from 2004 was negative for five out of the 
seven deprivation domains (education and skills, health, housing and services, living 
environment, and crime). In terms of the employment and income indicators of multiple 
deprivation, from 2004 to 2010, the English seaside has reduced its percentage of LSOAs that 
are considered to be in the most deprived national quartiles, but the improvements were very 
small. Indeed, the domains which had the highest proportion of resort LSOAs in the most 
deprived quartiles in both 2004 and 2010 were the ‘economic’ domains (employment, income, 
and education and skills), the ‘health deprivation and disability’ domain and ‘living 
environment deprivation’. That leaves the ‘crime’ and ‘barriers to housing and services’ 
domains, which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the least deprived quartiles in both 
2004 and 2010. These domains became more evenly distributed when comparing 2004 with 
2010, with the percentage of LSOAs falling within the upper quartiles increasing in size. Taken 
together, these findings highlight the increasing economic, social and environmental pressures 
that contribute to, and are indicators of a continued process of decline. The cumulative effects 
of these key socio-economic indicators are shown in the levels of multiple deprivation. In 
relation to national quartiles, quintiles and deciles, the latest evidence reveals that there is a 
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skew in resort LSOAs towards the very deprived. This skew is slightly more pronounced than 
in 2004. Since then, there has been a slight contraction in the proportion of LSOAs classed 
nationally as less deprived and a slight expansion in the proportion classed nationally as more 
deprived. Thus, multiple deprivation at the English seaside has increased both in extent (number 
of LSOAs) and concentration (severity).  
 
 In summary, the initial part of the study provided a descriptive analysis of the nature, 
intensity and scale of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. Research was undertaken 
because ‘seaside resorts are the least understood of Britain’s “problem” areas’ (CLG, 2007a: 
42) and the existing evidence base is patchy. Indeed, as earlier chapters highlighted, seaside 
resorts have until now received very little attention either from policy-makers or the academic 
community, particularly in comparison with inland urban and rural areas and declining 
industrial areas. The research found English seaside resorts generally had greater levels of 
deprivation than the rest of England. Higher deprivation levels than might be expected by the 
size of the resort were also found. Larger seaside resorts generally had higher levels of 
deprivation than the mid-sized resorts. As with the larger seaside resorts, there was variation in 
the levels of deprivation in the mid-sized seaside resorts. The most deprived resorts and areas 
have multiple problems, including low income and employment, poor skills, education and 
training, bad health, deprivation in the living environment, and high crime and disorder. Many 
of these commonly experienced problems are deeply embedded. They have persisted and 
intensified over the last decade. Thus, there is deprivation and social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts; individuals and households exist with a poorer standard of living in comparison 
to the majority of the population and with an inability to participate in everyday activities that 
most take for granted, and substantially more than is widely recognised.  
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 As well as highlighting the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics associated 
with social exclusion, the initial part of the study has: 
 
 Charted the quintile distribution of LSOAs for each seaside resort to show the overall 
pattern of deprivation; 
 
 Established a detailed understanding of their current position, as a baseline for monitoring 
future change; 
 Established a national seaside resort database to monitor change and mechanisms for 
collating and analysing the Indices of Deprivation data; 
 
 Identified deprived resorts and localities for more detailed study, using the upper quintile 
threshold as recommended by DCLG (McLennan et al., 2011); and,  
 
 Begun to understand and explain the contribution that tourism makes to the circumstances 
of seaside resort residents. 
 
 
7.1.2 Differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts 
 and the factors that may explain these differences 
  
 In seeking to understand the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, a statistical 
analysis was used to ascertain whether there were differences in socio-economic performance 
between deprived and non-deprived resorts identified in stage one, and if so, the scale and the 
extent of the differences. This objective was achieved by drawing on the newly created seaside 
resort database consisting also of a range of social, economic and demographic measures 
derived from multiple sources including the 2001 Census of Population, Labour Force Survey, 
Annual Business Inquiry, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs, 
Experian, Land Registry, Home Office, Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix and ONS. The 
results reveal that a range of facets of population composition (worklessness, education and 
skills, health, family stability, connectivity, and poverty) and place factors (employment base, 
economic prosperity, housing, and community safety) are significant for deprivation in seaside 
resorts. The second element of the research therefore provides a better understanding of some 
of the causes and consequences of social exclusion within English seaside resorts. However, in 
considering the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, a fundamental issue is the 
identification of similarities in the economic characteristics of deprived resorts which 
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significantly differentiate them from non-deprived resorts, and which consequently shape their 
development paths.  
 
 In comparison to the economic structure of more prosperous resorts, a general feature 
of deprived resorts is the relative weakness of the private sector in terms of employment (and 
by extension, investment and service provision). This finding is exemplified by the prevalence 
of public sector employment in deprived resorts, which is significant. However, although the 
public sector is particularly important as a source of semi-skilled service employment, a reliance 
on the public sector ‘is not necessarily advantageous to productivity as it focuses on non-traded 
goods, thereby limiting the supply chain’ (Agarwal et al., 2009: 317). In addition, the lack of 
dynamism of the private sector also negatively impacts upon the public sector, ‘as patterns of 
public sector investment are themselves strongly influenced by those of the private sector’ 
(North and Syrett, 2008: 82). Whilst employment in the sectors most dependent on the tourist 
trade was not identified as being significant for deprivation, which serves to demonstrate that 
tourism is still a key industry in seaside resorts, the deprived resorts are distinguished 
economically in terms of their labour market characteristics. Significantly, deprived resorts are 
characterised by high levels of unemployment (and youth; long-term unemployment) and 
worklessness, low rates of employment, high levels of part-time employment, many low-wage 
manual jobs, low levels of skills and education, and of household income. Furthermore, levels 
of formal entrepreneurship and small business formation are significantly lower, as measured 
by the proportion of population that are self-employed, employers in small organisations and 
own account workers.  
 
 Some of these disadvantaged labour market characteristics (unemployment, low 
income) have been documented in the academic and policy literature (English Tourist Board, 
1991; Cooper, 1997; British Resorts Association, 2000; Beatty and Fothergill, 2004). 
Moreover, such economic problems may be interpreted as ‘consequences of decline’ (Agarwal 
and Brunt, 2006: 667) and are highlighted by DCLG-funded qualitative research of ten 
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‘deprived’ resorts, which were identified on the basis of the local employment rate (Shared 
Intelligence, 2008). Thus, the present research confirms previous findings and contributes 
additional evidence that suggests the long-term structural decline of tourism has produced many 
resort economies with a number of common weaknesses in terms of low levels of productivity, 
economic activity, income, wages, skills and education.  
 
 A degraded physical environment also reflects a lack of ongoing investment from both 
private and public sector sources, over long periods of time (Shaw and Coles, 2007). This point 
is borne out by the record on two of the major sources of government regeneration funding, 
Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood Regeneration Fund (NRF) funding. 
These funding programmes were central to the New Labour social exclusion agenda, but seaside 
resorts were not recognised as a regeneration problem requiring specific action. However, 
owing to the publication of the DCLG Select Committee Inquiry on Coastal Towns in 2007, 
there is now a growing awareness that the decline in tourism has had serious consequences for 
the physical state of resorts. The situation is neatly summarised by Seeda (2005: 16): 
 
‘The decline in tourism income for B&Bs has led to a cycle of decline with the first 
closure of a B&B in a street being swiftly followed by the closure of other neighbouring 
establishments. These premises then either remain vacant or are converted into unlicensed 
‘Housing of Multiple Occupation’ providing low-quality rentals. The properties are 
poorly maintained and whole streets and neighbourhoods begin to take on the 
characteristics of slums, affecting property values and making the resorts less attractive 
to visitors’. 
 
 
Thus, contrary to earlier documents which highlight unemployment and low income as decline 
indicators (English Tourist Board, 1991), a broader range of problems including poor 
environmental quality, housing and increased crime are now recognised (British Resorts 
Association, 2000; English Heritage, 2003, 2007; British Urban Regeneration Association, 
2007; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010). Accordingly, the influence of resort decline on 
social exclusion was further examined through measures of physical distress. 
 
  
302 
 
 
 
 The research found significant differences between the deprived and non-deprived 
resorts for measures such as housing tenure and condition, vacant dwellings, crime, and 
residential property prices. House values can be seen as picking up on the condition of the built 
environment, where high prices equal better quality and decent transport links, schools, 
greenspace, community safety etc. Non-deprived resorts have higher than average values of 
property than seaside resorts as a whole, whilst deprived resorts exhibited lower than average 
values. A similar pattern is evident for owner-occupied housing. This finding may be explained 
by the fact that, in the non-deprived resorts, the number of retired persons is significantly higher 
and the net in-migration is especially strong among those aged 45 and over. Although the inflow 
of older people creates and perpetuates a relatively old age distribution, this in-migration is 
important as many are drawn from more affluent groups (Shaw and Williams, 2003) and can 
‘fuel economic development (most are not looking to give up work and may be keen to take 
local jobs or commute elsewhere, at least initially), employment growth in consumer and public 
services such as health (which is driven by population-driven formulae), and generate extra 
spending’ (Atterton, 2006: 29). Indeed, as Shaw and Williams (2003) have pointed out, 
members of affluent groups have relocated to resort towns for environmental and lifestyle 
reasons and not just simply to retire. Many become self-employed, establish a tourism business 
or pursue investment opportunities. It therefore appears that the deprived resorts generally 
provide few attractions to the entrepreneurial class, property developers and to business 
investment, owing to low levels of market demand and competition, and the adverse quality of 
the environment.  
 
 Significantly, the housing market in deprived resorts has higher proportions of social 
housing and private rented properties than more prosperous resorts. Moreover, unlike the rest 
of England, there is a higher proportion of private dwellings. The unbalanced housing stock is 
due to the remnants of former tourism accommodation being converted into small-flats, bedsits 
and other Housing of Multiple Occupation. This finding perhaps may best be exemplified by 
the prevalence of housing lacking/sharing basic facilities and of overcrowding, rates of which 
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are significantly higher in the deprived resorts. Such low quality housing provides a useful 
source of income for proprietors facing declining revenues from tourism, but Beatty et al. 
(2004) reveal it has attracted young, low skilled individuals and households often reliant on 
state benefits. What this particular housing study also noted is that many then move on to 
accommodation in the social housing sector (council or housing association) in the same seaside 
resort. Social housing is allocated according to need. The criteria is different for every local 
authority but can include homelessness, overcrowding, medical or welfare issues, financial 
circumstances and number of dependents (Hills, 2007). Thus, in many cases these residents 
have complex and multiple needs that place significant financial and managerial pressures on a 
range of public services.  
 
 Significantly, deprived resorts are differentiated in terms of higher proportions of young 
age-groups, as well as working-age residents. Furthermore, the net in-migration is greatest 
among the under-45s, although not markedly so. The cumulative effect over several years could 
help explain deprivation levels in these resorts. If, as Beatty et al. (2004) have pointed out, the 
latter group is largely characterised by disadvantaged socio-economic characteristics, the steady 
inflow over time may partly account for the inertia (documented in the previous section). 
Another explanation for inertia might be reduced expectations and aspirations resulting from 
no or little experience of employment extending across generations. The latter point perhaps 
may best be exemplified by the incidence of children in out-of-out work families and of children 
in lone parent families, rates of both in the deprived resorts are significantly higher than in non-
deprived resorts. 
 
 The importance of housing market change as a factor for deprivation in seaside resorts 
is well summarised by Shared Intelligence (2008: 10) drawing upon the results of interviews 
with housing managers in ten deprived resorts: 
 
‘the prevalence of cheap rental accommodation has served to attract in vulnerable 
individuals. The poor quality of the stock and the out-migration of younger households 
further creates a cycle of low demand and low prices. The low demand for “typical” 
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family accommodation depresses prices and acts as an incentive to meet the demand for 
low-quality, low rent flats and bedsits, which in turn encourages more affluent families 
to look elsewhere’.  
 
 
Put differently, with lower-income residents moving into an area, demand for higher rental 
properties decreases which makes it less profitable to invest in maintenance and improvements. 
Such a process can create a downward spiral, resulting in further degradation of the built 
environment (in terms of quality of buildings, litter, graffiti, vandalism etc.) and encouraging 
higher levels of crime, thus making such areas less attractive to existing and potential residents. 
The latter point is supported by evidence that levels of empty housing, which is an indicator of 
low demand and the decline of particular neighbourhoods, are significantly higher in the 
deprived resorts. A similar pattern is evident with respect to crime rates, which are not only an 
indicator of community safety but also reflect economic circumstances. Furthermore, the 
research found a very high turnover of population in the deprived resorts, which corroborates 
the observations of those housing managers, and which has important implications for public 
policy on regeneration. 
 
 Overall, the results do confirm expectations from the extant literature reviewed in 
Chapter Three (section 3.3.1). For the first time quantitative research demonstrated that 
indicators associated with negative labour-market outcomes, together with disadvantaged 
environmental and housing market characteristics are distinguishing features of deprived 
seaside resorts in England. In this respect, the research built on the qualitative work of Shared 
Intelligence (2008), which interviewed regeneration and housing managers in ten employment 
deprived resorts and commented that evidence on all of these characteristics is fairly scant, and 
that more detailed quantitative analysis is needed. Although it is possible to identify certain 
common economic and physical characteristics of deprived resorts, two points need to be 
recognised. First, the analysis identifies differences in conditions between deprived and non-
deprived resorts. The basis of comparison is with the seaside average in the measures used, but 
the scale of the differences are not always large. Nonetheless, they are statistically significant. 
Second, it is also the case that, on many of these measures, the 58 seaside resorts as a group 
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differ to a great degree from the figures for England overall. So, there are areas of convergence 
that in many cases result from the seaside resort characteristics of these urban areas. By 
undertaking a comparative analysis of the national averages of a range of socio-economic 
indicators (nearly 70) for England and for the 58 seaside resorts, the research also helped to fill 
the evidence gap that existed on seaside resorts. It built on the work of Beatty et al. (2008), 
their benchmarking study of the 37 largest seaside resorts used short of 30 measures of seaside 
socio-economic performance, but they also group several seaside resorts and do so using 
district-level data.  
 
 The outcome of the analysis prompts two broad conclusions. The first point concerns 
the main explanatory factors for seaside deprivation and the characteristics of deprived resorts. 
The second point relates to the potential of ‘area based’ effects in reinforcing the problems of 
these resorts. Both points are discussed in turn. To begin, no-one seriously doubts that ‘English 
seaside resort decline has been endemic since the late 1970s’ (Agarwal, 2005: 353) and that it 
generally takes many years for areas and their populations to become deprived or ‘detached 
from the conventional labour market’ (McGregor and McConnachie, 1995: 32). However, 
although a central feature of resort decline is the production and persistence of disadvantaged 
labour market characteristics as this study demonstrates, it appears that the subsequent 
evolution of seaside resorts has been driven by processes of residential sorting associated with 
the allocation of social housing, but particularly the availability of low cost rented property. 
Before proceeding to summarise the importance of the private housing market as a factor for 
seaside deprivation, however, it is necessary to touch on social housing policy, which is often 
the primary factor in the emergence of concentrations of deprivation in Britain (North and 
Syrett, 2008).  
 
 Indeed, such policy has brought about residential sorting. Throughout the 1930s and 
1970s, government sought to address urban overcrowding by uprooting inner-city communities 
and relocating them to especially constructed ‘mono-functional estates built as dormitories for 
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the families of mainly male workers’ (Power and Mumford, 1999: 81). The effect of this policy 
was the destruction of established social networks and the concentration of similar socio-
economic characteristics to new, social housing estates which were often on the periphery of 
towns and cities in Britain. Later, in the 1980s, government introduced the Right-to-Buy scheme 
which led to growth in private ownership but, at the same time, a distinction being made 
between the purchasing of the better social housing stock (whether on account of its quality of 
build or its location) and the non-purchase of the least desirable housing stock (Power and 
Mumford, 1999). More recently, the criteria employed by local authorities to allocate social 
housing has served to exacerbate the trends above by placing vulnerable individuals and 
families into such stock, ‘much of which is in low demand areas with concentrations of 
worklessness’ (Hills, 2007: 18).  
 
 Paralleling these housing policy impacts has been the residential sorting effects that the 
private housing market has had. The situation is neatly summarised by Sutherland et al. (2010: 
6): 
 
‘[First] The societal preference for private, owner-occupied housing has led to low 
demand for properties in areas of high social housing. [Second] New private sector 
housing has become increasingly accessible and affordable enabling most income groups 
to have greater choice in where they wish to live and can afford to buy. Consequently, 
individuals with the lowest incomes have the least housing choice and are ‘forced’ to live 
in areas of least demand’. 
 
 
It follows that urban disadvantage in Britain is invariably associated with the location of social 
housing. Indeed, in his foreword to the Social Exclusion Unit’s report on deprived areas, Tony 
Blair suggested that: ‘We all know the problems of our poorest social housing neighbourhoods 
- decaying housing, unemployment, street crime and drugs. People who can, move out. 
Nightmare neighbours move in. Shops, banks and other vital services close’ (SEU, 1998c: 7). 
Excepting Beatty et al. (2004), no mention has been made to the incidence of social housing in 
English seaside resorts, as attention has focused on the ‘new’ housing that was formerly tourist 
accommodation. 
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 Thus, such housing has become available in both the deprived and non-deprived resorts 
due to the decline in tourism. However, the prevalence of the public sector as a source of 
employment in the deprived resorts suggests that these resorts have experienced relatively 
significant decline in recent decades (compared to the more prosperous resorts), resulting in a 
more unbalanced housing market and impacting more on existing residents and changing 
population composition. The present research did not set out to cover population transience and 
migration in any depth as the ward-level data was limited to age, thus making it impossible to 
draw out more detailed conclusions regarding the nature of migrancy (e.g., short term vs. long 
term) and what skills, qualifications and expertise migrants are bringing to seaside resorts. But 
the research produced overall findings that are consistent with previous empirical work (Beatty 
et al., 2003, 2004; Atterton, 2006) and discussions (Shaw and Coles, 2007) and furthermore 
demonstrated that, in the deprived resorts, the net in-migration is greatest among the under-45s, 
whereas in the non-deprived resorts, net in-migration is especially strong among those aged 45 
and over. If, as the previous writers argue, the former group is less affluent (i.e., young, low-
income, low-skilled), then this pattern of in-migration is clearly a factor for seaside deprivation, 
not least if members of the group remain in the resort long-term and move from private rented 
accommodation to the social sector (with the private rented housing then being repopulated 
again with more vulnerable individuals and households). In the case of the more prosperous 
resorts, then, it might be that the decline of traditional seaside holidaymaking has sometimes 
been counterbalanced with the in-migration of affluent groups, resulting in investment flowing 
into business and residential developments and, perhaps, resulting in slightly more diversified 
economies.  
 
 Of course the relative importance of both migration and housing market change will 
vary from resort to resort, but doubtless the long-term structural decline of traditional seaside 
holidaymaking has led to economic deprivation in seaside resorts, with the continuing reliance 
on tourism and the shortcomings in the job market accounting for the stubborn levels of 
deprivation documented in the previous section. Arguably, while resort decline, housing market 
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change and migration are the underlying causes of seaside deprivation, they have largely had 
their direct impact. The persistence of deprivation might (in addition to the shortcomings in the 
job market) also be due to processes that are operating relating to people and place, which have 
been collectively termed as ‘area based’ effects in the social exclusion literature (e.g., Atkinson 
and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001; Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). So what are ‘area based’ effects, 
how can they be identified and what area effects might be operating in seaside resorts? 
 
 The literature on area based effects is more developed in the US than in UK, and its 
findings and theoretical propositions have been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Buck, 2001; Atkinson 
and Kintrea, 2002; North and Syrett, 2008). In brief, area effects refer to the notion that 
deprivation can have a compounding effect upon residents of deprived areas, above and beyond 
those experienced at an individual level. Studies from the US (see Jargowsky, 1996) have 
shown that the size of area effects in deprived towns and cities are generally small when 
compared to national macroeconomic conditions, structural factors at the regional level (such 
as skills, innovation, competition, enterprise, investment) and non-spatial explanatory variables 
(such as age, gender, ethnicity, social class). However, they are statistically significant. Area 
effects therefore shed some light on the question of why after years of tackling deprivation and 
social exclusion mainly through individually targeted responses (see section 2.3) there is, as the 
previous section highlighted, little significant change through time in the characteristics and 
performance of the most deprived areas in Britain. 
 
 A wide range of potential area effects can be identified with respect to deprived areas 
(Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001; North and Syrett, 2008). As already indicated, there 
are effects that flow from the characteristics of the population (the principal focus of academic 
debate) and those that flow from the characteristics of the place itself. Examples of population 
rooted area effects include socialisation processes, restricted social networks, stigmatisation of 
residents, high burden on local service provision etc. Some examples of place based effects are 
poor-quality and/or absence of private services, lower standards of public service provision, 
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features of the built environment, the physical isolation of the area, and high levels of 
environmental pollution. In an overview of the available evidence, North and Syrett (2008: 85) 
find the body of evidence inconclusive about area effects, noting ‘the major reason for the lack 
of clarity and agreement with regard to area effects is the difficulty in demonstrating them 
empirically given the complexity of disentangling an individual from the context in which they 
reside, socialise and grow up’. There are also enormous methodological difficulties for 
quantitative researchers in investigating area effects (see Buck, 2001 for a fuller discussion). 
The problems identified include: the fact that individual characteristics will influence choice 
and outcomes which may over/under play area effects; statistical data are of poor quality and 
limited relevance in measuring many area effects; effects may come into operation at particular 
thresholds; and, effects will operate at different levels. Furthermore, ‘the combination of 
interrelated factors within any given area ensures that there are multiple pathways of cause and 
effect’ (North and Syrett, 2008: 85). Perhaps these difficulties are why British research evidence 
is scant.  
 
 Studies from the US have used econometric multi-level modelling and large-scale 
household surveys in investigating effects of area deprivation on social exclusion measures (see 
Jargowsky, 1996), but the findings are ‘contradictory and inconsistent’ and ‘in some cases 
almost meaningless and possibly misleading’ (Lupton, 2004: 12). In asking ‘can we measure 
area effects and does it matter’, Lupton (2004: 4), a leading theorist of the relationship between 
spatial location and social exclusion, suggested that British studies need not necessarily rest on 
sophisticated modelling techniques, ‘as the more complex study design can “get lost” while 
much attention and debate is given to the weaker one’. The ‘weaker one’ refers to approaches 
that seek to identify whether there are differences between deprived and non-deprived areas 
(e.g., Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002), or to identify associations between indicators related to 
social exclusion in such areas (e.g., Buck, 2001). If there are, then specific area effects can be 
deduced. Although a ‘crude’ approach to investigating area effects, Lupton (2004: 3) 
commented that ‘area-based policies are not dependent on the existence of area effects, and that 
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most would be implemented anyway, even if no area effects were found’. Such policies are, for 
the most part, designed to address negative characteristics of the areas themselves. 
 
 Thus, following Lupton (2004), area effects can (to an extent) be ‘read off’ from the 
characteristics that differentiate deprived resorts from others. Since the primary concern of the 
investigation was to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, the 
differentiating economic and environmental characteristics previously identified are of interest 
here. In terms of people effects, the large group of people who are divorced from the resort 
economy is a concern, because the high degree of unemployed and economically inactive 
individuals inevitably limits the contact or relationships that residents of deprived resorts have 
with those in work. One ramification is that residents may be less aware of employment 
opportunities. It is estimated that only a third of job vacancies are notified to Jobcentre Plus 
(ONS, 2005), meaning that the majority of employment opportunities are filled through other 
formal methods and informal channels such as word of mouth, social networks etc. 
Consequently, people who are out of work or not in frequent contact with those in work are less 
likely to hear of potential opportunities. Another ramification of living in an area with high 
unemployment and economic inactivity is that there are fewer positive local role models (North 
and Syrett, 2008). As a result, some residents living in the deprived resorts may develop 
particular attitudes and perceptions towards education, training and employment. Specifically, 
a poverty of ambition and reduced expectations may affect some people and extend across 
generations. There might also be an acceptance of ‘getting by’ via benefits, informal work and 
illegal activity. Young people (due to socialisation processes) are particularly affected or at risk 
here, especially if they are from a lone-parent family or if parents have had long spells of 
unemployment/being in prison etc. (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). A lack of participation in 
employment or education is also linked to ‘network poverty’ (Bailey and Livingston, 2007), 
whereby the quality and quantity of social capital and networks are compromised, resulting in 
disaffection and social isolation.  
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 Serious place effects may arise from the poor quality of the environment and housing 
in deprived seaside resorts. House prices are low and it was found that, the housing stock is not 
well provided with basic amenities, overcrowding is high. In terms of housing lacking basic 
facilities, the conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between household 
members, and the development of children, whereas overcrowding is associated with a higher 
rate of child accidents and the resulting lack of privacy can be a considerable cause of mental 
stress (Shelter, 2005, 2006). Poor quality housing is also linked to high resident turnover, which 
leads to instability in school rolls, disrupting social networks and by eroding feelings of trust, 
safety and security contributes to local area dissatisfaction (Bailey and Livingston 2007). 
Studies have also found ‘a poor quality residential environment is linked to fear of crime, 
problems of antisocial behaviour, drugs, violence and a “generally threatening youth culture”’ 
(Bashir and Flint, 2010: 5). In such areas, a reduction in local private sector activity can raise 
prices for residents (North and Syrett, 2008). It can also create a shortage of local jobs, and low 
incomes and low levels of car ownership reduces accessibility to jobs (and services) in other 
locations, thus creating a ‘spatial mismatch’ between the local workforce and centres of 
employment (McGregor and McConnachie, 1995). So, in seaside resorts, living in a deprived 
area and living alongside disadvantaged residents may have several damaging effects on an 
individual’s life chances. The effects suggested above may well be small when compared to the 
special contribution tourism makes to the residents’ circumstances, but they are of interest 
because they add a new depth to understanding the internal dynamics of resort change. 
 
7.1.3 The diversity of deprived seaside resort localities 
 
 While this study illuminates the common problems of deprived resort localities (section 
7.1.1), it also illustrates the diversity of their physical characteristics, population composition, 
and problems. Indeed, cluster analysis of a range of social, economic and demographic 
measures for 399 resort LSOAs was undertaken to reveal the nature and incidence of localised 
problem complexes. This analysis has resulted in a typology of four clusters: 
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 Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages;  
 Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families;  
 Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems; and, 
 Areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters living in poor housing. 
 
 
 The outcome of the analysis points to several broad conclusions. First, as already 
indicated, deprived resort areas exhibit differences, and generalising across them may obscure 
more than it reveals. For example, the use of the ‘20% most deprived’ indicator can be helpful 
in understanding the levels of deprivation in seaside resorts and identifying the most deprived 
areas, not least because DCLG and other organisations use this threshold when assessing 
applications to access regeneration funds (McLennan et al., 2011). However, the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation is a composite measure and the domains are standardised (with different 
weights applied) and, moreover, it does not reveal anything about the local setting of individual 
areas or whether they are located within larger concentrations of disadvantage; both factors 
could have an important impact on any policy intervention in such areas.  
 
 Second, deprived areas in many seaside resorts are nearly all surrounded by similar 
areas. That similar deprived areas tend to cluster spatially is important since arguments relating 
to the negative impacts of area based effects may have greater significance in seaside resorts. 
Third, although a plethora of labour market difficulties beset English seaside resorts, such 
economic characteristics are much less important in terms of understanding why concentrations 
of deprivation exist where they do, in comparison to housing market characteristics. The spatial 
location of deprivation in England’s seaside resorts appears to reflect the physical legacy of the 
tourist trade and the outcomes of recent processes of residential sorting, as well as social 
housing allocation policies. Private rented housing is a major presence in three of the four 
distinct deprived area typology categories emerging from the analysis. Spatially, the three 
clusters are found predominantly in inner-resort localities, thus implicating the differing roles 
of the former commercial holiday accommodation, which is increasingly being turned into care 
homes, hostels, HMOs and small flats. Thus, the analysis has confirmed the inaccuracy of the 
widely-held assumption that urban deprivation in England is confined to the location of social 
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housing. It therefore appears that social exclusion is a somewhat more complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon in seaside resorts than in other English towns and cities 
 
 Fourth, some clusters are more deprived than others. Although the local authority 
housing estates in the middle and outer suburbs of the resorts emerged as the largest cluster of 
deprived areas, the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with areas grouped into 
cluster 1 (the second largest cluster). It displayed a range of problems, most notably 
unemployment (and youth; long-term unemployment), worklessness/dependency on benefits, 
and poverty (including child poverty). A review of the cluster profile suggests that individuals 
may be claiming ‘out of work’ benefits for a number of reasons including sickness and 
disability, looking after children (in the case of lone parents) or other caring responsibilities. 
Accordingly, interventions to improve connection to the labour market will be vitally important 
in these areas. However, although this typology of deprived resort areas can be used to develop 
targeted interventions aimed at addressing important local problems, one type of activity alone 
(e.g., skills and learning activities) will not transform the deprived areas. Given that the causes 
of deprivation and social exclusion are multiple, often long-term and deeply entrenched in 
nature, a genuine comprehensive approach is required. The approach needs to incorporate all 
factors promoting local area exclusion so that there is action in relation to housing, education, 
skills, health, employability, monetary advice, childcare, transport, crime etc. 
 
 Thus, for the first time research demonstrated that not all deprived seaside resort areas 
are the same (and some are more deprived than others), deprived areas in many seaside resorts 
are nearly all surrounded by similar areas, and seaside resorts are very obviously split in a socio-
spatial sense which owes much to the decline in tourism and the impact of the private and social 
housing markets. By producing a bespoke typology of highly deprived resort areas, the research 
offers a valuable summary of the diversity of deprived resort areas, a basis for benchmarking 
change and evidence for policy. Comparison of the previous seaside socio-economic typology 
(Agarwal and Brunt, 2006) and bespoke groups for the most deprived resort areas shows some 
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correspondences. It is important, however, to realise that Agarwal and Brunt (2006) suggest a 
typology based on profiling selected Census (2001) variables, so they suggest a typology of 
resort types and associated socio-economic characteristics (see Table 1.4). However, the 
typology developed in this thesis is not at the resort level, but the small area (or LSOA) level. 
Agarwal and Brunt (2006) suggested three resort types – ‘young’, ‘old’, and ‘wealthy’. On this 
basis, and looking no further than the demographic structure, the former two categories 
correspond to the groups identified in the cluster analysis. Clearly, the ‘old’ category relates to 
‘older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems’. The ‘young’ 
category may be seen to cover both the ‘unemployed households with low incomes and social 
disadvantages’ of cluster 1 and the ‘social housing neighbourhoods with young population in 
unstable families’ of cluster 2. It is interesting to note that the present research found young 
people (i.e., children and working-age residents) as a strong feature of clusters 1 and 2, whereas 
residents of working-age are over-represented in cluster 4. Thus, social exclusion is affecting 
sections of the working-age population differently. Exactly how can be seen by reviewing the 
cluster profiles, which provide an important insight into some of the causes and consequences 
of social exclusion. 
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7.2 Key contributions 
 
 Evidently, there are three key contributions which can be drawn from this investigation. 
First, this study enhances understanding and conceptualisations of resort decline and the 
internal dynamics of change in a number of ways. Up until now these conceptualisations have 
been simplistic and primarily tourism centric, focusing on what Agarwal (2002: 33) terms as 
the ‘symptoms of decline’. Indeed, as Chapter Three demonstrated, resort change has, for the 
most part, been framed as a lifecycle process and ‘symptoms of decline’ refer to decline in 
tourist volumes and expenditure, tourism-related employment and income, resorts’ market 
share, environmental quality of destination, quality of visitor experience, and appeal and 
investment. Thus, instead of studying a resort’s changing qualities, research has studied the 
changing quality of tourism within a resort. Therefore, there is no clear understanding of the 
consequences of this decline process for the quality of resorts. 
 
 This study has attempted to develop understanding of post-mature resort development 
by investigating the occurrence of a range of characteristics of area condition and population 
composition in English seaside resorts.  In doing so, the research built on the work of Agarwal 
(2005), whose conceptual paper highlighted the importance of place-specific factors in a study 
of English seaside resort restructuring. By focusing explicitly on the particularities of ‘place’ 
using measures of area factors and measures of population composition and dynamics, the 
research has advanced understanding of the character, problems and prospects for English 
seaside resorts. Although providing only a snapshot of seaside socio-economic performance at 
one point in time, this study reveals complexity and that resort decline is multi-dimensional 
with differing causes and consequences. The situation is complex because, on almost all 
indicators of socio-economic performance, the average for the seaside resorts is worse than for 
England as a whole, but the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the 
English average is not always large. It can therefore be assumed that the difficulties faced by 
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seaside resorts are by no means unique, but what sets them apart is the complex combination 
of factors that exist in seaside resorts.  
 
 Indeed, as well as comparatively analysing socio-economic characteristics of seaside 
resorts against national averages, the research provided an indication of the chief economic and 
physical differences between deprived and non-deprived resorts. By demonstrating that there 
are differences in terms of their economic characteristics, the research has produced empirical 
findings that lend support to claims of differing dynamics of change, particularly with regard 
to the operation of spirals of decline (Shared Intelligence, 2008). Thus, the importance of area 
factors/condition as a cause and component of decline is clear. What is also clear is the need to 
further understand these interactions (by studying specific resorts in detail and over time) to 
identify patterns and combinations of circumstances that repeatedly occur, by quantitative 
research incorporating all of these factors. The present research has isolated/identified factors 
as being significant for deprivation in seaside resorts, but better understanding of the nature of 
their interactions has potentially important implications for policy development. Thus, there is 
a need to model more formally the factors associated with spirals of decline, in order to fully 
understand within-resort processes of change and their undesired consequences. 
 
 Second, this study enhances understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in 
seaside resorts. The scale, nature and extent of social exclusion was investigated using the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation and its constituent domains – the study findings reveal that the majority 
of seaside resorts are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation. Most 
aspects of life are affected and the problems are deeply embedded. The research built on the 
work of Agarwal and Brunt (2006) in a number of ways. First, the indices used included 
environmental and crime indicators and were available for small areas, and the changes in levels 
of deprivation were explored. Second, differences in socio-economic performance between 
deprived and non-deprived resorts were investigated, revealing potential ‘area based’ effects in 
terms of people and place. Third, the research produced a typology of highly deprived resort 
  
317 
 
 
 
areas, thus revealing the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Thus, this 
combination of findings enhances understanding of deprivation and social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts. Moreover, by highlighting the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics 
associated with social exclusion, this study makes a theoretical contribution to existing theories 
of resort evolution. It does so by focussing explicitly on the consequences of decline instead of 
symptoms. By considering potential ‘area based’ effects the research has also developed 
understanding of the second-order effects emanating from consequences of decline, thereby 
enhancing understanding of the internal dynamics of post-mature resorts. 
 
 Third, this study develops and proposes a typology of highly deprived resort areas – 
which may be evaluated for its usefulness, and tested elsewhere. In the absence of a pre-existing 
theoretical framework for understanding resort socioeconomic change, the research opted for 
an inductive model – assembling socio-economic data (representing measures of population 
composition and measures of area condition) at the LSOA level and subjecting this data to 
principal components analysis and then cluster analysis in the expectation that this analysis 
would reveal distinct ‘clusters’ or areas with common combinations of values on specific 
variables. Thus this approach may be termed as ‘letting the data speak’. Admittedly, the results 
of the analysis of clusters in terms of the seven components identified in the principal 
components analysis are, depending on perspective, disappointing. On the one hand, although 
seven underlying ‘components’ summarise a great degree of the total variation in the original 
data, some of these components, depending on interpretation, do not amount to a clear 
dimension. Of course the fuzziness can be explained by the many different ways in which the 
data correlated during the PCA itself, and subsequent decisions on the number of components 
to retain and on the handling of ‘complex’ variables (i.e., variables that cross-load on numerous 
components). On the other hand, when analysing each cluster by original input variables, the 
groups and problems identified appear to have a good degree of conceptual and geographic 
coherence, in terms of the clustering of deprived areas near seafront and central resort regions.  
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 That is not to say the typology is, in any sense, a definitive classification of highly 
deprived resort areas. Other data, other clustering methods and different choices about the 
number of groups into which to place individual areas are likely to result in a different type of 
grouping of areas. Nonetheless, for the first time research developed a typology to be used as 
the basis for understanding of how types of deprived resort area are changing in different ways. 
The work described here, however, is the first stage in a process of research directed towards 
understanding area-based deprivation in English seaside resorts. Although providing an 
important empirical description of England’s highly deprived resort areas, there is a need to 
develop a typology of advantage and disadvantage across England’s seaside resorts (thus 
including all 1,686 resort LSOAs) in order to fully appreciate the socio-spatial structure of 
resorts and thereby the outcomes of post-mature resort development. The present research also 
suggests a degree of spatial clustering (which has serious implications in terms of area based 
effects), therefore, the extent to which individual resort LSOAs are located within deeply 
entrenched pockets of deprivation or affluence requires urgent investigation. Thus, two 
additional typologies will flow from this thesis: a typology of advantage and disadvantage (to 
fully understand the socio-spatial structure of resorts), and a spatial context typology (to fully 
understand exactly how concentrated deprived and non-deprived areas are, as well as gauge 
inequality in seaside resorts). Both typologies can be easily produced, owing to the production 
of the national seaside resort database. Of course, the former typology will require more 
thinking, possibly informed by survey research and/or peer review panel, about which 
indicators should be included. The survey and/or peer review additionally will help to ensure 
the typology’s acceptance by policymakers and the academic community, and it will generate 
a paper with a title akin to Cooper’s (1997) ‘parameters and indicators of decline of the British 
seaside resort’, with the emphasis being on seaside socio-economic performance. 
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7.3  Study limitations  
 
 Three important limitations need to be recognised. One is that the study employed an 
ecological study design and so is potentially liable to the ecological fallacy whereby 
associations at the area level do not necessarily mean associations at the individual level. 
Deprivation measures are area-based (see pages 128-9 for specific limitations of such measures) 
and do not correspond to individuals. Findings from this type of study cannot be related to 
individuals but give indications of average outcomes for individuals within small areas. 
However, in the absence of individual-level data, the use of the small area LSOA geography in 
this study is a significant improvement on previous work at census ward level (i.e., Agarwal 
and Brunt, 2006).  
 
 Second, it was not possible to link the Indices of Deprivation, census and administrative 
data with tourism statistics for English seaside resorts in order to demonstrate a stronger 
association between resort decline and social exclusion. The reason being the dearth of tourism 
data relating specifically to seaside resorts, and the non-standard way in which tourism 
information is collated. Tourism data are often collected on a district basis and that which is 
available for seaside resorts are often not directly comparable either over a period of time or 
between individual resorts as the parameters of the information collection vary greatly even 
between local authorities (see Agarwal, 1997a for a fuller discussion of tourism data problems). 
Thus, in the absence of such tourism data, relevant socioeconomic data (e.g., unemployment, 
household income, high crime rates, house prices etc.) combined with the Indices of 
Deprivation data, which relate to previously identified consequences of decline (English Tourist 
Board, 1991; British Resorts Association, 2000; English Heritage, 2003, 2007; British Urban 
Regeneration Association, 2007; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010), provided a crude 
indication of resort decline. 
 
 Third, the quantitative approach of this study is limited in its explanations of resort 
decline, area change and social exclusion. The study produced a national seaside resort database 
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– a wide range of data representing economic, social, demographic and environmental 
characteristics of seaside LSOAs, wards, resorts and districts was assembled from a range of 
data sources – including time-series absolute and relative variables. But consistent data for 
LSOAs and wards is lacking, meaning that any analysis can only offer strong explanations of 
local authority level differences (see pages 99-101 for a fuller +discussion of the data problems 
relating to seaside resorts). For seaside LSOAs and wards, there are not an equal number of 
years for each variable, yet most of the programmes running panel data is set for what is termed 
‘balanced panel’, whereby each resort have the same number of years data for each variable. 
The high frequency of missing data relating to wards and (especially) LSOAs across 2001-2010 
meant it would had been hard to justify converting an unbalanced panel into a balanced panel, 
as the efficiency loss might be considerable and because converting into a panel may result in 
biased sample, thus the decision was made not to pursue panel data analysis. The quantitative 
approach of this study is prima facie descriptive, as the analysis tends to identify differences 
and isolate variables, rather than to illuminate their interaction, and is limited in the extent to 
which it can shed light on the factors of resort change and exclusion, rather than their outcomes.  
 
 
7.4 Future research priorities  
 
 Traditionally seaside resorts have been one of the least understood of Britain’s ‘problem 
areas’. This thesis has broken new ground by reporting on an exploratory data analysis to probe 
the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in England’s seaside resorts. In particular, 
the research has produced a comprehensive and detailed comparative study of social exclusion 
in English seaside resorts through the manipulation and application of an existing dataset, 
namely the Indices of Deprivation. It has also drawn attention to differences in socio-economic 
structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts, and the factors that may explain these 
differences. In addition, the research developed a typology of disadvantage across localities 
within England’s seaside resorts, thus providing an indication of some of the causes and 
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consequences of local area exclusion, and of the variations in need between different groups of 
deprived seaside neighbourhoods. 
 
 The work described above is however the first stage in a process of research directed 
towards understanding economic change, spatial development and social exclusion in English 
seaside resorts. Indeed, for the first time research generated a national seaside resort database, 
which given the dearth of available specific resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable 
academic resource. Future analyses will increasingly draw upon data from the seaside resort 
database, which consists of a wide range of variables relating to their demographic, social and 
economic ecologies.  These data will be used to develop further five important aspects of the 
study: 
 
 In relation to resort decline, the present research identified, at times, considerable 
variation in economic performance between geographically proximate resorts. In light 
of the lack of knowledge of the underlying factors which explain the uneven geography 
of economic performance across England’s seaside resorts, future analyses will explore 
in greater depth differences in economic performance between seaside resorts of 
England and the factors that may explain these differences. Drawing on data from the 
national seaside resort database, the determinants of relative economic performance of 
seaside resorts will be investigated using methods that can account for the complexity 
of the issue. In particular, an econometric modelling approach will be employed to 
determine the influence of a wide range of indicators representing economic, human, 
cultural and environmental capital on three distinct components of economic 
performance, namely productivity, employment and labour market participation. 
Taking into account the different dimensions of economic performance identified in this 
analysis, a typology of seaside resorts will be constructed, reflecting relatively good 
(upper quartile) and poor (lower quartile) performance based on the observed 
dimensions.  This work will aid understanding of the resort economy and of its internal 
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dynamics. In addition though, significant policy implications are likely to emerge from 
the study’s findings which will inform the development of policy on seaside resort 
regeneration. 
 
 The influence of resort decline on social exclusion will be further investigated through 
in-depth study of six seaside resorts, two resorts will be in the upper quartile (‘well 
performing’) and two in the lower quartile (‘under-performing’). The fifth and sixth 
resorts will neither rank among the strongest or weakest seaside economies. Thus, case 
study selection will be informed by the results of the previous classification. Within 
each case study, primary data will be collected in the form of face-to-face semi 
structured interviews with key informants of organisations who are responsible for 
providing support and advice to local groups of people who are most likely to experience 
social exclusion. A purposeful and theoretical sampling strategy will be employed to 
ensure that the wide spectrum of groups of people who may be ‘at risk’ to social 
exclusion – including lone parents, the elderly, those with chronic illnesses, the 
disabled, the unemployed, young people and victims of crime – are represented. 
Examples of such organisation which are likely to be contacted and which have presence 
within English seaside resorts include Age Concern, the Prince’s Trust, relevant local 
authority departments, Victim Support, Housing Associations, Housing Action Groups 
and the YMCA. The interviews will contain a mix of closed and open-ended question 
and allow the researcher to examine, first, the way in which these groups are socially 
excluded and, second, the influence of resort decline on their circumstances. 
 
 While little is known about the main cause(s) of social exclusion, the present research 
has identified in-migration as a potential underlying driver. Thus, future analyses will 
explore the composition, level and extent of in-migration in a range of resorts 
experiencing differing levels of social exclusion and examine the impact of migrants on 
their socio-economic structures, including property markets. The influence of in-
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migration on social exclusion will be assessed in two different ways. First, by reviewing 
and processing the extensive secondary data gathered for seaside neighbourhoods, 
wards, resorts and districts to determine the composition, volume and distribution of in-
migration, as well as the degree to which in-migration has changed the socio-economic 
structure of deprived and non-deprived resorts. Second, through in-depth study of six 
seaside resorts – four chosen to represent the typology of deprived seaside areas 
identified in this study, whereas the fifth and sixth resorts will be non-deprived, with 
one exhibiting low in-migration and the other high in-migration. Within each case study, 
a life-course analysis using semi-structured interviews of different groups of migrants 
will be undertaken. The interviews will provide information on individuals’ motivation, 
as well as on items such as skills, work experience, welfare benefits and aspirations. 
 
 Taken together, the three studies above will provide a basis for subsequent research to 
ascertain the interplay and relative importance of a variety of tourism, social and 
economic factors within spirals of decline in deprived seaside resorts and their 
neighbourhoods. Indeed, by analysing the determinants of relative economic 
performance of seaside resorts, investigating the influence of resort decline on social 
exclusion through in-depth study of resorts and assessing the influence of in-migration 
on social exclusion, it will be possible to develop a theoretical model for resort change 
designed to be tested quantitatively, though structural equation modelling.  
 
 In relation to the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, the 
research produced a typology of deprived seaside localities. Inspection of the maps 
revealed that, in the majority of resorts, similar deprived localities are spatially clustered 
and that different deprived localities are, if not neighbouring each other, in close 
proximity. Future analyses will explore spatial patterns of deprivation in a more 
sophisticated manner by means of some in-depth spatial analysis. In particular, spatial 
autocorrelation analysis and nearest neighbour analysis will be used to investigate the 
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extent to which some deprived localities are located within much larger concentrations 
of deprivation, and which are more isolated. This information will then enable the 
development of a spatial context typology, which, given the emerging policy and 
academic focus on concentrated deprivation in urban areas and its presumed pernicious 
effects, is of significant value. 
 
Thus, this study highlights several avenues for further research. Only by addressing these 
research shortcomings, can there be in-depth knowledge and understanding of the manifestation 
of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort decline. 
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Appendix A: Tables of Results (Chapter 5) 
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Table A1: Inland v Coastal, 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 
92% 
Coastal 
n = 24, 8% 
Total 
294 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
69.8 
24.4% 
10 
6.2 
41.7% 
76 
 
25.9 
8.1 
.167 
 
3 0.043* 
 
 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
57 
57.9 
21.1% 
6 
5.1 
25.0% 
63 
 
21.4 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
67.0 
24.4% 
7 
6.0 
29.2% 
73 
 
24.8 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
81 
75.3 
30.0% 
1 
6.7 
4.2% 
82 
 
27.9 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
65 
67.0 
24.1% 
8 
6.0 
33.3% 
73 
 
24.8 
8.83 
.173 
3 0.032* 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
56 
59.7 
20.7% 
9 
5.3 
37.5% 
65 
 
22.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
68 
68.0 
25.2% 
6 
6.0 
25.0% 
74 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
81 
75.3 
30.0% 
1 
6.7 
4.2% 
82 
 
27.9 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
70.7 
24.8% 
10 
6.3 
41.7% 
77 
 
26.2 
5.6 
n/a 
3 0.128 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
58 
59.7 
21.5% 
7 
5.3 
29.2% 
65 
 
22.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
67.0 
25.6% 
4 
6.0 
16.7% 
73 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
76 
72.6 
28.1% 
3 
6.4 
12.5% 
79 
 
26.9 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
64 
68.9 
23.7% 
11 
6.1 
45.8% 
75 
 
25.5 
9.3 
.178 
3 0.026* 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
61 
61.5 
22.6% 
6 
5.5 
25.0% 
67 
 
22.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
67.0 
24.8% 
6 
6.0 
25.0% 
73 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
78 
72.6 
28.9% 
1 
6.4 
4.2% 
79 
 
26.9 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
73 
73.5 
27.0% 
7 
6.5 
29.2% 
80 
 
27.2 
3.3 
n/a 
3 0.337 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
56 
58.8 
20.7% 
8 
5.2 
33.3% 
64 
 
21.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
68.9 
25.6% 
6 
6.1 
25.0% 
75 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 72 3 75 
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Expected 
% within district 
68.9 
26.7% 
6.1 
12.5% 
 
25.5 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
72 
73.5 
26.7% 
8 
6.5 
33.3% 
80 
 
27.2 
5.4 
n/a 
3 0.140 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
57 
60.6 
21.1% 
9 
5.4 
37.5% 
66 
 
22.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
65.2 
24.8% 
4 
5.8 
16.7% 
71 
 
24.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
74 
70.7 
27.4% 
3 
6.3 
12.5% 
77 
 
26.2 
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Table A2: Inland v Coastal, 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 92% 
Coastal 
n = 24, 8% 
Total 
294 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
68.9 
24.4% 
9 
6.1 
37.5% 
75 
 
25.5 
10.5 
.190 
 
3 0.014** 
 
 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
56.0 
19.3% 
9 
5.0 
37.5% 
61 
 
20.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
70 
68.9 
25.9% 
5 
6.1 
20.8% 
75 
 
25.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
82 
76.2 
30.4% 
1 
6.8 
4.2% 
83 
 
28.2 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
65 
67.0 
24.1% 
8 
6.0 
33.3% 
73 
 
24.8 
14.2 
.220 
3 0.003** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
57.9 
19.3% 
11 
5.1 
45.8% 
63 
 
21.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
70 
68.0 
25.9% 
4 
6.0 
16.7% 
74 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
83 
77.1 
30.7% 
1 
6.9 
4.2% 
84 
 
28.6 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
72.6 
25.6% 
10 
6.4 
41.7% 
79 
 
26.9 
7.6 
.162 
3 0.053* 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
58.8 
20.7% 
8 
5.2 
33.3% 
64 
 
21.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
67.0 
25.6% 
4 
6.0 
16.7% 
73 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
71.6 
28.1% 
2 
6.4 
8.3% 
78 
 
26.5 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
61 
66.1 
22.6% 
11 
5.9 
45.8% 
72 
 
24.5 
10.2 
.187 
3 0.016* 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
63 
64.3 
23.3% 
7 
5.7 
29.2% 
70 
 
23.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
69 
68.0 
25.6% 
5 
6.0 
20.8% 
74 
 
25.2 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
77 
71.6 
28.5% 
1 
6.4 
4.2% 
78 
 
26.5 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
73 
73.5 
27.0% 
7 
6.5 
29.2% 
80 
 
27.2 
4.3 
n/a 
3 0.227 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
57 
58.8 
21.1% 
7 
5.2 
29.2% 
64 
 
21.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
68.9 
24.8% 
8 
6.1 
33.3% 
75 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
73 
68.9 
27.0% 
2 
6.1 
8.3% 
75 
 
25.5 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
72 
73.5 
26.7% 
8 
6.5 
33.3% 
80 
 
27.2 
6.5 
n/a 
3 0.087 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
55 
58.8 
20.4% 
9 
5.2 
37.5% 
64 
 
21.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
70 
68.9 
25.9% 
5 
6.1 
20.8% 
75 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
73 
68.9 
27.0% 
2 
6.1 
8.3% 
75 
 
25.5 
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Table A3: Inland v Coastal, 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 251, 92% 
Coastal 
n = 22, 8% 
Total 
273 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
63 
64.4 
25.1% 
7 
5.6 
31.8% 
70 
 
25.6 
10.0 
.192 
 
3 0.018* 
 
 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
47 
51.5 
18.7% 
9 
4.5 
40.9% 
56 
 
20.5 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
65 
64.4 
25.9% 
5 
5.6 
22.7% 
70 
 
25.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
76 
70.8 
30.3% 
1 
6.2 
4.5% 
77 
 
28.2 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
60 
62.5 
23.9% 
8 
5.5 
36.4% 
68 
 
24.9 
10.8 
.200 
3 0.012** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
49 
53.3 
19.5% 
9 
4.7 
40.9% 
58 
 
21.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
64.4 
26.3% 
4 
5.6 
18.2% 
70 
 
25.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
76 
70.8 
30.3% 
1 
6.2 
4.5% 
77 
 
28.2 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
67.1 
26.3% 
7 
5.9 
31.8% 
73 
 
26.7 
5.7 
n/a 
3 0.125 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
49 
52.4 
19.5% 
8 
4.6 
36.4% 
57 
 
20.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
66.2 
26.7% 
5 
5.8 
22.7% 
72 
 
26.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
65.3 
27.5% 
2 
5.7 
9.1% 
71 
 
26.0 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
56 
59.8 
22.3% 
9 
5.2 
40.9% 
65 
 
23.8 
7.3 
n/a 
3 0.063 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
59 
59.8 
23.5% 
6 
5.2 
27.3% 
65 
 
23.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
66.2 
26.3% 
6 
5.8 
27.3% 
72 
 
26.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
65.3 
27.9% 
1 
5.7 
4.5% 
71 
 
26.0 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
68 
68.0 
27.1% 
6 
6.0 
27.3% 
74 
 
27.1 
2.5 
n/a 
3 0.471 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
54.2 
20.7% 
7 
4.8 
31.8% 
59 
 
21.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
64 
64.4 
25.5% 
6 
5.6 
27.3% 
70 
 
25.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
67 
64.4 
3 
5.6 
70 
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% within district 26.7% 13.6% 25.6 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
68.0 
26.7% 
7 
6.0 
31.8% 
74 
 
27.1 
3.7 
n/a 
3 0.289 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
54.2 
20.7% 
7 
4.8 
31.8% 
59 
 
21.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
66.2 
26.3% 
6 
5.8 
27.3% 
72 
 
26.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
62.5 
26.3% 
2 
5.5 
9.1% 
68 
 
24.9 
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Table A4: Inland v Seaside, 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 82% 
Seaside 
n = 60, 18% 
Total 
330 
χ2   
C.V 
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
63.8 
24.4% 
12 
14.2 
20.0% 
78 
 
23.6 
17.5 
.231 
3 0.001*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
57 
67.9 
21.1% 
26 
15.1 
43.3% 
83 
 
25.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
67.1 
24.4% 
16 
14.9 
26.7% 
82 
 
24.8 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
81 
71.2 
30.0% 
6 
15.8 
10.0% 
87 
 
26.4 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
65 
65.5 
24.1% 
15 
14.5 
25.0% 
80 
 
24.2 
14.9 
.213 
3 0.002** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
65.5 
20.7% 
24 
14.5 
40.0% 
80 
 
24.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
68 
67.9 
25.2% 
15 
15.1 
25.0% 
83 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
81 
71.2 
30.0% 
6 
15.8 
10.0% 
87 
 
26.4 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
68 
63.8 
25.2% 
10 
14.2 
16.7% 
78 
 
23.6 
10.6 
.180 
3 0.014** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
58 
67.1 
21.5% 
24 
14.9 
40.0% 
82 
 
24.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
69.5 
25.6% 
16 
15.5 
26.7% 
85 
 
25.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
75 
69.5 
27.8% 
10 
15.5 
16.7% 
85 
 
25.8 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
64 
63.0 
23.7% 
13 
14.0 
21.7% 
77 
 
23.3 
6.8 
n/a 
3 0.077 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
60 
67.1 
22.2% 
22 
14.9 
36.7% 
83 
 
25.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
69 
68.7 
25.6% 
15 
15.3 
25.0% 
83 
 
25.2 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
77 
71.2 
28.5% 
10 
15.8 
16.7% 
87 
 
26.4 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
73 
66.3 
27.0% 
8 
14.7 
13.3% 
81 
 
24.5 
13.0 
.199 
3 0.004** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
66.3 
20.7% 
25 
14.7 
41.7% 
81 
 
24.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
67.9 
25.6% 
14 
15.1 
23.3% 
83 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
72 
69.5 
26.7% 
13 
15.5 
21.7% 
85 
 
25.8 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
72 
65.5 
26.7% 
8 
14.5 
13.3% 
80 
 
24.2 
11.6 
.188 
3 0.009** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
57 
65.5 
21.1% 
23 
14.5 
38.3% 
80 
 
24.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
69.5 
24.8% 
18 
15.5 
30.0% 
85 
 
25.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
74 
69.5 
27.4% 
11 
15.5 
18.3% 
85 
 
25.8 
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Table A5: Inland v Seaside, 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 82% 
Seaside 
n = 60, 18% 
Total 
370 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
64.6 
24.4% 
13 
14.4 
21.7% 
79 
 
23.9 
24.5 
.273 
3 0.000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
65.5 
19.3% 
28 
14.5 
46.7% 
80 
 
24.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
68.7 
25.9% 
14 
15.3 
23.3% 
84 
 
25.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
82 
71.2 
30.4% 
5 
15.8 
8.3% 
87 
 
26.4 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
65 
65.5 
24.1% 
15 
14.5 
25.0% 
80 
 
24.2 
22.8 
.263 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
63.8 
19.3% 
26 
14.2 
43.3% 
78 
 
23.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
69.5 
25.9% 
15 
15.5 
25.0% 
85 
 
25.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
83 
71.2 
30.7% 
4 
15.8 
6.7% 
87 
 
26.4 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
63.8 
25.6% 
9 
14.2 
15.0% 
78 
 
23.6 
13.5 
.203 
3 0.004** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
56 
66.3 
20.7% 
25 
14.7 
41.7% 
81 
 
24.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
69.5 
25.6% 
16 
15.5 
26.7% 
85 
 
25.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
76 
70.4 
28.1% 
10 
15.6 
16.7% 
86 
 
26.1 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
61 
63.0 
22.6% 
16 
14.0 
26.7% 
77 
 
23.3 
4.3 
n/a 
3 0.227 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
63 
67.1 
23.3% 
19 
14.9 
31.7% 
82 
 
24.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
68.7 
25.6% 
15 
15.3 
25.0% 
84 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
77 
71.2 
28.5% 
10 
15.8 
16.7% 
87 
 
26.4 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
73 
66.3 
27.0% 
8 
14.7 
13.3% 
81 
 
24.5 
12.6 
.196 
3 0.005** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
57 
67.1 
21.1% 
25 
14.9 
41.7% 
82 
 
24.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
66.3 
24.8% 
14 
14.7 
23.3% 
81 
 
24.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
73 
70.4 
13 
15.6 
86 
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% within district 27.0% 21.7% 26.1 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
72 
65.5 
26.7% 
8 
14.5 
13.3% 
80 
 
24.2 
13.4 
.202 
3 0.004** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
55 
65.5 
20.4% 
25 
14.5 
41.7% 
80 
 
24.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
68.7 
25.9% 
14 
15.3 
23.3% 
84 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
73 
70.4 
27.0% 
13 
15.6 
21.7% 
86 
 
26.1 
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Table A6: Inland v Seaside, 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 251, 83% 
Seaside 
n = 53, 17% 
Total 
304 
χ2   
C.V 
df P 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
63 
61.1 
25.1% 
11 
12.9 
20.8% 
74 
 
24.3 
25.8 
.292 
3 0.000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
47 
60.3 
18.7% 
26 
12.7 
49.1% 
73 
 
24.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
65 
63.6 
25.9% 
12 
13.4 
22.6% 
77 
 
25.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
66.1 
30.3% 
4 
13.9 
7.5% 
80 
 
26.3 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
60 
60.3 
23.9% 
13 
12.7 
24.5% 
73 
 
24.0 
20.9 
.262 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
49 
60.3 
19.5% 
24 
12.7 
45.3% 
73 
 
24.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
64.4 
26.3% 
12 
13.6 
22.6% 
78 
 
25.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
66.1 
30.3% 
4 
13.9 
7.5% 
80 
 
26.3 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
61.1 
26.3% 
 8 
12.9 
15.1% 
74 
 
24.3 
18.3 
.245 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
49 
61.1 
19.5% 
25 
12.9 
47.2% 
74 
 
24.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
63.6 
26.7% 
10 
13.4 
18.9% 
77 
 
25.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
65.2 
27.5% 
10 
13.8 
18.9% 
79 
 
26.0 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
59.4 
22.3% 
16 
12.6 
30.2% 
72 
 
23.7 
4.7 
n/a 
3 0.191 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
59 
62.8 
23.5% 
17 
13.3 
32.1% 
76 
 
25.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
66 
62.8 
26.3% 
10 
13.3 
18.9% 
76 
 
25.0 
  
349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
70 
66.1 
27.9% 
10 
13.9 
18.9% 
80 
 
26.3 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
68 
61.9 
27.1% 
7 
13.1 
13.2% 
75 
 
24.7 
13.2 
.209 
3 0.004** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
61.9 
20.7% 
23 
13.1 
43.4% 
75 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
64 
62.8 
25.5% 
12 
13.3 
22.6% 
76 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
64.4 
26.7% 
11 
13.6 
20.8% 
78 
 
25.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
61.1 
26.7% 
7 
12.9 
13.2% 
74 
 
24.3 
13.4 
.210 
3 0.004** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
61.9 
20.7% 
23 
13.1 
43.4% 
75 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
62.8 
26.3% 
10 
13.3 
18.9% 
76 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
65.2 
26.3% 
13 
13.8 
24.5% 
79 
 
26.0 
  
350 
 
 
 
Table A7: Coastal v Seaside, 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 24, 29% 
Seaside 
n = 60, 71% 
Total 
84 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
10 
6.3 
41.7% 
12 
15.7 
20.0% 
22 
 
26.2 
5.3 
n/a 
3 0.150 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
9.1 
25.0% 
26 
22.9 
43.3% 
32 
 
38.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
6.6 
29.2% 
16 
16.4 
26.7% 
23 
 
27.4 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
2.0 
4.2% 
6 
5.0 
10.0% 
7 
 
8.3 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
6.6 
33.3% 
15 
16.4 
25.0% 
23 
 
27.4 
1.2 
n/a 
3 0.762 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.4 
37.5% 
24 
23.6 
40.0% 
33 
 
39.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
6.0 
25.0% 
15 
15.0 
25.0% 
21 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
2.0 
4.2% 
6 
5.0 
10.0% 
7 
 
8.3 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
10 
5.7 
41.7% 
10 
14.3 
16.7% 
20 
 
23.8 
5.9 
n/a 
3 0.114 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
8.9 
29.2% 
24 
22.1 
40.0% 
31 
 
36.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
5..7 
16.7% 
16 
14.3 
26.7% 
20 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
3 
3.7 
12.5% 
10 
9.3 
16.7% 
13 
 
15.5 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
11 
6.9 
45.8% 
13 
17.1 
21.7% 
24 
 
28.6 
6.2 
n/a 
3 0.100 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
8.0 
25.0% 
22 
20.0 
36.7% 
28 
 
33.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
6.0 
25.0% 
15 
15.0 
25.0% 
21 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
3.1 
4.2% 
10 
7.9 
16.7% 
11 
 
13.1 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
4.3 
29.2% 
8 
10.7 
13.3% 
15 
 
17.9 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
9.4 
33.3% 
25 
23.6 
41.7% 
33 
 
39.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
5.7 
25.0% 
14 
14.3 
23.3% 
20 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
3 
4.6 
13 
11.4 
16 
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% within district 12.5% 21.7% 19.0 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
4.6 
33.3% 
8 
11.4 
13.3% 
16 
 
19.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.1 
37.5% 
23 
22.9 
38.3% 
32 
 
38.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
6.3 
16.7% 
18 
15.7 
30.0% 
22 
 
26.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
3 
4.0 
12.5% 
11 
10.0 
18.3% 
14 
 
16.7 
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Table A8: Coastal v Seaside, 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 24, 29% 
Seaside 
n = 60, 71% 
Total 
84 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
6.3 
37.5% 
13 
15.7 
21.7% 
22 
 
26.2 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
10.6 
37.5% 
28 
26.4 
46.7% 
37 
 
44.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
5 
5.4 
20.8% 
14 
13.6 
23.3% 
19 
 
22.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
1.7 
4.2% 
5 
4.3 
8.3% 
6 
 
7.1 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
6.6 
33.3% 
15 
16.4 
25.0% 
23 
 
27.4 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
11 
10.6 
45.8% 
26 
26.4 
43.3% 
37 
 
44.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
5.4 
16.7% 
15 
13.6 
25.0% 
19 
 
22.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
1.4 
4.2% 
4 
3.6 
6.7% 
5 
 
6.0 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
10 
5.4 
41.7% 
9 
13.6 
15.0% 
19 
 
22.6 
7.2 
n/a 
3 0.064 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
9.4 
33.3% 
25 
23.6 
41.7% 
33 
 
39.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
5.7 
16.7% 
16 
14.3 
26.7% 
20 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
2 
3.4 
8.3% 
10 
8.6 
16.7% 
12 
 
14.3 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
11 
7.7 
45.8% 
16 
19.3 
26.7% 
27 
 
32.1 
4.1 
n/a 
3 0.244 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
7.4 
29.2% 
19 
18.6 
31.7% 
26 
 
31.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
5 
5.7 
20.8% 
15 
14.3 
25.0% 
20 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
3.1 
4.2% 
10 
7.9 
16.7% 
11 
 
13.1 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
4.3 
29.2% 
8 
10.7 
13.3% 
15 
 
17.9 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
9.1 
29.2% 
25 
22.9 
41.7% 
32 
 
38.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
6.3 
33.3% 
14 
15.7 
23.3% 
22 
 
26.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
2 
4.3 
13 
10.7 
15 
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% within district 8.3% 21.7% 17.9 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
4.6 
33.3% 
8 
11.4 
13.3% 
16 
 
19.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.7 
37.5% 
25 
24.3 
41.7% 
34 
 
40.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
5 
5.4 
20.8% 
14 
13.6 
23.3% 
19 
 
22.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
2 
4.3 
8.3% 
13 
10.7 
21.7% 
15 
 
17.9 
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Table A9: Coastal v Seaside, 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 22, 29% 
Seaside 
n = 53, 71% 
Total 
75 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
5.3 
31.8% 
11 
12.7 
20.8% 
18 
 
24.0 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
10.3 
40.9% 
26 
24.7 
49.1% 
35 
 
46.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
5 
5.0 
22.7% 
12 
12.0 
22.6% 
17 
 
22.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
1.5 
4.5% 
4 
3.5 
7.5% 
5 
 
6.7 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
6.2 
36.4% 
13 
14.8 
24.5% 
21 
 
28.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.7 
40.9% 
24 
23.3 
45.3% 
33 
 
44.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
4.7 
18.2% 
12 
11.3 
22.6% 
16 
 
21.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
1.5 
4.5% 
4 
3.5 
7.5% 
5 
 
6.7 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
4.4 
31.8% 
8 
10.6 
15.1% 
15 
 
20.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
9.7 
36.4% 
25 
23.3 
47.2% 
33 
 
44.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
5 
4.4 
22.7% 
10 
10.6 
18.9% 
15 
 
20.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
2 
3.5 
9.1% 
10 
8.5 
18.9% 
12 
 
16.0 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
7.3 
40.9% 
16 
17.7 
30.2% 
25 
 
33.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
6.7 
27.3% 
17 
16.3 
32.1% 
23 
 
30.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
4.7 
27.3% 
10 
11.3 
18.9% 
16 
 
21.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
3.2 
4.5% 
10 
7.8 
18.9% 
11 
 
14.7 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
3.8 
27.3% 
7 
9.2 
13.2% 
13 
 
17.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
8.8 
31.8% 
23 
21.2 
43.4% 
30 
 
40.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
5.3 
27.3% 
12 
12.7 
22.6% 
18 
 
24.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
3 
4.1 
11 
9.9 
14 
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% within district 13.6% 20.8% 18.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
4.1 
31.8% 
7 
9.9 
13.2% 
14 
 
18.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
8.8 
31.8% 
23 
21.2 
43.4% 
30 
 
40.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
4.7 
27.3% 
10 
11.3 
18.9% 
16 
 
21.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
2 
4.4 
9.1% 
13 
10.6 
24.5% 
15 
 
20.0 
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Table A10: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 87% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 13% 
Total 
309 
χ2  
C.V  
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
66.4 
24.4% 
10 
9.6 
25.6% 
76 
 
24.6 
26.4 
.292 
3 0.000*** 
 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
57 
68.2 
21.1% 
21 
9.8 
53.8% 
78 
 
25.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
64.7 
24.4% 
8 
9.3 
20.5% 
74 
 
23.9 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
81 
70.8 
30.0% 
0 
10.2 
0.0% 
81 
 
26.2 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
65 
67.3 
24.1% 
12 
9.7 
30.8% 
77 
 
24.9 
21.5 
.264 
3 0.000*** 
 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
64.7 
20.7% 
18 
9.3 
46.2% 
74 
 
23.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
68 
67.3 
25.2% 
9 
9.7 
23.1% 
77 
 
24.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
81 
70.8 
30.0% 
0 
10.2 
0.0% 
81 
 
26.2 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
66.4 
24.8% 
9 
9.6 
23.1% 
77 
 
24.9 
19.5 
.251 
 
3 0.000*** 
 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
58 
68.2 
21.5% 
20 
9.8 
51.3% 
78 
 
25.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
67.3 
25.6% 
8 
9.7 
20.5% 
77 
 
24.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
68.2 
28.1% 
2 
9.8 
5.1% 
77 
 
24.9 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
64 
65.5 
23.7% 
11 
9.5 
28.2% 
75 
 
24.3 
16.9 
.234 
 
3 0.001*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
61 
69.0 
22.6% 
18 
10.0 
46.2% 
79 
 
25.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
67 
66.4 
24.8% 
9 
9.6 
23.1% 
77 
 
24.9 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
78 
69.0 
28.9% 
1 
10.0 
2.6% 
78 
 
25.2 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
73 
70.8 
27.0% 
8 
10.2 
20.5% 
81 
 
26.2 
17.5 
.238 
3 0.001*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
66.4 
20.7% 
20 
9.6 
51.3% 
76 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
65.5 
25.6% 
6 
9.5 
15.4% 
75 
 
24.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
72 
67.3 
26.7% 
5 
9.7 
12.8% 
77 
 
24.9 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
72 
69.0 
26.7% 
7 
10.0 
17.9% 
79 
 
25.6 
17.6 
.239 
3 0.001*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
57 
67.3 
21.1% 
20 
9.7 
51.3% 
77 
 
24.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
65.5 
24.8% 
8 
9.5 
20.5% 
75 
 
24.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
74 
68.2 
27.4% 
4 
9.8 
10.3% 
78 
 
25.2 
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Table A11: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 270, 87% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 13% 
Total 
309 
χ2  
C.V 
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
66 
67.3 
24.4% 
11 
9.7 
28.2% 
77 
 
24.9 
27.4 
.298 
3 0.000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
62.9 
19.3% 
20 
9.1 
51.3% 
72 
 
23.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
68.2 
25.9% 
8 
9.8 
20.5% 
78 
 
25.2 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
82 
71.7 
30.4% 
0 
10.3 
0.0% 
82 
 
26.5 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
65 
67.3 
24.1% 
12 
9.7 
30.8% 
77 
 
24.9 
25.8 
.289 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
52 
62.0 
19.3% 
19 
9.0 
48.7% 
71 
 
23.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
68.2 
25.9% 
8 
9.8 
20.5% 
78 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
83 
72.5 
30.7% 
0 
10.5 
0.0% 
83 
 
26.9 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
67.3 
25.6% 
8 
9.7 
20.5% 
77 
 
24.9 
22.2 
.268 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
56 
66.4 
20.7% 
20 
9.6 
51.3% 
76 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
69.0 
25.6% 
10 
10.0 
25.6% 
79 
 
25.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
76 
67.3 
28.1% 
1 
9.7 
2.6% 
77 
 
24.9 
Local 
concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
61 
65.5 
22.6% 
14 
9.5 
35.9% 
75 
 
24.3 
14.7 
.218 
3 0.002** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
63 
68.2 
23.3% 
15 
9.8 
38.5% 
78 
 
25.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
69 
68.2 
25.6% 
9 
9.8 
23.1% 
78 
 
25.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
77 
68.2 
28.5% 
1 
9.8 
2.6% 
78 
 
25.2 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
73 
70.8 
27.0% 
8 
10.2 
20.5% 
81 
 
26.2 
16.9 
.234 
3 0.001*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
57 
67.3 
21.1% 
20 
9.7 
51.3% 
77 
 
24.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
67 
62.9 
24.8% 
5 
9.1 
12.8% 
72 
 
23.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
73 
69.0 
6 
10.0 
79 
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% within district 27.0% 15.4% 25.6 
Employment 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
72 
69.9 
26.7% 
8 
10.1 
20.5% 
80 
 
25.9 
18.6 
.246 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
55 
65.5 
20.4% 
20 
9.5 
51.3% 
75 
 
24.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
70 
67.3 
25.9% 
7 
9.7 
17.9% 
77 
 
24.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
73 
67.3 
27.0% 
4 
9.7 
10.3% 
77 
 
24.9 
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Table A12: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2, 
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 251, 87% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 37, 13% 
Total 
288 
χ2  
C.V  
df P 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
63 
63.6 
25.1% 
10 
9.4 
27.0% 
73 
 
25.3 
29.1 
.318 
3 0.000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
47 
58.4 
18.7% 
20 
8.6 
54.1% 
67 
 
23.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
65 
62.8 
25.9% 
7 
9.3 
18.9% 
72 
 
25.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
66.2 
30.3% 
0 
9.8 
0.0% 
76 
 
26.4 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
60 
62.8 
23.9% 
12 
9.3 
32.4% 
72 
 
25.0 
24.5 
.292 
 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
49 
58.4 
19.5% 
18 
8.6 
48.6% 
67 
 
23.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
63.6 
26.3% 
7 
9.4 
18.9% 
73 
 
25.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
76 
66.2 
30.3% 
0 
9.8 
0.0% 
76 
 
26.4 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
63.6 
26.3% 
7 
9.4 
18.9% 
73 
 
25.3 
29.3 
.319 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
49 
61.9 
19.5% 
22 
9.1 
59.5% 
71 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
63.6 
26.7% 
6 
9.4 
16.2% 
73 
 
25.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
69 
61.9 
27.5% 
2 
9.1 
5.4% 
71 
 
24.7 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
56 
61.0 
22.3% 
14 
9.0 
37.8% 
70 
 
24.3 
14.6 
.226 
3 0.002** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
59 
64.5 
23.5% 
15 
9.5 
40.5% 
74 
 
25.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
66 
62.8 
26.3% 
6 
9.3 
16.2% 
72 
 
25.0 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
70 
62.8 
27.9% 
2 
9.3 
5.4% 
72 
 
25.0 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
68 
65.4 
27.1% 
7 
9.6 
18.9% 
75 
 
26.0 
19.3 
.259 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
62.8 
20.7% 
20 
9.3 
54.1% 
72 
 
25.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
64 
60.1 
25.5% 
5 
8.9 
13.5% 
69 
 
24.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
62.8 
26.7% 
5 
9.3 
13.5% 
72 
 
25.0 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
67 
64.5 
26.7% 
7 
9.5 
18.9% 
74 
 
25.7 
19.5 
.261 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
52 
62.8 
20.7% 
20 
9.3 
54.1% 
72 
 
25.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
62.8 
26.3% 
6 
9.3 
16.2% 
72 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
66 
61.0 
26.3% 
4 
9.0 
10.8% 
70 
 
24.3 
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Table A13: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 24, 38% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 62% 
Total 
63 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
10 
7.6 
41.7% 
10 
12.4 
25.6% 
20 
 
31.7 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
10.3 
25.0% 
21 
16.7 
53.8% 
27 
 
42.9 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.7 
29.2% 
8 
9.3 
20.5% 
15 
 
23.8 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.2% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.6 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
7.6 
33.3% 
12 
12.4 
30.8% 
20 
 
31.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
10.3 
37.5% 
18 
16.7 
46.2% 
27 
 
42.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
5.7 
25.0% 
9 
9.3 
23.1% 
15 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.2% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.6 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
10 
7.2 
41.7% 
9 
11.8 
23.1% 
19 
 
30.2 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
10.3 
29.2% 
20 
16.7 
51.3% 
27 
 
42.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
4.6 
16.7% 
8 
7.4 
20.5% 
12 
 
19.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
13 
1.9 
12.5% 
2 
3.1 
5.1% 
5 
 
7.9 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
11 
8.4 
45.8% 
11 
13.6 
28.2% 
22 
 
34.9 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
9.1 
25.0% 
18 
14.9 
46.2% 
24 
 
38.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
6 
5.7 
25.0% 
9 
9.3 
23.1% 
15 
 
23.8 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.8 
4.2% 
1 
1.2 
2.6% 
2 
 
3.2 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.7 
29.2% 
8 
9.3 
20.5% 
15 
 
23.8 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
10.7 
33.3% 
20 
17.3 
51.3% 
28 
 
44.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
4.6 
25.0% 
6 
7.4 
15.4% 
12 
 
19.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
3 
3.0 
12.5% 
5 
5.0 
12.8% 
8 
 
12.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
5.7 
33.3% 
7 
9.3 
17.9% 
15 
 
23.8 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
11.0 
37.5% 
20 
18.0 
51.3% 
29 
 
46.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
4.6 
16.7% 
8 
7.4 
20.5% 
12 
 
19.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
3 
2.7 
12.5% 
4 
4.3 
10.3% 
7 
 
11.1 
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Table A14: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 24, 38% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 62% 
Total 
63 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
7.6 
37.5% 
11 
12.4 
28.2% 
20 
 
31.7 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
11.0 
37.5% 
20 
18.0 
51.3% 
29 
 
46.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
5.0 
20.8% 
8 
8.0 
20.5% 
13 
 
20.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.2% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.6 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
7.6 
33.3% 
12 
12.4 
30.8% 
20 
 
31.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
11 
11.4 
45.8% 
19 
18.6 
48.7% 
30 
 
47.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
4.6 
16.7% 
8 
7.4 
20.5% 
12 
 
19.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.2% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.6 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
10 
6.9 
41..7% 
8 
11.1 
20.5% 
18 
 
28.6 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
10.7 
33.3% 
20 
17.3 
51.3% 
28 
 
44.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
5.3 
16.7% 
10 
8.7 
25.6% 
14 
 
22.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
1.1 
8.3% 
1 
1.9 
2.6% 
3 
 
4.8 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
11 
9.5 
45.8% 
14 
15.5 
35.9% 
25 
 
39.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
8.4 
29.2% 
15 
13.6 
38.5% 
22 
 
34.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
5 
5.3 
20.8% 
9 
8.7 
23.1% 
14 
 
22.2 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.8 
4.2% 
1 
1.2 
2.6% 
2 
 
3.2 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.7 
29.2% 
8 
9.3 
20.5% 
15 
 
23.8 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
10.3 
29.2% 
20 
16.7 
51.3% 
27 
 
42.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
5.0 
33.3% 
5 
8.0 
12.8% 
13 
 
20.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
3.0 
8.3% 
6 
5.0 
15.4% 
8 
 
12.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
6.1 
33.3% 
8 
9.9 
20.5% 
16 
 
25.4 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
11.0 
37.5% 
20 
18.0 
51.3% 
29 
 
46.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
4.6 
20.8% 
7 
7.4 
17.9% 
12 
 
19.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
2.3 
8.3% 
4 
3.7 
10.3% 
6 
 
9.5 
  
366 
 
 
 
Table A15: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 22, 37% 
Seaside (+R) 
n = 37, 63% 
Total 
59 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
6.3 
31.8% 
10 
10.7 
27.0% 
17 
 
28.8 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
10.8 
40.9% 
20 
18.2 
54.1% 
29 
 
49.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
4.5 
22.7% 
7 
7.5 
18.9% 
12 
 
20.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.5% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.7 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
7.5 
36.4% 
12 
12.5 
32.4% 
20 
 
33.9 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
10.1 
40.9% 
18 
16.9 
48.6% 
27 
 
45.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
4.1 
18.2% 
7 
6.9 
18.9% 
11 
 
18.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
0.4 
4.5% 
0 
0.6 
0.0% 
1 
 
1.7 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.2 
31.8% 
7 
8.8 
18.9% 
14 
 
23.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
11.2 
36.4% 
22 
18.8 
59.5% 
30 
 
50.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
4.1 
22.7% 
6 
6.9 
16.2% 
11 
 
18.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
1.5 
9.1% 
2 
2.5 
5.4% 
4 
 
6.8 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
9 
8.6 
40.9% 
14 
14.4 
37.8% 
23 
 
39.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
7.8 
27.3% 
15 
13.2 
40.5% 
21 
 
35.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
6 
4.5 
27.3% 
6 
7.5 
16.2% 
12 
 
20.3 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
1.1 
4.5% 
2 
1.9 
5.4% 
3 
 
5.1 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
4.8 
27.3% 
7 
8.2 
18.9% 
13 
 
22.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
10.1 
31.8% 
20 
16.9 
54.1% 
27 
 
45.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
4.1 
27.3% 
5 
6.9 
13.5% 
11 
 
18.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
3 
3.0 
13.6% 
5 
5.0 
13.5% 
8 
 
13.6 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.2 
31.8% 
7 
8.8 
18.9% 
14 
 
23.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
10.1 
31.8% 
20 
16.9 
54.1% 
27 
 
45.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
4.5 
27.3% 
6 
7.5 
16.2% 
12 
 
20.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
2.2 
9.1% 
4 
3.8 
10.8% 
6 
 
10.2 
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Table A16: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2004 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 65% 
Seaside (-R) 
n = 21, 35% 
Total 
60 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
10 
7.8 
25.6% 
2 
4.2 
9.5% 
12 
 
20.0 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
21 
16.9 
53.8% 
5 
9.1 
23.8% 
26 
 
43.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
10.4 
20.5% 
8 
5.6 
38.1% 
16 
 
26.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
0 
3.9 
0.0% 
6 
2.1 
28.6% 
6 
 
10.0 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
12 
9.8 
30.8% 
3 
5.3 
14.3% 
15 
 
25.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
18 
15.6 
46.2% 
6 
8.4 
28.6% 
24 
 
40.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.8 
23.1% 
6 
5.3 
28.6% 
15 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
0 
3.9 
0.0% 
6 
2.1 
28.6% 
6 
 
10.0 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
6.5 
23.1% 
1 
3.5 
4.8% 
10 
 
16.7 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
20 
15.6 
51.3% 
4 
8.4 
19.0% 
24 
 
40.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
10.4 
20.5% 
8 
5.6 
38.1% 
16 
 
26.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
2 
6.5 
5.1% 
8 
3.5 
38.1% 
10 
 
16.7 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
11 
8.5 
28.2% 
2 
4.6 
9.5% 
13 
 
21.7% 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
18 
14.3 
46.2% 
4 
7.7 
19.0% 
22 
 
36.7% 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
9 
9.8 
23.1% 
6 
5.3 
28.6% 
15 
 
25.0% 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
1 
6.5 
2.6% 
9 
3.5 
42.9% 
10 
 
16.7% 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
5.2 
20.5% 
0 
2.8 
0.0% 
8 
 
13.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
20 
16.3 
51.3% 
5 
8.8 
23.8% 
25 
 
41.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
6 
9.1 
15.4% 
8 
4.9 
38.1% 
14 
 
23.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
5 
8.5 
8 
4.6 
13 
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% within district 12.8% 38.1% 21.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
7 
5.2 
17.9% 
1 
2.8 
4.8% 
8 
 
13.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
20 
15.0 
51.3% 
3 
8.1 
14.3% 
23 
 
38.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
8 
11.7 
20.5% 
10 
6.3 
47.6% 
18 
 
30.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within district 
4 
7.2 
10.3% 
7 
3.9 
33.3% 
11 
 
18.3 
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Table A17: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2007 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (+R) 
n = 39, 65% 
Seaside (-R) 
n = 21, 35% 
Total 
60 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
11 
8.5 
28.2% 
2 
4.6 
9.5% 
13 
 
21.7 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
18.2 
51.3% 
8 
9.8 
38.1% 
28 
 
46.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
9.1 
20.5% 
6 
4.9 
28.6% 
14 
 
23.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
0 
3.3 
0.0% 
5 
1.8 
23.8% 
5 
 
8.3 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
12 
9.8 
30.8% 
3 
5.3 
14.3% 
15 
 
25.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
19 
16.9 
48.7% 
7 
9.1 
33.3% 
26 
 
43.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
9.8 
20.5% 
7 
5.3 
33.3% 
15 
 
25.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
0 
2.6 
0.0% 
4 
1.4 
19.0% 
4 
 
6.7 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
5.9 
20.5% 
1 
3.2 
4.8% 
9 
 
15.0 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
16.3 
51.3% 
5 
8.8 
23.8% 
25 
 
41,7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
10 
10.4 
25.6% 
6 
5.6 
28.6% 
16 
 
26.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
6.5 
2.6% 
9 
3.5 
42.9% 
10 
 
16.7 
Local 
concentration rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
14 
10.4 
35.9% 
2 
5.6 
9.5% 
16 
 
26.7 
18.6 
.557 
3 0.000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
15 
12.4 
38.5% 
4 
6.7 
19.0% 
19 
 
31.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
9 
9.8 
23.1% 
6 
5.3 
28.6% 
15 
 
25.0 
  
371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
1 
6.5 
2.6% 
9 
3.5 
42.9% 
10 
 
16.7 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
5.2 
20.5% 
0 
2.8 
0.0% 
8 
 
13.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
16.3 
51.3% 
5 
8.8 
23.8% 
25 
 
41.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
9.1 
12.8% 
9 
4.9 
42.9% 
14 
 
23.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
8.5 
15.4% 
7 
4.6 
33.3% 
13 
 
21.7 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
8 
5.2 
20.5% 
0 
2.8 
0.0% 
8 
 
13.3 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
16.3 
51.3% 
5 
8.8 
23.8% 
25 
 
41.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
9.1 
17.9% 
7 
4.9 
33.3% 
14 
 
23.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
8.5 
10.3% 
9 
4.6 
42.9% 
13 
 
21.7 
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Table A18: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2010 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 District type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (+R) 
n = 37, 70% 
Seaside (-R) 
n = 16, 30% 
Total 
53 
χ2 
C.V   
df p 
Average rank of 
LSOA scores 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
10 
7.7 
27.0% 
1 
3.3 
6.3% 
11 
 
20.8 
Inv.   
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
18.2 
54.1% 
6 
7.8 
37.5% 
26 
 
49.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
8.4 
18.9% 
5 
3.6 
31.3% 
12 
 
22.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
0 
2.8 
0.0% 
4 
1.2 
25.0% 
4 
 
7.5 
Average rank of 
LSOA ranks 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
12 
9.1 
32.4% 
1 
3.9 
6.3% 
13 
 
24.5 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
18 
16.8 
48.6% 
6 
7.2 
37.5% 
24 
 
45.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
8.4 
18.9% 
5 
3.6 
31.3% 
12 
 
22.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
0 
2.8 
0.0% 
4 
1.2 
25.0% 
4 
 
7.5 
Extent rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
5.6 
18.9% 
1 
2.4 
6.3% 
8 
 
15.1 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
22 
17.5 
59.5% 
3 
7.5 
18.8% 
25 
 
47.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
7.0 
16,2% 
4 
3.0 
25.0% 
10 
 
18.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
7.0 
5.4% 
8 
3.0 
50.0% 
10 
 
18.9 
Local concentration 
rank 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
14 
11.2 
37.8% 
2 
4.8 
12.5% 
16 
 
30.2 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
15 
11.9 
40.5% 
2 
5.1 
12.5% 
17 
 
32.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
6 
7.0 
16.2% 
4 
3.0 
25.0% 
10 
 
18.9 
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% within 
district 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
2 
7.0 
5.4% 
8 
3.0 
50.0% 
10 
 
18.9 
Income rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
4.9 
18.9% 
0 
2.1 
0.0% 
7 
 
13.2 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
16.1 
54.1% 
3 
6.9 
18.8% 
23 
 
43.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
8.4 
13.5% 
7 
3.6 
43.8% 
12 
 
22.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
5 
7.7 
13.5% 
6 
3.3 
37.5% 
11 
 
20.8 
Employment rank MD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
7 
4.9 
18.9% 
0 
2.1 
0.0% 
7 
 
13.2 
Inv.   
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
20 
16.1 
54.1% 
3 
6.9 
18.8% 
23 
 
43.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
6 
7.0 
16.2% 
4 
3.0 
25.0% 
10 
 
18.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within 
district 
4 
9.1 
10.8% 
9 
3.9 
56.3% 
13 
 
24.5 
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Table A19: Average rank of LSOA scores 
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD Blackpool 24 NW Blackpool 12 NW Blackpool 6 NW 
South Tyneside 27 NE Hastings 31 SE Hastings 19 SE 
Hastings 38 SE Penwith 36 SW Thanet 49 SE 
Wirral 48 NW South Tyneside 38 NE South Tyneside 52 NE 
Penwith 56 SW Great Yarmouth 58 E Great Yarmouth 54 E 
Great Yarmouth 70 E Wirral 60 NW Wirral 60 NW 
Sefton 78 NW Thanet 65 SE Torbay 61 SW 
Brighton and Hove 83 SE Torbay 71 SW Brighton and Hove 66 SE 
Thanet 85 SE Brighton and Hove 79 SE East Lindsey 73 EM 
Portsmouth 88 SE Sefton 83 NW Portsmouth 76 SE 
   East Lindsey 88 EM    
AA East Lindsey 89 EM Restormel 89 SW Eastbourne 84 SE 
Scarborough 91 Y&H Portsmouth 93 SE Scarborough 85 Y&H 
Restormel 93 SW Scarborough 97 Y&H Tendring 86 E 
Torbay 94 SW Tendring 103 E West Somerset 90 SW 
Bournemouth 95 SW Eastbourne 104 SE Sefton 92 NW 
Tendring 103 E West Somerset 106 SW Weymouth & Port. 94 SW 
Lancaster 107 NW Bournemouth 108 SW Shepway 97 SE 
West Somerset 110 SW Southend-on-Sea 111 E Bournemouth 102 SW 
Waveney 113 E Waveney 114 E Southend-on-Sea 106 E 
Southend-on-Sea 114 E Lancaster 117 NW Cornwall 110 SW 
Eastbourne 117 SE Carrick 120 SW Waveney 115 E 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 124 NE Shepway 123 SE Lancaster 116 NW 
Weymouth & Port. 125 SW Weymouth & Port. 127 SW Isle of Wight 126 SE 
Isle of Wight 126 SE Berwick-upon-Tweed 133 NE Dover 127 SE 
Shepway 131 SE Isle of Wight 134 SE Northumberland 135 NE 
North Devon 133 SW North Devon 146 SW North Devon 137 SW 
Carrick 149 SW Dover 153 SE Rother 139 SE 
Dover 154 SE Rother 166 SE Sedgemoor 152 SW 
Wyre 161 NW Sedgemoor 169 SW Arun 154 SE 
Sedgemoor 169 SW Wyre 170 NW Wyre 163 NW 
Teignbridge 177 SW       
BA Canterbury 190 SE Teignbridge 179 SW Canterbury 166 SE 
Rother 191 SE Arun 187 SE Teignbridge 184 SW 
Arun 205 SE Canterbury 198 SE North Somerset 201 SW 
North Somerset 228 SW North Somerset 215 SW East Devon 215 SW 
Fylde 240 NW Christchurch 220 SW Purbeck 218 SW 
East Devon 246 SW East Devon 238 SW Christchurch 230 SW 
Christchurch 247 SW Purbeck 241 SW Fylde 236 NW 
Purbeck 248 SW Fylde 251 NW    
LD    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
375 
 
 
 
Table A20: Average rank of LSOA ranks  
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD Blackpool 26 NW Blackpool 18 NW Blackpool 10 NW 
South Tyneside 28 NE Penwith 21 SW Hastings 23 SE 
Penwith 34 SW Hastings 29 SE West Somerset 45 SW 
Hastings 39 SE South Tyneside 37 NE South Tyneside 47 NE 
Great Yarmouth 71 E Great Yarmouth 55 E Torbay 49 SW 
Restormel 72 SW Torbay 57 SW Thanet 50 SE 
Brighton and Hove 74 SE Restormel 60 SW Great Yarmouth 57 E 
Wirral 75 NW Thanet 62 SE East Lindsey 58 EM 
East Lindsey 78 EM West Somerset 64 SW Brighton and Hove 67 SE 
West Somerset 79 SW Brighton and Hove 77 SE Eastbourne 68 SE 
Thanet 83 SE East Lindsey 82 EM Portsmouth 76 SE 
Portsmouth 88 SE Eastbourne 88 SE Tendring 81 E 
AA Torbay 89 SW Tendring 91 E Cornwall 82 SW 
Bournemouth 96 SW Portsmouth 92 SE Scarborough 83 Y&H 
Tendring 98 E Wirral 95 NW Weymouth & Port.  88 SW 
Sefton 99 NW Carrick 100 SW Shepway 89 SE 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 100 NE Scarborough 103 Y&H Bournemouth 96 SW 
Scarborough 102 Y&H Berwick-upon-Tweed 104 NE Wirral 103 NW 
Isle of Wight 108 SE Sefton 107 NW Isle of Wight 106 SE 
Eastbourne 113 SE Bournemouth 108 SW Waveney 112 E 
Waveney 118 E Isle of Wight 110 SE Sefton 114 NW 
Weymouth and Port. 119 SW Waveney 116 E Southend-on-Sea 117 E 
North Devon 120 SW Southend-on-Sea 124 E Dover 122 SE 
Shepway 124 SE Shepway 126 SE North Devon 126 SW 
Lancaster 129 NW Weymouth & Port. 130 SW Rother 132 SE 
Southend-on-Sea 130 E North Devon 133 SW Lancaster 133 NW 
Carrick 132 SW Lancaster 135 NW Northumberland 144 NE 
Dover 141 SE Dover 148 SE Arun 151 SE 
Teignbridge 163 SW Rother 163 SE Sedgemoor 154 SW 
Sedgemoor 172 SW Teignbridge 165 SW Canterbury 163 SE 
   Sedgemoor 169 SW    
BA Wyre 179 NW Wyre 182 NW Teignbridge 175 SW 
Rother 181 SE Arun 186 SE Wyre 185 NW 
Canterbury 188 SE Canterbury 187 SE Purbeck 199 SW 
Arun 203 SE Christchurch 216 SW East Devon 209 SW 
Purbeck 236 SW Purbeck 222 SW North Somerset 224 SW 
Fylde 240 NW East Devon 228 SW Christchurch 228 SW 
East Devon 242 SW North Somerset 242 SW Fylde 235 NW 
North Somerset 244 SW Fylde 249 NW    
Christchurch 249 SW       
LD    
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Table A21: Extent rank 
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD South Tyneside 20 NE Blackpool 24 NW Blackpool 16 NW 
Blackpool 35 NW South Tyneside 29 NE Hastings 24 SE 
Hastings 38 SE Hastings 38 SE South Tyneside 39 NE 
Wirral 49 NW Penwith 53 SW Wirral 54 NW 
Great Yarmouth 72 E Wirral 59 NW Thanet 57 SE 
Sefton 78 NW Great Yarmouth 66 E Great Yarmouth 64 E 
Penwith 81 SW Thanet 71 SE Sefton 80 NW 
Thanet 84 SE Sefton 80 NW    
Brighton and Hove 87 SE       
AA Scarborough 89 Y&H Torbay 89 SW Torbay 82 SW 
Portsmouth 90 SE Brighton and Hove 95 SE Brighton and Hove 84 SE 
East Lindsey 91 EM Scarborough 101 Y&H Weymouth & Port. 90 SW 
Bournemouth 101 SW East Lindsey 103 EM East Lindsey 91 EM 
Lancaster 104 NW Portsmouth 105 SE Portsmouth 93 SE 
Southend-on-Sea 111 E Southend-on-Sea 107 E Southend-on-Sea 97 E 
Torbay 113 SW Lancaster 109 NW Scarborough 99 Y&H 
Waveney 122 E Bournemouth 111 SW Eastbourne 101 SE 
Weymouth & Port. 126 SW Weymouth & Port. 115 SW Lancaster 104 NW 
Tendring 127 E Waveney 118 E Bournemouth 105 SW 
Wyre 134 NW Eastbourne 121 SE Tendring 112 E 
Restormel 137 SW Tendring 126 E Shepway 120 SE 
Eastbourne 142 SE Restormel 135 SW Waveney 123 E 
Shepway 143 SE Wyre 139 NW Northumberland 124 NE 
North Devon 148 SW Shepway 140 SE Dover 131 SE 
Sedgemoor 163 SW Sedgemoor 160 SW Wyre 135 NW 
Isle of Wight 165 SE North Devon 164 SW Sedgemoor 148 SW 
North Somerset 167 SW Dover 166 SE Rother 153 SE 
Dover 168 SE North Somerset 167 SW Cornwall 154 SW 
Carrick 174 SW Carrick 171 SW North Devon 157 SW 
      Arun 158 SE 
      North Somerset 159 SW 
BA Canterbury 187 SE Isle of Wight 178 SE Isle of Wight 165 SE 
Arun 189 SE Arun 181 SE Canterbury 170 SE 
Rother 194 SE Rother 184 SE West Somerset 173 SW 
Teignbridge 198 SW West Somerset 191 SW Teignbridge 192 SW 
West Somerset 212 SW Canterbury 197 SE Christchurch 197 SW 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 221 NE Teignbridge 200 SW Fylde 218 NW 
Christchurch 223 SW Christchurch 201 SW    
Fylde 236 NW Fylde 227 NW    
   Berwick-upon-Tweed 232 NE    
   East Devon 266 SW    
LD East Devon 268 SW Purbeck 309 SW East Devon 250 SW 
Purbeck 298 SW    Purbeck 294 SW 
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Table A22: Local concentration rank 
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD Wirral 8 NW Blackpool 3 NW Blackpool 1 NW 
Blackpool 10 NW Wirral 14 NW Wirral 14 NW 
Great Yarmouth 35 E Hastings 31 SE Hastings 19 SE 
Hastings 39 SE Great Yarmouth 32 E Thanet 26 SE 
Sefton 42 NW Thanet 37 SE Great Yarmouth 30 E 
South Tyneside 58 NE Sefton 46 NW Sefton 43 NW 
Lancaster 62 NW Lancaster 62 NW Portsmouth 52 SE 
Thanet 63 SE South Tyneside 64 NE Brighton and Hove 54 SE 
Scarborough 67 Y&H Portsmouth 66 SE Scarborough 56 Y&H 
Portsmouth 69 SE Scarborough 67 Y&H Lancaster 59 NW 
Brighton and Hove 74 SE Brighton and Hove 70 SE Torbay 61 SW 
   Torbay 75 SW Southend-on-Sea 73 E 
   Southend-on-Sea 83 E Tendring 74 E 
   Waveney 86 E South Tyneside 77 NE 
AA Penwith 89 SW Bournemouth 91 SW Northumberland 87 NE 
Waveney 92 E Penwith 94 SW Waveney 92 E 
Southend-on-Sea 97 E East Lindsey 102 EM East Lindsey 94 EM 
East Lindsey 101 EM Tendring 109 E Bournemouth 96 SW 
Bournemouth 103 SW Wyre 117 NW Weymouth & Port. 99 SW 
Tendring 111 E North Somerset 123 SW Wyre 101 NW 
Wyre 117 NW Weymouth & Port. 125 SW Shepway 102 SE 
Torbay 119 SW Shepway 128 SE North Somerset 115 SW 
Shepway 127 SE Eastbourne 139 SE Eastbourne 116 SE 
North Somerset 132 SW North Devon 152 SW North Devon 146 SW 
Weymouth & Port. 139 SW Restormel 156 SW Dover 147 SE 
North Devon 140 SW Carrick 160 SW Arun 148 SE 
Restormel 144 SW Sedgemoor 164 SW Cornwall 152 SW 
Eastbourne 150 SE Dover 176 SE Sedgemoor 153 SW 
Sedgemoor 165 SW Arun 177 SE Rother 155 SE 
Dover 171 SE       
Carrick 172 SW       
Isle of Wight 175 SE       
BA Arun 185 SE Rother 182 SE Canterbury 170 SE 
Canterbury 190 SE Isle of Wight 184 SE Isle of Wight 178 SE 
Rother 193 SE Teignbridge 195 SW West Somerset 183 SW 
Teignbridge 199 SW Canterbury 199 SE Teignbridge 192 SW 
West Somerset 216 SW Christchurch 202 SW Christchurch 201 SW 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 217 NE West Somerset 203 SW Fylde 220 NW 
Christchurch 233 SW Berwick-upon-Tweed 227 NE    
Fylde 235 NW Fylde 236 NW    
East Devon 259 SW East Devon 266 SW    
LD Purbeck 322 SW Purbeck 321 SW East Devon 246 SW 
      Purbeck 294 SW 
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Table A23: Income rank 
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD Wirral 13 NW Wirral 21 NW Cornwall 9 SW 
Sefton 33 NW Sefton 43 NW Wirral 22 NW 
Brighton and Hove 50 SE Brighton and Hove 51 SE Sefton 45 NW 
South Tyneside 56 NE South Tyneside 68 NE Northumberland 53 NE 
Blackpool 73 NW Blackpool 72 NW Brighton and Hove 57 SE 
Portsmouth 76 SE Portsmouth 77 SE Blackpool 74 NW 
Southend-on-Sea 79 E Southend-on-Sea 81 E South Tyneside 77 NE 
Thanet 88 SE Thanet 88 SE    
AA Bournemouth 91 SW Bournemouth 91 SW Portsmouth 84 SE 
Torbay 95 SW Torbay 93 SW Southend-on-Sea 88 E 
Isle of Wight 101 SE Tendring 99 E Thanet 95 SE 
Lancaster 102 NW North Somerset 101 SW Bournemouth 96 SW 
Tendring 103 E East Lindsey 104 EM Torbay 97 SW 
Hastings 107 SE Isle of Wight 105 SE Tendring 99 E 
North Somerset 109 SW Lancaster 114 NW East Lindsey 107 EM 
East Lindsey 111 EM Great Yarmouth 119 E North Somerset 109 SW 
Great Yarmouth 117 E Waveney 120 E Isle of Wight 116 SE 
Waveney 118 E Hastings 121 SE Hastings 124 SE 
Scarborough 123 Y&H Canterbury 125 SE Great Yarmouth 126 E 
Canterbury 129 SE Scarborough 126 Y&H Lancaster 127 NW 
Shepway 140 SE Arun 134 SE Waveney 128 E 
Dover 141 SE Shepway 147 SE Arun 131 SE 
Arun 143 SE Dover 151 SE Scarborough 133 Y&H 
Restormel 150 SW Teignbridge 152 SW Canterbury 137 SE 
Teignbridge 157 SW Restormel 153 SW Shepway 144 SE 
Eastbourne 168 SE Eastbourne 158 SE Dover 153 SE 
Wyre 170 NW Sedgemoor 162 SW Eastbourne 158 SE 
Sedgemoor 171 SW Wyre 167 NW Teignbridge 162 SW 
BA Penwith 178 SW North Devon 181 SW Sedgemoor 165 SW 
North Devon 179 SW East Devon 185 SW Wyre 174 NW 
Carrick 181 SW Penwith 198 SW North Devon 190 SW 
East Devon 196 SW Carrick 199 SW East Devon 192 SW 
Rother 225 SE Rother 219 SE Rother 202 SE 
Weymouth & Port. 253 SW       
LD Fylde 288 NW Weymouth & Port. 269 SW Weymouth & Port. 255 SW 
West Somerset 331 SW Fylde 296 NW Fylde 280 NW 
Christchurch 332 SW Christchurch 329 SW Christchurch 308 SW 
Purbeck 340 SW West Somerset 330 SW West Somerset 311 SW 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 347 NE Purbeck 341 SW Purbeck 318 SW 
   Berwick-upon-Tweed 348 NE    
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Table A24: Employment rank 
 
 ID2004 ID2007 ID2010 
MD Wirral 8 NW Wirral 8 NW Cornwall 8 SW 
Sefton 15 NW Sefton 23 NW Wirral 10 NW 
Brighton and Hove 43 SE Brighton and Hove 46 SE Sefton 26 NW 
South Tyneside 48 NE South Tyneside 55 NE Northumberland 29 NE 
Blackpool 59 NW Blackpool 61 NW Brighton and Hove 48 SE 
Bournemouth 81 SW Bournemouth 81 SW South Tyneside 62 NE 
Portsmouth 83 SE Portsmouth 82 SE Blackpool 63 NW 
   Southend-on-Sea 88 E    
AA Southend-on-Sea 89 E Thanet 93 SE Portsmouth 88 SE 
Thanet 90 SE Torbay 94 SW Southend-on-Sea 92 E 
Lancaster 93 NW East Lindsey 97 EM Bournemouth 93 SW 
Torbay 94 SW North Somerset 98 SW North Somerset 98 SW 
East Lindsey 98 EM Lancaster 103 NW Torbay 99 SW 
North Somerset 106 SW Tendring 104 E Thanet 101 SE 
Isle of Wight 108 SE Isle of Wight 110 SE East Lindsey 104 EM 
Tendring 109 E Great Yarmouth 116 E Tendring 107 E 
Great Yarmouth 117 E Waveney 121 E Lancaster 113 NW 
Scarborough 123 Y&H Hastings 127 SE Isle of Wight 114 SE 
Waveney 124 E Scarborough 129 Y&H Hastings 126 SE 
Hastings 126 SE Canterbury 141 SE Great Yarmouth 127 E 
Canterbury 147 SE Dover 144 SE Waveney 134 E 
Dover 148 SE Shepway 145 SE Scarborough 135 Y&H 
Wyre 151 NW Arun 153 SE Arun 145 SE 
Restormel 154 SW Restormel 154 SW Canterbury 146 SE 
Shepway 158 SE Wyre 157 NW Shepway 154 SE 
Teignbridge 170 SW Teignbridge 173 SW Dover 157 SE 
Arun 171 SE Sedgemoor 174 SW Wyre 162 NW 
Sedgemoor 176 SW Eastbourne 176 SE Eastbourne 163 SE 
BA Penwith 182 SW Carrick 198 SW Sedgemoor 167 SW 
North Devon 183 SW North Devon 202 SW Teignbridge 171 SW 
Carrick 186 SW East Devon 205 SW East Devon 204 SW 
East Devon 193 SW Penwith 209 SW North Devon 205 SW 
Eastbourne 194 SE Weymouth & Port. 230 SW Rother 218 SE 
Weymouth & Port. 230 SW Rother 239 SE Weymouth & Port. 219 SW 
Fylde 241 NW Fylde 260 NW    
Rother 244 SE       
LD West Somerset 332 SW West Somerset 335 SW Fylde 253 NW 
Christchurch 340 SW Christchurch 337 SW West Somerset 313 SW 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 342 NE Berwick-upon-Tweed 347 NE Christchurch 315 SW 
Purbeck 344 SW Purbeck 348 SW Purbeck 322 SW 
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Table A25: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Overall Index of M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6728 
6662.6 
25.80% 
738 
803.4 
23.50% 
7466 
 
25.6 
393.6 
0.116 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6140 
6430.6 
23.60% 
1066 
775.4 
33.90% 
7206 
 
24.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6207 
6378.8 
23.80% 
941 
769.2 
30.00% 
7148 
 
24.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6973 
6576 
26.80% 
396 
793 
12.60% 
7369 
 
25.2 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6711 
6658.1 
25.80% 
750 
802.9 
23.90% 
7461 
 
25.6 
368.2 
0.112 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6084 
6397.6 
23.40% 
1085 
771.4 
34.50% 
7169 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6281 
6398.4 
24.10% 
889 
771.6 
28.30% 
7170 
 
24.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6972 
6593.9 
26.80% 
417 
795.1 
13.30% 
7389 
 
25.3 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6684 
6651 
25.70% 
769 
802 
24.50% 
7453 
 
25.5 
288.6 
0.099 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6147 
6399.3 
23.60% 
1024 
771.7 
32.60% 
7171 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6296 
6424.3 
24.20% 
903 
774.7 
28.70% 
7199 
 
24.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6921 
6573.4 
26.60% 
445 
792.6 
14.20% 
7366 
 
25.2 
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Table A26: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
21,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Income 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6715 
6665.3 
25.80% 
754 
803.7 
24.00% 
7469 
 
25.6 
391.5 
0.116 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6135 
6419.9 
23.60% 
1059 
774.1 
33.70% 
7194 
 
24.6 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6208 
6376.1 
23.80% 
937 
768.9 
29.80% 
7145 
 
24.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6990 
6586.7 
26.80% 
391 
794.3 
12.40% 
7381 
 
25.3 
Rank of Income 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6765 
6672.4 
26.00% 
712 
804.6 
22.70% 
7477 
 
25.6 
410.7 
0.119 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6118 
6414.5 
23.50% 
1070 
773.5 
34.10% 
7188 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6179 
6369 
23.70% 
958 
768 
30.50% 
7137 
 
24.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6986 
6592.1 
26.80% 
401 
794.9 
12.80% 
7387 
 
25.3 
Rank of Income 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6740 
6676.9 
25.90% 
742 
805.1 
23.60% 
7482 
 
25.6 
363.3 
0.112 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6173 
6435.9 
23.70% 
1039 
776.1 
33.10% 
7212 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6184 
6368.1 
23.70% 
952 
767.9 
30.30% 
7136 
 
24.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6951 
6567.1 
26.70% 
408 
791.9 
13.00% 
7359 
 
25.2 
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Table A27: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6395 
6513.6 
24.60% 
904 
785.4 
28.80% 
7299 
 
25.0 
693.1 
0.154 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6057 
6442.2 
23.30% 
1162 
776.8 
37.00% 
7219 
 
24.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6334 
6401.1 
24.30% 
839 
771.9 
26.70% 
7173 
 
24.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7262 
6691.1 
27.90% 
236 
806.9 
7.50% 
7498 
 
25.7 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6432 
6534.1 
24.70% 
890 
787.9 
28.30% 
7322 
 
25.1 
538.9 
0.136 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6136 
6446.6 
23.60% 
1088 
777.4 
34.60% 
7224 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6296 
6398.4 
24.20% 
874 
771.6 
27.80% 
7170 
 
24.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7184 
6668.8 
27.60% 
289 
804.2 
9.20% 
7473 
 
25.6 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6398 
6543.9 
24.60% 
935 
789.1 
29.80% 
7333 
 
25.1 
485.2 
0.129 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6206 
6439.5 
23.80% 
1010 
776.5 
32.20% 
7216 
 
24.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6274 
6398.4 
24.10% 
896 
771.6 
28.50% 
7170 
 
24.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7170 
6666.2 
27.50% 
300 
803.8 
9.60% 
7470 
 
25.6 
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Table A28: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Health 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6637 
6592.1 
25.50% 
750 
794.9 
23.90% 
7387 
 
25.3 
675.8 
0.152 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6199 
6532.3 
23.80% 
1121 
787.7 
35.70% 
7320 
 
25.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6117 
6372.6 
23.50% 
1024 
768.4 
32.60% 
7141 
 
24.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7095 
6551 
27.20% 
246 
790 
7.80% 
7341 
 
25.1 
Rank of Health 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6588 
6595.7 
25.30% 
803 
795.3 
25.60% 
7391 
 
25.3 
579.9 
0.141 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6215 
6538.5 
23.90% 
1112 
788.5 
35.40% 
7327 
 
25.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6168 
6354.7 
23.70% 
953 
766.3 
30.30% 
7121 
 
24.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7077 
6559.1 
27.20% 
273 
790.9 
8.70% 
7350 
 
25.2 
Rank of Health 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6480 
6560.9 
24.90% 
872 
791.1 
27.80% 
7352 
 
25.2 
547.7 
0.137 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6202 
6493.9 
23.80% 
1075 
783.1 
34.20% 
7277 
 
24.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6228 
6377.9 
23.90% 
919 
769.1 
29.30% 
7147 
 
24.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7138 
6615.3 
27.40% 
275 
797.7 
8.80% 
7413 
 
25.4 
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Table A29: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Education 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6547 
6473.4 
25.10% 
707 
780.6 
22.50% 
7254 
 
24.9 
165.9 
0.075 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6202 
6389.5 
23.80% 
958 
770.5 
30.50% 
7160 
 
24.5 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6334 
6464.5 
24.30% 
910 
779.5 
29.00% 
7244 
 
24.8 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6965 
6720.6 
26.70% 
566 
810.4 
18.00% 
7531 
 
25.8 
Rank of Education 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6482 
6441.3 
24.90% 
736 
776.7 
23.40% 
7218 
 
24.7 
190.0 
0.081 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6163 
6399.3 
23.70% 
1008 
771.7 
32.10% 
7171 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6393 
6465.4 
24.50% 
852 
779.6 
27.10% 
7245 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7010 
6742 
26.90% 
545 
813 
17.40% 
7555 
 
25.9 
Rank of Education 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6424 
6427.9 
24.70% 
779 
775.1 
24.80% 
7203 
 
24.7 
161.6 
0.074 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6201 
6388.6 
23.80% 
958 
770.4 
30.50% 
7159 
 
24.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6408 
6487.7 
24.60% 
862 
782.3 
27.40% 
7270 
 
24.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7015 
6743.8 
26.90% 
542 
813.2 
17.30% 
7557 
 
25.9 
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Table A30: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6641 
6659 
25.50% 
821 
803 
26.10% 
7462 
 
25.6 
59.2 
0.045 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6675 
6574.2 
25.60% 
692 
792.8 
22.00% 
7367 
 
25.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6488 
6412.7 
24.90% 
698 
773.3 
22.20% 
7186 
 
24.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6244 
6402 
24.00% 
930 
772 
29.60% 
7174 
 
24.6 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6655 
6601.9 
25.50% 
743 
796.1 
23.70% 
7398 
 
25.3 
15.7 
0.023 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6509 
6573.4 
25.00% 
857 
792.6 
27.30% 
7366 
 
25.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6420 
6459.1 
24.60% 
818 
778.9 
26.00% 
7238 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6464 
6413.6 
24.80% 
723 
773.4 
23.00% 
7187 
 
24.6 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6639 
6592.1 
25.50% 
748 
794.9 
23.80% 
7387 
 
25.3 
26.3 
0.030 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6569 
6634.9 
25.20% 
866 
800.1 
27.60% 
7435 
 
25.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6361 
6427.9 
24.40% 
842 
775.1 
26.80% 
7203 
 
24.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6479 
6393.1 
24.90% 
685 
770.9 
21.80% 
7164 
 
24.5 
  
386 
 
 
 
Table A31: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7242 
6836.6 
27.80% 
419 
824.4 
13.30% 
7661 
 
26.2 
424.6 
0.121 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6724 
6636.7 
25.80% 
713 
800.3 
22.70% 
7437 
 
25.5 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6235 
6425.2 
23.90% 
965 
774.8 
30.70% 
7200 
 
24.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
5847 
6149.5 
22.40% 
1044 
741.5 
33.20% 
6891 
 
23.6 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7124 
6810.7 
27.30% 
508 
821.3 
16.20% 
7632 
 
26.1 
234.5 
0.090 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6648 
6616.2 
25.50% 
766 
797.8 
24.40% 
7414 
 
25.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6319 
6432.4 
24.30% 
889 
775.6 
28.30% 
7208 
 
24.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
5957 
6188.7 
22.90% 
978 
746.3 
31.10% 
6935 
 
23.8 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
7205 
6832.1 
27.70% 
451 
823.9 
14.40% 
7656 
 
26.2 
487.8 
0.129 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6837 
6695.6 
26.20% 
666 
807.4 
21.20% 
7503 
 
25.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6325 
6430.6 
24.30% 
881 
775.4 
28.00% 
7206 
 
24.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
5681 
6089.7 
21.80% 
1143 
734.3 
36.40% 
6824 
 
23.4 
  
387 
 
 
 
Table A32: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Living environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Inland 
n = 26,048 
89.2 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
10.8% 
Total 
29,189 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6829 
6857.1 
26.20% 
855 
826.9 
27.20% 
7684 
 
26.3 
4.0 
0.012 
3 .252 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6504 
6528.7 
25.00% 
812 
787.3 
25.90% 
7316 
 
25.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6424 
6402.9 
24.70% 
751 
772.1 
23.90% 
7175 
 
24.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6291 
6259.2 
24.20% 
723 
754.8 
23.00% 
7014 
 
24.0 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6613 
6750 
25.40% 
951 
814 
30.30% 
7564 
 
25.9 
72.0 
0.050 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6527 
6593 
25.10% 
861 
795 
27.40% 
7388 
 
25.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6447 
6402.9 
24.80% 
728 
772.1 
23.20% 
7175 
 
24.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6461 
6302.1 
24.80% 
601 
759.9 
19.10% 
7062 
 
24.2 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6549 
6717.9 
25.10% 
979 
810.1 
31.20% 
7528 
 
25.8 
66.7 
0.048 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6568 
6571.6 
25.20% 
796 
792.4 
25.30% 
7364 
 
25.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6491 
6447.5 
24.90% 
734 
777.5 
23.40% 
7225 
 
24.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
6440 
6311 
24.70% 
632 
761 
20.10% 
7072 
 
24.2 
  
388 
 
 
 
Table A33: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Overall Index of M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
553 
518.3 
26.20% 
738 
772.7 
23.50% 
1291 
 
24.6 
66.7 
0.113 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
585 
662.9 
27.80% 
1066 
988.1 
33.90% 
1651 
 
31.5 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
553 
599.8 
26.20% 
941 
894.2 
30.00% 
1494 
 
28.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
416 
326 
19.70% 
396 
486 
12.60% 
812 
 
15.5 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
555 
523.9 
26.30% 
750 
781.1 
23.90% 
1305 
 
24.9 
58.2 
0.105 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
585 
670.5 
27.80% 
1085 
999.5 
34.50% 
1670 
 
31.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
548 
576.9 
26.00% 
889 
860.1 
28.30% 
1437 
 
27.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
419 
335.6 
19.90% 
417 
500.4 
13.30% 
836 
 
15.9 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
557 
532.4 
26.40% 
769 
793.6 
24.50% 
1326 
 
25.3 
64.4 
0.111 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
583 
645.2 
27.70% 
1024 
961.8 
32.60% 
1607 
 
30.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
508 
566.5 
24.10% 
903 
844.5 
28.70% 
1411 
 
26.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
459 
362.9 
21.80% 
445 
541.1 
14.20% 
904 
 
17.2 
  
389 
 
 
 
Table A34: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Income 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
529 
515.1 
25.10% 
754 
767.9 
24.00% 
1283 
 
24.4 
60.4 
0.107 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
613 
671.3 
29.10% 
1059 
1000.7 
33.70% 
1672 
 
31.9 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
547 
595.8 
26.00% 
937 
888.2 
29.80% 
1484 
 
28.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
418 
324.8 
19.80% 
391 
484.2 
12.40% 
809 
 
15.4 
Rank of Income 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
526 
497 
25.00% 
712 
741 
22.70% 
1238 
 
23.6 
88.5 
0.130 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
583 
663.7 
27.70% 
1070 
989.3 
34.10% 
1653 
 
31.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
544 
603 
25.80% 
958 
899 
30.50% 
1502 
 
28.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
454 
343.3 
21.50% 
401 
511.7 
12.80% 
855 
 
16.3 
Rank of Income 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
526 
509.1 
25.00% 
742 
758.9 
23.60% 
1268 
 
24.2 
82.4 
0.125 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
569 
645.6 
27.00% 
1039 
962.4 
33.10% 
1608 
 
30.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
553 
604.2 
26.20% 
952 
900.8 
30.30% 
1505 
 
28.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
459 
348.1 
21.80% 
408 
518.9 
13.00% 
867 
 
16.5 
  
390 
 
 
 
Table A35: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
669 
631.5 
31.80% 
904 
941.5 
28.80% 
1573 
 
30.0 
106.7 
0.143 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
578 
698.6 
27.40% 
1162 
1041.4 
37.00% 
1740 
 
33.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
543 
554.9 
25.80% 
839 
827.1 
26.70% 
1382 
 
26.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
317 
222 
15.00% 
236 
331 
7.50% 
553 
 
10.5 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
654 
619.9 
31.00% 
890 
924.1 
28.30% 
1544 
 
29.4 
75.1 
0.120 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
577 
668.5 
27.40% 
1088 
996.5 
34.60% 
1665 
 
31.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
539 
567.3 
25.60% 
874 
845.7 
27.80% 
1413 
 
26.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
337 
251.3 
16.00% 
289 
374.7 
9.20% 
626 
 
11.9 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
634 
629.9 
30.10% 
935 
939.1 
29.80% 
1569 
 
29.9 
55.6 
0.103 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
587 
641.2 
27.90% 
1010 
955.8 
32.20% 
1597 
 
30.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
546 
578.9 
25.90% 
896 
863.1 
28.50% 
1442 
 
27.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
340 
257 
16.10% 
300 
383 
9.60% 
640 
 
12.2 
  
391 
 
 
 
Table A36: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Health 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
633 
555.3 
30.00% 
750 
827.7 
23.90% 
1383 
 
26.4 
149.2 
0.169 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
576 
681.3 
27.30% 
1121 
1015.7 
35.70% 
1697 
 
32.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
548 
631.1 
26.00% 
1024 
940.9 
32.60% 
1572 
 
30.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
350 
239.3 
16.60% 
246 
356.7 
7.80% 
596 
 
11.4 
Rank of Health 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
625 
573.3 
29.70% 
803 
854.7 
25.60% 
1428 
 
27.2 
126.3 
0.155 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
559 
670.9 
26.50% 
1112 
1000.1 
35.40% 
1671 
 
31.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
554 
605 
26.30% 
953 
902 
30.30% 
1507 
 
28.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
369 
257.8 
17.50% 
273 
384.2 
8.70% 
642 
 
12.2 
Rank of Health 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
654 
612.7 
31.00% 
872 
913.3 
27.80% 
1526 
 
29.1 
101.5 
0.139 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
578 
663.7 
27.40% 
1075 
989.3 
34.20% 
1653 
 
31.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
520 
577.7 
24.70% 
919 
861.3 
29.30% 
1439 
 
27.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
355 
252.9 
16.80% 
275 
377.1 
8.80% 
630 
 
12.0 
  
392 
 
 
 
Table A37: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Education 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
714 
570.5 
33.90% 
707 
850.5 
22.50% 
1421 
 
27.1 
92.0 
0.132 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
618 
632.7 
29.30% 
958 
943.3 
30.50% 
1576 
 
30.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
490 
562.1 
23.30% 
910 
837.9 
29.00% 
1400 
 
26.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
285 
341.7 
13.50% 
566 
509.3 
18.00% 
851 
 
16.2 
Rank of Education 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
732 
589.4 
34.70% 
736 
878.6 
23.40% 
1468 
 
28.0 
83.4 
0.126 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
605 
647.6 
28.70% 
1008 
965.4 
32.10% 
1613 
 
30.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
493 
540 
23.40% 
852 
805 
27.10% 
1345 
 
25.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
277 
330 
13.10% 
545 
492 
17.40% 
822 
 
15.7 
Rank of Education 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
726 
604.2 
34.50% 
779 
900.8 
24.80% 
1505 
 
28.7 
61.3 
0.108 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
604 
627.1 
28.70% 
958 
934.9 
30.50% 
1562 
 
29.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
467 
533.6 
22.20% 
862 
795.4 
27.40% 
1329 
 
25.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
310 
342.1 
14.70% 
542 
509.9 
17.30% 
852 
 
16.2 
  
393 
 
 
 
Table A38: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
242 
426.8 
11.50% 
821 
636.2 
26.10% 
1063 
 
20.3 
181.2 
0.186 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
503 
479.8 
23.90% 
692 
715.2 
22.00% 
1195 
 
22.8 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
659 
544.8 
31.30% 
698 
812.2 
22.20% 
1357 
 
25.9 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
703 
655.6 
33.40% 
930 
977.4 
29.60% 
1633 
 
31.1 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
308 
422 
14.60% 
743 
629 
23.70% 
1051 
 
20.0 
91.1 
0.132 
 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
514 
550.4 
24.40% 
857 
820.6 
27.30% 
1371 
 
26.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
645 
587.4 
30.60% 
818 
875.6 
26.00% 
1463 
 
27.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
640 
547.2 
30.40% 
723 
815.8 
23.00% 
1363 
 
26.0 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
310 
424.8 
14.70% 
748 
633.2 
23.80% 
1058 
 
20.2 
131.2 
0.158 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
466 
534.8 
22.10% 
866 
797.2 
27.60% 
1332 
 
25.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
637 
593.8 
30.20% 
842 
885.2 
26.80% 
1479 
 
28.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
694 
553.6 
32.90% 
685 
825.4 
21.80% 
1379 
 
26.3 
  
394 
 
 
 
Table A39: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
386 
323.2 
18.30% 
419 
481.8 
13.30% 
805 
 
15.3 
68.1 
0.114 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
576 
517.5 
27.30% 
713 
771.5 
22.70% 
1289 
 
24.6 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
640 
644.4 
30.40% 
965 
960.6 
30.70% 
1605 
 
30.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
505 
621.9 
24.00% 
1044 
927.1 
33.20% 
1549 
 
29.5 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
425 
374.6 
20.20% 
508 
558.4 
16.20% 
933 
 
17.8 
47.9 
0.096 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
563 
533.6 
26.70% 
766 
795.4 
24.40% 
1329 
 
25.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
640 
613.9 
30.40% 
889 
915.1 
28.30% 
1529 
 
29.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
479 
585 
22.70% 
978 
872 
31.10% 
1457 
 
27.8 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
398 
340.9 
18.90% 
451 
508.1 
14.40% 
849 
 
16.2 
43.0 
0.091 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
479 
459.7 
22.70% 
666 
685.3 
21.20% 
1145 
 
21.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
631 
607 
29.90% 
881 
905 
28.00% 
1512 
 
28.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
599 
699.4 
28.40% 
1143 
1042.6 
36.40% 
1742 
 
33.2 
  
395 
 
 
 
Table A40: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Living environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Coastal 
n = 2,107 
 40.1 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
59.9% 
Total 
5,248 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
293 
460.9 
13.90% 
855 
687.1 
27.20% 
1148 
 
21.9 
186.3 
0.188 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
457 
509.5 
21.70% 
812 
759.5 
25.90% 
1269 
 
24.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
643 
559.7 
30.50% 
751 
834.3 
23.90% 
1394 
 
26.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
714 
576.9 
33.90% 
723 
860.1 
23.00% 
1437 
 
27.4 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
301 
502.7 
14.30% 
951 
749.3 
30.30% 
1252 
 
23.9 
307.5 
0.242 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
430 
518.3 
20.40%
  
861 
772.7 
27.40% 
1291 
 
24.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
644 
550.8 
30.60% 
728 
821.2 
23.20% 
1372 
 
26.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
732 
535.2 
34.70% 
601 
797.8 
19.10% 
1333 
 
25.4 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
327 
524.3 
15.50% 
979 
781.7 
31.20% 
1306 
 
24.9 
249.7 
0.218 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
446 
498.6 
21.20% 
796 
743.4 
25.30% 
1242 
 
23.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
604 
537.2 
28.70% 
734 
800.8 
23.40% 
1338 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
730 
546.8 
34.60% 
632 
815.2 
20.10% 
1362 
 
26.0 
  
396 
 
 
 
Table A41: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Overall Index of M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
101 
230 
8.50% 
738 
609 
23.50% 
839 
 
19.4 
242.3 
0.237 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
330 
382.6 
27.80% 
1066 
1013.4 
33.90% 
1396 
 
32.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
420 
373 
35.40% 
941 
988 
30.00% 
1361 
 
31.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
335 
200.4 
28.20% 
396 
530.6 
12.60% 
731 
 
16.9 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
104 
234.1 
8.80% 
750 
619.9 
23.90% 
854 
 
19.7 
198.9 
0.214 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
367 
398 
30.90% 
1085 
1054 
34.50% 
1452 
 
33.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
403 
354.1 
34.00% 
889 
937.9 
28.30% 
1292 
 
29.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
312 
199.8 
26.30% 
417 
529.2 
13.30% 
729 
 
16.8 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
110 
240.9 
9.30% 
769 
638.1 
24.50% 
879 
 
20.3 
167.1 
0.197 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
367 
381.3 
30.90% 
1024 
1009.7 
32.60% 
1391 
 
32.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
414 
361 
34.90% 
903 
956 
28.70% 
1317 
 
30.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
295 
202.8 
24.90% 
445 
537.2 
14.20% 
740 
 
17.1 
  
397 
 
 
 
Table A42: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Income 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
122 
240.1 
10.30% 
754 
635.9 
24.00% 
876 
 
20.2 
217.0 
0.224 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
314 
376.3 
26.50% 
1059 
996.7 
33.70% 
1373 
 
31.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
429 
374.4 
36.20% 
937 
991.6 
29.80% 
1366 
 
31.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
321 
195.2 
27.10% 
391 
516.8 
12.40% 
712 
 
16.5 
Rank of Income 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
117 
227.2 
9.90% 
712 
601.8 
22.70% 
829 
 
19.2 
154.1 
0.189 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
350 
389.2 
29.50% 
1070 
1030.8 
34.10% 
1420 
 
32.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
440 
383.2 
37.10% 
958 
1014.8 
30.50% 
1398 
 
32.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
279 
186.4 
23.50% 
401 
493.6 
12.80% 
680 
 
15.7 
Rank of Income 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
112 
234.1 
9.40% 
742 
619.9 
23.60% 
854 
 
19.7 
184.6 
0.207 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
340 
378 
28.70% 
1039 
1001 
33.10% 
1379 
 
31.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
432 
379.3 
36.40% 
952 
1004.7 
30.30% 
1384 
 
32.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
302 
194.6 
25.50% 
408 
515.4 
13.00% 
710 
 
16.4 
  
398 
 
 
 
Table A43: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
152 
289.4 
12.80% 
904 
766.6 
28.80% 
1056 
 
24.4 
358.1 
0.288 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
324 
407.3 
27.30% 
1162 
1078.7 
37.00% 
1486 
 
34.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
405 
341 
34.10% 
839 
903 
26.70% 
1244 
 
28.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
305 
148.3 
25.70% 
236 
392.7 
7.50% 
541 
 
12.5 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
144 
283.4 
12.10% 
890 
750.6 
28.30% 
1034 
 
23.9 
302.2 
0.264 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
320 
385.9 
27.00% 
1088 
1022.1 
34.60% 
1408 
 
32.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
412 
352.5 
34.70% 
874 
933.5 
27.80% 
1286 
 
29.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
310 
164.2 
26.10% 
289 
434.8 
9.20% 
599 
 
13.8 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
153 
298.2 
12.90% 
935 
789.8 
29.80% 
1088 
 
25.1 
282.4 
0.256 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
318 
364 
26.80% 
1010 
964 
32.20% 
1328 
 
30.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
405 
356.6 
34.10% 
896 
944.4 
28.50% 
1301 
 
30.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
310 
167.2 
26.10% 
300 
442.8 
9.60% 
610 
 
14.1 
  
399 
 
 
 
Table A44: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Health 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
100 
233 
8.40% 
750 
617 
23.90% 
850 
 
19.6 
628.9 
0.381 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
225 
368.9 
19.00% 
1121 
977.1 
35.70% 
1346 
 
31.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
432 
399.1 
36.40% 
1024 
1056.9 
32.60% 
1456 
 
33.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
429 
185 
36.20% 
246 
490 
7.80% 
675 
 
15.6 
Rank of Health 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
104 
248.6 
8.80% 
803 
658.4 
25.60% 
907 
 
21.0 
545.8 
0.355 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
235 
369.2 
19.80% 
1112 
977.8 
35.40% 
1347 
 
31.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
446 
383.5 
37.60% 
953 
1015.5 
30.30% 
1399 
 
32.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
401 
184.7 
33.80% 
273 
489.3 
8.70% 
674 
 
15.6 
Rank of Health 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
114 
270.3 
9.60% 
872 
715.7 
27.80% 
986 
 
22.8 
445.3 
0.321 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
266 
367.6 
22.40% 
1075 
973.4 
34.20% 
1341 
 
31.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
454 
376.3 
38.30% 
919 
996.7 
29.30% 
1373 
 
31.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
352 
171.9 
29.70% 
275 
455.1 
8.80% 
627 
 
14.5 
  
400 
 
 
 
Table A45: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-
R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Education score, 
2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
152 
235.4 
12.80% 
707 
623.6 
22.50% 
859 
 
19.9 
70.1 
0.127 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
343 
356.6 
28.90% 
958 
944.4 
30.50% 
1301 
 
30.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
387 
355.5 
32.60% 
910 
941.5 
29.00% 
1297 
 
30.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
304 
238.5 
25.60% 
566 
631.5 
18.00% 
870 
 
20.1 
Rank of 
Education score, 
2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
170 
248.3 
14.30% 
736 
657.7 
23.40% 
906 
 
20.9 
66.0 
0.124 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
345 
370.8 
29.10% 
1008 
982.2 
32.10% 
1353 
 
31.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
383 
338.5 
32.30% 
852 
896.5 
27.10% 
1235 
 
28.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
288 
228.3 
24.30% 
545 
604.7 
17.40% 
833 
 
19.3 
Rank of 
Education score, 
2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
191 
265.9 
16.10% 
779 
704.1 
24.80% 
970 
 
22.4 
44.1 
0.101 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
358 
360.7 
30.20% 
958 
955.3 
30.50% 
1316 
 
30.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
384 
341.5 
32.40% 
862 
904.5 
27.40% 
1246 
 
28.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
253 
217.9 
21.30% 
542 
577.1 
17.30% 
795 
 
18.4 
  
401 
 
 
 
Table A46: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
416 
339.1 
35.10% 
821 
897.9 
26.10% 
1237 
 
28.6 
51.1 
0.109 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
251 
258.5 
21.20% 
692 
684.5 
22.00% 
943 
 
21.8 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
276 
267 
23.30% 
698 
707 
22.20% 
974 
 
22.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
243 
321.5 
20.50% 
930 
851.5 
29.60% 
1173 
 
27.1 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
414 
317.1 
34.90% 
743 
839.9 
23.70% 
1157 
 
26.7 
70.8 
0.128 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
241 
301 
20.30% 
857 
797 
27.30% 
1098 
 
25.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
238 
289.4 
20.10% 
818 
766.6 
26.00% 
1056 
 
24.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
293 
278.5 
24.70% 
723 
737.5 
23.00% 
1016 
 
23.5 
Rank of Housing 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
423 
321 
35.70% 
748 
850 
23.80% 
1171 
 
27.1 
75.8 
0.132 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
220 
297.7 
18.50% 
866 
788.3 
27.60% 
1086 
 
25.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
281 
307.8 
23.70% 
842 
815.2 
26.80% 
1123 
 
26.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
262 
259.6 
22.10% 
685 
687.4 
21.80% 
947 
 
21.9 
  
402 
 
 
 
Table A47: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
73 
134.9 
6.20% 
419 
357.1 
13.30% 
492 
 
11.4 
300.6 
0.264 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
108 
225 
9.10% 
713 
596 
22.70% 
821 
 
19.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
281 
341.5 
23.70% 
965 
904.5 
30.70% 
1246 
 
28.8 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
724 
484.6 
61.00% 
1044 
1283.4 
33.20% 
1768 
 
40.9 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
63 
156.5 
5.30% 
508 
414.5 
16.20% 
571 
 
13.2 
325.6 
0.274 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
144 
249.4 
12.10% 
766 
660.6 
24.40% 
910 
 
21.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
273 
318.5 
23.00% 
889 
843.5 
28.30% 
1162 
 
26.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
706 
461.6 
59.50% 
978 
1222.4 
31.10% 
1684 
 
38.9 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
66 
141.7 
5.60% 
451 
375.3 
14.40% 
517 
 
11.9 
204.1 
0.217 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
139 
220.6 
11.70% 
666 
584.4 
21.20% 
805 
 
18.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
284 
319.3 
23.90% 
881 
845.7 
28.00% 
1165 
 
26.9 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
697 
504.3 
58.80% 
1143 
1335.7 
36.40% 
1840 
 
42.5 
  
403 
 
 
 
Table A48: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Living environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Seaside (-R) 
n = 1,186 
 27.4 % 
Seaside 
(+R) 
n = 3,141 
72.6% 
Total 
4,327 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
143 
273.5 
12.10% 
855 
724.5 
27.20% 
998 
 
23.1 
124.3 
0.170 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
348 
317.9 
29.30% 
812 
842.1 
25.90% 
1160 
 
26.8 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
303 
288.9 
25.50% 
751 
765.1 
23.90% 
1054 
 
24.4 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
392 
305.6 
33.10% 
723 
809.4 
23.00% 
1115 
 
25.8 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
255 
330.6 
21.50% 
951 
875.4 
30.30% 
1206 
 
27.9 
54.8 
0.113 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
303 
319 
25.50% 
861 
845 
27.40% 
1164 
 
26.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
302 
282.3 
25.50% 
728 
747.7 
23.20% 
1030 
 
23.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
326 
254.1 
27.50% 
601 
672.9 
19.10% 
927 
 
21.4 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
265 
341 
22.30% 
979 
903 
31.20% 
1244 
 
28.7 
41.7 
0.098 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
311 
303.4 
26.20% 
796 
803.6 
25.30% 
1107 
 
25.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
292 
281.2 
24.60% 
734 
744.8 
23.40% 
1026 
 
23.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
318 
260.4 
26.80% 
632 
689.6 
20.10% 
950 
 
22.0 
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Table A49: District type LSOAs by National LSOA Index of Multiple Deprivation deciles 
 
 
Index of M.D. decile Inland Coastal Seaside Seaside (-R) Seaside (+R) 
1 10.3 9.7 8.2 3.3 10 
2 10.4 11.1 7.3 3.5 8.8 
3 9.9 10.9 10.3 5.6 12.1 
4 9.5 11.5 12.4 11.7 12.6 
5 9.2 11 14.3 16.1 13.6 
6 9.5 9 13.2 15 12.5 
7 9.7 10.9 11.6 12.6 11.2 
8 10 9.3 10.1 12.6 9.2 
9 10.4 9.3 7.7 9.9 6.9 
10 11.1 7.4 4.8 9.6 3 
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Table A50: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 
‘seaside with resort’ district on IMD, 2010 
 
District Region All LSOAs in 
district 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
10% 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
20% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
10% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
20% 
Blackpool NW 94 35 11 37.2 11.7 
Hastings SE 53 15 9 28.3 17.0 
Wirral NW 207 48 17 23.2 8.2 
Great Yarmouth E 61 13 3 21.3 4.9 
Sefton NW 190 35 12 18.4 6.3 
Thanet SE 84 14 11 16.7 13.1 
Torbay SW 89 12 4 13.5 4.5 
Brighton and Hove SE 164 19 18 11.6 11.0 
Portsmouth SE 123 14 14 11.4 11.4 
Scarborough Y&H 71 8 6 11.3 8.5 
Lancaster NW 89 10 8 11.2 9.0 
South Tyneside NE 103 11 31 10.7 30.1 
Weymouth & Portland SW 39 4 6 10.3 15.4 
Bournemouth SW 107 10 7 9.3 6.5 
East Lindsey EM 80 7 10 8.8 12.5 
Wyre NW 69 6 4 8.7 5.8 
Eastbourne SE 59 5 5 8.5 8.5 
Southend-on-sea E 107 9 14 8.4 13.1 
Tendring E 90 7 8 7.8 8.9 
North Somerset SW 124 9 4 7.3 3.2 
Waveney E 73 5 7 6.8 9.6 
Shepway SE 65 4 7 6.2 10.8 
Penwith SW 38 2 5 5.3 13.2 
North Devon SW 58 2 4 3.4 6.9 
Rother SE 58 2 3 3.4 5.2 
Arun SE 94 3 5 3.2 5.3 
Sedgemoor SE 68 2 4 2.9 5.9 
Carrick SW 58 1 5 1.7 8.6 
Restormel SW 64 1 4 1.6 6.3 
Dover SE 67 1 10 1.5 14.9 
Canterbury SE 90 0 8 0 8.9 
Isle of Wight SE 89 0 5 0 5.6 
West Somerset SW 23 0 1 0 4.3 
Fylde NW 51 0 2 0 3.9 
Teignbridge SW 84 0 3 0 3.6 
Christchurch SW 30 0 1 0 3.3 
East Devon SW 82 0 1 0 1.2 
Berwick-upon-Tweed NE 17 0 0 0 0 
Purbeck SW 29 0 0 0 0 
Seaside districts (+R)  3,141 314 277 10 8.8 
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Table A51: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 
‘seaside with resort’ district on IMD, 2007 
 
District All LSOAs in 
district 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
10% 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
20% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
10% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
20% 
Blackpool 94 30 11 31.9 11.7 
Hastings 53 14 7 26.4 13.2 
Wirral 207 50 18 24.2 8.7 
Great Yarmouth 61 12 5 19.7 8.2 
Sefton 190 34 15 17.9 7.9 
South Tyneside 103 15 33 14.6 32.0 
Thanet 84 12 12 14.3 14.3 
Torbay 89 10 4 11.2 4.5 
Lancaster 89 9 8 10.1 9.0 
Scarborough 71 7 6 9.9 8.5 
Portsmouth 123 12 12 9.8 9.8 
Brighton and Hove 164 15 20 9.1 12.2 
Bournemouth 107 9 8 8.4 7.5 
East Lindsey 80 6 9 7.5 11.3 
Southend-on-sea 107 8 11 7.5 10.3 
Wyre 69 5 5 7.2 7.2 
Waveney 73 5 6 6.8 8.2 
North Somerset 124 7 6 5.6 4.8 
Penwith 38 2 9 5.3 23.7 
Weymouth and Portland 39 2 6 5.1 15.4 
Shepway 65 3 6 4.6 9.2 
Tendring 90 4 8 4.4 8.9 
North Devon 58 2 3 3.4 5.2 
Carrick 58 1 4 1.7 6.9 
Eastbourne 59 1 7 1.7 11.9 
Restormel 64 1 5 1.6 7.8 
Dover 67 1 5 1.5 7.5 
Sedgemoor 68 1 4 1.5 5.9 
Arun 94 0 7 0 7.4 
Isle of Wight 89 0 6 0 6.7 
Christchurch 30 0 2 0 6.7 
Rother 58 0 3 0 5.2 
West Somerset 23 0 1 0 4.3 
Canterbury 90 0 3 0 3.3 
Teignbridge 84 0 2 0 2.4 
Fylde 51 0 1 0 2.0 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 17 0 0 0 0 
East Devon 82 0 0 0 0 
Purbeck 29 0 0 0 0 
Seaside districts 3141 278 278 8.9 8.9 
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Table A52: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 
‘seaside with resort’ district on IMD, 2004 
 
District All LSOAs in 
district 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
10% 
LSOAs in the 
most deprived 
20% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
10% 
% of LSOAs 
falling in the 
most deprived 
20% 
Blackpool 94 25 13 26.6 13.8 
Wirral 207 52 23 25.1 11.1 
Hastings 53 12 8 22.6 15.1 
Sefton 190 37 13 19.5 6.8 
South Tyneside 103 20 34 19.4 33.0 
Great Yarmouth 61 11 5 18.0 8.2 
Thanet 84 10 10 11.9 11.9 
Portsmouth 123 13 14 10.6 11.4 
Scarborough 71 7 8 9.9 11.3 
Lancaster 89 8 11 9.0 12.4 
Brighton and Hove 164 14 21 8.5 12.8 
Waveney 73 5 6 6.8 8.2 
East Lindsey 80 5 10 6.3 12.5 
Bournemouth 107 6 13 5.6 12.1 
Penwith 38 2 6 5.3 15.8 
Southend-on-sea 107 5 13 4.7 12.1 
Shepway 65 3 4 4.6 6.2 
Torbay 89 4 8 4.5 9.0 
Tendring 90 4 8 4.4 8.9 
Wyre 69 3 8 4.3 11.6 
North Somerset 124 5 7 4.0 5.6 
North Devon 58 2 4 3.4 6.9 
Restormel 64 2 5 3.1 7.8 
Weymouth and Portland 39 1 6 2.6 15.4 
Eastbourne 59 1 5 1.7 8.5 
Dover 67 1 3 1.5 4.5 
Sedgemoor 68 1 4 1.5 5.9 
Carrick 58 0 4 0 6.9 
Isle of Wight 89 0 6 0 6.7 
Arun 94 0 6 0 6.4 
Canterbury 90 0 5 0 5.6 
Teignbridge 84 0 3 0 3.6 
Fylde 51 0 1 0 2.0 
Rother 58 0 1 0 1.7 
Berwick-upon-Tweed 17 0 0 0 0 
Christchurch 30 0 0 0 0 
East Devon 82 0 0 0 0 
Purbeck 29 0 0 0 0 
West Somerset 23 0 0 0 0 
Seaside districts  3141 259 296 8.2 9.4 
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Table A53: Resort v Other – Overall Index of M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
480 
396.1 
28.5% 
258 
341.9 
17.7% 
738 
 
23.5 
87.3 
.167 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
609 
572.2 
36.1% 
457 
493.8 
31.4% 
1066 
 
33.9 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
417 
505.1 
24.7% 
524 
435.9 
36.0% 
941 
 
30.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
180 
212.6 
10.7% 
216 
183.4 
14.8% 
396 
 
12.6 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
493 
402.6 
29.2% 
257 
347.4 
17.7% 
750 
 
23.9 
85.5 
.165 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
605 
582.4 
35.9% 
480 
502.6 
33.0% 
1085 
 
34.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
406 
477.2 
24.1% 
483 
411.8 
33.2% 
889 
 
28.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
182 
223.8 
10.8% 
235 
193.2 
16.2% 
417 
 
13.3 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
519 
412.8 
30.8% 
250 
356.2 
17.2% 
769 
 
24.5 
100.9 
.179 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
561 
549.7 
33.3% 
463 
474.3 
31.8% 
1024 
 
32.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
410 
484.7 
24.3% 
493 
418.3 
33.9% 
903 
 
28.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
196 
238.9 
11.6% 
249 
206.1 
17.1% 
445 
 
14.2 
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Table A54: Resort v Other – Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Income 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
493 
404.7 
29.2% 
261 
349.3 
17.9% 
754 
 
24.0 
125.6 
.200 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
630 
568.4 
37.4% 
429 
490.6 
29.5% 
1059 
 
33.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
437 
540.5 
25.9% 
570 
466.5 
39.2% 
1007 
 
32.1 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
126 
172.3 
7.5% 
195 
148.7 
13.4% 
321 
 
10.2 
Rank of Income 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
460 
382.2 
27.3% 
252 
329.8 
17.3% 
712 
 
22.7 
117.6 
.193 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
641 
574.3 
38.0% 
429 
495.7 
29.5% 
1070 
 
34.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
431 
514.2 
25.6% 
527 
443.8 
36.2% 
958 
 
30.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
154 
215.2 
9.1% 
247 
185.8 
17.0% 
401 
 
12.8 
Rank of Income 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
481 
398.3 
28.5% 
261 
343.7 
17.9% 
742 
 
23.6 
130.4 
.204 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
627 
557.7 
37.2% 
412 
481.3 
28.3% 
1039 
 
33.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
426 
511.0 
25.3% 
526 
441.0 
36.2% 
952 
 
30.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
152 
219.0 
9.0% 
256 
189.0 
17.6% 
408 
 
13.0 
  
410 
 
 
 
Table A55: Resort v Other – Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
590 
485.2 
35.0% 
314 
418.8 
21.6% 
904 
 
28.8 
113.9 
.190 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
646 
623.7 
38.3% 
516 
538.3 
35.5% 
1162 
 
37.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
363 
450.4 
21.5% 
476 
388.6 
32.7% 
839 
 
26.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
87 
126.7 
5.2% 
149 
109.3 
10.2% 
236 
 
7.5 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
590 
477.7 
35.0% 
300 
412.3 
20.6% 
890 
 
28.3 
139.7 
.211 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
612 
584.0 
36.3% 
476 
504.0 
32.7% 
1088 
 
34.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
389 
469.1 
23.1% 
485 
404.9 
33.3% 
874 
 
27.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
95 
155.1 
5.6% 
194 
133.9 
13.3% 
289 
 
9.2 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
624 
501.9 
37.0% 
311 
433.1 
21.4% 
935 
 
29.8 
146.8 
.216 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
563 
542.1 
33.4% 
447 
467.9 
30.7% 
1010 
 
32.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
400 
480.9 
23.7% 
496 
415.1 
34.1% 
896 
 
28.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
99 
161.0 
5.9% 
201 
139.0 
13.8% 
300 
 
9.6 
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Table A56: Resort v Other – Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Health 
and Disability 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
489 
402.6 
29.0% 
261 
347.4 
17.9% 
750 
 
23.9 
156.3 
.223 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
669 
601.7 
39.7% 
452 
519.3 
31.1% 
1121 
 
35.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
461 
549.7 
27.3% 
563 
474.3 
38.7% 
1024 
 
32.6 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
67 
132.0 
4.0% 
179 
114.0 
12.3% 
246 
 
7.8 
Rank of Health 
and Disability 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
539 
431.0 
32.0% 
264 
372.0 
18.1% 
803 
 
25.6 
201.9 
.254 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
667 
596.9 
39.6% 
445 
515.1 
30.6% 
1112 
 
35.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
407 
511.5 
24.1% 
546 
441.5 
37.5% 
953 
 
30.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
73 
146.5 
4.3% 
200 
126.5 
13.7% 
273 
 
8.7 
Rank of Health 
and Disability 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
602 
468.1 
35.7% 
270 
403.9 
18.6% 
872 
 
27.8 
235.7 
.274 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
635 
577.0 
37.7% 
440 
498.0 
30.2% 
1075 
 
34.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
375 
493.3 
22.2% 
544 
425.7 
37.4% 
919 
 
29.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
74 
147.8 
4.4% 
201 
127.4 
13.8% 
275 
 
8.8 
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Table A57: Resort v Other – Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Education, Skills 
and Training 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
428 
379.5 
25.4% 
279 
327.5 
19.2% 
707 
 
22.5 
25.5 
.090 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
527 
514.2 
31.3% 
431 
443.6 
29.6% 
958 
 
30.5 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
461 
488.5 
27.3% 
449 
421.5 
30.9% 
910 
 
29.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
270 
303.8 
16.0% 
296 
262.2 
20.3% 
566 
 
18.0 
Rank of 
Education, Skills 
and Training 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
439 
395.1 
26.0% 
297 
340.9 
20.4% 
 736 
 
23.4 
21.7 
.083 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
555 
541.1 
32.9% 
453 
466.9 
31.1% 
1008 
 
32.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
430 
457.3 
25.5% 
422 
394.7 
29.0% 
852 
 
27.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
262 
292.5 
15.5% 
283 
252.5 
19.5% 
545 
 
17.4 
Rank of 
Education, Skills 
and Training 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
474 
418.1 
28.1% 
305 
360.9 
21.0% 
779 
 
24.8 
30.9 
.099 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
525 
514.2 
31.1% 
433 
443.8 
29.8% 
958 
 
30.5 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
410 
462.7 
24.3% 
452 
399.3 
31.1% 
862 
 
27.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
277 
290.9 
16.4% 
265 
251.1 
18.2% 
542 
 
17.3 
  
413 
 
 
 
Table A58: Resort v Other – Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Barriers 
to Housing and 
Services score, 
2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
366 
440.7 
21.7% 
455 
380.3 
31.3% 
821 
 
26.1 
42.4 
.116 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
368 
371.4 
21.8% 
324 
320.6 
22.3% 
692 
 
22.0 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
409 
374.7 
24.3% 
289 
323.3 
19.9% 
698 
 
22.2 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
543 
499.2 
32.2% 
387 
430.8 
26.6% 
930 
 
29.6 
Rank of Barriers 
to Housing and 
Services score, 
2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
283 
398.8 
16.8% 
460 
344.2 
31.6% 
743 
 
23.7 
107.8 
.185 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
523 
460.0 
31.0% 
334 
397.0 
23.0% 
857 
 
27.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
497 
439.1 
29.5% 
321 
378.9 
22.1% 
818 
 
26.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
383 
388.1 
22.7% 
340 
334.9 
23.4% 
723 
 
23.0 
Rank of Barriers 
to Housing and 
Services score, 
2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
304 
401.5 
18.0% 
444 
346.5 
30.5% 
748 
 
23.8 
93.9 
.173 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
512 
464.8 
30.4% 
354 
401.2 
24.3% 
866 
 
27.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
529 
452.0 
31.4% 
313 
390.0 
21.5% 
842 
 
26.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
341 
367.7 
20.2% 
344 
317.3 
23.6% 
685 
 
21.8 
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Table A59: Resort v Other – Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
288 
224.9 
17.1% 
131 
194.1 
9.0% 
419 
 
13.3 
187.7 
.244 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
476 
382.7 
28.2% 
237 
330.3 
16.3% 
713 
 
22.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
523 
518.0 
31.0% 
442 
447.0 
30.4% 
965 
 
30.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
399 
560.4 
23.7% 
645 
483.6 
44.3% 
1044 
 
33.2 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
350 
272.7 
20.8% 
158 
235.3 
10.9% 
508 
 
16.2 
240.6 
.277 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
511 
411.2 
30.3% 
255 
354.8 
17.5% 
766 
 
24.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
485 
477.2 
28.8% 
404 
411.8 
27.8% 
889 
 
28.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
340 
525.0 
20.2% 
638 
453.0 
43.8% 
978 
 
31.1 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
337 
242.1 
20.0% 
114 
208.9 
7.8% 
451 
 
14.4 
278.6 
.298 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
442 
357.5 
26.2% 
224 
308.5 
15.4% 
666 
 
21.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
501 
472.9 
29.7% 
380 
408.1 
26.1% 
881 
 
28.0 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
406 
613.5 
24.1% 
737 
529.5 
50.7% 
1143 
 
36.4 
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Table A60: Resort v Other – Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Resort 
n = 1686, 
54% 
Other 
n = 1455, 
46% 
Total 
3,141 
χ2 
C.V 
df P 
Rank of Living 
Environment score, 
2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
536 
458.9 
31.8% 
319 
396.1 
21.9% 
855 
 
27.2 
43.0 
.117 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
433 
435.9 
25.7% 
379 
376.1 
26.0% 
812 
 
25.9 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
366 
403.1 
21.7% 
385 
347.9 
26.5% 
751 
 
23.9 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
351 
388.1 
20.8% 
372 
334.9 
25.6% 
723 
 
23.0 
Rank of Living 
Environment score, 
2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
575 
510.5 
34.1% 
376 
440.5 
25.8% 
951 
 
30.3 
33.1 
.103 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
465 
462.2 
27.6% 
396 
398.8 
27.2% 
861 
 
27.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
366 
390.8 
21.7% 
362 
337.2 
24.9% 
728 
 
23.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
280 
322.6 
16.6% 
321 
278.4 
22.1% 
601 
 
19.1 
Rank of Living 
Environment score, 
2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
586 
525.5 
34.8% 
393 
453.5 
27.0% 
979 
 
31.2 
29.0 
.096 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
435 
427.3 
25.8% 
361 
368.7 
24.8% 
796 
 
25.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
359 
394.0 
21.3% 
375 
340.0 
25.8% 
734 
 
23.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
308 
339.2 
18.1% 
326 
292.8 
22.4% 
632 
 
20.1 
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Table A61: Comparing ID 2004 to ID 2010: ‘resort’ LSOAs in national quartiles 
 
 
a) Income 
    
b) Living Environment 
  
 ID2004      ID2004    
ID2010 MD AA BA LD     ID2010 MD AA BA LD    
MD 434 47    481   MD 482 103  1 586  
AA 59 500 68   627   AA 54 283 95 3 435  
BA  83 315 28 426   BA  47 224 88 359  
LD     54 98 152   LD     47 259 306  
  493 630 437 126 1686     536 433 366 351 1686  
Number of LSOAs that are:     Number of LSOAs that are:    
getting worse     143 8.50%  getting worse  290 17.20% 
getting better  196 11.60%  getting better  148 8.80% 
similar (same quartile)   1347 79.90%  similar (same quartile)   1248 74.00% 
     1686        1686  
               
 
c) Employment 
    
d) Barriers to Housing and Services 
  
 ID2004      ID2004    
ID2010 MD AA BA LD     ID2010 MD AA BA LD    
MD 532 90 2   624   MD 193 42 34 35 304  
AA 56 444 63   563   AA 161 185 113 53 512  
BA 2 110 264 24 400   BA 12 130 223 164 529  
LD   2 34 63 99   LD   11 39 291 341  
  590 646 363 87 1686     366 368 409 543 1686  
Number of LSOAs that are:     Number of LSOAs that are:    
getting worse  179 10.60%  getting worse  441 26.20% 
getting better  204 12.10%  getting better  353 20.90% 
similar (same quartile)   1303 77.30%  similar (same quartile)   892 52.90% 
     1686        1686  
e) Health and disability 
   
 
f) Education, skills and training 
  
 ID2004      ID2004    
ID2010 MD AA BA LD     ID2010 MD AA BA LD    
MD 430 170 2   602   MD 386 84 4   474  
AA 58 418 156 3 635   AA 42 390 90 3 525  
BA 1 79 268 27 375   BA  52 317 41 410  
LD   2 35 37 74   LD   1 50 226 277  
  489 669 461 67 1686     428 527 461 270 1686  
Number of LSOAs that are:     Number of LSOAs that are:    
getting worse  358 21.20%  getting worse  222 13.20% 
getting better 175 10.40%  getting better  145 8.60% 
similar (same quartile)   1153 68.40%  similar (same quartile)   1319 78.20% 
     1686        1686  
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g) Crime 
    
h) Index of Multiple Deprivation 
  
 ID2004      ID2004    
ID2010 MD AA BA LD     ID2010 MD AA BA LD    
MD 201 124 12   337   MD 448 71    519  
AA 75 212 137 18 442   AA 32 478 51   561  
BA 11 121 259 110 501   BA  60 311 39 410  
LD 1 19 115 271 406   LD     55 141 196  
  288 476 523 399 1686     480 609 417 180 1686  
Number of LSOAs that are:     Number of LSOAs that are:    
getting worse  401 23.80%  getting worse  161 9.50% 
getting better  342 20.30%  getting better 147 8.70% 
similar (same quartile)  943 55.90%  similar (same quartile)  1378 81.70% 
     1686        1686  
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Table A62: Resort LSOAs by deprivation decile – 2004, 2007, and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of resort 
LSOAs 
(2004) 
% of resort 
LSOAs 
(2007) 
% of resort 
LSOAs 
(2010) 
10% - (most deprived 10% in England) 8.8 10.1 12.3 
20% 12.7 11.7 11.4 
30% 14.8 15.2 14.8 
40% 15.4 14.4 13.8 
50% 12.9 13.7 11.9 
60% 11.6 11 11.1 
70% 9 9.5 9 
80% 8.4 7.4 7.8 
90% 4.7 5.3 6 
100% (least deprived 10% in England) 1.7 1.5 2.1 
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Figure A1: IMD / Income deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.96 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
 
 
Figure A2: IMD / Employment deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.95 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
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Figure A3: IMD / Health deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.88 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
 
 
Figure A4: IMD / Education deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.78 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
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Figure A5: IMD / Crime deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.74 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
 
 
Figure A6: IMD / Living environment deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.63 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
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Figure A7: IMD / Housing and services deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) r = 0.24 
 
 
1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived 
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Table A63: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Overall Index of M.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
384 
351.6 
31.1% 
96 
128.4 
21.3% 
480 
 
28.5 
23.2 
.118 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
450 
446.1 
36.4% 
159 
162.9 
35.3% 
609 
 
36.1 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
257 
275.4 
20.8% 
119 
100.6 
26.4% 
376 
 
22.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
144 
161.9 
11.7% 
77 
59.1 
17.1% 
221 
 
13.1 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
398 
361.1 
32.2% 
95 
131.9 
21.1% 
493 
 
29.2 
25.0 
.122 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
441 
443.2 
35.7% 
164 
161.8 
36.4% 
605 
 
35.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
277 
297.4 
22.4% 
129 
108.6 
28.6% 
406 
 
24.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
119 
133.3 
9.6% 
63 
48.7 
14.0% 
182 
 
10.8 
Rank of IMD 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
417 
380.2 
33.8% 
102 
138.8 
22.6% 
519 
 
30.8 
24.2 
.120 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
410 
410.9 
33.2% 
151 
150.1 
33.5% 
561 
 
33.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
277 
300.3 
22.4% 
133 
109.7 
29.5% 
410 
 
24.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
131 
143.6 
10.6% 
65 
52.4 
14.4% 
196 
 
11.6 
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Table A64: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Income 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
387 
361.9 
31.3% 
107 
132.1 
23.7% 
494 
 
29.3 
10.9 
.081 
3 .012** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
456 
460.7 
36.9% 
173 
168.3 
38.4% 
629 
 
37.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
278 
295.9 
22.5% 
126 
108.1 
27.9% 
404 
 
24.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
114 
116.5 
9.2% 
45 
42.5 
10.0% 
159 
 
9.4 
Rank of Income 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
370 
337.0 
30.0% 
90 
123.0 
20.0% 
460 
 
27.3 
20.5 
.110 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
466 
469.5 
37.7% 
175 
171.5 
38.8% 
641 
 
38.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
290 
315.7 
23.5% 
141 
115.3 
31.3% 
431 
 
25.6 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
109 
112.8 
8.8% 
45 
41.2 
10.0% 
154 
 
9.1 
Rank of Income 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
387 
352.3 
31.3% 
94 
481.0 
28.5% 
481 
 
28.5 
27.4 
.128 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
460 
459.3 
37.2% 
167 
167.7 
37.0% 
627 
 
37.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
277 
312.0 
22.4% 
149 
114.0 
33.0% 
426 
 
25.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
111 
111.3 
9.0% 
41 
40.7 
9.1% 
152 
 
9.0 
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Table A65: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
453 
432.2 
36.7% 
137 
157.8 
30.4% 
590 
 
35.0 
7.0 
n/a 
3 .072 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
453 
473.2 
36.7% 
193 
172.8 
42.8% 
646 
 
38.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
266 
265.9 
21.5% 
97 
97.1 
21.5% 
363 
 
21.5 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
63 
63.7 
5.1% 
24 
23.3 
5.3% 
87 
 
5.2 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
452 
432.2 
36.6% 
138 
157.8 
30.6% 
590 
 
35.0 
6.5 
n/a 
3 .090 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
444 
448.3 
36.0% 
168 
163.7 
37.3% 
612 
 
36.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
270 
284.9 
21.9% 
119 
104.1 
26.4% 
389 
 
23.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
69 
69.6 
5.6% 
26 
25.4 
5.8% 
95 
 
5.6 
Rank of 
Employment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
484 
457.1 
39.2% 
140 
166.9 
31.0% 
624 
 
37.0 
11.8 
.084 
3 .008** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
408 
412.4 
33.0% 
155 
150.6 
34.4% 
563 
 
33.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
272 
293.0 
22.0% 
128 
107.0 
28.4% 
400 
 
23.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
71 
72.5 
5.7% 
28 
26.5 
6.2% 
99 
 
5.9 
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Table A66: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Health 
and disability 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
397 
358.2 
32.1% 
92 
130.8 
20.4% 
489 
 
29.0 
26.5 
.125 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
481 
490.0 
38.9% 
188 
179.0 
41.7% 
669 
 
39.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
316 
337.7 
25.6% 
145 
123.3 
32.2% 
461 
 
27.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
41 
49.1 
3.3% 
26 
17.9 
5.8% 
67 
 
4.0 
Rank of Health 
and disability 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
439 
394.8 
35.5% 
100 
144.2 
22.2% 
539 
 
32.0 
36.3 
.147 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
483 
488.6 
39.1% 
184 
178.4 
40.8% 
667 
 
39.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
270 
298.1 
21.9% 
137 
108.9 
30.4% 
407 
 
24.1 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
43 
53.5 
3.5% 
30 
19.5 
6.7% 
73 
 
4.3 
Rank of Health 
and disability 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
491 
441.0 
39.8% 
111 
161.0 
24.6% 
602 
 
35.7 
49.5 
.171 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
465 
465.1 
37.7% 
170 
169.9 
37.7% 
635 
 
37.7 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
233 
274.7 
18.9% 
375 
375.0 
22.2% 
375 
 
22.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
46 
54.2 
3.7% 
74 
74.0 
4.4% 
74 
 
4.4 
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Table A67: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Education, 
Skills and 
Training score, 
2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
341 
313.5 
27.6% 
87 
114.5 
19.3% 
428 
 
25.4 
15.1 
.095 
3 .002** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
367 
386.0 
29.7% 
160 
141.0 
35.5% 
527 
 
31.3 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
324 
337.7 
26.2% 
137 
123.3 
30.4% 
461 
 
27.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
203 
197.8 
16.4% 
67 
72.2 
14.9% 
270 
 
16.0 
Rank of 
Education, 
Skills and 
Training score, 
2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
344 
32.6 
27.9% 
95 
117.4 
21.1% 
439 
 
26.0 
14.9 
.094 
3 .002** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
397 
406.5 
32.1% 
158 
148.5 
35.0% 
555 
 
32.9 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
292 
315.0 
23.6% 
138 
115.0 
30.6% 
430 
 
25.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
202 
191.9 
16.4% 
60 
70.1 
13.3% 
262 
 
15.5 
Rank of 
Education, 
Skills and 
Training score, 
2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
375 
347.2 
30.4% 
99 
126.8 
22.0% 
474 
 
28.1 
18.9 
.106 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
361 
384.6 
29.2% 
164 
140.4 
36.4% 
525 
 
31.1 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
285 
300.3 
23.1% 
125 
109.7 
27.7% 
410 
 
24.3 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
214 
202.9 
17.3% 
63 
74.1 
14.0% 
277 
 
16.4 
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Table A68: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of 
Barriers to 
Housing and 
Services score, 
2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
308 
268.1 
24.9% 
58 
97.9 
12.9% 
366 
 
21.7 
36.7 
.148 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
273 
269.6 
22.1% 
95 
98.4 
21.1% 
368 
 
21.8 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
267 
299.6 
21.6% 
142 
109.4 
31.5% 
409 
 
24.3 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
387 
397.7 
31.3% 
156 
145.3 
34.6% 
543 
 
32.2 
Rank of 
Barriers to 
Housing and 
Services score, 
2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
195 
207.3 
15.8% 
88 
75.7 
19.5% 
283 
 
16.8 
23.4 
.118 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
415 
383.1 
33.6% 
108 
139.9 
23.9% 
523 
 
31.0 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
372 
364.1 
30.1% 
125 
132.9 
27.7% 
497 
 
29.5 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
253 
280.5 
20.5% 
130 
102.5 
28.8% 
383 
 
22.7 
Rank of 
Barriers to 
Housing and 
Services score, 
2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
235 
222.7 
19.0% 
69 
81.3 
15.3% 
304 
 
18.0 
22.5 
.116 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
397 
375.0 
32.1% 
115 
137.0 
25.5% 
512 
 
30.4 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
385 
387.5 
31.2% 
144 
141.5 
31.9% 
529 
 
31.4 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
218 
249.8 
17.7% 
123 
91.2 
27.3% 
341 
 
20.2 
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Table A69: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
245 
211.0 
19.8% 
43 
77.0 
9.5% 
288 
 
17.1 
90.1 
.231 
3 .000*** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
390 
348.7 
31.6% 
86 
127.3 
19.1% 
476 
 
28.2 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
370 
383.1 
30.0% 
153 
139.9 
33.9% 
523 
 
31.0 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
230 
292.3 
18.6% 
169 
106.7 
37.5% 
399 
 
23.7 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
299 
256.4 
24.2% 
51 
93.6 
11.3% 
350 
 
20.8 
131.4 
.279 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
418 
374.3 
33.8% 
93 
136.7 
20.6% 
511 
 
30.3 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
344 
355.3 
27.9% 
141 
129.7 
31.3% 
485 
 
28.8 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
174 
249.1 
14.1% 
166 
90.9 
36.8% 
340 
 
20.2 
Rank of Crime 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
276 
246.9 
22.3% 
61 
90.1 
13.5% 
337 
 
20.0 
52.3 
.176 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
352 
323.8 
28.5% 
90 
118.2 
20.0% 
442 
 
26.2 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
358 
367.0 
29.0% 
143 
134.0 
31.7% 
501 
 
29.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
249 
297.4 
20.2% 
157 
108.6 
34.8% 
406 
 
24.1 
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Table A70: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deprivation 
measure 
Deprivation 
level 
 LSOA type  χ2,  
Cramer’s V 
   Large 
n = 1235, 54% 
Medium 
n = 451, 46% 
Total 
1,686 
χ2 
C.V 
df p 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2004 
MD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
419 
392.6 
33.9% 
117 
143.4 
25.9% 
536 
 
31.8 
11.9 
.084 
3 .008** 
AA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
317 
317.2 
25.7% 
116 
115.8 
25.7% 
433 
 
25.7 
BA 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
251 
268.1 
20.3% 
115 
97.9 
25.5% 
366 
 
21.7 
LD 
 
Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
248 
257.1 
20.1% 
103 
93.9 
22.8% 
351 
 
20.8 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2007 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
458 
421.2 
37.1% 
117 
153.8 
25.9% 
575 
 
34.1 
25.6 
.123 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
339 
340.6 
27.4% 
126 
124.4 
27.9% 
465 
 
27.6 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
259 
268.1 
21.0% 
107 
97.9 
23.7% 
366 
 
21.7 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
179 
205.1 
14.5% 
101 
74.9 
22.4% 
280 
 
16.6 
Rank of Living 
Environment 
score, 2010 
MD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
457 
429.2 
37.0% 
129 
156.8 
28.6% 
586 
 
34.8 
19.7 
.108 
3 .000*** 
AA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
325 
318.6 
26.3% 
110 
116.4 
24.4% 
435 
 
25.8 
BA Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
254 
261.5 
20.6% 
103 
95.5 
22.8% 
357 
 
21.2 
LD Observed 
Expected 
% within LSOA t. 
199 
225.6 
16.1% 
109 
82.4 
24.2% 
308 
 
18.3 
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Table A71: Seaside resorts grouped ‘domain ranking’ and deprivation level, 2010 
Deprivation level 
 
Domain 
Very deprived  
(Rank 1-8,120) 
Above average  
(Rank 8,121-16,241) 
Below average  
(Rank 16,242-24,362) 
Least deprived  
(Rank 24,363-32,482) 
Multiple deprivation Skegness 6,985 M Penzance 8,212 M Deal 16,456 M Formby 25,405 M 
 Blackpool 7,154 L Dover 8,385 M Herne Bay 16,538 M    
    Margate 8,658 L Southport 16,557 L    
    Great Yarmouth 8,840 L Hythe 16,672 M    
    Hastings 8,854 L Crosby 16,728 L    
    Clacton-on-Sea 8,915 L Broadstairs 18,505 M    
    Ilfracombe 8,942 M Exmouth 18,511 M    
    New Brighton 9,116 M Thorton-Cleveleys 19,470 M    
    Bognor Regis 9,285 M Swanage 19,777 M    
    Ramsgate 9,556 L Whitstable 19,786 M    
    Fleetwood 10,068 M Lytham St Annes 21,161 L    
    South Shields 10,140 L Christchurch 21,468 L    
    Scarborough 10,254 L Holylake 22,440 M    
    Torquay 10,601 L Clevedon 23,131 M    
    Folkestone 11,016 L Sidmouth 23,349 M    
    Heysham 11,128 M West Kirby 23,717 M    
    Littlehampton 11,639 M       
    Morecambe 11,884 M       
    Minehead 11,984 M       
    Lowestoft 12,045 L       
    Eastbourne 12,474 L       
    Brighton 12,477 L       
    Brixham 12,506 M       
    Whitby 12,525 M       
    Newquay 12,698 M       
    Hove 12,771 L       
    Ryde 13,045 M       
    Paignton 13,078 L       
    Southsea 13,242 L       
    Berwick 13,609 M       
    Bournemouth 13,970 L       
    Weymouth 13,992 L       
    Dawlish 14,231 M       
    Falmouth 14,282 M       
    Bexhill-on-Sea 14,464 L       
    Weston-S-mare 14,578 L       
    Southend-on-Sea 14,943 L       
    Teignmouth 15,363 M       
    Burnham-on-Sea 15,946 M       
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Income Skegness 7,891 M Great Yarmouth 8,283 L Hythe 16,855 M    
 Margate 7,895 L Penzance 8,726 M Broadstairs 17,044 M    
    Clacton-on-Sea 8,980 L Thorton-Cleveleys 17,497 M    
    Ramsgate 9,079 L Exmouth 17,894 M    
    Blackpool 9,097 L Swanage 18,396 M    
    South Shields 9,166 L Christchurch 18,726 L    
    New Brighton 9,195 M Whitstable 18,872 M    
    Dover 9,273 M Lytham St Annes 19,113 L    
    Hastings 10,213 L Holylake 20,290 M    
    Ilfracombe 10,402 M West Kirby 21,039 M    
    Torquay 10,442 L Sidmouth 21,062 M    
    Folkestone 10,611 L Clevedon 21,915 M    
    Scarborough 10,799 L Formby 24,148 M    
    Bognor Regis 10,836 M       
    Fleetwood 10,944 M       
    Brixham 11,287 M       
    Heysham 11,582 M       
    Lowestoft 11,614 L       
    Berwick 11,923 M       
    Ryde 12,398 M       
    Paignton 12,472 L       
    Morecambe 12,789 M       
    Whitby 13,041 M       
    Littlehampton 13,327 M       
    Southend-on-Sea 13,474 L       
    Weston-S-mare 13,500 L       
    Teignmouth 13,533 M       
    Minehead 13,555 M       
    Eastbourne 13,748 L       
    Hove 14,242 L       
    Newquay 14,289 M       
    Bournemouth 14,359 L       
    Falmouth 14,501 M       
    Brighton 14,577 L       
    Deal 14,609 M       
    Burnham-on-Sea 14,978 M       
    Bexhill-on-Sea 15,092 L       
    Dawlish 15,093 M       
    Southport 15,397 L       
    Herne Bay 15,829 M       
    Weymouth 15,928 L       
    Crosby 15,984 L       
    Southsea 16,137 L       
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Employment Skegness 4,601 M Ilfracombe 8,242 M Exmouth 16,250 M    
 New Brighton 5,482 M Ramsgate 8,479 L Broadstairs 16,302 M    
 South Shields 6,169 L Heysham 8,561 M Holylake 16,338 M    
 Clacton-on-Sea 6,695 L Torquay 8,854 L West Kirby 16,923 M    
 Penzance 6,974 M Hastings 8,950 L Southsea 18,107 L    
 Blackpool 7,118 L Scarborough 9,066 L Christchurch 18,462 L    
 Great Yarmouth 7,306 L Brixham 9,149 M Formby 19,158 M    
 Dover 7,519 M Minehead 9,565 M Whitstable 19,452 M    
 Margate 7,895 L Morecambe 9,668 M Swanage 20,360 M    
 Fleetwood 7,958 M Lowestoft 9,778 L Clevedon 20,604 M    
    Ryde 10,048 M Sidmouth 20,819 M    
    Paignton 10,099 L       
    Bognor Regis 10,236 M       
    Berwick 10,561 M       
    Folkestone 10,627 L       
    Dawlish 10,874 M       
    Bexhill-on-Sea 11,006 L       
    Newquay 11,250 M       
    Whitby 11,606 M       
    Weston-S-mare 11,926 L       
    Teignmouth 12,029 M       
    Burnham-on-Sea 12,046 M       
    Crosby 12,093 L       
    Weymouth 12,094 L       
    Eastbourne 12,128 L       
    Southport 12,481 L       
    Deal 12,757 M       
    Littlehampton 13,494 M       
    Southend-on-Sea 13,641 L       
    Falmouth 14,066 M       
    Hove 14,067 L       
    Bournemouth 14,108 L       
    Brighton 14,119 L       
    Thorton-Cleveleys 14,709 M       
    Lytham St Annes 14,826 L       
    Herne Bay 14,883 M       
    Hythe 15,277 M       
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Education 
 
Clacton-on-Sea 
 
6,038 
 
L 
 
Margate 
 
8,358 
 
L 
 
New Brighton 
 
16,803 
 
M 
 
Lytham St Annes 
 
24,376 
 
L 
 Skegness 6,296 M Ramsgate 8,640 L Thorton-Cleveleys 17,133 M West Kirby 26,499 M 
 Great Yarmouth 6,361 L Blackpool 9,088 L Southsea 17,155 L Formby 27,511 M 
 Fleetwood 7,113 M Littlehampton 9,173 M Swanage 17,323 M Holylake 28,799 M 
 Dover 7,123 M Ilfracombe 9,212 M Hythe 17,465 M    
 Lowestoft 8,117 L Bognor Regis 9,424 M Brighton 18,629 L    
    Hastings 10,113 L Broadstairs 18,897 M    
    South Shields 10,411 L Falmouth 18,918 M    
    Whitby 10,855 M Clevedon 19,478 M    
    Folkestone 11,176 L Christchurch 19,658 L    
    Berwick 11,213 M Southport 19,753 L    
    Heysham 11,736 M Hove 20,346 L    
    Scarborough 12,055 L Sidmouth 21,480 M    
    Morecambe 12,477 M Crosby 22,085 L    
    Brixham 12,542 M       
    Minehead 12,753 M       
    Herne Bay 12,835 M       
    Torquay 13,169 L       
    Weston-S-mare 13,423 L       
    Ryde 13,603 M       
    Paignton 13,627 L       
    Burnham-on-Sea 13,821 M       
    Southend-on-Sea 14,181 L       
    Eastbourne 14,622 L       
    Dawlish 14,622 M       
    Penzance 14,945 M       
    Bexhill-on-Sea 15,016 L       
    Deal 15,231 M       
    Weymouth 15,309 L       
    Teignmouth 15,558 M       
    Bournemouth 15,802 L       
    Whitstable 15,894 M       
    Exmouth 15,981 M       
    Newquay 15,996 M       
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Crime and disorder Southsea 6,759 L Margate 11,106 L Lowestoft 16,341 L Lytham St Annes 24,447 L 
    Blackpool 11,363 L Morecambe 17,024 M Swanage 24,583 M 
    Fleetwood 11,423 M South Shields 17,087 L Thorton-Cleveleys 24,940 M 
    Dover 11,515 M Eastbourne 17,804 L Brixham 25,360 M 
    Torquay 11,650 L Hove 18,607 L Sidmouth 25,856 M 
    Hastings 11,911 L Newquay 19,419 M Holylake 25,945 M 
    Bognor Regis 12,091 M Teignmouth 19,866 M Formby 28,258 M 
    Littlehampton 12,335 M Paignton 20,254 L West Kirby 29,389 M 
    Ilfracombe 12,824 M Broadstairs 20,266 M    
    Ramsgate 12,968 L Whitby 20,317 M    
    Bournemouth 13,154 L Burnham-on-Sea 20,370 M    
    Penzance 13,493 M Exmouth 21,160 M    
    Weston-S-mare 13,721 L Crosby 21,366 L    
    Skegness 14,213 M Dawlish 21,399 M    
    Great Yarmouth 14,508 L Berwick 21,641 M    
    Clacton-on-Sea 14,548 L New Brighton 21,725 M    
    Falmouth 14,560 M Bexhill-on-Sea 21,856 L    
    Scarborough 15,009 L Herne Bay 22,081 M    
    Heysham 15,120 M Minehead 22,092 M    
    Folkestone 15,274 L Hythe 22,541 M    
    Brighton 15,656 L Whitstable 22,598 M    
    Ryde 15,926 M Christchurch 22,987 L    
    Southend-on-Sea 15,953 L Clevedon 23,083 M    
    Weymouth 16,118 L Southport 23,512 L    
       Deal 23,883 M    
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Health and disability Blackpool 4,754 L Weymouth 8,125 L Thorton-Cleveleys 16,517 M 
 New Brighton 5,495 M Hove 8,395 L Dawlish 16,712 M    
 Skegness 6,021 M Brighton 8,640 L Falmouth 17,029 M    
 Hastings 6,109 L Bognor Regis 8,678 M Lytham St Annes 17,169 L    
 Morecambe 6,911 M Penzance 8,857 M Broadstairs 17,391 M    
 Heysham 7,400 M Dover 9,001 M Swanage 17,432 M    
 Scarborough 7,784 L Southport 9,220 L Newquay 18,459 M    
 Margate 8,049 L Ilfracombe 9,532 M Whitstable 18,459 M    
    Eastbourne 9,576 L Exmouth 21,234 M    
    South Shields 9,709 L Christchurch 22,932 L    
    Fleetwood 10,109 M Clevedon 23,126 M    
    Folkestone 10,189 L Sidmouth 23,996 M    
    Minehead 10,563 M       
    Bexhill-on-Sea 10,643 L       
    Ramsgate 10,651 L       
    Clacton-on-Sea 10,733 L       
    Whitby 10,902 M       
    Crosby 11,117 L       
    Torquay 11,474 L       
    Brixham 11,641 M       
    Littlehampton 12,402 M       
    Ryde 12,451 M       
    Great Yarmouth 12,856 L       
    Bournemouth 12,861 L       
    Paignton 12,928 L       
    Deal 13,205 M       
    Southend-on-Sea 13,320 L       
    Holylake 13,484 M       
    Hythe 13,704 M       
    Berwick 13,970 M       
    Herne Bay 14,805 M       
    Weston-S-mare 15,047 L       
    Southsea 15,206 L       
    Burnham-on-Sea 15,287 M       
    West Kirby 15,324 M       
    Formby 15,479 M       
    Teignmouth 15,864 M       
    Lowestoft 16,154 L       
Housing and services Minehead 7,024 M Newquay 8,125 M Bournemouth 16,242 L West Kirby 25,935 M 
 Blackpool 7,783 L Brighton 8,420 L Broadstairs 16,338 M Morecambe 26,291 M 
    Eastbourne 8,689 L Christchurch 16,366 L Lytham St Annes 26,396 L 
    Bognor Regis 8,928 M Swanage 17,036 M Southport 26,591 L 
    Littlehampton 9,101 M Ilfracombe 17,134 M Crosby 27,083 L 
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    Hove 9,354 L Ramsgate 17,484 L Fleetwood 27,750 M 
    Hythe 9,487 M Ryde 17,665 M Heysham 27,887 M 
    Dawlish 10,253 M Brixham 17,733 M Holylake 29,009 M 
    Sidmouth 11,585 M Dover 17,760 M New Brighton 30,214 M 
    Hastings 12,648 L Weymouth 17,919 L    
    Clacton-on-Sea 12,917 L Scarborough 18,562 L    
    Exmouth 13,092 M Penzance 18,662 M    
    Whitstable 13,248 M Great Yarmouth 18,931 L    
    Southsea 13,682 L Berwick 19,062 M    
    Folkestone 13,726 L Lowestoft 19,364 L    
    Whitby 14,141 M Skegness 19,736 M    
    Herne Bay 14,174 M Weston-S-mare 19,929 L    
    Paignton 14,687 L Teignmouth 20,178 M    
    Bexhill-on-Sea 14,872 L Burnham-on-Sea 20,570 M    
    Falmouth 14,907 M South Shields 21,993 L    
    Torquay 15,268 L Southend-on-Sea 22,210 L    
    Margate 15,650 L Deal 22,403 M    
    Clevedon 15,764 M Formby 23,307 M    
       Thorton-Cleveleys 23,345 M    
Living environment Penzance 2,978 M Hove 8,410 L Exmouth 17,582 M West Kirby 27,396 M 
 Southsea 4,463 L Scarborough 9,017 L Southport 17,620 L Formby 28,196 M 
 New Brighton 5,702 M Dover 9,437 M Minehead 17,763 M    
 Falmouth 7,114 M Bognor Regis 9,530 M Deal 17,777 M    
 Ilfracombe 7,565 M Torquay 10,054 L Berwick 18,042 M    
 Newquay 7,580 M Heysham 10,215 M Bexhill-on-Sea 18,616 L    
 Blackpool 7,929 L Bournemouth 10,694 L Holylake 18,675 M    
    Great Yarmouth 10,749 L Lytham St Annes 18,744 L    
    Brighton 11,116 L Burnham-on-Sea 18,850 M    
    Morecambe 11,221 M Weston-S-mare 19,678 L    
    Brixham 11,858 M Clacton-on-Sea 19,817 L    
    Dawlish 11,898 M Thorton-Cleveleys 19,946 M    
    Ramsgate 12,246 L Christchurch 20,450 L    
    Hastings 12,393 L Hythe 20,729 M    
    Fleetwood 12,776 M South Shields 21,532 L    
    Folkestone 13,001 L Herne Bay 21,715 M    
    Littlehampton 13,125 M Whitstable 22,330 M    
    Margate 13,383 L Sidmouth 22,422 M    
    Southend-on-Sea 13,421 L Clevedon 22,996 M    
    Paignton 13,459 L       
    Whitby 13,547 M       
    Swanage 13,743 M       
    Crosby 14,138 L       
    Teignmouth 14,192 M       
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    Lowestoft 14,486 L       
    Eastbourne 14,680 L       
    Weymouth 14,978 L       
    Skegness 15,845 M       
    Ryde 15,874 M       
    Broadstairs 16,137 M       
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Appendix B: Tables of Results (Chapter 6) 
 
All tables and figures are the work of the author. 
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Table B1: Population composition – results of t-tests  
 
Factor 
Resort advantage 
or disadvantage? 
t df p d 
Average age, 2001 Advantage 8.6 1684 0.001 0.419 
Children, 2010 Disadvantage 8.0 1684 0.001 0.390 
Working age, 2010 Disadvantage 6.5 1684 0.001 0.317 
Pensioners, 2010 Advantage 8.5 1684 0.001 0.414 
Retired, 2001 Advantage 7.7 1684 0.001 0.375 
White, 2001 Advantage 0.7 1684 0.514 0.034 
One person household, 2001 Disadvantage 0.5 1684 0.615 0.051 
One person household above pensionable age, 2001 Advantage 4.1 1684 0.001 0.420 
One person household lone parent, 2001 Disadvantage 5.9 1684 0.001 0.604 
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010 Disadvantage 11.7 1684 0.001 0.570 
IB/SDA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 9.6 1684 0.001 0.468 
ESA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 10.3 1684 0.001 0.502 
DLA/AA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 10.6 1684 0.001 0.517 
No qualification, 2001 Disadvantage 13.5 1684 0.001 0.658 
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001 Advantage 11.1 1684 0.001 0.541 
In managerial occupation, 2001 Advantage 11.4 1684 0.001 0.556 
In manual occupation, 2001 Disadvantage 11.4 1684 0.001 0.556 
Out-of work benefits claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 12.7 1684 0.001 0.619 
JSA claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 13.4 1684 0.001 0.653 
JSA 6 months, 2010 Disadvantage 12.3 1684 0.001 0.599 
JSA 12 months, 2010 Disadvantage 11.2 1684 0.001 0.546 
JSA Youth, 2010 Disadvantage 13.9 1684 0.001 0.677 
Children in workless families, 2010 Disadvantage 13.4 1680 0.001 0.653 
Income Support claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 12.0 1684 0.001 0.585 
Pension Credit claimants, 2010 Disadvantage 9.9 1684 0.001 0.482 
Have no car or van, 2001 Disadvantage 11.8 1684 0.001 0.575 
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Table B2: Area condition – results of t-tests 
Factor 
Resort advantage or 
disadvantage? 
t df p D 
Employment in primary industries, 2010 Advantage 0.1 1684 0.910 0.009 
Employment in secondary industries, 2010 Advantage 1.6 1684 0.099 0.078 
Employment in tertiary industries, 2010 Disadvantage 1.6 1684 0.108 0.078 
Employment in public sector, 2010 Disadvantage 2.1 1684 0.040 0.102 
Employment in hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010 Advantage 0.2 1684 0.848 0.010 
Employment in tourism-related jobs, 2010 Advantage 0.7 1684 0.462 0.034 
Location quotient for public sector, 2010 Disadvantage 1.2 382 0.218 0.321 
Location quotient for hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010 Advantage 1.3 382 0.197 0.347 
Location quotient for tourism, 2010 Advantage 1.5 382 0.151 0.401 
Employment rate, 2010 Disadvantage 3.6 382 0.001 1.024 
Full-time, 2010 Advantage 2.2 1684 0.026 0.607 
Part-time, 2010 Disadvantage 2.2 1684 0.028 0.607 
Self-employed, 2001 Advantage 6.6 1684 0.001 0.322 
Household income, 2010 Advantage 10.6 1684 0.001 0.517 
House prices, 2010 Advantage 9.9 382 0.001 1.013 
Owner-occupied housing, 2001 Advantage 7.8 1684 0.001 0.380 
Social rented housing, 2001 Disadvantage 6.5 1684 0.001 0.317 
Private rented housing, 2001 Disadvantage 3.1 1684 0.002 0.151 
Overcrowded households, 2001 Disadvantage 2.5 1684 0.014 0.122 
Households without central heating, 2001 Disadvantage 5.7 1684 0.001 0.278 
Households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet, 2001 Disadvantage 1.3 1684 0.001 0.378 
Vacant dwellings, 2001 Disadvantage 13.7 1684 0.001 0.668 
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010 Disadvantage 5.0 382 0.001 0.512 
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Table B3: Results of one-way ANOVA, seven components, four clusters 
 
 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Component 1 Between Groups 69.352 3 23.117 27.785 .000 
Within Groups 328.648 395 .832 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 2 Between Groups 172.910 3 57.637 101.144 .000 
Within Groups 225.090 395 .570 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 3 Between Groups 8.301 3 2.767 2.805 .040 
Within Groups 389.699 395 .987 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 4 Between Groups 188.159 3 62.720 118.062 .000 
Within Groups 209.841 395 .531 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 5 Between Groups 107.219 3 35.740 48.549 .000 
Within Groups 290.781 395 .736 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 6 Between Groups 120.046 3 40.015 56.866 .000 
Within Groups 277.954 395 .704 
  
Total 398.000 398 
   
Component 7 Between Groups 10.175 3 3.392 3.454 .017 
Within Groups 387.825 395 .982 
  
Total 398.000 398 
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Table B4: The homogenous subsets from Tukey’s test for seven principal components 
 
Component 1        Component 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component 3        Component 4  
  
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component 5        Component 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
4 27 -1.4584782 
 
3 41 
 
-.0216602 
2 243 
 
.0341326 
1 88 
 
.3633268 
Sig. 
 
1.000 .139 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
4 27 -.6457427 
 
2 243 -.3202950 
 
3 41 -.3123264 
 
1 88 
 
1.2280922 
Sig. 
 
.111 1.000 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 
1 88 -.2249567 
4 27 -.2090712 
3 41 -.0004582 
2 243 .1047732 
Sig. 
 
.329 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 3 4 
3 41 -1.1404235 
   
2 243 
 
-.1466518 
  
1 88 
  
.2825341 
 
4 27 
   
2.1307690 
Sig. 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 3 
2 243 -.3916991 
  
4 27 
 
.3416431 
 
1 88 
 
.4810455 
 
3 41 
  
1.0640613 
Sig. 
 
1.000 .841 1.000 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 3 
2 243 -.2741250 
  
1 88 -.1140745 
  
4 27 
 
.5633385 
 
3 41 
  
1.4985561 
Sig. 
 
.765 1.000 1.000 
Cluster N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
4 27 -.5515317 
 
3 41  -.0715387 
1 88 
 
-.0274347 
2 243 
 
.0832868 
Sig. 
 
.066 .856 
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Table B5: Results of one-way ANOVA, original input variables, four clusters 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Median age of population 
Between Groups 7196.088 3 2398.696 102.646 .000 
Within Groups 9230.586 395 23.369   
Total 16426.674 398    
% pop. children 
Between Groups 5447.456 3 1815.819 97.710 .000 
Within Groups 7340.555 395 18.584   
Total 12788.011 398    
% pop. working age 
Between Groups 7703.528 3 2567.843 94.897 .000 
Within Groups 10688.380 395 27.059   
Total 18391.908 398    
% pop. pensionable age 
Between Groups 8246.845 3 2748.948 76.530 .000 
Within Groups 14188.334 395 35.920   
Total 22435.180 398    
Demographic dependency ratio 
(number of dependents per 100 people 
of working age) 
Between Groups 47649.242 3 15883.081 70.146 .000 
Within Groups 89439.863 395 226.430   
Total 137089.104 398    
% pop. white 
Between Groups 686.010 3 228.670 46.805 .000 
Within Groups 1929.801 395 4.886   
Total 2615.811 398    
% of households single person 
Between Groups 9878.458 3 3292.819 61.944 .000 
Within Groups 20997.553 395 53.158   
Total 30876.011 398    
% of households single pensioner 
Between Groups 1110.226 3 370.075 26.803 .000 
Within Groups 5453.935 395 13.807   
Total 6564.161 398    
% of households lone parent with 
dependent children 
Between Groups 2443.767 3 814.589 39.529 .000 
Within Groups 8139.817 395 20.607   
Total 10583.584 398    
% of working age pop. in 
employment, classified as managers 
and professionals 
Between Groups 9398.686 3 3132.895 81.883 .000 
Within Groups 15112.970 395 38.261   
Total 24511.657 398    
% of working age pop. in 
employment, classified as skilled 
manual 
Between Groups 766.791 3 255.597 42.674 .000 
Within Groups 2365.876 395 5.990   
Total 3132.667 398    
% of all employee jobs that are 
tourism-related 
Between Groups 18979.532 3 6326.511 32.109 .000 
Within Groups 77827.292 395 197.031   
Total 96806.824 398    
% of working age pop. self-employed 
Between Groups 1761.316 3 587.105 53.864 .000 
Within Groups 4305.418 395 10.900   
Total 6066.734 398    
Median gross annual household 
income 
Between Groups 578557892.867 3 192852630.956 21.296 .000 
Within Groups 3577021799.224 395 9055751.390   
Total 4155579692.091 398    
% of all occupied household spaces 
owned 
Between Groups 11546.518 3 3848.839 21.972 .000 
Within Groups 69192.926 395 175.172   
Total 80739.444 398    
% of all occupied household spaces 
rented privately 
Between Groups 19758.269 3 6586.090 33.429 .000 
Within Groups 77822.743 395 197.020   
Total 97581.013 398    
% of all occupied household spaces 
rented from council/social 
Between Groups 13743.368 3 4581.123 10.540 .000 
Within Groups 171676.083 395 434.623   
Total 185419.450 398    
% of households lacking/sharing 
bath/shower or inside toilet 
Between Groups 266.397 3 88.799 34.512 .000 
Within Groups 1016.339 395 2.573   
Total 1282.736 398    
% of households with no central 
heating 
Between Groups 67.419 3 22.473 .233 .047 
Within Groups 38126.637 395 96.523   
Total 38194.055 398    
% of households living in 
overcrowded conditions 
Between Groups 5041.576 3 1680.525 69.092 .000 
Within Groups 9607.643 395 24.323   
Total 14649.219 398    
% of household spaces vacant 
Between Groups 760.856 3 253.619 95.818 .000 
Within Groups 1045.516 395 2.647   
Total 1806.372 398    
Crime 
Between Groups 559315700.641 3 186438566.880 5.741 .001 
Within Groups 12828646819.630 395 32477586.885   
Total 13387962520.271 398    
% of dependent children receiving 
child tax-credit in out-of-work 
families 
Between Groups 4590.069 3 1530.023 16.012 .000 
Within Groups 37745.156 395 95.557   
Total 42335.225 398    
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% of working age pop. claiming 
Income Support 
Between Groups 359.675 3 119.892 8.902 .000 
Within Groups 5319.585 395 13.467   
Total 5679.261 398    
% of older people receiving Pension 
Credit Guarantee Element 
Between Groups 2266.372 3 755.457 17.174 .000 
Within Groups 17375.113 395 43.988   
Total 19641.485 398    
% of working age pop. claiming Out-
of-Work benefits 
Between Groups 2522.629 3 840.876 15.009 .000 
Within Groups 22129.553 395 56.024   
Total 24652.182 398    
% of working age pop. claiming Job 
Seekers Allowance (JSA) 
Between Groups 1276.210 3 425.403 67.572 .000 
Within Groups 2486.747 395 6.296   
Total 3762.958 398    
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work 
benefits claimants 
Between Groups 6315.293 3 2105.098 60.051 .000 
Within Groups 13846.705 395 35.055   
Total 20161.998 398    
% of working age pop. claiming JSA 
for over 6 months 
Between Groups 322.710 3 107.570 64.347 .000 
Within Groups 660.332 395 1.672   
Total 983.042 398    
% of working age pop. claiming JSA 
for over 12 months 
Between Groups 93.167 3 31.056 46.937 .000 
Within Groups 261.351 395 .662   
Total 354.518 398    
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as 
% of working age pop. 
Between Groups 73.297 3 24.432 39.763 .000 
Within Groups 242.708 395 .614   
Total 316.005 398    
% of working age pop. claiming 
Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability 
Allowance 
Between Groups 112.851 3 37.617 2.344 .040 
Within Groups 6339.812 395 16.050   
Total 6452.663 398    
% of working age pop. claiming 
Employment and Support Allowance 
Between Groups 25.610 3 8.537 6.354 .000 
Within Groups 530.655 395 1.343   
Total 556.265 398    
% of working age pop. claiming 
Disability Living Allowance 
Between Groups 183.595 3 61.198 9.279 .000 
Within Groups 2605.307 395 6.596   
Total 2788.903 398    
% of working age pop. with no 
qualifications 
Between Groups 7303.722 3 2434.574 42.265 .000 
Within Groups 22753.007 395 57.603   
Total 30056.730 398    
% of working age pop. with higher 
education (i.e., level 4/5 
qualifications) 
Between Groups 9667.078 3 3222.359 99.004 .000 
Within Groups 12856.428 395 32.548   
Total 22523.506 398    
% of households without access to a 
car or van 
Between Groups 11157.487 3 3719.162 50.593 .000 
Within Groups 29037.206 395 73.512   
Total 40194.693 398    
% of dependent children in lone  
parent families 
Between Groups 2137.553 3 712.518 14.277 .000 
Within Groups 19713.313 395 49.907   
Total 21850.866 398    
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Figure B1: Blackpool, Northwest England 
(46 clustered LSOAs / 94 resort LSOAs, 49%) 
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Figure B2: Hastings, Southeast England 
(24 clustered LSOAs / 53 resort LSOAs, 45%) 
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Figure B3: Folkestone, Southeast England 
(11 clustered LSOAs / 31 resort LSOAs, 36%) 
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Figure B4: Scarborough, Yorkshire and the Humber 
(12 clustered LSOAs / 34 resort LSOAs, 35%) 
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Figure B5: Clacton-on-Sea, East of England  
(11 clustered LSOAs / 32 resort LSOAs, 34%) 
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Figure B6: Brighton, Southeast England 
(29 clustered LSOAs / 101 resort LSOAs, 29%) 
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Figure B7: Lowestoft, East of England 
(12 clustered LSOAs / 42 resort LSOAs, 29%) 
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Figure B8: Torquay, Southwest England 
(11 clustered LSOAs / 43 resort LSOAs, 26%) 
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Figure B9: Southend-on-Sea, East of England 
(23 clustered LSOAs / 107 resort LSOAs, 22%) 
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Figure B10: Heysham, Northwest England 
(6 clustered LSOAs / 11 resort LSOAs, 55%) 
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Figure B11: Margate, Southeast England 
(14 clustered LSOAs / 27 resort LSOAs, 52%) 
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Figure B12: Great Yarmouth, East of England 
(16 clustered LSOAs / 36 resort LSOAs, 44%) 
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Figure B13: South Shields, Northeast England 
(24 clustered LSOAs / 55 resort LSOAs, 44%) 
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Figure B14: Ramsgate, Southeast England 
(10 clustered LSOAs / 26 resort LSOAs, 39%) 
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Figure B15: Morecambe, Northwest England 
(7 clustered LSOAs / 21 resort LSOAs, 33%) 
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Figure B16: Falmouth, Southwest England 
(3 clustered LSOAs / 14 resort LSOAs, 21%) 
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Figure B17: Skegness, East Midlands 
(7 clustered LSOAs / 12 resort LSOAs, 58%) 
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Figure B18: Dover, Southeast England 
(10 clustered LSOAs / 18 resort LSOAs, 56%) 
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Figure B19: Ilfracombe, Southwest England 
(3 clustered LSOAs / 8 resort LSOAs, 38%) 
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Figure B20: Weston-Super-Mare, Southwest England 
(13 clustered LSOAs / 48 resort LSOAs, 27%) 
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Figure B21: Weymouth, Southwest England 
(8 clustered LSOAs / 31 resort LSOAs, 26%) 
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Figure B22: Whitby, Yorkshire and the Humber 
(2 clustered LSOAs / 9 resort LSOAs, 22%) 
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Figure B23: Fleetwood, Northwest England 
(9 clustered LSOAs / 18 resort LSOAs, 50%) 
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Figure B24: Penzance, Southwest England 
(6 clustered LSOAs / 13 resort LSOAs, 46%) 
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Figure B25: Littlehampton, Southeast England 
(4 clustered LSOAs / 17 resort LSOAs, 24%) 
